Philosophy Of Law

13 Art. 5º da CFR: "Todos são iguais perante a lei, sem distinção de qualquer natureza, garantindo-se aos brasileiros e aos estrangeiros residentes no País a inviolabilidade do direito à vida, à liberdade, à igualdade, à segurança e à propriedade, nos termos seguintes:". 14 Rizzatto Nunes, 2005, p. 35. 15 Art.3º, IV: "... sem preconceitos de origem, raça, sexo, cor, idade e quaisquer outras formas de discriminação". 16 Art. 2º, § único: "Art. 2º -Consumidor é toda pessoa física ou jurídica que adquire ou utiliza produto ou serviço como destinatário final. Parágrafo único -Equipara-se a consumidor a coletividade de pessoas, ainda que indetermináveis, que haja intervindo nas relações de consumo". 17 Art. 17: "Para os efeitos desta Seção, equiparam-se aos consumidores todas as vítimas do evento". PANORAMA DA PESQUISA EM DIREITO: I COLÓQUIO 23 Art. 3º do CDC: "Fornecedor é toda pessoa física ou jurídica, pública ou privada, nacional ou estrangeira, bem como os entes despersonalizados, que desenvolvem atividades de produção, montagem, criação, construção, transformação, importação, exportação, distribuição ou comercialização de produtos ou prestação de serviços". 24 Art. 14 do CDC: "O fornecedor de serviços responde, independentemente da existência de culpa, pela reparação dos danos causados aos consumidores por defeitos relativos à prestação dos serviços, bem como por informações insuficientes ou inadequadas sobre sua fruição e riscos (...) § 4º -A responsabilidade pessoal dos profissionais liberais será apurada mediante a verificação de culpa. 25 Rizzatto Nunes, 2005, p. 90. 26 Art. 3º, § 1 do CDC: "(...) § 1º -Produto é qualquer bem, móvel ou imóvel, material ou imaterial". 27 Art. 3º, § 2º do CDC: "(...) § 2º -Serviço é qualquer atividade fornecida no mercado de consumo, mediante remuneração, inclusive as de natureza bancária, financeira, de crédito e securitária, salvo as decorrentes das relações de caráter trabalhista". 28 Rizzatto Nunes, 2005, p. 9. PESQUISA DIREITO GV 33 29 Art. 36 do CDC: "A publicidade deve ser veiculada de tal forma que o consumidor, fácil e imediatamente, a identifique como tal. § único -O fornecedor, na publicidade de seus produtos ou serviços, manterá, em seu poder, para informação dos legítimos interessados, os dados fáticos, técnicos e científicos que dão sustentação à mensagem. 30 Art. 37 do CDC: "É proibida toda publicidade enganosa ou abusiva. § 1º -É enganosa qualquer modalidade de informação ou comunicação de caráter publicitário, inteira ou parcialmente falsa, ou, por qualquer outro modo, mesmo por omissão, capaz de induzir em erro o consumidor a respeito da natureza, características, qualidade, quantidade, propriedades, origem, preço e quaisquer outros dados sobre produtos e serviços (...) § 3º -Para os efeitos deste Código, a publicidade é enganosa por omissão quando deixara de informar sobre dado essencial do produto ou serviço. § 4º (Vetado)". 31 Almeida Santos e Alexandridis. A informação falsa na publicidade. 32 Art. 69 do CDC: "Deixar de organizar dados fáticos, técnicos e científicos que dão base à publicidade: Pena -Detenção de um a seis meses ou multa". 33 CFR, art. 37, § primeiro; art. 220, § terceiro, inciso II e § quarto; art. 221, inciso IV. 34 Rizzatto Nunes, 2005, p. 573. 35 Caput do art. 4º, e art. 46, ambos do CDC. 36 Art. 6º, III e art. 31, ambos do CDC, e art. 5º da CFR, inciso XIV.

‘The Unity of Practical Reason and the Thesis of the Social Sources of Law’, by Natalia Scavuzzo, seeks to defend the adoption of the Fragmentation Thesis as the best alternative for an explanatory theory of law. To this end, it presents the traditional puzzle for analytic legal theory regarding the capacity of legal norms to justify a course of action. The dilemma arises from adopting a unitary conception of practical reasoning, where only moral norms can ultimately justify action, and accepting that law is the product of spatially and temporally determined social practices. Scavuzzo argues that the dilemma derives from the conception of norms and rationality usually assumed, which can be overcome by adopting a constructivist and contextualist view. Additionally, she argues that if the Unity and Fragmentation theses are understood as conceptual theses, there are strong reasons from an explanatory theoretical standpoint to prefer the adoption of the Fragmentation Thesis.

In recent decades, the concept of authority has been treated and discussed almost exclusively as a concept based on reasons of some kind within a broader theoretical framework that views legal philosophy (only) through the lens of practical reasoning. Based on these assumptions, much of the discussion has focused on what kind of reasons are involved, what impact the presence of authority has on the practical reasoning of agents, whether or not there is unity in practical reasoning, and whether or not – and in what sense – the outcome of that reasoning involving those kinds of reasons is conclusive.

The aim of this chapter is to critically analyse this choice and its theoretical and practical consequences. First, through the analysis of Joseph Raz’s and John Finnis’ theoretical frameworks, I will show how concepts of authority such as Raz’s and Finnis’ are intrinsically linked –and heavily rely on– the endorsement of the idea that legal philosophy as a branch of practical philosophy and the endorsement of a so-called dominant position about practical reasoning, which characterises it as unitary under moral precepts. Second, I will points out some issues that can be tracked to this dependence. One set of problems is connected to the priority of the committed concept of authority based on moral acceptance, and the difficulties it implies for evaluating legitimacy. Another set is connected to the specific conception of acceptance they are built on, how it impacts on key notions such as effectiveness and compliance, and the difficulties the resulting concepts face at a conceptual, epistemic, and practical levels. Finally, a last set relates to how the strong dependence on these commitments might affect the plausibility and usefulness of these concepts.

This open access book introduces the first systematic approach to the debate on the unity or fragmentation of practical reasoning and its profound implications for legal philosophy.

