Pessimistic Meta-Induction

I attempt to refute Hume's problem of induction. I raise the problem of counter-induction. I develop a template for generating philosophical problems. I develop and defend stage theory of scientific development for scientific realism. I develop and defend two new metaethical theories: cultural emotivism and moral functionalism. I argue that to compare morality to mathematics is to lose credibility. I develop the problem of moral induction against moral realism.

A presente tese visa discutir a possibilidade de um realismo cientifico capaz de fazer frente ao desafio antirrealista da metainducao pessimista. Procuramos mostrar como o desafio, pelo menos do modo como o formulamos, e um argumento pertinente de sorte que qualquer realismo cientifico precisa levar em conta a possibilidade de as teorias presentes (e sua ontologia) sofrerem o mesmo destino das passadas (cujos termos teoricos foram considerados nao referentes). Em seguida argumentamos que o realismo experimental proposto inicialmente por Hacking (1983) e Cartwright (1983) pode ser consistente com a metainducao, seja porque as entidades teoricas abandonadas ao longo da historia da ciencia nao cumpriam os requisitos desta forma de realismo, seja porque uma mudanca teorica nao parece ameacar entidades inobservaveis manipuladas experimentalmente. Tambem analisaremos os meritos e as fraquezas das criticas dirigidas ao realismo experimental, propondo algumas respostas possiveis a tais crit...

No presente trabalho procurarei expor dois desafios antirrealistas ancorados na história da ciência, que Stanford (2006) apelidou respectivamente de ‘antiga’ e ‘nova indução pessimista’. Argumentarei que existe uma solução realista já disponível a ambos os desafios pessimistas: o realismo experimental, inicialmente proposto por Hacking (1983) e Cartwritght (1983), segundo o qual é possível comprometer-se com entidades teóricas com as quais desenvolvemos interações causais e com as quais produzimos fenômenos controlados, sem que tal compromisso se estenda às teorias mesmas. Tomarei como parâmetro não propriamente os argumentos de Hacking e Cartwright que sofrem inúmeras críticas, mas uma formulação sofisticada do realismo experimental proposta por Egg (2012).

A presente tese visa discutir a possibilidade de um realismo cientifico capaz de fazer frente ao desafio antirrealista da metainducao pessimista. Procuramos mostrar como o desafio, pelo menos do modo como o formulamos, e um argumento pertinente de sorte que qualquer realismo cientifico precisa levar em conta a possibilidade de as teorias presentes (e sua ontologia) sofrerem o mesmo destino das passadas (cujos termos teoricos foram considerados nao referentes). Em seguida argumentamos que o realismo experimental proposto inicialmente por Hacking (1983) e Cartwright (1983) pode ser consistente com a metainducao, seja porque as entidades teoricas abandonadas ao longo da historia da ciencia nao cumpriam os requisitos desta forma de realismo, seja porque uma mudanca teorica nao parece ameacar entidades inobservaveis manipuladas experimentalmente. Tambem analisaremos os meritos e as fraquezas das criticas dirigidas ao realismo experimental, propondo algumas respostas possiveis a tais crit...

No presente trabalho procurarei expor dois desafios antirrealistas ancorados na história da ciência, que Stanford (2006) apelidou respectivamente de ‘antiga’ e ‘nova indução pessimista’. Argumentarei que existe uma solução realista já disponível a ambos os desafios pessimistas: o realismo experimental, inicialmente proposto por Hacking (1983) e Cartwritght (1983), segundo o qual é possível comprometer-se com entidades teóricas com as quais desenvolvemos interações causais e com as quais produzimos fenômenos controlados, sem que tal compromisso se estenda às teorias mesmas. Tomarei como parâmetro não propriamente os argumentos de Hacking e Cartwright que sofrem inúmeras críticas, mas uma formulação sofisticada do realismo experimental proposta por Egg (2012).

