Right Wing Terrorism

Right-wing violence and terrorism have slowly gained more academic and public attention in recent years, with an increase in anti-immigration and anti-government organised violence from the extreme right in most Western countries. Some evidence exists that right-wing extremists have attempted to infiltrate the military in their home countries to gain access to tactical training, weapons, and to recruit highly skilled new members. Research about the extent and impact of extreme right-wing links to the military is, however, scarce. In addition to the lack of insight into potential right-wing (or other forms of) extremism problems in the military, most armed forces have not developed effective countering violent extremism (CVE) tools. In this way, the incorporation of CVE in the military lags far behind the use of CVE in other aspects of counter-terrorism in the West. As the military, next to the police and intelligence, is a critical part of a country’s security infrastructure, it must also include specially designed mechanisms to protect it from infiltration and abuse from violent extremists and those planning terrorist activities. This Policy Brief will discuss available knowledge about extreme right-wing links to the military in Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. It will conclude by formulating concrete recommendations for handling this potential threat.

At the end of the 1970s a racist rock music movement known as White Power music emerged in Great Britain in connection with political parties of the extreme right and remains a vibrant force in racist social movements today. Throughout the 1990s, White Power music expanded significantly from its origins in a clandestine network of punk-inspired live shows and record promotions into a multi-million dollar, international enterprise of web-pages, radio stations and independent record labels promoting White Power musicians performing a wider range of musical genres. In this article, we view White Power music as a cultural resource created and produced by racist movements and used as a tool to further key movement goals.  Specifically, we examine White Power music’s role when used to 1) recruit new adherents, especially youth, 2) frame issues and ideology to cultivate a White Power collective identity, and 3) obtain financial resources. In doing so we rely upon in-depth interviews with W...

The threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism is widely attributed to collective actors based on a religious ideology, e.g. globally operating Salafi-jihadist groups like al-Qaeda or ISIL. Only limited attention has been given to the CBRN threat of violent domestic extremists in general or far-right terrorists specifically. Nevertheless, a number of incidents involving far-right activists and CBRN agents in Western countries are known to the public, even though these have had comparatively little impact on public threat perception. This study systematically collected public information about far-right CBRN incidents to identify their main characteristics. The authors were able to identify 31 incidents in Western countries since 1970, which display features contrary to generally assumed forms of CBRN terrorism. Far-right CBRN terrorism appears to be predominantly a lone-actor phenomenon oftentimes involving middle aged and comparatively well-educated male perpetrators, mostly motivated by non-religious forms of far-right ideology (i.e. neo-Nazism, non-religious white supremacism) and indiscriminately targeting victims. Overall, far-right actors attempting to weaponize CBRN agents have been few and generally technically inept. However, the characteristics of the plots pose potential challenges for effective countermeasures and intervention, should the number of actors or the technical sophistication of plots increase in the future.

The Order, otherwise known as the Silent Brotherhood, or Bruder Schweigen, had one of the shortest but most eventful and notorious careers of the post-civil rights or fifth-era extreme Right (1970s to the 1990s). In its short lifespan (from 1983 to 1985), members of The Order were connected to numerous murders, armed robberies, and terrorist plots and were the subject of an FBI manhunt and the defendants in two major trials, including one for seditious conspiracy. Arguably, the majority of attention focused on the extreme Right during the early 1980s was due to the activities of The Order and its members. The most high-profile incident involving The Order, which attracted national attention, was the murder of talk radio disc jockey Alan Berg in Denver, Colorado. The group's notoriety is best illustrated by the fact that no less than three films were made about them: the television film Brotherhood of Murder (1999), as well as two major motion pictures by critically acclaimed directors, Betrayed (1988) by Costa-Gavras and Talk Radio (1989) by Oliver Stone. The latter two were centered on the murder of Berg, albeit loosely in the case of Betrayed.