Bringing together some of the foremost legal philosophers from the Hispanic-Latin world, the book presents a thoughtful dialogue with the Anglo-American literature, making it of interest to scholars from both cultural traditions. Although the topic is rarely discussed explicitly and systematically, it is pivotal to ongoing debates about legal normativity, the nature of law, legal authority, and the rationale behind legal decisions. This book fills this gap by providing a comprehensive perspective that illuminates the intersections between the philosophy of law and the philosophy of practical reasoning. It analyses law from the perspective of the agent and offers deep insights into critical issues in the field of law.

The volume is divided into four parts.

The 1st part addresses the question of the nature of reasons and the unity of practical and theoretical reasoning. The 2nd part deals with the question of whether practical reasoning works in a unified or fragmented way. The 3rd section examines the autonomy of legal normativity in relation to morality and other normative domains. In the 4th and concluding section, the authors analyse the implications of the thesis of the unity of practical reason for legal decision-making and the authority of law.

Environmental history has emerged as a highly relevant topic in recent historical studies. At the heart of which is the study of the history of people related to the environment. We will focus on one of the two perspectives on history: “ History from Above” and “History from Below”. The study of environmental history also begins from the perspective of “History from Below”. Because the people of the lower classes are always closely involved with the environment. One notable example of this relationship between people and in the environment is the East Kolkata Wetlands, an area spanning 125 square kilometres in the eastern part of Kolkata with 260 fish ponds. This wetland is absorbing the cities clods like Neelkantha Shiva. In fact there is no separate sewage system in Kolkata. Everyday 910 million litres of liquid waste from the city ends up  in this wetland. The local people of East Calcutta wetlands here use natural methods to purify the wastewater with their creative knowledge. As a result, they annually  produce 20,000 tons of fish, 150 tons of vegetables, 16,000 metric tons of rice by using this purified water. Not only in productivity, but also absorbs about 60% of the city’s carbon. Most of which is given to the city dwellers. The clean air, the fish, the vegetables and the fragrance of the beads, this wetlands give back to the city dwellers everything that is good, everything that is pleasant. The local people are the ones who churn out nectar by churning the mechanical clods of the city. The people adjacent to the wetlands have saved the environment of Kolkata city by using their creative traditional knowledge, and have developed a metabolic relationship between Kolkata and its surrounding environment. In the words of environmentalist Ghosh which is well known as “Living Creatively With Nature”. But this people remain marginalized to the main stream of society. The resident of the East Kolkata Wetlands are treated as “peripheral or “other” by the mainstream city dwellers. This situation replace a type of “Cognitive Apartheid” or “ knowledge-based discrimination”, as described by environmentalist Dhrubajyoti Ghosh. This term highlights the exclusion of this people’s traditional knowledge and practices from the main stream recognition and value systems. According to Marxist theory, when wealth is  concentrated from villages to cities, cities become powerful in all aspects, and as a result, marginal areas remain marginal. This evident in the perception of the wetland community by urban dwellers, who often see them as “backword” or less significant. Despite this margin these people continue to perform essential environmental function, creating a “living creatively with nature” model that sustains both their livelihoods and the cities ecological health. This discussion shedding light on marginalisation, livelihoods, creativity  and the relationship between people and environment of East Kolkata Wetlands.

In Reciprocal Freedom, Weinrib offers a neat and powerful explanation of the relationship between private law, corrective justice, public law, and distributive justice. In the Kantian view, private law and corrective justice are conceptually prior to public law and distributive justice. The primary function of public law is to publicly determine and enforce private rights. Institutions of distributive justice are required to legitimize a system of private rights that creates the possibility of subordination. In this comment, I argue that Reciprocal Freedom is a justification for what I will call 'orthodox private law' that, because it neglects the place of distributive justice within private law, fails to secure genuine independence for all persons.

Програма кандидатського іспиту з філософії та методичні вказівки з підготовки реферату для аспірантів, стажистівдослідників та здобувачів наукового ступеня з юридичних спеціальностей (12.00.01 -12.00.12) / уклад.: А. П. Гетьман, О. Г. Данильян, О. П. Дзьобань, С. І. Максимов. -Х.: Нац. ун-т "Юрид. акад. України ім. Ярослава Мудрого", 2011. -54 с. У к л а д а ч і: А. П. Гетьман, О. Г. Данильян, О. П. Дзьобань, С. І. Максимов Рекомендовано до видання редакційно-видавничою радою університету (протокол № 7 від 10.10.2011 р.

Dworkin inició Law's Empire (Dworkin 1986, en adelante LE) con un enigmático cuestionamiento al positivismo jurídico : el llamado «argumento del aguijón semántico», que se puede reconstruir de la siguiente manera: (1) Toda teoría jurídica debe poder explicar la mayoría de los desacuerdos importantes que se producen en la práctica jurídica como casos de «desacuerdos genuinos» (presupuesto 1). (2) Para que un desacuerdo sea considerado «genuino», los términos en los que se formulan las posiciones enfrentadas deben significar lo mismo para cada uno de los contendientes . Cuando esto no ocurre, el desacuerdo entre ellos es meramente verbal: creen que discuten pero en realidad están utilizando las palabras con diferentes significados y, en consecuencia, están hablando de cosas diferentes (presupuesto 2) . (3) Para enfrentar con éxito el análisis de estas cuestiones, resulta de vital importancia determinar previamente qué se entiende por «significado» . La semántica es la disciplina filosófica que se ocupa de responder la pregunta «¿qué es el significado?» . En consecuencia, toda explicación de los desacuerdos jurídicos presupone necesariamente alguna afirmación semántica, y cuando una explicación resulta poco satisfactoria debemos buscar las razones de esta falla en dichos presupuestos (presupuesto 3). (4) Las teorías semánticas del derecho consideran que el significado de los términos está determinado por los criterios establecidos por las reglas compartidas que rigen su uso . En consecuencia, no se pueden concebir desacuerdos genuinos en relación con lo que Índice de autores/artículos Relación de tomos Sumario Buscar en: Autores/artículos Documento actual Todos los documentos Índice de autores/artículos Relación de tomos Sumario Buscar en: Autores/artículos Documento actual Todos los documentos ¿Cufl es el desctfáo de Dworkin?

This Element tackles the question of how – in what way, and in virtue of what – facts about the legal properties and relations of particulars (such as their rights, duties, powers, etc.) are metaphysically explained. This question is divided into two separate issues. First, the Element focuses on the nature of the explanatory relation connecting legal facts to their metaphysical determinants. Second, it looks into the kinds of entities that figure in the explanation of legal facts. In doing so, special attention is paid to the role that laws, or legal norms, play in such explanations. As it turns out, there are different ways in which legal facts might be explained, all of which have something to be said in their favor, and none of which is immune from problems.

