Social Epistemology

El falibilismo no es debilidad: es una forma de pensar con otros sin clausurar el juicio. El texto explora cómo reconocer la posibilidad de error no implica renunciar a la razón, sino asumirla como práctica abierta, revisable y compartida. Se analiza el vínculo entre falibilismo y deliberación, mostrando que el desacuerdo no se resuelve por imposición, sino por hospitalidad epistémica. Pensar falibilistamente es sostener nuestras razones sin convertirlas en dogma, y abrir espacio para que otras razones también pesen.

522 523 kontrastieren und so die Verhältnisse aus der Balance bringen. Und Gayle Salamon rekonstruiert die Blickregime transphobischer Gewalt, um die präreflexiven sedimentierten Vorurteile und Herrschaftsstrukturen sozialer Gewalt sichtbar zu machen und deren leibkörperliche Folgen für Subjekte zu untersuchen. 112 Diese Beispiele sind nicht singulär. Sie sind Teil einer sich in den letzten Jahren erneuernden und sich politisierenden Phänomenologie. 113 Sie mögen als Ansätze für einen Dialog zwischen Phänomenologie und Kritischer Theorie dienen, den trotz seiner bruchstückhaften Geschichte fortzusetzen sich lohnt. Die Hoffnung darauf wird dadurch bestärkt, dass auch die jüngere Kritische Theorie ihrerseits in Aussicht stellt, auf »Formen situierter theoretischer Anstrengung« 114 zu bauen und die »Haltung der Philosophie« 115 zu Pluralität, Differenz, Kontingenz und Heterogenität in der Erfahrung zu verankern, was womöglich in einen produktiven Austausch mit einer politischen Phänomenologie der Haltung zu bringen wäre. 116

El nacionalismo promete pertenencia, pero a menudo clausura el juicio. El texto analiza cómo las narrativas nacionalistas simplifican la pluralidad moral y epistémica, apelando a una identidad homogénea que excluye la diferencia. Se explora la tensión entre comunidad y crítica, mostrando que pensar desde el nosotros no implica renunciar al disenso. Contra el nacionalismo, se propone una ética del reconocimiento que sostenga la complejidad sin convertirla en amenaza. Pensar juntos no exige pensar igual.

La autoridad epistémica no se impone: se construye. El texto analiza cómo ciertos discursos pseudocientíficos imitan las formas del saber sin asumir sus exigencias. Se explora la figura del charlatán como síntoma de una crisis de confianza, donde la apariencia de rigor suplanta el juicio. Más que falsedad, lo que está en juego es la performatividad del saber: cómo se presenta, cómo se valida, cómo se consume. Pensar críticamente implica distinguir entre lo que convence y lo que merece ser creído.

La figura del charlatán no encarna solo el engaño, sino una forma de autoridad que simula saber sin someterse al juicio. El texto analiza cómo la pseudociencia opera en el espacio público, apelando a la verosimilitud y al afecto antes que a la evidencia. Se explora la tensión entre el saber técnico y la confianza epistémica, mostrando que el problema no es solo lo falso, sino lo que se presenta como razonable sin serlo. Pensar críticamente implica distinguir entre el peso de las razones y el ruido de las apariencias.

The major ethical theories---welfarist consequentialism, Kantianism, contractualism, common sense morality, and virtue ethics---appear to converge on the same practical advice in many situations. Such convergence seems epistemically significant. A natural thought would be that the convergence should assure us about the advice. However, what would be the rationale behind this---why should the convergence increase our assurance? That's the main question we pursue in this paper. As the question is only sparsely addressed in the existing literature, we begin by detailing various kinds and structures of convergence. In relation, we propose a specific way to think about the epistemic significance of convergence. The remainder of the paper is primarily negative. We argue that even granting nonskeptical assumptions that are common in moral epistemology, the epistemic significance of convergence is harder to account for than most would probably think.