Entropy is not part of the human condition.  Wonder, empathy, desire to know – these characterize human life.  Human beings are curious, innovative, and creative:  We transform the world around us.  We share life moments with those around us; we share food with those in need; we share ideas with others asking questions.  Human beings build lives, communities, gardens, libraries, machines.  When we define “reality” and talk about what exists, we must include human life.  Our world view depends more upon our transformative effects on the world than any theories which are distant from our experiences. A naturalistic view of the universe is too narrow to explain what is real.

Elsahami, in his Could Theoretical Entities Save Realism? (1994), offers a set of problems that should be a threat to the alleged improvements of entity realism over explanationist realism (or theory realism, in entity realism's vocabulary). Those criticisms were driven particularly to Hacking's entity realism (1983). In this present article, I will briefly appreciate Elsamahi's argumentation recognizing some of its merits and some of its problems. My efforts will be especially concentrated on the assumption that entity realism's-criterion might be revised in that cases of theoretical changes in which the replaced theoretical entities turned to be considered fictional ones; this is a similar strategy than to answering to some versions of pessimistic meta-induction. I will argue that, far from Elsamahi's thought, entity realism is compatible to those theoretical changes that discarded the ether, the caloric, and the phlogiston, three entities that usually cause trouble to explanationist realism

A guiding thread in Mario Alai's longstanding research is the exploration of the nature and limits of our knowledge of reality. For at least 20 years now, he has focused specifically on scientific knowledge and the issue of scientific realism versus antirealism, making some rather significant contributions to the advancement of the debate. In particular, with his distinctive rigour and attention to the structure of the argument, Alai has played a key role in defining what is no doubt one of the most convincing, if not THE most convincing, formulations of scientific realism nowadays. Namely, a sort of selective 'deployment realism' urging a realist attitude only towards those elements within scientific theories that prove to be responsible for those theories' unexpected predictions. In this short note, I illustrate (what I take to be) the main components of Alai's views. Based on the proposed reconstruction, I then suggest a couple of points where Alai's arguments, and predictivist deployment realism more generally, could be objected to and might benefit from further reflection. 2. Mario Alai's scientific realism Scientific realism is the thesis that the best philosophical explanation of the success of scientific theories is that they are (approximately) true descriptions of the world. As is well-known, scientific realists have to respond to the antirealist critique based on Laudan-style (Laudan 1981) pessimistic meta-inductions. Even granting realism the status of 'default' position, the objection goes, several cases can be pointed at in the history of science in which theories that we now regard as false have nonetheless been successful. Therefore, scientific realism is untenable. Typical realist defences are based on the idea that a realist commitment is in fact still warranted, once it is restricted to those parts of theories that are responsible for their success and have been preserved across theory change. Consider, however, empirical success intended as the ability to account for what has been observed. A constructive empiricist, who is only committed to the empirical adequacy of a theory, i.e., to its ability to 'save the phenomena', can contend that nothing else is required in the case at hand: since that a theory T saves the phenomena means that T accounts for the known data, that T is empirically adequate suffices for explaining why T accounts for the known data. 'Deployment realists' such as Alai consequently embrace 'predictivism', putting a special emphasis on novel predictions. They argue that, while it is indeed reasonable to think that the accommodation of old data does not lend support to the claim that a certain hypothesis is true or approximately true, a theory's ability to apply to unexpected domains and make correct predictions about them strongly suggests that it latched onto the objective structure of reality. This leads to the problem that prediction and confirmation are logically on a par: after all, whether or not certain data are already known when a theory is formulated is a contingent fact, hence prediction cannot play any role that the confirmation by known data cannot also play. In response to this 'deductivist' objection, Alai (see, e.g., Alai 2014c) acknowledges the logical symmetry between prediction and confirmation but at the same time argues that the crucial features of novel predictions do not concern their logical relationship with the theory. Rather, what makes them instrumental to the realist case is that novel predictions are in at least some occasions genuinely surprising: as Alai explains, this happens when they are not used essentially in the construction of the relevant theories (Alai 2014c, 303-307; Alai 2018, 123-124; Alai, 2014a, 57), they are a priori improbable (Alai 2014c, 307-309), and they are heterogeneous with respect to the data that proved essential for producing the theory (Alai 2014c, 309-312). 1 Based on this conception of novel prediction, Alai also successfully deals with other challenges. For instance, Doppelt (2005, 2007) contends that deployment realism is in fact not efficacious in neutralizing the pessimistic meta-induction. Doing so, says Doppelt, requires a compelling account of a theory's ability to explain known data in a virtuous way, that is, to provide explanations that are simple, complete, plausible, consistent with background beliefs etc. This is because it is only by having recourse to these non-empirical virtues that one can make sense of the fact that some particular theories were selected among several empirically equivalent alternatives. Noticing that some of the false theories of the past were virtuous in this sense, however, Doppelt concludes that realists should restrict their claims to current theories, which are clearly successful in the most comprehensive sense, as well as non-falsified (Doppelt 2011). In response to this, Alai convincingly argues that novel predictions are normally made by virtuous theories, while being virtuous is by itself insufficient to licence realism. Indeed, says Alai, it is only the conjunction of novel predictions and theoretical virtues that counts, and requiring both sidesteps Doppelt's objection (Alai 2018, 126). According to Alai, however, Doppelt is right in saying that theories with the right features can plausibly be regarded as true only if one makes certain additional assumptions, ultimately at the metaphysical level (Doppelt 2005, 1082). How can one claim that a theory is (approximately) true 2 and virtuous, i.e., simple, unified, etc., if not by assuming that nature is itself simple, unified, etc.? Alai, however, also points out that what Doppelt specifically asks is whether it is an accident that true theories are also virtuous, and this seems to presuppose truth rather than using it as an explanans. The question 'Why are theories that make true predictions also virtuous?', adds Alai, is also potentially misleading, for it might be intended as asking of a theory why it is the case that it makes the predictions that it in fact does and has the internal structure that it in fact has, which of course are purely logical facts about the theory being itself (Alai, 2014a, 50, referring