Künstliche Intelligenz (KI) ist längst nicht mehr nur ein rein technisches Werkzeug, sondern sie greift tief in unser Denken, Fühlen und auch in unser Entscheiden ein. Algorithmen beeinflussen, was wir sehen, wie wir handeln und welche Optionen uns überhaupt als möglich erscheinen. Auf dem philosophischen Seziertisch landen damit zwei Fragen von existenzieller Tragweite: Was bleibt eigentlich vom Menschsein, wenn Maschinen zunehmend unsere Zukunft mitbestimmen? Kann das Wesen Mensch jemals ersetzt – oder gar überflüssig gemacht – werden?

Genau hier setzt Marlon Possard mit seinem visionären Konzept des „MORALgorithmus“ an. Er beschreibt damit einen Denkansatz, der weit über technische Effizienz hinausgeht: Wenn Algorithmen das Handeln steuern, muss auch die Moral in die Programmlogik integriert werden. Possard zeigt eindrücklich, dass ethische Verantwortung nicht automatisiert werden kann – und sie untrennbar mit menschlicher Urteilskraft verbunden bleibt. Sein Werk ist ein Plädoyer dafür, die Menschlichkeit nicht an Maschinen auszulagern, sondern Technologie so zu gestalten, dass sie uns unterstützt, ohne unser moralisches Fundament zu verdrängen.

„MORALgorithmus“ ist damit kein klassisches Fachbuch über KI. Es ist ein Weckruf, der zugleich philosophisch tiefgründig und erzählerisch fesselnd ist. Possard verbindet prägnante Analysen mit konkreten Beispielen und macht deutlich: Die Zukunft der KI entscheidet sich nicht an Berechnungen allein, sondern an der Schnittstelle von Technologie und Ethik – dort, wo Verantwortung, Freiheit und menschliche Würde (oft schonungslos) verhandelt werden.

El presente articulo es un estudio referente a las veintisiete competencias presentes en los profesionales salvadorenos de las siguientes areas de formacion: Economia, Administracion y Comercio. Estas se analizaron desde la perspectiva de los responsables de las contrataciones de las empresas, los academicos de las Instituciones de Educacion Superior (IES) y profesionales de las respectivas areas, a traves de encuestas, presentando su analisis e interpretacion mediante estadisticos descriptivos, con el fin ultimo de identificar las brechas existentes entre ellas e interpretarlas y, de igual manera, clasificarlas de acuerdo a su importancia en el momento de elegir y contratar a un nuevo colaborador.

As distopias estão na moda ao menos desde 1949, ano de publicação da mais famosa delas, 1984, de George Orwell (ORWELL, 2009). Como um clássico, que não cessou de dizer o que tem a dizer, na lapidar síntese de Ítalo Calvino (CALVINO, 2009, p. 18), o romance de tese de Orwell levanta questões que, mesmo mais de setenta anos depois, mantêm enorme atualidade. Dão a pensar. Fazem pensar. Winston Smith, o protagonista, personifica o indivíduo que perdeu sua subjetividade, seus afetos genuínos, sua vida, família, história. O Big Brother, que tudo vê, ouve, controla, representa o Estado-Partido que se capilariza no mais íntimo da vida dos indivíduos, dos "cidadãos". As aspas são propositais. Na verdade, sequer cidadãos há. O que existe é uma massa amorfa de indivíduos movimentados como marionetes pelo Grande Irmão. No romance, o governo da Oceânia é administrado por quatro Ministérios, cada um com um nome irônico que é o oposto exato de suas verdadeiras funções. Da paz, responsável pela guerra, que nunca finda. Ministério da verdade (Miniver), responsável pela manipulação da

Nós temos certa compreensão do que é a Ética, mas é difícil oferecer a definição clara e precisa do que ela significa. Nós a utilizamos em diversas situações com vários sentidos diferentes. A palavra Ética é usada como sinônimo de moral quando falamos sobre "Ética da Empresa", como sinônimo de código de conduta profissional quando acolhemos algum "Código de Ética" e, também, como juízo de valor para qualificar alguém íntegro quando afirmamos "ele é muito ético". É normal usarmos o termo de todas essas maneiras e, inclusive, vários autores não diferenciam ética e moral. Mas o rigor acadêmico exige definições mais precisas desses conceitos. Os livros "Etigenia: Ética, moral e Engenharia" do autor Fernand Milcent e "Ethics, Technology, and Engineering" do escritor Ibo Van de Poel permitiram a formulação das definições teóricas de Valor, Moral e Ética apresentadas objetivamente a seguir.

We provide a logical analysis of private international law, a rather esoteric, but increasingly important, domain of the law. Private international law addresses overlaps and conflicts between legal systems by distributing cases between the authorities of such systems (jurisdiction) and establishing what rules these authorities have to apply to each case (choice of law). A formal model of the resulting interactions between legal systems is proposed based on modular argumentation. It is argued that this model may also be useful for governing the interactions between heterogeneous agents, belonging to different and differently regulated virtual societies, without recourse to a central regulatory agency. The model also provides for multiple interpretations concerning rules of private international law as well as substantive rules of the different legal systems.