This paper focuses on the urban graffiti painted with a political message by different
movements of the Italian political radicalism in the cities of Rome, Florence, Massa,
Carrara, Verona and Udine. For the purpose of this article, during the period from June
2011 to June 2012, a total of 165 graffiti have been photographed, of which 83 painted by
neo-fascist groups, 72 by extreme left groups and 10 by anarchist groups. These three
macro communities, made of different subgroups, emerged as the most active in expressing
their antagonism towards the parliamentary parties with their graffiti that combine semantic
(words) and semiotic (images) elements. An analysis of the collected graffiti’s language
form, meaning and context allows for the identification of the variety of styles of
communication adopted by the different political antagonisms and the different contents of
their communication through graffiti as well as the key elements of their political identities.
Key words: political radicalism, graffiti, linguistics

Chi si serve oggi del medioevo? Tutti.
La politica attuale lo usa come una miniera da cui estrarre esempi e modelli ritenuti utili per capire il presente. Identificato con i «secoli bui», il medioevo è presentato come modello perfetto per spiegarci i «nuovi barbari», lo «scontro di civiltà» e il terrore che il nostro mondo stia per finire. Al contrario, se considerato come il tempo dei cavalieri e delle origini eroiche, il medioevo assume una funzione mitica per moltissimi gruppi politici e comunità organizzate, che lo usano per affermare la propria originale identità.
Questa attualizzazione del medioevo, spesso una vera e propria invenzione delle tradizioni, va sotto il nome di «medievalismo». La sua analisi è una chiave nuova e inusuale per leggere la società contemporanea e gli indirizzi che sta percorrendo.
Dalla militanza politica allo svago new age, dai tornei cittadini al tradizionalismo identitario cattolico, fino ai richiami alle origini dell'Europa unita e alla mitologia della Lega Nord, Tommaso di Carpegna propone con gli strumenti del medievista, ma con lo sguardo puntato all'attualità, un appassionante percorso che si snoda dagli anni Sessanta e raggiunge i drammatici giorni degli attentati in Norvegia del «templare » Breivik.

""Debates about the relationship and boundary between mainstream and extremist (sometimes referred to as radical or violent) activism historically emerge in response to violent incidents, where defenders of a cause will attempt to differentiate between the two in order to maintain their legitimacy and critics will attempt to make links between them in order to delegitimize the movement. This is necessary in the case of the former and possible in the case of the latter because of both popular opposition and distaste for ‘extremism’ (however defined) and because of the overlap between the ideologies and objectives of mainstream movements and so-called extremist ones, even if they differ in terms of tactics. While a movement’s ideology does come into play in the definition of extremism, its application is usually reserved for those movements or activists that, while sharing an ideology or objectives with mainstream ones, reject legitimate democratic methods in favor of violence. While this analytical distinction and boundary is applied to many movements, perhaps the clearest application is the anti-abortion movement in the United States, which includes: elected officials, members of the Republican Party, the Christian Right, church groups and citizen activists, as well as more militant direct action organizations, terrorists and elements of the extreme right. The distinction and relationship between the ‘mainstream’ and ‘extreme’ anti-abortion activism has become more significant in the first decade of the 21st century as America has not only waged a war against terrorism, but the stigma of terrorism that had become attached to the anti-abortion movement in the 1990s has been obscured as anti-abortion activism reached the White House and political power under President George W. Bush and the ascendant Christian Right. Yet, anti-abortion violence returned soon after Bush left office and Barack Obama entered it as the murder of Dr. George Tiller, one of the few doctors to perform so-called ‘late-term abortions,’ by activist Scott Roeder in Wichita, Kansas on May 31 2009 clearly illustrated.

This chapter provides an overview of the literature on extremist or violence anti-abortion activism, and where it fits in to wider literature on the anti-abortion or pro-life movement, the Christian Right and other forms or sectors of the right, as well as terrorism. This is followed by an overview and examination of the different sectors of the anti-abortion movement, including the mainstream, militant direct action organizations such as Operation Rescue, the Pro-Life Action Network and Lambs of Christ, and extremist ones that advocate or perpetuate violence such as the American Coalition of Life Activists, Missionaries of the Preborn and the Army of God, websites such as the Nuremburg Files and so-called ‘lone wolf’ terrorists such as Rev. Mike Bray, Rev. Paul Hill, John Salvi, James Kopp, Eric Rudolph and Scott Roeder. This includes an overview and examination of the theological and textual sources and material used to advocate and justify violent activism, and the history of anti-abortion extremism and violence in the post-Roe v. Wade context from 1973 to the present. Through these sections, the chapter interrogates the relationships between extremist and violent anti-abortion violence, the mainstream anti-abortion movement, wider mainstream Christian Right and extreme right. It also examines responses to these activists and anti-abortion violence by the government and the mainstream anti-abortion movement. Significantly, the chapter looks at whether the mainstream anti-abortion movement provides support for more extreme elements activists or disassociates itself from these elements as it is frequently called upon to do, and whether it can or should be held responsible for perpetrators of violence who share a common cause. Finally, the chapter examines how anti-abortion extremism and violence are understood in relation in post-9/11 America.

