Legal Philosophy

‘The Unity of Practical Reason and the Thesis of the Social Sources of Law’, by Natalia Scavuzzo, seeks to defend the adoption of the Fragmentation Thesis as the best alternative for an explanatory theory of law. To this end, it presents the traditional puzzle for analytic legal theory regarding the capacity of legal norms to justify a course of action. The dilemma arises from adopting a unitary conception of practical reasoning, where only moral norms can ultimately justify action, and accepting that law is the product of spatially and temporally determined social practices. Scavuzzo argues that the dilemma derives from the conception of norms and rationality usually assumed, which can be overcome by adopting a constructivist and contextualist view. Additionally, she argues that if the Unity and Fragmentation theses are understood as conceptual theses, there are strong reasons from an explanatory theoretical standpoint to prefer the adoption of the Fragmentation Thesis.

In recent decades, the concept of authority has been treated and discussed almost exclusively as a concept based on reasons of some kind within a broader theoretical framework that views legal philosophy (only) through the lens of practical reasoning. Based on these assumptions, much of the discussion has focused on what kind of reasons are involved, what impact the presence of authority has on the practical reasoning of agents, whether or not there is unity in practical reasoning, and whether or not – and in what sense – the outcome of that reasoning involving those kinds of reasons is conclusive.

The aim of this chapter is to critically analyse this choice and its theoretical and practical consequences. First, through the analysis of Joseph Raz’s and John Finnis’ theoretical frameworks, I will show how concepts of authority such as Raz’s and Finnis’ are intrinsically linked –and heavily rely on– the endorsement of the idea that legal philosophy as a branch of practical philosophy and the endorsement of a so-called dominant position about practical reasoning, which characterises it as unitary under moral precepts. Second, I will points out some issues that can be tracked to this dependence. One set of problems is connected to the priority of the committed concept of authority based on moral acceptance, and the difficulties it implies for evaluating legitimacy. Another set is connected to the specific conception of acceptance they are built on, how it impacts on key notions such as effectiveness and compliance, and the difficulties the resulting concepts face at a conceptual, epistemic, and practical levels. Finally, a last set relates to how the strong dependence on these commitments might affect the plausibility and usefulness of these concepts.

This open access book introduces the first systematic approach to the debate on the unity or fragmentation of practical reasoning and its profound implications for legal philosophy.

Bringing together some of the foremost legal philosophers from the Hispanic-Latin world, the book presents a thoughtful dialogue with the Anglo-American literature, making it of interest to scholars from both cultural traditions. Although the topic is rarely discussed explicitly and systematically, it is pivotal to ongoing debates about legal normativity, the nature of law, legal authority, and the rationale behind legal decisions. This book fills this gap by providing a comprehensive perspective that illuminates the intersections between the philosophy of law and the philosophy of practical reasoning. It analyses law from the perspective of the agent and offers deep insights into critical issues in the field of law.

The volume is divided into four parts.

The 1st part addresses the question of the nature of reasons and the unity of practical and theoretical reasoning. The 2nd part deals with the question of whether practical reasoning works in a unified or fragmented way. The 3rd section examines the autonomy of legal normativity in relation to morality and other normative domains. In the 4th and concluding section, the authors analyse the implications of the thesis of the unity of practical reason for legal decision-making and the authority of law.

In Reciprocal Freedom, Weinrib offers a neat and powerful explanation of the relationship between private law, corrective justice, public law, and distributive justice. In the Kantian view, private law and corrective justice are conceptually prior to public law and distributive justice. The primary function of public law is to publicly determine and enforce private rights. Institutions of distributive justice are required to legitimize a system of private rights that creates the possibility of subordination. In this comment, I argue that Reciprocal Freedom is a justification for what I will call 'orthodox private law' that, because it neglects the place of distributive justice within private law, fails to secure genuine independence for all persons.

Програма кандидатського іспиту з філософії та методичні вказівки з підготовки реферату для аспірантів, стажистівдослідників та здобувачів наукового ступеня з юридичних спеціальностей (12.00.01 -12.00.12) / уклад.: А. П. Гетьман, О. Г. Данильян, О. П. Дзьобань, С. І. Максимов. -Х.: Нац. ун-т "Юрид. акад. України ім. Ярослава Мудрого", 2011. -54 с. У к л а д а ч і: А. П. Гетьман, О. Г. Данильян, О. П. Дзьобань, С. І. Максимов Рекомендовано до видання редакційно-видавничою радою університету (протокол № 7 від 10.10.2011 р.