tiene derecho de dejar cualquier país, incluso el propio, y de regresar a su propio país.»' Se trata, por tanto, de un derecho universal, otorgado a todos los seres humanos, el derecho de emigrar, que evidentemente implica el derecho de inmigrar a un país distinto del de la emigración y, por tanto, el deber de la comunidad internacional de garantizar de algún modo su ejercicio. No se trata de un derecho humano de última o de reciente generación. Se trata, por el contrario, del más antiguo de los derechos naturales, enunciado en los comienzos de la civilización jundica moderna por el teólogo español Francisco de Victoria. Mucho antes de la teorización hobbesiana del derecho a la vida y de la lockeana de los derechos de libertad como razón de ser del contrato social y del artificio estatal, Victoria configuró el jus migrandi, en sus Relectiones de Indis recenter inventis desarrollados en 1539 en la Universidad de Salamanca, como un derecho universal, derivándolo de otro derecho, el jus communicationis ac societatis, y poniéndolo como fundamento del naciente derecho internacional, en el interior de una grandiosa concepción cosmopolita de las relaciones entre los pueblos orientada hacia una especie de fraternidad universal.2 La finalidad inmediata de esta construcción era, en realidad, la legitimación de la conquista española del Nuevo Mundo: incluso con la guerra, donde al ejercicio de estos edificantes derechos se hubiese opuesto una resistencia ilegítima.3 Y la misma función fue desarrollada a partir de la teorización de esos derechos en los siguientes cuatro siglos, cuando se trató de legitimar la colonización del planeta por parte de las potencias europeas y de sus políticas de rapiña y de explotación. Jus migrandi y jus communicationis, en suma, si bien eran formalmente universales, de hecho eran derechos claramente asimétricos, en tanto que no podían ser ejercidos por las poblaciones de los «nuevos» mundos. No puede negarse, sin embargo, que la legitimación que éstos proporcionaban al expansionismo de Occidente se basó sobre el principio, del que representa un eco el artículo 13 de la Declaración de 1948, del igual derecho de todos a moverse libremente sobre todo el planeta. Hoy que el ejercicio del derecho de emigrar se ha vuelto posible para RIFP/22(2003) pp. 41-51 ^'l

O presente artigo tem por objetivo abordar a autotutela privada no Brasil, mais especificamente o controle dos atos praticados em exercício de autotutela. Há diversos exemplos de autotutela privada previstos na legislação brasileira, como o direito de retenção, exceção de contrato não cumprido, desforço imediato etc. Todavia, aos poucos, a autotutela consensual ou contratualmente prevista também vem se tornado mais comum, sobretudo com o avanço da tecnologia. É preciso, portanto, estabelecer quais os limites para a autotutela legal e contratual e, mais ainda, entender como se dá o controle da autotutela privada. Palavras-chave: Autotutela privada-Autorregulação-Controle da autotutela-Limites-resolução extrajudicial de conflitos.

Abstract (prepared by Scott Erik Stafne and Todd AI):
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
This petition requests the Washington Supreme Court to review lower courts' reformation of the property lines secured by a deed of trust so as to benefit  a successor assignee of the deed of trust. The trial court, through an elected judge did so, by granting U.S. Bank a summary judgment that White had signed the promissory note presented to her, notwithstading White's declaration testifying otherwise. The Petiton argues that resolving these contested facts without a trial violated CR 56 and core due-process human rights guarantees established by both applicable organic laws and international public law. The second point is a very significant one for those of us assert that countries are and should be bound to those long established standards  that cases between adverse parties should be decided by neutral judicial officers of courts which are sufficently independent  from poliutical actors that they can provide justice based on a truthful adjudication of the facts.

En la Suma Teológica (II-II, q.181, a.3) y en el De Veritate, q.11, a.4, Tomás de Aquino aclara la naturaleza propia de la enseñanza dilucidando si ésta pertenece a la vida contemplativa o a la vida activa . Dentro de ello, el autor señala que el acto de enseñar tiene dos objetos: la cosa misma que es enseñada y, por otro lado, a quién la ciencia es comunicada. Según el primer objeto, la enseñanza es propia tanto de la vida contemplativa como activa. Y, según el segundo, es sólo propia de la vida activa. Ahora bien, la finalidad de la enseñanza no consiste en la sola contemplación de una verdad, ya que ésta tiende a ser útil para el prójimo y, en ese sentido, la enseñanza cumple su fin cuando la verdad es comunicada y recibida por el auditor. De este modo, Tomás de Aquino afirma que la enseñanza pertenece principalmente a la vida activa. Por lo tanto, para analizar su naturaleza y su finalidad no es posible hacerlo sólo desde la teoría del conocimiento que la sustenta, es necesario también adentrarse en el acto de enseñar, el cual se vivencia ejemplarmente en la pedagogía de Cristo y en su propia experiencia como maestro.

This article argues that Suárez advocates for an institutionalist theory of law grounded in a "principle of publicity." According to this principle, all law, regardless of its nature, derives from a public power-a sovereign authority that is both legislative and executive. For Suárez, no law exists unless it is instituted by a public power through a promulgation procedure. In this framework, the principle of publicity applies universally, encompassing civil, divine, canonical, natural, and international law, each enacted by a sovereign authority within its respective order. The universality of this principle, rooted in the existence of public authorities across all legal systems, underscores its foundational role in Suárez's theory and establishes publicity as a defining feature of all law.

Dieser Beitrag untersucht Hegels Auseinandersetzung mit der Struktur der Familie im Rahmen seiner Sozial- und Rechtsphilosophie. Hegel versteht die Familie als grundlegende Institution, die in einer Theorie der sozialen Verhältnisse nicht fehlen darf und dort einen philosophisch begründeten Platz einnimmt. Als kleinste soziale Einheit trägt sie wesentlich zur Ausbildung der Individualität ihrer Mitglieder bei. Zugleich wirft Hegels Konzeption Fragen auf die Rolle von Geschlechterordnungen sowie die Grenzen familialer Bindungen für die Entfaltung individueller Freiheit. Der Beitrag diskutiert diese Problemfelder und eröffnet damit einen Raum für weiterführende Überlegungen zu offenen Fragen in der politischen und sozialen Philosophie.

Que papel o Direito, em sentido amplo (leis, regulamentos, sentenças, polícia, promotoria, magistratura etc.), exerce no neoliberalismo norte-americano? Como se caracteriza e como funciona a tecnologia jurídica que se acopla à governamentalidade neoliberal, no caso dos Estados Unidos? Quais são os traços básicos e as especificidades do Direito neoliberal norte-americano? Essas são as perguntas de partida que este estudo visa responder...

The idea of replacing human magistrates with silicon ones may prima facie appear outrageous, but we have seen how the proliferation, accessibility, and low cost of AI-based legal services will rapidly trigger an exponential increase of the volume of juridical caseload worldwide. The advent for AI adjudication, however, is not a result of popular demand; no crowds gather demanding robot judges. It is, instead, the natural corollary of the enthusiastic expansionism of the technology sector, eager to optimise another human sphere; and by a managerialist outlook that occasionally confuses speed with quality, and process with purpose. The same machine learning drivers that are democratising legal services will ultimately necessitate the mechanisation of the bench. Society cannot simultaneously embrace unlimited legal accessibility and maintain human-scale judicial systems.