On the book Extremism in America:

“A first-rate survey of the various strands of domestic extremism, from far left to far right, that are increasingly convulsing our country. A must-read for students, scholars, officials, and others entering this important field.”—Mark Potok, Southern Poverty Law Center

“With contributions on areas ranging from anti-abortion extremism to modern anarchism and black nationalism, this is a fascinating study of an often neglected and vital area of American politics.”—Martin Durham, author of White Rage: The Extreme Right and American Politics

The American Republic was born in revolt against the British crown, and ever since, political extremism has had a long tradition in the United States. To some observers, the continued presence of extremist groups?and the escalation of their activities?portends the fragmentation of the country, while others believe such is the way American pluralism works. The word extremism often carries negative connotations, yet in 1964 Barry Goldwater famously said, “Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.”
         
Extremism in America is a sweeping overview and assessment of the various brands of bigotry, prejudice, zealotry, dogmatism, and partisanship found in the United States, including the extreme right, the antiglobalization movement, Black Nationalism, Chicano separatism, militant Islam, Jewish extremism, eco-extremism, the radical antiabortion movement, and extremist terrorism. Many of these forms of single-minded intolerance are repressed by both the state and society at large, but others receive significant support from their constituencies and enjoy a level of respectability in some quarters of the mainstream. The essays in this volume, written by area specialists, examine the relationship between these movements and the larger society, dissect the arguments of contemporary American anarchist activists, look at recent trends in political extremism, and suggest how and why such arguments resonate with a considerable number of people.
"

The goal of the CICERO project is to develop and implement a counter-narrative communication campaign aimed at preventing radicalisation leading to violent extremism, accompanied by a methodology for evaluating the campaign’s effectiveness.

The CICERO consortium will, at first, identify the target audiences that are considered particularly susceptible to extremist propaganda. The most prominent radicalisation narratives circulating across the EU will then be collected and analysed. The campaign will rely on both online and offline communication channels for disseminating a wide range of multimedia contents, produced by the consortium, to the different audiences.

At 9:02 on the morning of April 19th, 1995, a bomb went off at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The bomb not only killed over 160 people and injured more than 650, but it also shook the illusion held by many Americans of a nation safe from the political unrest and terrorism outside its borders (an illusion that would be shattered for good on 9/11). In the hours and days following the bombing, the media and law enforcement authorities focused on the Muslim terrorists they believed were responsible, including a Muslim Oklahoma City resident detained at Heathrow Airport in London. On April 20th, one day after bombing, another Oklahoma City resident, Iraqi refugee Suhair al-Mosawi, was attacked in his home as retaliation for the bombing. When Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols – two white, Christian, home-grown anti-government activists – were arrested, what became evident was that these were ‘American’ terrorists. In spite of the initial shock of the bombing and focus on Muslims, this was far from a new phenomenon. For many experts who had been researching and monitoring the extreme right, the bombing was the culmination of a fifteen-year trajectory of violence. In response to the bombing, hearings were held, anti-terror legislation was passed, arrests were made and numerous books written and films made about the phenomenon. Yet, following the events of 9/11, Oklahoma City and the domestic extreme right were pushed to the margins of history and memory, as terrorism and terrorists were redefined as Islamic or Islamist, and Christianity and patriotism were evoked in America’s defense.

Throughout American history, both terrorism and extremism have been constructed, evoked or ignored strategically by the state, media and public at different points, in order to disown and demonize political movements whenever their ideologies and objectives become problematic or inconvenient – because they overlap with, and thus compromise, the legitimacy of the dominant ideology and democratic credentials of the state, because they conflict with the dominant ideology or hegemonic order, because they offend the general (voting) public, or because they expose the fallacies of national unity and bi-polar opposition in the face of foreign enemies or international conflicts, such as the war on terror. This chapter looks at how domestic extreme right terrorism has been constructed, represented, evoked or ignored in the American political imagination in the post-civil rights era, with a particular focus on its changing status following the Oklahoma City bombing and 9/11.""