The vision of legendary criminologist Cesare Lombroso to use scientific theories of individual causes of crime as a basis for screening and prevention programmes targeting individuals at risk for future criminal behaviour has resurfaced, following advances in genetics, neuroscience and psychiatric epidemiology. This article analyses this idea and maps its ethical implications from a public health ethical standpoint. Twenty-seven variants of the new Lombrosian vision of forensic screening and prevention are distinguished, and some scientific and technical limitations are noted. Some lures, biases and structural factors, making the application of the Lombrosian idea likely in spite of weak evidence are pointed out and noted as a specific type of ethical aspect. Many classic and complex ethical challenges for health screening programmes are shown to apply to the identified variants and the choice between them, albeit with peculiar and often provoking variations. These variations are shown to actualize an underlying theoretical conundrum in need of further study, pertaining to the relationship between public health ethics and the ethics and values of criminal law policy.

This article attempts to clarify some of the sources and stakes of Marxist legal theory today. It proceeds in three stages. In the first section, I provide a brief overview of Marx's own engagement with questions of law, rights, and the state in the first volume of Capital, the only volume he completed and saw to publication. Formally educated in law, Marx's abiding interest in legal ideologies, instruments, and institutions is palpable throughout his writings, both published and unpublished. I focus on three portions of the first volume of Capital that are especially important from the perspective of legal and socio-legal theory: the discussion of commodities, labour, and value in its opening chapters; chapters ten and fifteen, which concern class struggles around the length and intensity of the working day; and chapters twenty-six through thirty-three, which relate to the origins and presuppositions of capitalist production in and beyond Europe. Capital, I suggest, is under-appreciated for its attentiveness to law's role in capitalist social relations.

In the article's second section, I show that the complex handling of law in Capital is in keeping with Marx's life-long concern with questions of law, legality, and legal ideology, evidenced as early as his political essays, philosophical studies, and journalistic interventions in the early to mid-1840s. Taking up the work of Evgeny Pashukanis and Nicos Poulantzas, I argue that different forms of Marxist legal theory may be generated on the basis of different readings of Capital and Marx's other writings, particularly as they engage questions of law, the political power and juridical authority of the state, and social struggles waged at least partly in the language of rights. I then concretize the implications of Marx's nuanced understanding of law by considering the degree to which it can be said to possess "constitutive power." Using Katharina Pistor's influential recent study of private law as an illustration of how law's ability to shape social relations may be exaggerated, I demonstrate that Marx and Engels understood acutely how juridico-political developments both foster and fetter the socio-economic dynamics that drive capital accumulation. Typically misread as dismissive of all things "superstructural," Marx and Engels were keenly aware of law's ability to feed back into the constitution of the "base," even as they consistently maintained the latter’s primacy.

I conclude the article with some brief remarks about Marx's views on the transition to full communism, a condition that he and Engels thought would be realized through a succession of social transformations so sweeping as to usher in the decisive dissolution of the state and its laws. While Marx refrained from offering detailed blueprints for post-capitalist social relations, he repeatedly invoked the need for a full-scale "expropriation of the expropriators" that would result in the creation of a workers' state capable of eliminating capitalist private property and instituting common possession of means of production, thereby laying the groundwork for a classless society in which law and the state would eventually become substantively superfluous. If legal scholars are serious about understanding the character and composition of capitalist law, not to speak of its supersession, these and other arguments in Marx's complex and multi-vocal corpus remain as vital as ever—not because they are canonical or possessed of scriptural authority, but because the spirit of angry critique that animates them encourages direct confrontation with law’s inherence in capitalism's social ontology.

Bu makale, Türkiye'deki İslamcılık akımının tarihini, gelişimini ve dönüşümünü ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. İslamcılık, Türkiye'nin modernleşme ve laikleşme süreçlerinde önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Bu bağlamda çalışma, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin (AK Parti) kurulmasına kadar olan süreçte İslamcılık akımının seyrini kapsamaktadır. Çalışmada tarihsel parametreler, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son yılları, tek parti dönemi, 1960-1980 yılları ve 1980-2002 yılları arası dönem olarak belirlenmiştir. Bu dönemlerin seçilme nedeni, askeri müdahaleler ve mevzuatsal düzenlemeler ile İslamcılığın temsilinde önemli bir rol oynamasıdır. Çalışmada bu dönemler tarihsel karşılaştırmalı ve betimleyici yöntemlerle incelenmiştir. İslamcılık akımının filizlenmesi, Tanzimat ve Islahat Fermanları dönemlerinde Osmanlı'nın Batı'ya olan tepkisinin bir yansıması olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu dönemde, İslamcılık akımı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun parçalanmasını önlemek amacıyla bir kurtuluş misyonu üstlenmiştir. Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarında ise İslamcılık, laiklik ilkesinin benimsenmesiyle birlikte kamusal alandan uzaklaştırılmış ve bu da İslamcı kesimlerin tepkisine neden olmuştur.1961 Anayasası ve yeni seçim sistemi sayesinde parlamentoda ilk kez İslami referanslara sahip Milli Nizam Partisi temsil olanağı bulmuştur. Böylece İslamcı kimliğe sahip Milli Görüş geleneği ortaya çıkmış ve bu geleneğin partileri Türk siyasal yaşamında etkin olmuştur. Neoliberal politikaların benimsenmesi, SSCB'nin yıkılması ve sol-sağ çatışmasının güç kaybetmesi Milli Görüş partilerinin güç kazanmasını sağlamıştır. Ancak 28 Şubat süreci Milli Görüş içinde derin bir sarsıntı yaratarak bölünmenin önünü açmıştır. Milli Görüş partileri içinden ortaya çıkan AK Parti ile birlikte İslamcılık akımı yeni bir aşamaya geçmiştir. AK Parti, İslamcı söylemleri terk ederek daha kapsayıcı bir politika izlemiş ve laik sınırlar içinde dindar bir toplum yaratma hedefini benimsemiştir.