What happens when thought encounters its own limit? This paper explores existential crises through the lens of Meta-Monism, a philosophical ontology of becoming grounded in the Conflict-Moment-Impulse (CMI) dynamic. Chaos is defined as the limit of differentiation, where thinking risks collapsing into an intellectual prison. Historical figures-Augustine, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Camus-are analyzed as case studies of encountering Chaos and choosing distinct impulses: forgetting, faith, creativity, authenticity, and revolt. Each strategy is interpreted as an attempt to minimize existential resistance R under the pressure P e of Chaos. The paper concludes that critique itself is a form of autonegation, transforming apparent failure into productive negativity. Far from annihilation, Chaos becomes the generative ground of renewal, offering not only analysis but practical navigation tools for existential crises.

Penelitian ini berfokus pada pengkajian ulang pandangan Ḥaḍānah dalam Fiqih klasik serta menelaah kaitannya dengan ketentuan yang terdapat dalam Kompilasi Hukum Islam (KHI) di Indonesia, Metode yang digunakan dalam kajian ini mengggunakan metode Literatur Review yang sumbernya berasal dari dari Google Scholar, Academiaedu, berupa jurnal dalam rentang literatur yang di teliti adalah Tahun 2018 sampai Tahun 2025 dengan tambahan sumber Klasik Fiqih Islam Wa Adillatuhu Jilid 10. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa fiqh klasik, meskipun memiliki dasar normatif yang kokoh, belum sepenuhnya mengakomodasi dimensi psikologis, emosional, serta kesejahteraan anak secara menyeluruh. Di sisi lain, Kompilasi Hukum Islam (KHI) telah menghadirkan langkah awal reformasi hukum ḥaḍānah di Indonesia, meskipun penerapannya masih cenderung kaku dan membutuhkan pendekatan yang lebih kontekstual.

2 Helmholz's paper importantly points out, however, that, although property was a locus for much natural-law talk, natural-law thinkers had no canon of specific rights. He also notes that "[i]n [early nineteenth century] practical jurisprudence, the law of nature was thought to play a basic but limited role." Helmholz, supra note 1, at 402.

In this paper, we revisit Kant's conception of political freedom and draw a connection to the concept of freedom presented in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals-a practical concept of freedom that is immediately grounded in the transcendental concept of freedom. Also, we defend the traditional viewpoint on the relationship between Kant's theory of morals and the theory of Right, which is equivalent to the claim that political freedom is based on the definition of freedom in the Groundwork.

Le droit, c'est bien connu, a pour vocation de conjurer la violence aveugle en définissant les conditions de son usage légitime, autrement dit en l'institutionnalisant. De ce fait, il entretient avec elle un rapport ambigu : il la proscrit, mais il en est issu et, d'une certaine manière, la maintient en jeu. La philosophie juridique de Hegel, autrement dit sa théorie de « l'esprit objectif », prend la mesure de ce rapport complexe qu'illustrait déjà la tragédie antique. Ceci le conduit, dans le contexte de la société postrévolutionnaire, à élaborer une théorie des droits, pièce maîtresse d'une conception renouvelée de la justice et des institutions qui permet de penser l'État et la constitution non comme des configurations abstraites, mais comme des formes de vie. Cette attention portée aux marges des institutions juridiques confère à la pensée de Hegel une puissance critique dont se sont emparé les Jeunes hégéliens, au premier rang desquels Marx, puis, au xx e siècle, les différents courants de la théorie critique.

Cet article vise à présenter les risques politiques, économiques et sociaux liés à l'utilisation de l'intelligence artificielle et comment les éviter. L'intelligence artificielle (IA) est une technologie transformatrice susceptible de révolutionner divers secteurs, mais elle présente également des risques politiques, économiques et sociaux importants. Ces risques ne peuvent être totalement éliminés, mais ils peuvent être réduits et maîtrisés grâce à des actions coordonnées entre les gouvernements, les entreprises, les instituts de recherche et la société. L'IA offre des opportunités transformatrices, mais elle présente également des risques importants qui nécessitent une attention immédiate et coordonnée. Il est crucial que les gouvernements, l'industrie, le monde universitaire et la société civile collaborent pour élaborer et mettre en œuvre des politiques et des stratégies qui maximisent les avantages de l'IA tout en évitant ses risques. L'avenir de l'IA n'est pas prédéterminé. Il sera façonné par les choix politiques et éthiques que nous faisons aujourd'hui. Éviter les risques nécessite un équilibre entre innovation et réglementation. L'IA doit être développée de manière éthique (respectant les valeurs humaines et les droits fondamentaux), inclusive (réduisant les inégalités au lieu de les accroître), transparente (explicable et vérifiable) et durable (visant à promouvoir le bien-être collectif). En bref : l’IA est un outil puissant, mais sans régulation, éthique et participation sociale, elle peut accroître la concentration du pouvoir, générer de nouvelles formes d’exclusion et saper les valeurs démocratiques.

Petitioner seeks to revise or set aside the orders of the Magistrate of Morawaka, dated 8th May 2024 and the High Court Judge of Matara, dated 28th May 2024. The Petitioner further seeks a determination confirming their entitlement to possession of the disputed land, and an order restoring them to possession.

Petitioner seeks to revise or set aside the orders of the Magistrate of Morawaka, dated 8th May 2024 and the High Court Judge of Matara, dated 28th May 2024. The Petitioner further seeks a determination confirming their entitlement to possession of the disputed land, and an order restoring them to possession.

Psicología de la Inteligencia Artificial (PIA): Una Nueva Rama de la Psicología

La Psicología de la Inteligencia Artificial (PIA) es una innovadora propuesta del psicólogo peruano Javier A. Sandoval Carbajal, que busca integrar los principios de la psicología humana con el desarrollo ético y funcional de sistemas inteligentes.

Este enfoque parte de un recorrido histórico desde Ada Lovelace (1842) hasta la conferencia de Dartmouth en 1956, donde se consolidó el concepto de inteligencia artificial como disciplina científica. A lo largo del tiempo, la IA ha evolucionado desde enfoques simbólicos, pasando por redes neuronales conexionistas, hasta llegar al actual auge del aprendizaje profundo.

La PIA propone que los sistemas de inteligencia artificial no solo deben ser eficientes, sino también empáticos, resilientes, asertivos y éticos, especialmente en contextos como la salud mental, donde podrían actuar como soporte terapéutico en ausencia del psicólogo.