This essay analyses how social platforms operate as ontopolitical infrastructures whose ontotechnical design reallocates the conditions and costs of proof. By indexing value to attention capture-clicks, shares, dwell time-they privilege the performative efficacy of adherence over epistemic validity, making functional falsehood operationally superior. In this environment, filters of appearance and retentional efficacy displace confrontation with evidence, destabilizing classical accounts of truth (correspondence, coherence, pragmatism, truth as event). Empirically, statistical learning without understanding amplifies emotionally charged content and produces authorless falsity by design rather than intention. The essay proposes an operative program: friction algorithms and sustained verification time; binding multistakeholder governance (audits ex ante/ex post, objective-function transparency, model/version registries, redress); digital public goods (open provenance protocols, trust graphs, evidence repositories); and critical literacies with counter-algorithmic practices that redistribute the cost of proof. Reframing critique as intervention at the level of infrastructure, it concludes that public reason must be materially engineered so that truth regains a right it has been algorithmically denied: the right to spend time.

La adversarialidad ha sido vista como rasgo distintivo del ejercicio filosófico: argumentar, refutar, vencer. El texto interroga esta tradición, preguntando si pensar juntos exige necesariamente confrontación. Se analiza cómo el desacuerdo puede operar desde la hospitalidad intelectual, sin renunciar al rigor. La filosofía, en este marco, no se define por la victoria argumentativa, sino por la apertura al otro, incluso cuando no hay acuerdo. Pensar con otros implica sostener la diferencia sin convertirla en amenaza.

La democracia no se define solo por sus procedimientos, sino por las condiciones epistémicas que permiten el juicio colectivo. El texto analiza cómo el diseño institucional influye en la calidad del desacuerdo, la circulación de razones y la posibilidad de deliberación. Frente a modelos ideales que suponen ciudadanos racionales y bien informados, se propone una mirada más modesta: reconocer los límites cognitivos, afectivos y estructurales que atraviesan la práctica democrática. Pensar el diseño epistémico implica preguntarse no solo cómo decidimos, sino cómo pensamos juntos.

Picking up on Olof Hallonsten's contention that contemporary science evaluation is 'mostly counterproductive', we argue that the contemporary focus on evaluation is antagonistic to innovation or novelty in science, even though innovation is one of the values that evaluation is often supposed to support. In arguing for the antagonistic relation between evaluation and innovation, we consider arguments from the nature of audit and the situational logic of scientific practice.

Преимущества самообучающихся систем Главная идея Винера заключается в том, что такая машина может самостоятельно анализировать свой опыт, находить ошибки и совершенствовать алгоритмы действий. Он приводит пример, где система всего за двадцать часов работы способна достичь уровня, превосходящего навыки своего создателя. Это открывает огромные перспективы для автоматизации, позволяя значительно повышать эффективность процессов без постоянного участия человека.

Преимущества самообучающихся систем Главная идея Винера заключается в том, что такая машина может самостоятельно анализировать свой опыт, находить ошибки и совершенствовать алгоритмы действий. Он приводит пример, где система всего за двадцать часов работы способна достичь уровня, превосходящего навыки своего создателя. Это открывает огромные перспективы для автоматизации, позволяя значительно повышать эффективность процессов без постоянного участия человека.

Generations of China anthropologists have complained about the marginality of Chinese research in general debates in anthropology. One reason for this malaise may be that anthropologists of China did not get the balance of context and substance right. Either they adopted context created by other disciplines (for instance, to describe the setting of a village ethnography), or they focused merely on context (when providing commentaries on social change). Both approaches typically fail to capture social complexity. To approach social complexity, we need to bracket the problem of ‘context’, and instead follow actors in their own practices of attention, through the resonances that background and foreground action. Such an approach is not necessarily related to ‘China’ and never exhaustively given in ‘texts’, but it requires the analyst to attend to the forces of simplification in action and in analysis, against which it is possible to measure complexity.