This Element tackles the question of how – in what way, and in virtue of what – facts about the legal properties and relations of particulars (such as their rights, duties, powers, etc.) are metaphysically explained. This question is divided into two separate issues. First, the Element focuses on the nature of the explanatory relation connecting legal facts to their metaphysical determinants. Second, it looks into the kinds of entities that figure in the explanation of legal facts. In doing so, special attention is paid to the role that laws, or legal norms, play in such explanations. As it turns out, there are different ways in which legal facts might be explained, all of which have something to be said in their favor, and none of which is immune from problems.

Seneca, abordado por el pensador Ivan Dario Carmona en su obra: Seneca – conciencia y dra-ma (2008), nos presenta unos fundamentos muy significativos de su filosofia, que posibi-litan posteriormente entender la concepcion que tiene sobre el tema “El cuidado de si”, po-sible de lograrlo una vez que se tenga juicio cri-tico y apropiacion de los referentes claves de su pensamiento, planteados en este articulo res-pecto a: ubicacion historica, sobre la virtud, el logos: razon, naturaleza, Dios, la sabiduria como arte de vivir y la virtud como acontecimiento. A partir de la fundamentacion que Seneca plantea sobre los temas mencionados, Ivan Dario Carmona trae en la obra citada, los contenidos basicos en los cuales nos pre-senta a Seneca, filosofo, haciendo alusion al pensamiento griego y replanteando la pos-tura propia sobre el hombre de su tiempo en su problematica existencial en relacion a la vida moral, su etica y llegar al “cuidado de si”.

Este artigo aborda os fatos constitucionais morais e a contribuição dos amici curiae para o julgamento dessa temática perante o Supremo Tribunal Federal. Considerando que os fatos constitucionais morais dizem respeito a discussões jurídicas sobre normas e valores estabelecidos, por vezes esbarrando em aspectos éticos e religiosos, questiona-se se a participação desses intervenientes é suficiente para auxiliar o tribunal a estar pronto para decidir. A reflexão parte das premissas de que a intervenção dos amici curiae, além de assegurar a transposição de conhecimento técnico especializado para os tribunais, é também forma de representação, perante as cortes, de interesses da sociedade, em abertura ao diálogo democrático.

e até um ensaio sobre "A Sujeição das Mulheres" (1869), a maior parte dos quais não está traduzida em português. Este ecletismo intelectual era mais a regra do que a excepção, no século XIX, quando a maior parte das ciências sociais ainda estava por se autonomizar, abrangendo a Filosofia e a Filosofia Social preocupações que hoje pertencem ao domínio da Economia, da Sociologia e da Ciência Política. Por isso não é de estranhar que obras de fundo económico -como a "Riqueza das Nações" de Adam Smith, ou os "Princípios de Economia Política" de J. S. Mill -incluam análises e reflexões sociológicas ou politológicas, merecendo portanto mais atenção do que é costume dar-lhes, por parte de sociólogos e politólogos. É sabido como J. S. Mill foi influenciado por seu pai, James Mill, em cujas relações se encontravam figuras tão marcantes como Bentham e Ricardo. Não admira portanto que ambos estes autores tenham exercido uma influência real sobre o pensamento de J. S. Mill, mas terá igualmente de se reconhecer que, com o passar dos anos, Mill se foi autonomizando dessas influências, estabelecendo relações intelectuais com autores muito diversos desses, como foi o caso de Augusto Comte. Não tendo sido uma figura decisiva na evolução do pensamento social, J. S. Mill é no entanto particularmente atraente pela sua total falta de dogmatismo. Colocado entre os pensadores liberais, Mill manifestou no entanto uma capacidade pouco usual para perceber o socialismo e as suas motivações, sem nunca ter aderido a essa corrente de pensamento. Particularmente fascinado com as ideias de Owen, Saint Simon e Fourier, não deixou, no entanto, de emitir reservas de uma clarividência rara sobre o socialismo. Ao mesmo tempo racional e emotivo nas suas análises, é ainda com prazer que se lê, ou relê, este autor inglês. Seria mais lógico que uma análise politológica dos escritos de J. S. Mill se fizesse a partir das "Considerações sobre o Governo Representativo". No entanto, e talvez até por ter passado mais desapercebido, pareceu-nos que um pequeno capítulo sobre a Propriedade, do Livro II dos "Princípios de Economia Política", poderia ser mais interessante para a compreensão do pensamento de Mill, na esfera da politologia. O problema da propriedade foi visto no século XIX como central, no campo das ciências sociais, dada a influência que o seu regime poderia ter, não só na organização da sociedade, mas também para a resolução dos graves problemas sociais de todos reconhecidos. Alguns autores, como Proudhon e Marx, dedicaram-lhe uma parte importante do seu trabalho intelectual, mas até autores tão distantes