Selective Realism is the most-common 'type' of scientific realism. It groups many diverse approaches to science, theories, and truth, and so, it is very difficult to define it with precision. Yet, there are three elements which, allegedly, suffice for a general characterization of this view, namely: a Non-Miracles Argument motivation, a Pessimistic Meta-Induction motivation and selectivity. I contend that such characterization is not robust enough for pointing out all the elements that selective realists actually share. In particular, I argue that such characterization prevents selective realists from blocking the possibility of true contradictions, dialetheias, even if they are not desirable.

Elsewhere I have argued that the most significant threat to scientific realism arises from what I call the problem of unconceived alternatives: the repeated failure of past scientists and scientific communities to even conceive of alternatives to extant scientific theories, even when such alternatives were both (1) well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and (2) sufficiently scientifically serious as to be actually embraced in the course of further investigation. In this paper I explore Francis Galton's development and defense of his ''stirp'' theory of inheritance and conclude that this particular historical example offers impressive support for the challenge posed by the problem of unconceived alternatives while simultaneously showing how we can make that challenge deeper and sharper.

Innovation is central to the development of the sciences. A major part of this innovation consists of the introduction of new concepts in response to unanticipated discoveries. Yet the claim that we are not capable of creating new concepts that are not reducible to existing concepts is a recurring theme in the history of philosophy. A related theme emerged when Feyerabend and Kuhn argued, beginning in 1962, that conceptual innovation plays a key role in the history of science; many philosophers treated this as an attack on the rationality of science. In this paper I explore the way new concepts are introduced as scientists respond to unexpected discoveries and I consider some consequences of conceptual innovation.