Of course, the good terrorists are those who respond to the interests of the State, those who become allied with them. Bear in mind that the governments of Puerto Rico and the U.S. very much feared the development of Puerto Rican independence movements in the 1960s and the 1970s. They were afraid because the independence movements were very strong in those years. Then, these other right wing groups -paramilitary, death squads-that feed off of Vietnam veterans, people from the PNP and Cuban exiles were the base that the State had there, on the street, and obviously they were operating according to the interests of the State. Then, the State looked at them with sympathy because they took a bit of pressure away. Because the State did not have to set the bombs, these people set them against the independence movements. (Interviewee) 1 J. M. Atiles

We do not advocate [….] segregation [….] That was a temporary political measure and that time is past [….] The Greater White Racialist movement intends to establish for our White Aryan Race what every other race on earth has: A Racial homeland. 3

Extreme right-wing violence and terrorism are a growing threat to Western societies. This form of political violence is also quite elusive and differs from others (e.g. jihadist violence) in some key characteristics. Since the September 11 attacks, policy makers, law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as researchers have focused most of their attention on Islamic extremist violence and terrorism. This has led to an imbalance in the understanding of other threats, especially from the far-right, and adequate ways to counter it. This paper, using Germany as a main case study, argues that far-right violence has a potential risk of being misunderstood and under-classified, thus creating the perception among victims of that violence that democratic countries “are blind on the right side”. This erosion of trust in the rule of law and the monopoly of force is one goal of extreme right-wing terrorists. Specific recommendations to improve countering the threat posed by the far-right are avoiding double standards in dealing with political violence at all costs, swift and efficient appropriate legal actions against extreme right perpetrators of violence, an increase in funding for research about right-wing terrorism, a possible refinement of the legal definition of “terrorism” and a discussion about its relationship with “hate crimes”, as well as wide scale support for countering violent extremism (CVE) and deradicalisation programs targeting the far-right.

Κατά την περίοδο της κοινωνικοοικονομικής κρίσης, η κοινωνία των πολιτών - και ιδίως οι ανθρωπιστικοί φορείς - παρά τις αντιξοότητες, αναπτύχθηκε και κατάφερε να υποστηρίξει σε σημαντικό βαθμό τις πιο ευάλωτες πληθυσμιακές ομάδες οι οποίες ήταν τα πρώτα και μεγαλύτερα θύματα της κρίσης. Το ξέσπασμα της προσφυγικής κρίσης έκανε ακόμα πιο αναγκαία την παρέμβαση των ανθρωπιστικών φορέων.
Όμως, την ίδια περίοδο, η εξτρεμιστική δεξιά, απέκτησε σημαντική και σταθερή εκλογική εκπροσώπηση, ενώ το φαινόμενο της οργανωμένης ρατσιστικής βίας έλαβε ιδιαίτερα ανησυχητικές διαστάσεις. Εργαζόμενοι, εθελοντές και μέλη ανθρωπιστικών οργανώσεων - και κάθε υπερασπιστής ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων  είναι επίσης θύματα αυτής της βίας. Είναι οι υπερασπιστές των «ανεπιθύμητων» ή/και «κατώτερων» Άλλων. Τα τελευταία έτη κι ενώ η κοινωνικοοικονομική και η προσφυγική κρίση εξακολουθούν, το φαινόμενο δείχνει να αυξάνεται. Η Πολιτεία μπορεί και πρέπει να λάβει μέτρα πρόληψης και προστασίας, ακολουθώντας σχετικές συστάσεις διεθνών φορέων καθώς και προτάσεις ειδικών.

Italy has a long history of struggle against terrorism. At least since the mid-1970s, it has developed a national counterterrorism (CT) strategy, combining a range of different tactics and tools. Over the decades Italy has had to respond to many forms of violence: ethno-nationalist, right-wing, left-wing, anarchist, and jihadist. It is worth noting that right-wing, left-wing, and anarchist terrorism represented an indigenous phenomenon, even if many of these armed groups had significant connections abroad. On the contrary, ethno-nationalistic terrorism in the 1960s was perceived as inspired and supported by foreign forces, and jihadist terrorism is now a transnational threat.
This chapter outlines the evolution of Italy’s CT policy, from a social
science perspective. It distinguishes two major phases. In the first phase (from the 1960s to the 1980s), during the time of the so-called First Republic at the national level and the Cold War at the international level, the country dealt with separatist violent incidents and, above all, with a long and intense campaign of right-wing and left-wing terrorism, during the Anni di piombo (Years of Lead). In the second phase (from the 1990s to the present day), at the time of the Second Republic and in the post-Cold War era, Italy has had to face new challenges, especially from jihadist extremism.