State Conservatory of Music ... e fare come Ii arcieri prudenti, a' quali parendo ellaco dove disegnona ferire troppa lantana, e canascendo fino a quanta va la virtu del lora arco, pongono la mira assai piu alta che illoco destinato, non per aggiugnere con la loro freccia a tanta altezza, ma per potert', con 10 aiuto di sf alta mira, pervenire al disegna lora. (N. Machiavelli, II principe)l I n order to understand history, values and trends of musical studies in Italy, one must consider certain fundamental aspects: 1. The necessity to distinguish, within the generic expression musical studies, between the two components of instrumental instruction and musicological studies. Instrumental instruction (which I will call from now on musical studies tout court), is something one can pursue at the Conservatory of Music and will be the object of this exploration. Musicological studies, on the contrary, fall within the competence of Universities. 2 I think there's the need of this distinction both for clarity 1 n Let him act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach" [author'S translation]. 2The penetration of musicological research in the University system is relatively recent. The first professorship of History of Music was given, in 1941, to Torrefranca, in the University of Florence.

QUADERNI FIORENTINI per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno 54 (2025) PIER GIUSEPPE PUGGIONI IL GIURISTA DEMIURGO. PLURALISMO, SOVRANITÀ E POLITICA DEL DIRITTO IN FILIPPO VASSALLI 1. Premesse. Vassalli nella teoria del diritto del primo Novecento.-2. Diritto romano, diritto comune e uso delle fonti nelle allegazioni processuali di Vassalli.-3. Il diritto dello Stato come ius proprium: il discorso pluralistico di Vassalli.-4. Il ruolo del giurista nella costruzione dell'ordine: l'unità del diritto e il problema della sovranità.-5. Non più « strumento d'una classe dominante »? Liberalismo, proprietà e politica del diritto.

Na Alemanha, a dogmática constitucional ocupa posição central no discurso sobre o direito constitucional, especialmente como instância de mediação entre a doutrina acadêmica e a jurisprudência do Tribunal Constitucional Federal. A distinção entre dogmática voltada à prática e dogmática acadêmica, bem como entre dogmática produzida por operadores e por estudiosos do direito, permite reconstruir a genealogia do pensamento jurídico-dogmático desde o século XIX. A dogmática caracteriza-se por quatro traços fundamentais: toma como objeto apenas o direito vigente; orienta-se à aplicação do direito; parte da ideia de um sistema normativo abrangente; e é focada em regras. Tais elementos lhe conferem a capacidade de produzir saber prático, ainda que seu estatuto, como fonte do direito, permaneça controverso. Sua influência contingente na jurisprudência constitucional alemã decorre também da atuação de juízes com perfil acadêmico. Frente à incorporação do direito europeu e às tensões com a política constitucional, o discurso dogmático revela seus limites.

Норберт Винер, основоположник кибернетики, в своей работе "Моральные последствия автоматизации" поднимает важные вопросы о влиянии автоматизации на общество и моральные нормы. В условиях стремительного технологического прогресса, Винер акцентирует внимание на том, что автоматизация не только меняет экономические реалии, но и ставит перед человечеством новые этические вызовы.

Recent scholarship by Rahman and collaborators, inspired by Suhrawardī's Illuminationism, has undertaken a dialectical expansion of Avicenna's logic, opening new avenues for exploring both its potentials and limitations. This project is particularly significant in light of Avicenna's dismissal of dialectical reasoning within Islamic debate theory (Risāla fī taʿaqqub al-mawḍiʿ al-jadalī), 1 revealing what he took to be a tension between the formal rigor of logic and the, according to him, vague features of Islamic debate practice.

Can neurological evidence help courts assess criminal responsibility? To answer this question, we must first specify legal criteria for criminal responsibility and then ask how neurological findings can be used to determine whether particular defendants meet those criteria. Cognitive neuroscience may speak to at least two familiar conditions of criminal responsibility: intention and sanity. Functional neuroimaging studies in motor planning, awareness of actions, agency, social contract reasoning, and theory of mind, among others, have recently targeted a small assortment of brain networks thought to be instrumental in such determinations. Advances in each of these areas bring specificity to the problems underlying the application of neuroscience to criminal law.