The contemporary Nigerian society is faced with several societal cum religious challenges amongst many other challenges facing her. This paper tries to x-ray some of those socio-political, socio-cultural as well as the socio-religious challenges by looking into some of those Igbo traditional or cultural practices as well as how these traditional practices or foremost ways of living could become  possible solution to the very many moral crisis facing our today Nigerian society. The emphasis here is on revitalizing those our core moral African values through these 'forgotten or passing' Igbo traditional Practices. A critical method of inquiry is employed in this discourse. The paper concludes by citing few of the Igbo traditional practices and how they have aided the primitive Igbo society as well as how they could be a solution to today modernized Nigerian society in resuscitating the dying moral values.

You learn that you disagree about P with someone who—according to your evidence—should be your equal in discerning whether P. Some argue that rationality requires weighing your judgment and your Peer’s judgment equally. I show that this ‘equal weight view’ requires the undefended stipulation that your evidence suggests zero correlation between your success in initially determining whether P and your success in reevaluating P in the face of Peer Disagreement. I describe a Peer Disagreement in which self-trust is rationally mandated, given that this further stipulation fails. Finally, I suggest that default, asymmetric self-trust in the face of Peer Disagreement is justified, given a reasonable expectation of a baseline correlation between success in initial determinations whether P and success in reevaluations of P in the face of Peer Disagreement.

La injusticia epistémica (IE) constituye una forma de discriminación que, aunque en principio puede afectar a cualquier individuo, se manifiesta predominantemente contra aquellos asociados con grupos marginados. Se parte de la premisa de que la teorización sobre la IE, junto con conceptos relacionados —como el de injusticia cognitiva, por ejemplo— puede servir para esclarecer diversas formas de opresión. Cuando se observa el discurso académico en torno a la IE, puede verse que se han realizado valiosas propuestas de diversos estudiosos del tema; sin embargo la investigación se ha centrado principalmente en delinear y otorgar contenido práctico al concepto al revelar sus múltiples manifestaciones. Aún persiste una notable ausencia de un marco teórico que proporcione una clasificación exhaustiva o que al menos permita articular las variadas formas en que ocurre el fenómeno. El presente estudio, fundamentado en una extensa revisión de trabajos en los que se tratan tipologías y enfoques para comprender el fenómeno, busca contribuir a cerrar esta brecha. En ese sentido se presenta una propuesta conceptual ampliada de la IE —originada en el acceso, producción y reproducción del conocimiento— que termina en una categorización que, aunque abarca las variedades de IE identificadas en la literatura, se presenta como un marco abierto, con la intención y aspiración explícitas de que pueda albergar también cualquier ulterior manifestación del fenómeno que pueda ser revelada en otras investigaciones. Para estos fines se ha conceptualizado la transacción epistémica como el proceso central alrededor del cual ocurren las diversas manifestaciones de IE, y se propone, consecuentemente, la injusticia pre-transaccional, transaccional y post-transaccional como categorías primarias.

Fogelin (Informal Logic 7:1-8, 1985) puts forth the notion of "deep disagreements" in the context of the discussion on informal logic and the scope and functions of argumentation. My aim is to contrast some of the assumptions that led Fogelin to a restrictive model about the uses of argumentation and deep disagreements, resolution model based on some of Fogelin's ideas: those in disagreement are interested in grammatical model the idea of open disagreements. The model also points out the diverse purposes as rational seeing and understanding the moral issue under discussion.

A correct externalist theory of reference does not allow us to claim that texts generated by artificial intelligence (AI) are meaningful in the full sense of the word. Within such a theory, context carries a normative dimension to which AI lacks sensitivity. Nevertheless, AI-generated texts can be considered partially mean-ingful in a pragmatic and functional sense.