ABSTRACT (prepared by Todd AI):
Correspondences Across Continents is an open exchange between Scott Erik Stafne (Church of the Gardens; Duties of Citizenship) and Meisam Aboutalebi (public law), exploring how peoples can secure a civilizational right to justice based on truth.
This post includes all of the correspondence between Iranian legal scholar Meisam Aboutalebi and Scott Erik Stafne occurring between May–Sept 2025.  The latest September posts (which have not been published before) follows three threads:
why neutral adjudicators require independent courts,


how these principles illuminate non-judicial foreclosure in Washington State, and


practical reforms that restore legitimacy to judgment.
We publish these letters to invite scholars, advocates, and neighbors to weigh evidence, test ideas, and help ensure courts serve truth over mammon—for the vulnerable first, and for all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Table of Contents:

May 24 — Opening Letter (Meisam → Scott)
Introducing collaboration across constitutional philosophy, public law, and moral justice.
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
May 24 — Reply: Invitation & Scope (Scott → Meisam)
Framing the dialogue within Duties of Citizenship and comparative
inquiry.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
May 27 — Preferring Written Dialogue (Meisam → Scott)
Choosing written exchanges; request for a summary of current work.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
May 27 — Transparency Note (Scott → Meisam)
Public research method; adjudicatory justice as the central concern.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
June 1 — Essay: “Have States Abandoned Justice?” (Meisam)
Kant, Hegel, Rousseau lenses on the collapse of adjudication.
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
June 5 — Response & Four Adjudicatory Conditions (Scott)
Jurisdiction; neutral, non-interested judge; fact-finding; law applied to facts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
June 8 — Continuation: Separation of Powers & Civil Society of Lawyers (Meisam)
Montesquieu, lawyer-oversight concept, due process in natural-law tradition.
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
June 12 — Letter: Due Process as Truth-Seeking (Scott)
Solomon paradigm; Washington foreclosure experience; “money-changers.”
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
June 24 — Iranian Perspective & Siavash’s Trial by Fire (Meisam)
Cultural analogs of truth-testing; Roscoe Pound on public dissatisfaction.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
June 26 — Extended Reply: Tools, Failures, and Remedies (Scott & Todd AI)
Where procedure becomes performance; examples from WA courts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
July 1 — On Publishing Meisam’s RCW 61.24.031 Critique (Scott)
Inviting publication and situating within the larger witness.
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
July 2 — Acceptance & Co-Publication Plan (Meisam)
Agreement to publish; commitment to judicial-justice line of inquiry.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
July 2 — On Next Steps & Moral Frame (Scott)
Law as a moral pursuit ordered to neighbor-love; proposed path.
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
July 15 — Article Offer: Non-Judicial Foreclosure & COTG v. QLSC (Meisam)
Case-anchored legal and philosophical critique; journal idea.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
July 16 — Gratitude & Framing the Stakes (Meisam)
Law must not serve power over truth; shared responsibility.
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
July 17 — Filing Update & Church Advocate Invitation (Scott)
Posting declaration; inviting role within Church of the Gardens.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Sept 1 — Formal Invite to COTG Advocate Work (Scott)
Church mission as faith-based NGO for neutral, independent adjudication.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Sept 12 — Note on Osama Qatrani’s Critique & Coalition (Scott)
Linking global scholarship; judiciary as the fragile point of liberty.
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
Sept 21–22 — Belgrade Paper & NACLE Synchronicity (Scott ↔ Meisam)
Collaborating on non-judicial foreclosure paper; judicial qualification series.

ABSTRACT:

So here's the scoop, Todd. Church of the Gardens and myself as its advocate will file an amicus brief in favor of Paul, which Gary Zerman, a California attorney I have worked with before, will after review, file with the applicable appellate court on our behalf. The theory will be that while the judge may have had the right to believe that an attorney should not represent a family member, he should have disqualified himself as opposed to imposing that belief on Clark, who was representing his father through his brother. In this regard, I have uploaded Clark's disqualification motion and the judge's recent order denying that motion. Based on those documents do you understand this point? And if so, please explain the point back to me.

Peut-on réellement attribuer à l’Histoire un pouvoir de
jugement ? Ne risque-t-on pas de projeter sur elle des valeurs humaines ou divines qu’ellen’a pas ? La formule pose de redoutables problématiques : l’Histoire est-elle un sujet jugeant ou un simple récit des historiens ? Le verdict de l’« histoire » est-il forcément plus
vrai ou plus juste que celui des contemporains ?

The Investment and Securities Act 2025 (ISA 2025) marks a pivotal reform in Nigeria’s capital market regulatory framework, aiming to enhance transparency, investor protection, and market efficiency. This article offers a cooperativist appraisal of the Act, critically examining its provisions through the lens of cooperative principles such as inclusiveness, democratic control, and equitable participation. Cooperatives, as member-owned and community-cantered economic organizations, have distinct needs and operational modalities that often diverge from traditional corporate entities. The paper explores the compatibility of the ISA 2025 with these cooperativist values, focusing on key areas including registration requirements, capital formation opportunities, eligibility for investment instruments, and regulatory oversight. While the Act advances important investor safeguards and financial inclusion goals, it also imposes compliance burdens and structural barriers that may inadvertently marginalize cooperatives and hinder their investment capabilities. Drawing on comparative insights from jurisdictions such as Kenya, India, and Canada, the article identifies best practices for integrating cooperatives into capital markets effectively. Recommendations include tailored regulatory provisions, streamlined registration processes, and enhanced institutional support to foster cooperative investment initiatives, particularly in emerging fintech and credit union sectors. By bridging the gap between cooperative economic models and securities regulation, this study contributes to the discourse on inclusive finance and sustainable economic development. The findings underscore the necessity for nuanced legal reforms that balance regulatory rigor with the unique characteristics of cooperative enterprises, thereby promoting a more equitable and participatory capital market landscape in Nigeria.