Este ensaio, escrito por ocasião do desassossegado ano de 2022, momento de várias tensões no cenário nacional, mas, também, de várias efemérides para o Brasil. 200 anos da independência, 100 anos do nascimento de Darcy Ribeiro, mas, também, centenário da turnê dos Oito Batutas em Paris, da Exposição Internacional de 1922 e da Semana de Arte Moderna. Todos esses registros são marcas significativas à identidade brasileira, momentos de sua (re)fundação, interpretação e disputa por ela. São episódios ligados à modernização fundamentalmente contraditória e, por que não, dialética da sociedade, da vida e existência cultural do país.
Os ventos dos anos 1920, tão transformadores em todo o mundo, não pararam no Brasil de 1922, mas seguiram se alimentando, retroalimentando e transmudando. Foram tocados na música fundadora de Villa-Lobos e Pixinguinha e na de seus tantos sucessores. Continuaram na arquitetura de Lucio Costa e Oscar Niemeyer e nas artes plásticas de Tarsila do Amaral, Di Cavalcanti e Portinari. Nas letras, são ventos que seguem soprando para além de Mário e Oswald de Andrade, chegando também à geração de 1930 de Graciliano Ramos, Carlos Drummond de Andrade, Rachel de Queiroz e Jorge Amado, bem como à de 1945 de João Cabral de Melo Neto, Guimarães Rosa e Clarice Lispector, muitas vezes negando e algo afirmando os ares anteriores.
Esses ventos também estiveram nas leituras antropológicas e sociológicas do Brasil. São do Brasil moderno/izador as construções de Gilberto Freyre, Caio Prado Júnior, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda. Mais que isso, é possível dizer que até mesmo a própria conformação da tradição de intérpretes do Brasil, da qual o festejado Darcy é das figuras solares, é legado desse curso cultural. Interpretações que ao mesmo tempo em que buscaram desvendar e compreender a identidade brasileira, forjaram e fundiram-na, na medida em que a foram conformando, disputando e construindo.
Não é de 1922, mas de 1928, o Manifesto Antropófago (ou Manifesto Antropofágico) no qual Oswald de Andrade “resolve com graça e sem vergonha alguma por meio da reversão antropofágica, da poesia-exportação” o imbróglio do modernismo brasileiro (Wisnik): “Só a antropofagia nos une. Socialmente. Economicamente. Philosophicamente” (Andrade).
Além de Oswald, antropofágico também foi/é Macunaíma, o herói sem nenhum caráter, na leitura/conformação da identidade brasileira feita por Mario de Andrade. Foi/é antropofágico o Darcy Ribeiro antropólogo, mas também o de Maíra (Tupi or not tupi); Glauber Rocha e todos os do Cinema Novo; Caetano Veloso, Gilberto Gil e todos os Tropicalistas; e tantos outros que, deglutindo e digerindo, devorando e subvertendo aquilo que era estrangeiro, foram formulando o Brasil.
Talvez também seja esse o destino ou, pelo menos, a possibilidade de nossa identidade constitucional. Na antropofagia e no cruzo, ser aquilo que é, tornando-se melhor naquilo que ainda está por ser.
Se o constitucionalismo não é por definição brasileiro, ele também o é na medida em que é devorado, desconstruído e reconstruído, na aspiração de apresentar um projeto que consiga se fazer legítimo quer enquanto constitucional, quer enquanto brasileiro. É na tensão do contrafactual (pretensamente) universal com o concreto particular, nesse ritual diário de devoração, que se transforma e é (re)construído em algo novo.
Construir e, potencialmente, efetivar um projeto constitucional brasileiro é tomar como nosso algo da identidade do constitucionalismo, tornando-a outra coisa, a partir de nossas próprias identidades, circunstâncias e vivências. É no cruzo entre essas identidades, sobretudo, na vivência sempre renovada e reconfigurada delas, que se pode aspirar uma identidade constitucional brasileira própria.

The publication in 2024 of the first Polish translation of the dialogue of the Italian physician and humanist Battista Fiera entitled De iustitia pingenda, edited by Professor Jerzy Zajadło, is one of the most important scientific events related to Polish research on the aesthetics of law. The fictional conversation that the Renaissance artist Andrea Mantegna has with the Greek satyre idol Momus provides an opportunity to develop some themes related to the ways in which Justice has been depicted over the centuries. However, it is surprising that the dialogue between Momus and Mantegna turns out not to be a conversation only about art. The tenor of the debate and its dynamics evolve. From issues related to the legal iconography, the interlocutors move on to dissect fundamental matters. These include life and death, the meaning and meaninglessness of human existence, the causality and lack of causality of man confronted with the eternal laws of nature, etc.