Esta pesquisa analisa alguns tópicos sobre a metodologia de acordo com a filosofia da ciência de Larry Laudan, além de examinar, na área da educação, esta proposta de interpretação filosófica. Trouxemos como elementos algumas considerações e definições sobre a metodologia em Laudan, isto é, da metodologia como um instrumento para a realização da axiologia (que são as metas e os valores cognitivos), porém, apresentando também interessantes relações para com as teorias específicas, como o de justificar as teorias específicas e de ser restringida por elas. A metodologia é também, dentro do modelo reticulado de Laudan, justificada pela axiologia. Para além desta análise, há também uma defesa da metodologia enquanto o estudo dela própria, o que permite encontrarmos conexões interessantes em teorias da educação, como no caso da investigação-ação, onde vemos que estamos diante de uma tradição de pesquisa nos moldes defendidos pela filosofia da ciência de Laudan, por reconhecermos que temos um modelo reticular composto por teorias específicas, metodologias e axiologia também na área da educação. Veremos também que a metodologia em Laudan possui um caráter dinâmico, tensionando e sendo tensionada pelos componentes da tradição de pesquisa, caracterizando o modelo reticulado de racionalidade proposto pelo filósofo. Este debate em Laudan, juntamente com a tradição de pesquisa da investigação-ação da área da educação serão investigados neste artigo. Como base para a construção deste texto, utilizamos as seguintes obras de Laudan: The Progress and its problems: towards a theory of scientific growth (1977), Science and Values (1984a), Explaining the success of science: beyond epistemic realism and relativism (1984b), Methodology’s prospects (1986), Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism (1987a), Aim-less Epistemology? (1990a) e Normative Naturalism (1990b).

Stanford's unconceived alternative argument is inductively based on the history of science and tells us that when a scientist is choosing a theory T1 at time t1 over a set of less promising alternatives, she is concurrently failing to conceive valid theoretical alternatives to T1, i.e., theories that will be accepted by a scientific community at later times, thus displacing T1. The aim of the present paper is to argue that the actual strength and reach of Stanford's argument sensibly vary according to the status of the unconceived alternatives at time t1, i.e, whether they are conceivable (theories that could be conceived by scientists at t1, but in fact are not) or inconceivable (theories which can not be conceived at t1 as they are incompatible with scientists' background knowledge at t1). As Stanford does not explicitly address this issue, we give reasons to conclude that alternatives considered in the unconceived alternative argument are supposedly conceivable at time t1, and we investigate the consequences of this conclusion for the alleged novel induction the argument draws upon. We then investigate what are the implications for Stanford's analysis if inconceivability is considered as a possible status of an unconceived alternative at t1, and we argue that, in this case, Stanford's antirealism has to be severily restricted to specific phases of theory-change, thus making room for tamed forms of realism.

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The paper addresses the so-called miracle argument in favor of scientific realism and examines the viability of scientific reahsm as an explanation for the success of science. Scientific realism is committed to the claims that the theoretical terms in the mature sciences typically refer to real objects and that the theoretical laws in such sciences are typically approximately true. Instrumentalism or non-realism draws an the principles that factual claims need to be confirmed empirically and that experience fails to single out true assumptions. The miracle argument says that if a theory referred to fictitious objects, it would he miraculous that it is able to correctly predict observable effects. This argument transforms scientific realism into a hypothesis that is testable by the history of science. 1 perform such tests and conclude that the only type of realism that appears to be in agreement with the historical record is "reahsm of natural Kinds." Theories that enjoy distinguished explanatory success truthfully establish equivalence relations among phenomena.

The aim here is to develop some of Alai’s ideas and strategies in order to defend a realist approach to scientific understanding. Although the notion of scientific understanding is not central to his work, I think his defence of scientific realism is helpful in disambiguating and defining the role of scientific understanding in arguing for or against scientific realism.  In particular, I argue that, in order to clarify their positions, philosophers of understanding should define them with respect to the realism-antirealism debate before digging into the subtleties of understanding (also scientific).
So, the focus here will be on the scientific realism issues, rather than on the Quinean themes which determined my first encounter with Alai. In §2 I sketch the main ideas taken from the debate about scientific understanding. In §3, I present Alai’s contribution to the scientific realism debate, namely his definition of deployment realism (DR), as an upgrading to resist anti-realist criticisms (Lyons 2002, 2016; Laudan, 1981). In §4, I present the defence of realism provided by Pincock (2023) on the basis of an analysis of scientific understanding. In §5, I sketch a possible line of connection between the debate about scientific realism and scientific understanding, and describe the role of essentiality in scientific understanding.