El presente trabajo discute a partir de una revisión general de la historia
de Baja California Sur, los límites del mito legitimador del Estado nación
según el cual esta institución, de forma autónoma, ejerce una dominación
absoluta sobre un espacio determinado, tanto de los sujetos que ahí habitan como de sus recursos naturales a partir de la implementación del
proyecto racional de sus líderes políticos. Dicha discusión se organiza en
torno a dos ideas centrales: en primer lugar, la idea de la racionalidad de
los proyectos de dominación estatales que se imponen sobre un espacio
de forma apegada a las intenciones e intereses de los líderes políticos, en
un triunfo de la mente sobre la naturaleza, noción básica dentro del pensamiento occidental. En segundo lugar, la premisa de la autonomía del
Estado nación respecto de otras organizaciones sociales a quienes vence
y controla. La tesis principal del trabajo sostiene que los distintos proyectos de dominación en Baja California Sur fueron empresas colectivas entre grupos sociales con capacidades similares de coacción, organización y extracción.

This paper critically examines Coliva and Palmira's characterization of the disagreement between Humean skeptics and hinge epistemologists as a distinctive kind of conceptual disagreement. Humean skepticism requires evidential justification for all rational beliefs, presenting a narrower conception of rationality. This contrasts with constitutivist hinge epistemology, which posits that our unwarranted hinge propositions-the basic certainties which makes the justifications for ordinary empirical propositions possible-are constitutive of the concept of epistemic rationality, thus they are also rationally accepted by us. Coliva and Palmira (2020, 2021) argue that this divergence reflects a conceptual disagreement over the conception of epistemic rationality, implying a dispute about how the concept of epistemic rationality should be understood. Their strategy is twofold: they first mentioned Stroud's (2019) categorization of conceptual disagreement, but contended that the disagreement between Humean skeptics and hinge epistemologists represents a novel kind of conceptual disagreement that Stroud's categorization cannot encompass. They suggest this new framing allows for a rational resolution of the disagreement; second, they argue that the extended conception of rationality is superior because it coherently accounts for the rationality of our epistemic practices. However, I contend that both parts of their twofold strategy fail. Even if the disagreement is conceptual, it can be understood as a type of disagreement within Stroud's categorization; therefore, it does not represent a novel type of disagreement. Additionally, I argue that they misinterpret the skeptic's stance. Skeptics do not assume that our epistemic practices are rational; rather, they doubt the rationality of these practices and the possibility of knowledge. Therefore, for a skeptic, there is no advantage from a conceptual proposal that makes a coherent account of the alleged rationality of our epistemic practices.

The Crisis of Human Knowledge by Yang Burzhome is a bold and thought-provoking critique of how modern societies construct and control knowledge. Here are its central themes:
Main Themes of the Book
Epistemic Corruption The book argues that what we consider “objective knowledge” is often shaped by hidden ideologies that serve power structures. It challenges the myth of neutrality and exposes how dominant narratives suppress marginalized voices.
Critique of Scientific Reductionism & Cartesian Dualism Burzhome explores how these philosophical frameworks have disconnected humans from nature, turning the world into a lifeless object ripe for exploitation.
Capitalism’s Impact on Institutions Schools, workplaces, and even families are portrayed as systems that enforce conformity, competition, and hierarchy. Education becomes a factory for producing “human capital,” and relationships are reduced to transactions.
The Myth of Objectivity The book dismantles the idea of a “view from nowhere,” showing how it legitimizes oppression and silences dissent.
Pathways to Liberation Rather than just critique, Burzhome offers alternatives:
Indigenous epistemologies and feminist ethics of care
Art and imagination as tools for breaking ideological trances
Participatory action and critical pedagogy to democratize knowledge
This is not just a philosophical treatise—it’s a call to reclaim how we think, learn, and relate to the world.

This paper examines the trajectory of modern civilization through a dual lens: the descent from the inquisitive Homo sapiens into the passive, superficial Homo imbecilis, and the prospective ascent toward a resilient, audacious Homo audax. It posits that contemporary society, ensnared by technological saturation, systemic disinformation, and cultural vacuity, teeters on the brink of a predatory abyss. Yet, within this crisis lies the seed of redemption-a radical reimagining of human potential through critical inquiry, communal bonds, and purposeful action. Drawing on historical precedents, sociological analysis, and speculative foresight, the study articulates five postulates to chart the decline and propose a path forward, culminating in a call for a cultural and social renaissance to avert collapse and forge a luminous future.