Socialist authors were aware of the striking similarities between revolutionary and right-wing terrorism: assassinations were non-verbal messages aimed at intimidating the enemy. They also noted the ways that right-wing terrorists imitated revolutionary aesthetics and organizational principles (in caricature-like fashion, from a revolutionary perspective). I argue that left- and right-wing terrorism were “entangled,” in the sense that right-wing terroristic practices and concepts emerged out of leftist discourses. In turn, right-wing terrorism challenged the self-understanding of the Party of Socialist-Revolutionaries as a party whose most radical members were actively involved in terrorism, and whose more moderate members either tacitly supported or failed to condemn terrorist acts.

Germany experienced in recent years a resurgence of several forms of organized and unorganized extreme right-wing violence, including lone-actor attacks, pogrom-like mass violence or clandestine cells plotting and executing attacks. A new and puzzling development, according to the German authorities, is the increasing involvement of individuals with no previous ties to the extreme right-wing environment, i.e. 'ordinary citizens', in terror plots or severe acts of violence (e.g. arson and explosive attacks). To address this puzzle, this article follows the development of extreme right-wing violence and terrorism in Germany between the detection of the 'National Socialist Underground' (NSU) terrorist cell in 2011 via the so-called 'refugee crisis' of 2015 and 2016 to the data currently available in 2018. The goal is not to explore causal pathways to right-wing violence in Germany but to explain the nature of the phenomenon, using the most recent theoretical literature. It is argued that a combination of significant refugee influx, the struggle of the legal system to label severe acts of extreme right-wing violence clearly as terrorism and a subcultural change (i.e. the decreased importance of extreme right-wing political parties in favour of subcultural forms of mobilization) might in theory have resulted in lowering the threshold for contact between 'ordinary' citizens and highly radicalized extremists. In addition, this combination of factors might also have encouraged 'ordinary' citizens to engage in severe acts of extreme right-wing-motivated violence by facilitating the transmission of grievances, opportunities, and polarization.

Der vorliegende Beitrag beleuchtet die Verbindungen des Ministeriums für Staatssicher-heit (MfS) der DDR zum westdeutschen Rechtsterrorismus und unterzieht den bisherigen Forschungsstand einer kritischen Revision. So widerlegt die historische Aktenanalyse die populäre These von der "Unterwanderung" westdeutscher Rechtsextremist*innen durch die Stasi, mit dem Ziel, die BRD zu destabilisieren. Vielmehr ist davon auszugehen, dass ein Bündel an Motiven eine Rolle spielte: Neben der Absicht, sich vor rechtsterroristischen An-griffen zu schützen und dem Bestreben, die Bundesrepublik als faschistisch zu diskreditieren, sind auch ideologische Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen der Stasi und den von ihr Beobachteten hervorzuheben. Am Beispiel der Rechtsterroristen Udo Albrecht und Odfried Hepp wird ge-zeigt, dass das MfS einen aktiven Teil zum rechten Terror in der Bundesrepublik beitrug-im Namen eines gemeinsam geteilten antiimperialistischen Antizionismus.

This paper considers the recent phenomenon of the vehicle-ramming attack (VRA): i.e. the act of purposely driving a vehicle into pedestrians and populated vehicles. It documents the recent (2015–2017) rise in the prevalence of ramming attacks and how these incidents challenge some of the assumptions we have about terrorism and its causes. Typically, criminologists and terrorist scholars tend to focus on either the ‘psychology’ of individual terrorists or wider structural or ethno-political issues, such as religion, ideological doctrine or the role of terrorist organizations in converting and recruiting people to violence. This paper will adopt a different position, one which focusses less on structure and individual psychology, and more on the act itself, as something that is not merely an expression of an individual or an ideology, but something that has a lure and force all of its own, as something that travels through our contemporary mediascape, to be internalized and imitated by an increasingly varied set of subjects with varying motivations, psychologies, ideologies and circumstantial backgrounds.

Keywords: Affect, contagion, Gabriel Tarde, terrorism, (crime) waves, vehicle-ramming attacks, virality.

British Journal of Criminology. (doi:10.1093/bjc/azy017)
https://academic.oup.com/bjc/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/bjc/azy017/5052837?redirectedFrom=fulltext

A draft of this article is currently under restricted access at https://kar.kent.ac.uk/67097/, or feel free to contact one of the authors.