Why believe in scientific realism? The answer that overwhelms the mainstream debate is "the nomiracles argument" (NMA): realism best explains the observational success of scientific theories. Yet more than thirty years ago another argument was proposed by Smart, Devitt, Glymour, McMullin, and Salmon and called "the basic argument" (BA) by Devitt: realism best explains the observed phenomena. Rather than having been addressed and assessed since, BA has been almost entirely ignored. The paper carefully distinguishes BA from NMA and argues that whereas NMA is dubious, BA is good. Why has BA been ignored? Experience suggests that philosophers may find it too close to science and mistakenly hanker after a "more philosophical" justification for realism. No such justification is needed or desirable.

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Total and sudden transformations of language seldom happen; conquests and migrations are now very rare: but there are other causes of change, which, though slow in their operation, and invisible in their progress, are perhaps as much superior to human resistance, as the revolutions of the sky, or intumescence of the tide.

In an attempt to avert Laudan's pessimistic induction, Kitcher, Worrall and Psillos introduce a narrower version of scientific realism. According to this version, which can be referred to as “localized realism,” realists need not accept every component in a successful theory. They are supposed only to accept those components that led to the theory's empirical success. Consequently, realists can avoid believing in dubious entities like the caloric and ether. This paper examines and critiques localized realism. It also scrutinizes Psillos's historical study of the caloric theory of heat, which is intended to support localized realism.

The contemporary philosophical understanding of scientific rationality fundamentally distinguishes itself from the conservative positions by what may be considered a categorial reorientation by which it is meant that it replaces the old categories by the new ones in terms of which the essential nature of the structure and dynamics of science are described and explained. In the beginning, the radicalization of the categorial framework has been brought through category transformation, which is very well exemplified in the nullification of the discovery-justification distinction. Apart from this parasitic semantic content, 'discovery' carried a negative meaning in terms of what it is not. With the nullification of the distinction, the semantic content of discovery has become not only autonomous, and positive but also, comprehensive so much as to become the focal concept in grasping the essence of scientific activity. These changes have fundamentally altered the discourse about discovery in ways that can be of momentous significance to science education (Schickore and Steinle, 2006). An attempt is made in this paper to illuminate how the denial of the divorce thesis has been justified by the philosophical arguments of

A common approach to problem solving is to first specify an end we wish to achieve and then seek the appropriate means to achieve that end. In the case of the sciences the traditional end-a body of true propositions so firmly established that they will never have to be reconsidered-is not achievable. In the present paper I address this situation by focusing first on the process of scientific research and then considering the products that we can achieve through this research.

Kuhn’s Structure richly displayed the relevance of historical considerations to questions of what it is rational for scientists to believe and why. He did not, as some have, think his interpretation threatened to make scientists ’ beliefs look irrational, but his work did make an approach to this issue via rules of Scientific Method seem cartoonish. One could be forgiven for thinking philosophers have not fully assimilated what was distinctive in Kuhn’s contribution. Philosophers can be forgiven, I think, for not knowing how to imitate it. For good or ill we have not stopped investigating methodological rules and principles of rationality, and though today there are more Bayesians than falsificationists and we tend to avoid that two-word proper name “Scientific Method ” that now seems so naïve, still many philosophers continue to take the relevance of the history of science to be as a pool of cases to be used to test and illustrate our views of the general rules of rationality, whic...

Many philosophers have thought that Kuhn’s claim that there have been paradigm shifts introduced a problem for the rationality of science, because it appears that in such a change nothing can count as a neutral arbiter; even what you observe depends on which theory you already subscribe to. The history of science challenges its rationality in a different way in the pessimistic induction, where failures of our predecessors to come up with true theories about unobservable entities is taken by many to threaten the rationality of confidence in our own theories. The first problem arises from a perception of too much discontinuity, the second from an unfortunate kind of continuity, in the track record of science. I argue that both problems are only apparent, and due to under-description of the history. The continuing appeal of the pessimistic induction in particular is encouraged by narrow focus on a notion of method that Kuhn was eager to resist.