Apologies often create expectations of meaningful change and repair. Yet when institutions or states deliver apologies for past wrongs that lack substantive reparative action, they risk deepening, rather than redressing, the harms they acknowledge. In this article, I examine what I call 'botched apologies' that can be performative, temporally disconnected from the ongoing effects of harm, and ultimately serve the interests of perpetrators. I argue that these botched apologies inflict distinct epistemic harms: they gaslight the victims, silence them, appropriate their hermeneutical resources, and exploit them. Using an epistemic reparations framework, I propose four non-exhaustive conditions for epistemically responsible apology: truthfulness, testimonial uptake, hermeneutical openness, and reciprocal epistemic labour.

This essay presents a critical examination of the dual pathologies of the professional self: the superiority complex engendered by formal credentials and the inferiority complex precipitated by their absence. The study argues that both conditions are symptoms of a modern, unhealthy relationship with expertise and are mutually reinforcing. Drawing upon a synthesis of sociological, psychological, and philosophical literature, the essay posits that the credential-based superiority complex is a manifestation of misplaced 'habitus', a concept developed by Bourdieu, whereby specialised knowledge is illegitimately transposed into a claim for broader moral and intellectual authority. Conversely, the inferiority complex is explored as a form of epistemic pre-emption, leading to the retreat into insular 'echo chambers' and the active rejection of valid knowledge sources. The essay provides a nuanced analysis of these phenomena, moving beyond mere psychological critique to a broader sociological account of the fragmentation of public discourse. The conclusion proposes a prescriptive framework grounded in intellectual humility and a renewed commitment to the democratic and service-oriented functions of knowledge, offering a pathway to a more robust and equitable professional landscape.

Kəlmənin Avropa dillərindəki qarşılığı olan “angel” sözü qədim yunan dilində “xəbər gətirən”, “xəbər daşıyan”, elçi mənalarını verən “anqelos” (ἄγγελος) sözündən yaranıb. Bu kəlmə də ivrit (qədim yəhudi) dilindəki “malaha” (מלאכא // mələk) sözünün yunan dilinə birbaşa tərcüməsindən başqa bir şey deyildir.

In today’s attention economy billions of people voluntarily share personal data that is then bought, sold, and analysed at industrial scale.
This paper examines how that ordinary but opaque data market—and the open, incentive-driven practice of elite talent recruitment—are often misread as evidence of hidden cabals.
By mapping these systems and contrasting them with the self-sealing logic of online conspiracy culture, we present a four-part framework—falsifiability, evidentiary quality, incentive alignment, and openness to revision—for distinguishing valid inference from conspiratorial speculation.
The goal is to preserve critical inquiry while avoiding narratives that mistake ordinary data exploitation for proof of shadow governance.

In this article, I examine the widespread sense of distrust that the literary humanities, with a specific emphasis on science fiction studies, have long expressed towards science’s claims of objectivity and neutrality. I argue that such distrust is chiefly tied to two factors: a simplistic, almost caricaturized understanding of the general nature of scientific inquiry and related concepts, and a tendency to conflate the politics and ethics of scientific practice and applications with the epistemic workings of science. I begin by offering a critique of the latter fallacy, identified as a fallacy in fact/value distinction, and of one of its most pernicious corollaries, namely the politicization of this fallacy via claims concerning the perceived oppressive and imperialist character of so-called ‘Western’ science. In the second part of the article, I ground this analysis in an extensive investigation of how such mischaracterizations have come to radically inform the field of science fiction studies, often through their institutionalization in Kuhnian philosophy of science, the Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge, and more generally the field of science and technology studies. Finally, I offer practical strategies for re-establishing fruitful interdisciplinary communication.