There has been much written about the white male backlash or ‘angry white male’ phenomenon of the 1980s and 1990s, much of it concerning mainstream conservative political and cultural manifestations. What is rarely considered within this literature are the ways in which the extreme right itself transformed during the period, particularly as they have traditionally been the most vocal about, and mobilised around, perceived threats to white supremacy, from abolition to civil rights. For the extreme right, the passing of the Civil Rights Act did not lead to a conventional backlash or a reassertion of white supremacy and white nationalism. Instead, corresponding to the perceived loss of white supremacy that the Act represented to them, such identities and ideologies were effectively rejected. In their place, what emerged were forms of racial and national identity and ideology that represented the white man as a racial and political other, displaced as an effect of the developments of the civil rights era.

In this paper, I will examine this transformation of traditional hegemonic white supremacy and white nationalism and the development of counter-hegemonic forms of white otherness and white separatism. The focus of this analysis will be the Christian Patriot Movement (including Aryan Nations, Posse Comitatus and The Order), which emerged from the KKK, John Birch Society and Christian Identity movement in the 1970s and came to dominate the extreme right in the 1980s and 1990s. More specifically, I will examine the ways in which the Christian Patriot movement employed mythology, theology, producerist populism and republicanism, as well as discourses appropriated from Jews, African-Americans and anti-imperialist movements in order to represent the white race as an oppressed and persecuted racial other within post-civil rights America, and inform their white separatist programme.

Key Points:
- Increased monitoring of the communications of far-right extremists suggests that their personal and international contacts are growing in importance.

- Far-right extremists travel internationally to network at conferences and events, and to gain combat experience and training in conflict zones.

- The increasing internationalisation of far-right extremism is likely to further international networking between extremists in-person and virtually.

The US Department of State designated the St Petersburg-based Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and three of its leaders as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) on 6 April. This was the first such designation of a far-right extremist group by the US government.

I examine variation in nativist organizing through an analysis of the number of nativist organizations in U.S. counties. I make two primary contributions to literatures on anti-immigrant phenomena and right-wing mobilization. First, I investigate the extent to which theories of threat, in addition to resource mobilization and political opportunity theories, further our understandings of nativist mobilization. Pro-immigrant oppositional activism and racist hate resource and organizational bases facilitate this mobilization, whereas a weak economic base, growing working-class base, and increasing Latino political representation constrain it. In addition, the association between nativist mobilization and Latino population change, as well as conservative voting, is curvilinear (inverted U). Nativist mobilization thrives in the presence of low-to-moderate levels of demographic threat, as well as in contexts in which political conservatism is present but weak enough to make the conservative, nativist identity nonnormative. Second, few studies examine nonattitudinal or noninstitutionalized anti-immigrant phenomena. There is little understanding of whether or not social structures facilitating anti-immigrant attitudes and institutionalized anti-immigrant activity similarly influence the presence of anti-immigrant mobilization. Although results suggest that political and cultural threats shape diverse anti-immigrant phenomena, I also point to a unique set of structural conditions beyond threat to explain nativist mobilization in particular.

This thesis examines how the American extreme right transformed in the post-civil rights era, or what is termed the “fifth era”, between 1976 and 1995. I argue that the extreme right underwent a radical re-politicisation in the mid-1970s, in response to the perceived effects of the political developments of the civil rights era on its traditional white Christian constituency, and the failure of its predecessors to maintain white supremacy and defend the nation. What occurred was a rejection of traditional hegemonic extreme right organisations, ideologies and strategies and their replacement by newer, more radical, counter-hegemonic ones. These were based around opposition to the state and political mainstream, most notably the shift from traditional white supremacy and nationalism to racial separatism, and from electoral activism to armed insurgency. Furthermore, I argue that this historical paradigm shift requires a corresponding analytic paradigm shift. This is because the majority of existing analysis not only fails to address this transformation but is also based on paradigms established in previous eras and based on traditional characteristics that the fifth era extreme right themselves rejected because of their overlap with the mainstream right, failure or lack of relevance. This thesis focuses on the case of the Christian Patriot movement and its three most prominent representatives, Posse Comitatus, Aryan Nations and The Order, which dominated the era and played a role in each major era-defining event and ideological and strategic initiative. I examine the movement’s history, ideology, identity and strategies both in comparison to those of their predecessors and through the development of the fifth era itself. In doing so, I illustrate both how the movement responded to political developments of the post-civil rights era and how this historical paradigm shift manifested, as well as propose a new analytic approach to the extreme right through my method of discourse analysis.