The contemporary scientific realism debate centers around the realist’s claim that successful scientific theories are at least approximately true. Realists, such as Hilary Putnam justify this claim by arguing that it would be a miracle were our successful scientific theories not at least approximately true. Denying the possibility of miracles, the scientific realist must defend a theory’s approximate truth as the only possible explanation for its success. Anti-realist Bas van Fraassen responds to the realist’s argument by offering a Darwinian explanation for the success of scientific theories, an explanation that involves neither truth nor miracles: we have successful theories because we reject those that do not succeed. Realists object that – although van Fraassen’s alternative may explain why we have successful theories – it fails to explain why any particular theory is successful. Striking at realism from another direction, Larry Laudan offers a list of historically successful sc...

AlejAndro Victor thiry T he dispute between scientific realism and anti-realism is one of the most exciting topics in the current general philosophy of science. In the debate, the anti-realists attack their opponents with two main arguments, the pessimistic induction and the underdetermination of theories by all possible data. The realists, on the other hand, defend their position through the famous no miracle argument, which seems to be their most important standpoint. Scientific realism 1 has been the subject of various characterizations throughout this struggle (see, for example, van Fraassen 8, Kukla 3-4, Carman 43-6, Diéguez Lucena 252-253). We could summarize this position in the following four theses:

The limits of induction as a means of establishing general claims are well known yet many scientists and philosophers resist accepting these limits. In this paper I review two common forms of inductive argument: generalizations supported by an established body of data, and the use of successful predictions from a theory as evidence that the theory is true.  Among other examples, I focus on three instances from Galileo - not as a criticism of Galileo, but as an illustration of how even the most astute scientists may attribute greater power to inductive arguments than they actually have.  I end the paper with two recent examples.

IN SPITE OF appearances to the contrary, I will not present an exercise in applied theology but rather in applied philosophy of science. That is, I will draw some systematic conclusions from some historical case studies. More specifically, my aim is to show that the so-called "Miracle Argument" that is frequently advanced in favor of scientific realism doesn't hold water. Before I can address the problematic aspects of that argument, I must first straighten out the argument itself as well as the position it is intended to support.

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Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold Sommerfeld’s ([1916]) derivation of the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. Not only were his predictions good, he derived exactly the same formula that would later drop out of Dirac’s 1928 treatment (something not possible using 1925 Schrödinger–Heisenberg quantum mechanics). And yet the most central elements of Sommerfeld’s theory were not even approximately true: his derivation leans heavily on a classical approach to elliptical orbits, including the necessary adjustments to these orbits demanded by relativity. Even physicists call Sommerfeld’s success a ‘miracle’, which rather makes a joke of the so-called ‘no miracles argument’. However, this can all be turned around. Here I argue that the realist has a story to tell vis-à-vis the discontinuities between the old and the new theory, leading to a realist defence based on sufficient continuity of relevant structure. 1Introduction2No Realist...

V diplomski nalogi preizprašujem tehtnost ideje, ki vzpostavlja razlagalno povezavo med empiričnim uspehom teorije in njeno resničnostjo. Ker deluje ideja intuitivno zelo prepričljivo, se mi zdi toliko bolj zanimivo proučiti načine, kako vse bi jo lahko preizkušali. Tako je temeljno vprašanje naloge, kako razložiti empirični uspeh v znanosti. Ta izhodiščna točka je povezana z vrsto podvprašanj: kaj so ugovori realistični razlagi, ki jo tukaj jemljem za zdravorazumsko izhodišče diskusije, in kakšne so alternativekakšnega pomena je to vprašanje in kakšno vlogo igra v širšem epistemološkem vprašanju o spoznavnem statusu znanostizakaj je to vprašanje pomembno? V nalogi skušam doseči celostni pregled nad diskusijo okoli t. i. argumenta brez čudežev.This paper examines the plausibility of an explanatory link connecting the empirical success of a scientific theory with its truth. Because this idea is intuitively convincing, it might be worth considering all the potential problems of it. Th...