The Nishanth Effect is introduced as a corrective doctrine within the Indian justice system, designed to liberate truth from the constraints of rigid procedural finality. While existing legal safeguards emphasize negative freedoms for the accused (such as double jeopardy or the right to silence), this doctrine advances a positive legal freedom: the freedom of truth itself to operate in law. A key premise is that credible evidence is equal to complete evidence-provided it is corroborated by date, time, forensic verification, and independent judicial oversight. This prevents the misuse of late-emerging evidence while preserving the system's legitimacy. The Nishanth Effect therefore unites mercy (for the wrongfully convicted) and punishment (for the guilty who escaped), reshaping victimology, humanism, and deterrence under a single legal framework. Safeguards such as the one-time rule, oversight panels, and penalties for fabrication ensure that the doctrine strengthens justice without destabilizing courts. This paper positions the Nishanth Effect as a post-positivist, humanist contribution rejecting legal positivism where it silences truth, while reforming procedure to remain workable. It is proposed as a model of legal freedom: emancipating victims, innocents, society, and even law itself from procedural tyranny.

In this essay, I aim to reflect on the "Singapore Model", which Danilo Zolo evokes at the end of Democracy and Complexity (Il principato democratico). The focus of my reflection will revolve around the impact of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs) on contemporary democracies: I will ask how the evolution of information processing and dissemination technologies affects democratic processes. The conclusion of my reasoning is that a thorough reflection on the scope of ICT in the democratic sphere could lead to repositioning, if not downsizing, some of the critical issues that filtered through Zolo's speech.

This study focuses on interpretive sociology, employing ethnography, ethnomethodology, and phenomenology to contextualize the India-Pakistan conflict that occurred in August. Notably, two memes from social media were analyzed, and their sociological significance is presented in the paper. The study demonstrates the powerful application of sociology in understanding digital cultural expressions and public sentiment in real-world conflicts.

Excerpt from the Annual Survey of Indian Law on 'Constitutional Law-I 2023'. This part examines two decisions rendered by two different benches of the Supreme Court in 2023 and highlights the strikingly contrasting approach adopted by them: Pesala Nookaraju v. State of A.P. (2023) decided by a three judge bench and Ameena Begum v. State of Telengana (2023) decided by a two judge bench.

12. Acerca de las diferencias en las tesis constructivistas que NIÑO marca frente a RAWLS y HABERMAS en el plano ontológico y epistemológico, véase El constructivismo..., op. cit., pp. 93-110 y The Constitution of Deliverative Democracy, Newhaven, Londres, Yalc University Press, 1996, pp. 107-117. 13. Ética y derechos humanos, pp. 163 y ss., donde se da cuenta de las inconsecuencias de RAWLS frente a los desafíos relativistas y que analizamos al tratar la polémica de NIÑO contra las posturas comunitaristas.

Der Essay stellt Hegels revolutionäres Engagement 1789ff und seine Verarbeitung des Revolutionsverlaufs dar. Davon ausgehend entwickelt er die These, dass es das Scheitern der Revolution war, das Hegel dazu veranlasste, von der Politik zur Philosophie überzuwechseln: Als Philosoph sei Hegel zwar Revolutionär geblieben – aber gerade das habe ihn zu seinem System geführt, das die modernen Herrschaftsverhältnisse affirmierte. Dieser Widerspruch zwischen radikaler Kritik und Glorifizierung der Moderne, der zuerst von Marx herausgearbeitet worden sei, sei zentral für das Verständnis von Hegels Philosophie sowie für die Anknüpfung an sie, zum Beispiel in feministischen und antirassistischen Diskussionen. Aus diesem Widerspruch wird schließlich auch der bis heute fortwirkende Streit zwischen Links- und Rechtshegelianismus erklärt.

Nesta segunda edição de Nietzsche-Schopenhauer: ecologia cinza,
natureza agônica, penetramos novamente no terreno vasto e tortuoso
dos pensamentos de Nietzsche e Schopenhauer, que, como
dois faróis antagônicos, iluminam a compreensão da existência humana
e da relação entre o ser humano e a natureza. Esta edição
marca um avanço significativo na jornada intelectual do Apoena:
Grupo de Estudos Schopenhauer-Nietzsche. Agora, adotamos a
forma do e-book, que é capaz de ir muito além das limitações físicas
da impressão tradicional. Neste formato digital, a presente obra
se liberta das fronteiras geográficas, podendo alcançar um público
bem mais amplo, composto de mentes ávidas por se aventurar nos
universos de Schopenhauer e Nietzsche. Assim, em um mundo
cada vez mais conectado e entrelaçado, as ideias contidas nestas
páginas podem alimentar reflexões e discussões, expandindo as
fronteiras do pensamento e demonstrando que a filosofia, como
a ecologia cinza que Nietzsche e Schopenhauer nos apontam, é
um desafio constante e intrinsecamente agônico. Que esta edição
eletrônica seja, portanto, uma ponte para um público mais amplo,
uma lanterna para os interessados em Nietzsche e Schopenhauer
e um tributo à problematização crítica do caos e da complexidade
do mundo.