Homegrown terrorism has been a security concern in the United States for many years, focusing primarily on affiliates of al-Qaeda and ISIS. Threats from these groups continue, and the prospects of an attack are worrisome. However, equally troubling is the rapid growth and vocal intensity of white, racially motivated violent extremist groups that prioritize and engage in domestic terrorism. Among these groups is The Base, a fairly new organization that warrants scrutiny. Perhaps by coincidence or by clever calculation, the group’s name is the English translation of the Arabic word al-Qaeda, which also is the name of a Salafi jihadist terrorist organization.

Indians in America, or at least a very rich and visible section of the community, have looked upon Trump as one of their own. They found common cause with his religiously-tinged hyperbolic nationalism; it reminded them of someone closer home. But things haven’t worked out quite as expected.

BBC Radio Scotland: Sunday Morning With ...: A Norwegian court recently sentenced Anders Breivik to 21 years in jail for shooting dead 77 people last July. Presiding Bishop of the Church of Norway Helga Byfuglien and sociologist Dr Aaron Winter from Abertay University in Dundee discuss how different countries respond to acts of shocking violence.

Between Militancy and the Middle-Class: The Self-understanding and Practices of the Extreme Right


About the Book

Xenophobic and right-wing extremist acts of violence have become routine occurrences in some parts of Germany; such acts are generally perceived as the trademark of neo-Nazi groups. But although evidence seems to support this image, right extremist organizations have changed their strategy in recent years. Many staunch right-wing functionaries denounce the use of violence—at least in public—and try to discipline their followers. Presenting themselves as the civilized, well-mannered, bourgeois members of a progressive social movement that aims solely to »do good«, they claim their right to equal treatment in the political arena, surprising and unsettling the public with this transformation. Right-wingers asserting their political rights and accusing their political opponents of intolerance seem a far cry from the cliché of ignorant skinheads conjured up by the media.

What methods does the extreme right employ to improve its image and what are the underlying strategies? How can democratic society best respond to this change of political tactics? Andreas Klärner asks who today’s right-wing activists are and what self-understanding fuels their mission, explores how the operations and organizational modes of the right have changed, and discusses the prospects for new forms of right-wing extremism.

The author’s extensive research yielded detailed empirical data about activities and actors on the political right. This is the first in-depth portrayal of the elite and activists of the right-wing movement in Germany, focusing especially on their violence-prone environment. Andreas Klärner’s observations and interviews offer new internal perspectives on this hermetic milieu and insights into the links between rightist protest movements and political parties operating in various parts of Germany.

Analysis reveals that the extreme right movement is active, provocative, and innovative but has a limited capacity to mobilize supporters. The author discusses the extreme right’s prospects for success and possible counterstrategies, considering factors that constrain or promote their strategy. He argues that maintaining today’s relative isolation of the extreme right will depends whether all democratic political parties and groups uphold the border between democratic society and right extremists.




German abstract

Fremdenfeindliche und rechtsextrem motivierte Gewalttaten gehören heute in vielen Regionen Deutschlands zum Alltag. Auflehnung, Aktivismus und eine gewalttätige Aura sind Kennzeichen der rechtsextremen Szene. Obwohl Rechtsextremismus in der Öffentlichkeit zu Recht mit Gewalt gleichgesetzt wird, haben sich diese Gruppen in den letzten Jahren verändert.

Zumindest verbal distanzieren sich viele rechtsextremistische Kader und überzeugte Neonazis öffentlich von Gewalt und versuchen ihre Mitstreiter zu disziplinieren. Sie beanspruchen für sich Gleichbehandlung und gerieren sich nach außen als gesittete und zivilisierte Biedermänner, als Mitglieder einer sozialen, progressiven Bewegung, die nur das »Gute« will. Die Öffentlichkeit ist von diesem Wandel überrascht und verunsichert. Rechtsextremisten, die Meinungsfreiheit und Toleranz »für sich« fordern, die überzeugten Demokraten Into leranz, gar »Faschismus« vorwerfen, passen nicht in das medial verbreitete Klischee des dumpfen Nazi-Skinheads.