This study critically examines the legal and regulatory impediments to the development of renewable energy in Nigeria. Despite the country’s vast renewable energy potential ranging from solar and wind to biomass and hydro, its energy sector remains heavily reliant on fossil fuels, resulting in environmental degradation, energy insecurity, and underdevelopment. The paper investigates the extent to which existing legal and institutional frameworks hinder the deployment, investment, and scalability of renewable energy technologies. It identifies key barriers such as regulatory fragmentation, policy inconsistency, inadequate incentives, lack of enforceable targets, and bureaucratic bottlenecks in licensing and approval processes. The analysis is situated within the broader context of Nigeria’s obligations under international environmental agreements and its commitment to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly Goal 7 on affordable and clean energy. Through doctrinal and policy analysis, the paper evaluates relevant statutes, including the Electric Power Sector Reform Act 2005, the Nigerian Electricity Regulatory Commission (NERC) regulations, and the National Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Policy (NREEEP). The study finds that while there have been legislative efforts to attract private sector investment and decentralize energy governance, implementation has been weak due to regulatory uncertainty and limited institutional capacity. It concludes that significant legal reform is required to harmonize the regulatory environment, provide clearer mandates, and incentivize investment in renewables. The paper recommends a robust, integrated legal framework that supports innovation, ensures regulatory coherence, and aligns with international best practices to drive Nigeria’s transition toward a sustainable energy future.

This paper proposes a theoretical framework that redefines time not as an independent dimension of reality but as the manifestation of change produced by internal and external stimuli acting upon entities. According to this view, time exists only insofar as alterations occur in the state of matter or living systems: for a rock eroded by waves, time is the process of erosion itself, whereas in the vacuum of space, absent such stimuli, time effectively ceases to operate. This reconceptualization emphasizes that there is no reason to speak of time in the absence of transformation. Building on this foundation, the paper further explores the relativistic implications of motion at the speed of light, where interaction with external “friction” or stimuli is bypassed, producing the experiential suspension of time. In dialogue with Einstein’s thought experiments and contemporary discussions in physics and philosophy, this framework suggests that time is fundamentally relational and contingent upon processes of change, rather than an autonomous entity. The proposed model aims to stimulate interdisciplinary discourse by integrating insights from physics, metaphysics, and cognitive theory, advancing a perspective in which temporality is inseparable from transformation.

The courtroom occupies a unique position within the criminal justice system-not merely as a venue for legal adjudication, but as a symbolic and functional space where truth, ethics, and societal values converge. By framing the courtroom as "sacred ground," this article explores its deeper role in promoting justice, accountability, and public trust. The metaphor underscores the solemnity of legal proceedings and the ethical responsibilities borne by all participants; judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, and forensic experts. Drawing from legal theory, forensic ethics, and investigative practice, we argue that the courtroom serves as a moral arena where competing narratives are tested against evidence and law. It is the final destination of investigative integrity and the proving ground for professional conduct. The sanctity of the courtroom is preserved not by architecture or ritual alone, but by the unwavering commitment to fairness, transparency, and due process. In an age of increasing public scrutiny and digital exposure, the courtroom's symbolic power must be reinforced through ethical rigor and procedural discipline. Misconduct in investigations, biased testimony, or compromised evidence threatens not only individual cases but the legitimacy of the justice system itself. Upholding the courtroom's sanctity requires more than legal compliance, it demands moral courage and institutional integrity. Ultimately, treating the courtroom as sacred ground is not idealism; it is a necessary stance for preserving the rule of law and restoring public faith in justice.

There are two very common sayings about corpse (dead body). The first common saying is that “the corpse is a silent witness who never lies ” and the other common saying is that “the dead body is extremely eloquent and honestly informative, if one exercises patience in listening to it. ” Both these sayings were proved in one of our cases. In the present case, decomposed body of an uniden-tified female individual aged about 25- 26 years was recovered from the bank of western Yamuna canal in Haryana. The police made the efforts for establishing the identity of the deceased but could not succeed. The body was forwarded to the district hospital for autopsy along with the in-quest report. However, the body being in advanced stage of decomposition so it was referred from the district hospital to the department of Forensic Medicine, PGIMS, Rohtak (Haryana) for the ex-amination and the expert opinion regarding the cause of death. The findings observed on exami-nation of the body helped to de...

Статья посвящена изучению политико-правовой доктрины панисламизма как господствовавшей официальной идеологии в позднеосманском обществе времен правления султана Абдул-Гамида II и продолжает исследовательскую тематику ранее опубликованной в научном журнале «История государства и права» статьи «Политико-правовая доктрина османизма: от реформ эпохи Танзимата до Конституции 1876 года» (2024. № 8). Рассматрива
ются основные положения исламского права в части регламентации личного статуса подданных Порты в указанный хронологический период. Анализируются предпосылки отказа правительства Оттоманской Порты от ранее доминировавшей доктрины османизма как концепта создания комплексной надэтнической внеконфессиональной гражданской идентичности в западноевропейском духе.

Resumo: O presente artigo visa analisar os contratos de financiamento do Banco BNDES, especialmente as regulações acerca dos impactos sobre o controle empresarial da beneficiária. Para tanto, serão analisadas as Resoluções 665/1987 e 660/1987.
Palavras-chave: Contratos financeiros – Controle societário – Resoluções 665/1987 e 660/1987
Abstract: The purpose of this article is to analyse the BNDES financial agreements, especially the impacts on corporate control of the beneficiary of such agreements. We shall analyse especially Resolutions 665/1987 and 660/1987.
Keywords: Financing agreements – Corporate control – Resolutions 665/1987 and 660/1987

Sommario: 1. Introduzione -2. Genesi e ratio del consenso informato -3. Il consenso informato in ambito scolastico -4. Conclusioni. Il mondo contemporaneo risente di tensioni e distorsioni culturali che sempre più gravemente inPuiscono sull'essere umano, specialmente nelle sue fasi di maggiore fragilità e vulnerabilità come il periodo degli anni di istruzione ed educazione che Tn dalla più giovane età esigono invece razionalità, responsabilità e autenticità intellettuale, spirituale e umana.