In light of the urgency posed by ecological concerns, it becomes increasingly important to consider how the proliferation of scientific ideas for legal innovation can manifest as legal reality. This is undoubtedly a question for legal theory. This paper contends that the legal philosophical issue of how ideas evolve into laws can be enriched by the philosophy of science. The emerging field of Earth System Law (ESL) is utilised as a case study, subjecting it to Thomas Kuhn's theory of paradigm shifts. The legal theoretical foundation combines Niklas Luhmann's autopoietic systems theory with Bruno Latour's theory of modes of existence to analyse how scientific facts may become legal norms. The article presents three arguments. The first is that new legal ideas from academia, such as ESL, must be situated within the science system rather than the legal one. Second, inspired by Kuhn and complemented by Michel Serres, it is posited that these ideas can be fruitfully understood as competing paradigms within a disciplinary crisis, aiming to effect a paradigm shift within 'normal' environmental law. Finally, the question of how academic theories can translate into positive law is addressed by highlighting the similarities and differences between scientific and legal arguments.

Die Vorlesung fragt nach dem Verhältnis von Recht und Gerechtigkeit und den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines Naturrechts in der antiken Philosophie und in der Hebräischen Bibel sowie in neuzeitlicher Philosophie und in moderner Rechtstheorie des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts

АКТУАЛЬНЫЕ ВОПРОСЫ ПУБЛИЧНОГО ПРАВА КОНСТИТУЦИОННОЕ ПРАВО других норм этой системы; 2) это множество норм выделяется на фоне других норм, помимо прочего за счет способа создания этого множества, т. е. за счет его специфической формы. 3 Некая система права может не иметь формальной конституции. Также возможно (по меньшей мере, теоретически), что формальная конституция не облечена в форму текста. С учетом этих оговорок мы ограничим наше последующее изложение только замечаниями о писаных формальных конституциях, которые сегодня встречаются чаще всего. 4 Образующие формальную конституцию тексты зачастую имеют свои особенности. Именно эти тексты дают повод для предположений о том, гипотеза называется Кельзеном «основной нормой». Она не подразумевает какого-либо морального подтекста рассматриваемой системы и служит исключительно для определения объекта исследования.

El soft law ad intra.-III. El soft law ad extra.-IV. El soft law en cuanto avance del hard law.-V. El soft law en cuanto alternativa al hard law.-VI. El soft law en cuanto complemento del hard law.-VII. El soft law en cuanto parámetro de interpretación del hard law.-VIII. Los efectos jurídicos del soft law.-IX. La impugnabilidad del soft law.-X. Un significativo ejemplo del alcance del soft law comunitario en el Derecho español: la STC 224/1999, de 13 de diciembre, sobre acoso sexual.

This work deals with Kant’s treatment of the phenomenon of
boredom in his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View.
In this sense, it should be recognized that there is no main
discussion among contemporary interpreters in this respect,
since they all agree on the negative character of the pain that
is proper to boredom and its intimate relationship with the
temporal dimension. However, such interpreters have not noticed
the relation between boredom and the importance of taking
advantage of the time one has while living in the development
of one’s abilities, whether bodily or spiritual, as a duty in the
pragmatic sense intimately linked to the phenomenon of boredom.

This article shows how the Court accommodated abortion within the Convention by remaining silent on the unborn child’s status and leaving States to define whether the unborn qualifies as a "person." The Court consistently ruled that the Convention does not confer a "right to abortion" and allowed a margin of appreciation for States to regulate abortion while controlling that national frameworks comply with its interpretation of the Convention. This involves balancing the competing rights of the mother, the unborn child, social interests, such as limiting abortions and protecting morals, and others. The article also highlights contentious issues like forced abortions, eugenic practices, and discriminatory abortions based on gender or disability.

Private law regulates the resolution of conflicts between private entities who engage in legal actions due to alleged harm or loss. Private law theory analyzes the principles and foundations of the various disciplines within private law. One of the key inquiries in this field is the purpose of private law itself, which involves multiple, potentially conflicting interpretations of justice. It is crucial to determine which interpretation should prevail and whether justice is the sole value when resolving disputes between private individuals, or if other considerations are relevant. This chapter explores these issues from the perspective of the Jewish legal tradition. It examines a variety of Jewish law sources in light of contemporary discussions in private law theory, aiming to uncover novel perspectives on both Jewish law and private law theory. The discussion begins with an overview of key questions debated among private law theorists, forming the foundation for examining various issues in Jewish law.

