Important Next Steps in Phronetic Social Science

2020

In this article, I aim to clarify why the idea of prudence or practical rationality, as embodied in Aristotle's concept of phronesis, is an object of special interest to some prominent social scientists such as G. H. von Wright and B. Flyvbjerg. I raise the hypothesis that if the concept of phronesis is elaborated upon as a value-rationality, as von Wright suggests, one can find some methodological hints for re-enchanting the status of the social sciences. Specifically, one can take a new stance in the debate whether or not social sciences can meet the requirements of so-called normal science, as the natural sciences do. As a crucial premise for outlining both the methodological advantages and disadvantages of phronetic social sciences in Flyvbjerg's sense, I point out the role of what I call provocative humanism, which displays a developed vision of von Wright's theory of provocative pessimism.

Applied Phronesis, 2012

Civic Sociology, 2024

Normative sociology and phronetic social science are research programmes that aim to overcome the dead end of positivism and the obfuscating effects of cryptonormativity, promising renewed social science disciplines that engage normatively with the public. In this article, I aim to deepen our understanding of social science's (re)turn to normativity by examining how the disciplinary aims of such programmes fare against their conception of practical reason. I consider Tariq Modood's presentation of the Bristol School of Multiculturalism as a form of normative sociology and begin from its understanding of practical reason after Michael Oakeshott, before specifying Modood's recommendations, also with reference to other prominent versions of normative sociology. I then show that Bent Flyvbjerg's phronetic social science, an Aristotle-inspired programme that has received widespread attention, is a particularly useful object of comparison: it bears high proximity to the Bristol School of Multiculturalism by being contextualist, dialogical, and prising public engagement. Most importantly, it too espouses antirationalist arguments via the emphasis it places on the Aristotelian notion of phronesis (practical wisdom). I argue that Oakeshott's and Aristotle's insights on the character and growth of practical reason both clarify and problematize the disciplinary aims of normative sociology and phronetic social science. Thus, to develop and defend normative social science, it is necessary to address a host of resulting challenges, most centrally the following: phronesis as an intellectual virtue based on one's disposition, character, and experience largely eludes disciplinary-level training of the kind that social scientists and political theorists have received, exercise, or provide to students.

The International Journal of Humanities and Social Studies (IJHSS), 2017

The social science has generally been regarded as a category of science that accommodates solely the disciplines which study Man in relation to his social environment for the purpose of formulating laws, generalisations and more importantly to make predictions on the future actions of Man. Distinct as it is from the other category of science i.e. the pure science which accommodates disciplines that study inanimate objects, the social science as one out of the two categories of science is yet to have a universally accepted number of fields of study that comprises it. But for the sake of this paper, the six major social science disciplines were identified and treated accordingly - Political Science, Economics, Sociology, Anthropology, Psychology and Geography. These fields of study as at today can arguably be said to have developed to an appreciable level. Nevertheless, their development, in particular political science, is tied to the other social science disciplines. This paper therefore takes a critical look at the origin of some of the concepts, theories, scholars etc. in political science from the five social science disciplines mentioned above, the present status of political science; as well as the pathway the discipline is following. In this research paper, it was discovered that political science indeed has its root in the other five social science disciplines. But as touching the direction of political science, the discipline, based on the dynamic nature of Man and social problems, would dwell more on the interdisciplinary approach in order to have a holistic understanding of them, be able to make predictions, solve and if possible, control and forestall the unacceptable actions and occurrence of the former and latter respectively. The historical and comparative approaches were adopted in the course of this study with secondary sources of qualitative data as part of the research methodology.

Politics & Society, 2004

Economics and Philosophy, 2012

The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences, edited by Ian Jarvie and Jesús Zamora-Bonilla, SAGE Publications, 2011, xvii + 749 pages. The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences is a valuable and well-organized collection, offering a fresh and comprehensive picture of this diverse field. Edited by Ian Jarvie, who also serves as editor of the journal Philosophy of the Social Sciences, and Jesús Zamora-Bonilla, philosopher of science at the National Open University of Spain, the volume collects 39 articles by leading thinkers. This new Handbook is distinctive in its usefulness for philosophers and social scientists interested in the foundations of the discipline. Jarvie motivates the Handbook's organization in his introduction. He begins with a history of the topics falling within the discipline, tracing its institutionalization in the 20 th century as it coalesced around a series of problems. Jarvie stresses that the problems in the philosophy of social sciences reflect the dynamics of interactions, over the years, among philosophical schools and numerous fields in the social sciences. Moreover, because an academic field is "a socially constructed institution par excellence," the philosophy of the social sciences is uniquely positioned (or perhaps, cursed) to challenge its own foundations. Different approaches to the philosophy of social science cannot avoid taking a stand on questions of the continuity between natural and social sciences and even the possibility of social science altogether. Neither can they avoid taking a stand, at least implicitly, on the ontology of the social world. Jarvie points out that in the early days of the philosophy of social sciences, when logical positivism dominated the literature, any topic

British Journal of Sociology, vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 758–762, 2013

Social science today often contents itself with trying to explain particular events in terms of general models without understanding those events as experienced by the people being studied and without providing findings that might help people address the problems they are experiencing. It can be argued that the recent development of social science has focused too much on its own ‘evidence-inference methodological core’ and has lost sight of what is being studied, who is being studied, and how the results of research can challenge popular understanding, misconceptions, and power relations. At the most basic level, our edited volume Real Social Science: Applied Phronesis (Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram 2012) is designed to provide examples of research that is situated in real communities, grows out of the concerns of people in those communities and is conducted in ways that can help those people address those concerns. These examples demonstrate that what we are calling ‘phronetic social science’ (as originally coined by Bent Flyvbjerg) offers a meaningful approach for making social science useful and relevant to real people experiencing real problems. Phronetic social science calls for social scientists foregoing the attempt to build generic models of social behaviour and instead situate their work in ongoing political struggles as they occur in specific contexts.

The Australian Anthropological Society Newsletter, no. 130, pp. 33-34., 2013

Economics and Philosophy, 2012