Welche Taktiken wenden Rechtsextreme zur Imageverbesserung an, welche Strategien verfolgen sie? Und wie kann und muss die demokratische Öffentlichkeit mit diesem Wandel des politischen Stils umgehen? Andreas Klärner interessiert, wie sich die Aktionen und Organisationsformen der rechtsextre- men Szene verändert haben, wer die Aktivisten sind, welches Selbstverständnis sie prägt und welche Erfolgsaussichten sich daher für diese Form des Rechtsextremismus prognostizieren lassen.

Der Autor verschaffte sich über zwei Jahre hinweg die Möglichkeit, empirische Daten über Aktionen und Akteure in einer deutschen Stadt detailgenau zu erheben. Dank intensiver Gespräche ist er in der Lage, die Bewegungselite und Basisaktivisten sowie deren gewalttätiges Umfeld in einer Weise zu porträtieren, wie dies sonst bisher nicht möglich war. Seine Recherchen und Interviews gewähren sowohl einen Einblick in die Binnenperspektive dieses oft schwer zugänglichen Milieus als auch in die Kontaktnetze der Akteure mit überregional operierenden Protestbewegungen und politischen Parteien.

Die rechtsextreme Bewegung zeigt sich zwar aktiv, provokativ und innovativ, ihre Mobilisierungskraft erweist sich jedoch als begrenzt. In einem kundigen Ausblick zu den Erfolgsaussichten der Rechten und möglichen Gegenstrategien wägt der Autor am Ende seiner Studie fördernde und hemmende Faktoren ab.

Sein Fazit: Es hängt vor allem von den gesellschaftlichen Gegenkräften und der strikten Abgrenzung aller demokratischen Parteien von der rechtsextremen Szene ab, ob deren gegenwärtige relative Isolierung aufrechterhalten werden kann.

Breivik's comments are quite characteristic of the growing far-right political movements in Europe, therefore it is quite possible that the motives for his terrorist acts may have been in part influenced by this right-wing extremist ideology. Breivik's dislike for left-wing politicians may also explain why he chose a youth camp of the social democratic Labor Party as a target for his attack. The tragic irony is that in many ways, right-wing extremists in Europe who promote a culture of hatred against mostly Muslim immigrants are not too dissimilar from Muslim right wing extremists, who in turn try to promote a culture of hatred against "unbelievers." Both groups strongly resist the progressive-liberal values that are represented by the center-left political parties, both groups want to replace multiculturalism and tolerance of the "other" with a more homogeneous and traditional society, and members of both groups have shown that they are willing to use violent means to achieve their goals.

In recent decades, the experience of non-governmental politically motivated violence became a central element of global memory culture. Motivated by several shocking attacks at the beginning of the new millennium, this commemorative culture evolved in a memory ecology, which was significantly shaped by the prosperity of global Holocaust memory. Therefore, public commemoration of politically motivated violence intersects different discursive elements, leading to multidirectional forms of memory. Based on interdisciplinary theoretical approaches, this article examines public memorials commemorating two notable cases of neo-Nazi xenophobic attacks in Germany as discursive spheres referring to the confrontation with the country's unique past and its impact on Germany's contemporary self-image challenged by right-wing extremism. We argue that various commemorative actors in the field adopted and appropriated Second World War and Holocaust-related iconography and terminology to shape these memory sites as instruments linking current Germany to the period of National Socialism.

Just prior to, and immediately following, the election of Barack Obama for a second term in 2011/12, there were widespread reports of far-right activists stating their intention to leave the United States as exiles, secede from it or create their own nation. In addition to such secessionism and separatism, there has also been a rise in far-right and more ‘mainstream’ right-wing disaster preparedness and survivalism. This far-right secessionism, separatism and survivalism, as well as anti-government enmity, have their origins in the post-civil rights 1970s, as responses to the alleged loss of white supremacy brought about by Civil Rights and perceived need to prepare, adapt to or escape the crisis that this was seen to represent to white Americans. This paper will trace the history of white secessionism, separatism and survivalism on the far right in response to perceived crises in the post-civil rights era, including the Civil Rights Act, Cold War, Millennium, 9/11, election(s) of Obama and current economic crisis. In addition to this, the paper will examine the ways in which such far-right ideologies, discourses and practices concerning threats to whiteness relate to more ‘mainstream’ right-wing ones in which race plays a less overt, but important role.