Contextualização: O trabalho contextualiza o debate em torno do positivismo jurídico ao apresentar a proposta de Jeremy Waldron, que transforma a tese descritiva da separação entre direito e moral em uma defesa normativa voltada às democracias constitucionais contemporâneas.

Objetivo: O objetivo do presente artigo é apresentar uma introdução ao positivismo jurídico normativo de Jeremy Waldron, teoria que busca articular o positivismo, até então uma tese descritiva por excelência, com uma tese prescritiva acerca do Direito.

Método: O presente estudo adota o método de pesquisa teórico-bibliográfico, fundamentado na análise crítica da literatura especializada em filosofia do direito e teoria jurídica. A abordagem é de caráter analítico e prescritivo, na medida em que busca não apenas descrever conceitos, mas também discutir seus fundamentos normativos e implicações para a teoria democrática e para o controle de constitucionalidade.

Resultados: O artigo conclui que a teoria normativa de Jeremy Waldron reafirma a separação entre direito e moral como requisito democrático, ao sustentar que o Poder Legislativo, por sua legitimidade representativa, deve prevalecer sobre o Judiciário na resolução de desacordos morais fundamentais.

The contemporary law and administration in common with other branches of
knowledge have strong impacts of ‘positivism’ that spearheaded the rise and fall of
modernism. Methodologically, there is little distinctions and divergence between Modernity
and its 21st century successor, namely, post-modernism manifested in legal pluralism. The
concept, ‘Law as social Rules’ has clear pedigree in British empiricism and uninterrupted lineage in the American and Continental European jurisprudential imaginations. Thus, H.L.A. Hart remains one of the central point of references and teachings for scholars today. The theory constructed, on the professed denouncements of previous theories and their central suppositions has resurrected the similar archetypes and social moorings. However, in this process, concept of rules described by H.L.A. Hart revolutionises the idea of “advanced and organized Modernity”. The subsequent and contemporary writers have tried and struggled hard to answer the questions raised by H.L.A. Hart about the subjects of law, morality, judicial process, coercion, or authority, etc. In the process, the theory has lively and lasting effects on the development and understanding of law. This paper provides the descriptive insights of the theory of law expounded by H.L.A. Hart along with raising a few unsolved questions, especially what motivates one to obey the system of rules and to what extent an internal perspective of law has succeeded in allaying the psychology of fear, which has been central motivation to construct the foundations of legal positivism in the philosophies and legal theories constructed by Thomas Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham, and John Austin, etc. H.L.A. Hart introduced a soft version of legal positivism, but somehow, he could not escape from the hardest truth about the fear psychosis, central to the civilizing process penetrated in the minds and hearts in the epoch-making age of disciplinary form of governance.

The COVID-19 pandemic severely affected India and Puerto Rico despite their crucial roles in the global pharmaceutical supply chain. This article identifies the core issue behind the pandemic's mismanagement as dispossession by production, a form of value extraction rooted in global capitalist practices supported by colonial-legal arrangements involving local states, pharmaceutical corporations, and transnational organisations. Existing scholarship has focused on the roles of the WTO, COVAX, and WHO, as well as vaccine apartheid between the Global North and South. This article examines the socio-spatial dynamics that led to the paradoxical situation where India and Puerto Rico-two key nodes of global pharmaceutical production-lacked access to essential medical equipment needed to address the pandemic. The article demonstrates how the pharmaceutical industry undermines the Global South's public health systems by engaging in extreme value extraction while denying local populations access to the very products their states manufacture.

The right to resist has been a paradigmatic issue in Italian legal philosophy of the XXth century. Leading authors have explored its meaning from their own theoretical perspectives, by pointing out the relationship and differences between resistance and similar notions (like conscientious objection, civil disobedience, and contestation), and by investigating the foundation of the resistance to political power, and the limits of its legitimacy. That debate turns out to shed light not only on a basic category of legal, political, moral, and theological thought, but also on a crossroads in the recent history of legal philosophy.

For centuries, the legal maxim "justice delayed is justice denied" has shaped legal thought across jurisdictions. The Nishanth Effect challenges this assumption by introducing a paradox: acquittals achieved through legitimate legal means can still conceal guilt, and delay may not always deny justice but instead reveal it. Drawing from philosophy, psychology, sociology, and law, this paper proposes a new framework for understanding the interplay between truth, authority, and time. It highlights the psychological dimensions of innocence and guilt, critiques the blind repetition of legal proverbs, and situates the theory within M. N. Roy's Radical Humanism. By unmasking the gap between legal authority and truth, the Nishanth Effect asserts that justice, though delayed, may still arrive with dignity restored.