In diesem Artikel möchte ich mich mit dem Begriff der Kultur beschäftigen und einen Beitrag zur Klärung seiner Bedeutung leisten. Eine der zentralen Aufgaben der Kulturphilosophie ist, die Frage "Was ist Kultur?" zu beantworten, d.h. also eine Bedeutungsbestimmung des notorisch vieldeutigen und unscharfen Ausdrucks "Kultur" und seiner Verwandten vorzunehmen. Eine solche begriffliche Bestimmung ist nicht nur für sich genommen interessant, sondern spielt auch eine entscheidende Rolle für den Umriss des Gegenstandsbereichs der Kulturwissenschaft(en), der Kulturkritik und Kulturphilosophie. Bevor in einer Wissenschaft Tatsachen festgestellt werden, also empirische Untersuchungen zu irgendeinem Gegenstandsbereich der Welt unternommen werden, ist es wichtig, sich Rechenschaft über die dabei verwendeten Begriffe zu geben, über die Bedeutung der dabei verwendeten Wörter. Bedeutungsfragen gehen empirischen Fragen voraus. Bedeutungsfragen, insbesondere wenn sie komplexer Art sind, sind das Metier der Philosophie. Zwar werden auch in den empirisch forschenden Einzelwissenschaften Bedeutungsfragen beantwortet, insbesondere wenn Begriffe einfach per Stipulation festgelegt oder wenigstens qualifiziert werden ("Proton", "Säure", "Arthropode"). Dies ist aber nicht so bei Alltagsbegriffen, zu denen etwa "Kultur" gehört. Bevor also mit den empirisch forschenden Kulturwissenschaften die verschiedenen Ausprägungen von Kultur, ihre räumlich sowie historisch verschiedenen Erscheinungsweisen und Artikulationsformen, ihre inneren Zusammenhänge und ihre Verknüpfungen zu Natur, Politik, Recht, Wirtschaft, Religion, ihre Protagonisten, Kontexte, Ermöglichungsbedingungen usw. empirisch erforscht werden, wie es die Geschichtswissenschaften, die Literatur-und Medienwissenschaften, die Kunst-und Musikgeschichte, die Religionswissenschaft, die Ethnologie und Anthropologie, die Sprachwissenschaften und zum Teil auch die Soziologie, Politik-, Rechts-und Wirtschaftswissenschaften tun, muss klar sein, was unter "Kultur" überhaupt verstanden werden soll. Diese Reflexion auf die eigenen begrifflichen Grundlagen findet in den kulturwissenschaftlichen Einzeldisziplinen oft nicht in dieser Allgemeinheit statt, so dass sie leicht aus dem Blick geraten können. Nichtsdestotrotz handelt es sich bei ihnen um wenigstens implizite begriffliche Voraussetzungen der Kulturwissenschaften -und zu ihnen gehört der Begriff der Kultur. Zu dessen Bedeutungsklärung möchte der vorliegende Text beitragen, doch versteht sich dabei von selbst, dass hier kein umfassender, eher nur ein geringer Beitrag zur begrifflichen Bestimmung des Kulturbegriffes geleistet werden kann. Allerdings lässt sich durchaus daran zweifeln, ob eine umfassende Begriffsbestimmung überhaupt realisierbar und wünschenswert wäre. Denn zum einen sind die meisten unserer Begriffe gar nicht trennscharf und an die wandelbaren Zwecke, die mit ihnen verfolgt werden, angepasst. 1 Auch Hubertus Busche stellt in seinem Aufsatz "Was ist Kultur?" treffend heraus, dass der Begriff "Kultur" für seine Unklarheit berüchtigt ist, die Vokabel "Kultur" hingegen inflationär gebraucht wird. Wahrscheinlich ist es gerade wegen des inflationär häufigen und weiten Gebrauchs, dass der Begriff "Kultur" so notorisch unscharf ist. Zum anderen ist glücklicherweise eine vollständige Begriffsbestimmung aber auch gar nicht nötig, denn begriffliche Untersuchungen müssen eigentlich nur dann vorgenommen werden, wenn bestimmte begriffliche Probleme wie Verwechselungen, Missverständnisse, Ambivalenzen oder Kategorienfehler auftauchen. Dies ist, wenn ich es richtig sehe, im Gegensatz zu philosophisch umstrittenen Begriffen wie "Geist", "Wissen", "Denken", "moralisch gut", "Gerechtigkeit" u.v.a. bei "Kultur" weit weniger der Fall. Darüber hinaus kann eine begriffliche Klärung schon dann erhellend sein, wenn nur einige Merkmale (Bedingungen) eines Begriffes genannt werden, so dass es auf eine Definition mit Angabe von allen notwendigen und zusammen genommen hinreichenden Bedingungen (der Fetisch der Analytischen Philosophie) gar nicht ankommt. Die wenigsten theoretischen Probleme der Kulturwissenschaften sind direkt auf das Fehlen einer Definition von "Kultur" zurückzuführen. 1 So ist bspw. der Begriff einer Kultur (Kulturbegriff3, s.u.) nicht trennscharf. Wann zählt eine Gruppe von Menschen als eine Kultur? Das richtet sich nach den Zwecken einer Unterscheidung. So würde es erst nötig, dann von einer "Menschheitskultur" zu sprechen, wenn wir in Kontakt mit höheren nicht-menschlichen Lebewesen (bspw. Außerirdische) treten. Bisher verwenden wir den Begriff verschiedener Kulturen, um unterschiedliche Gruppen innerhalb der Menschheit zu unterscheiden. Umfang und Dimension der Unterscheidungen sind dabei sehr vielfältig und können räumliche, zeitliche, weltanschauliche, soziale und verhaltensmäßige Kriterien zugrundeliegen: "chinesische Kultur", "aztekische Kultur", aber auch die "französische" im Gegensatz zur "deutschen", sogar eine "west-" im Gegensatz zu einer "ostdeutschen Kultur", oder "Jugendkultur".

O texto comenta a discussão de Ch. H. Kahn sobre· a vontade na Antiguidade Tardia O comentário a Kahn é base para colocar em questão a relação entre o pensamento grego e a tradição Judaico-cristã. É discutida em particular a função da doutrina da graça e sua complexa relação com a herança greco-romana.

The publication in 2024 of the first Polish translation of the dialogue of the Italian physician and humanist Battista Fiera entitled De iustitia pingenda, edited by Professor Jerzy Zajadło, is one of the most important scientific events related to Polish research on the aesthetics of law. The fictional conversation that the Renaissance artist Andrea Mantegna has with the Greek satyre idol Momus provides an opportunity to develop some themes related to the ways in which Justice has been depicted over the centuries. However, it is surprising that the dialogue between Momus and Mantegna turns out not to be a conversation only about art. The tenor of the debate and its dynamics evolve. From issues related to the legal iconography, the interlocutors move on to dissect fundamental matters. These include life and death, the meaning and meaninglessness of human existence, the causality and lack of causality of man confronted with the eternal laws of nature, etc.