It is widely assumed that it is the anti-realist who stakes his case on evidence from the history of science. I argue that (i) realists have failed to recognize the need to collect evidence from the history of science to support their methodological claims, and (ii) anti-realists do not rely on evidence from the history of science to the extent that many suggest.

In addition to regular reviews, book notes, essay reviews, and symposia, Metascience also publishes anniversary pieces, reflecting on the importance of a particular book in one of our fields, history of science, philosophy of science, and science studies. These reviews are commissioned by the journal editors and are often written by scholars who have a particularly insightful perspective on the piece under review. This issue includes two such pieces, one on Bas van Fraassen's Laws and Symmetry, originally published in 1989, and one on Stathis Psillos' Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, originally published in 1999. The books are celebrating their 30th and 20th year in print, respectively. Both books have played a significant role in the realism/anti-realism debate over the last few decades. Van Fraassen is one of the key contemporary proponents of anti-realism, and Laws and Symmetry contains a number of his critical arguments against realism, most importantly against realist conceptions of laws of nature. But the book is filled with much more, including his influential attack on inference to the best explanation as a rule of inference. Psillos' book is one of the few sophisticated and comprehensive surveys of the realism/ anti-realism debate and has thus become a standard textbook of sorts for those interested in the debate. But Scientific Realism is far more than a textbook. In it, Psillos advances his own realist position, a form of what has come to be called selective realism, one of the most influential realist positions in the contemporary debate. These two books would be on any reading list of the ten most important books to read for anyone wanting to engage in the debate. And their importance does not seem to be waning. The editors would like to confess to being a bit sly in arranging these anniversary reviews. Unbeknownst to the authors of the books, we simultaneously invited van Frasssen, an anti-realist, to review Psillos' book and Psillos, a realist, to review van

IN SPITE OF appearances to the contrary, I will not present an exercise in applied theology but rather in applied philosophy of science. That is, I will draw some systematic conclusions from some historical case studies. More specifically, my aim is to show that the so-called "Miracle Argument" that is frequently advanced in favor of scientific realism doesn't hold water. Before I can address the problematic aspects of that argument, I must first straighten out the argument itself as well as the position it is intended to support.

Lyons (2016, 2017, 2018) formulates Laudan's (1981) historical objection to scientific realism as a modus tollens. I present a better formulation of Laudan's objection, and then argue that Lyons's formulation is supererogatory. Lyons rejects scientific realism (Putnam, 1975) on the grounds that some successful past theories were (completely) false. I reply that scientific realism is not the categorical hypothesis that all successful scientific theories are (approximately) true, but rather the statistical hypothesis that most successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. Lyons rejects selectivism (Kitcher, 1993; Psillos, 1999) on the grounds that some working assumptions were (completely) false in the history of science. I reply that selectivists would say not that all working assumptions are (approximately) true, but rather that most working assumptions are (approximately) true.

Scientific realists use the "no miracle argument" to show that the empirical and pragmatic success of science is an indicator of the ability of scientific theories to give true or truthlike representations of unobservable reality. While antirealists define scientific progress in terms of empirical success or practical problem-solving, realists characterize progress by using some truth-related criteria. This paper defends the definition of scientific progress as increasing truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Antirealists have tried to rebut realism with the "pessimistic metainduction", but critical realists turn this argument into an optimistic view about progressive science.

Gerald Doppelt claims that Deployment Realism cannot withstand the antirealist objections based on the “pessimistic meta-induction” and Laudan’s historical counterexamples. Moreover it is incomplete, as it purports to explain the predictive success of theories, but overlooks the necessity to explain also their explanatory success. Accordingly, he proposes a new version of realism, presented as the best explanation of both predictive and explanatory success, and committed only to the truth of best current theories, not of the discarded ones (Doppelt (2007, 2011, 2013, 2014). Elsewhere I criticized his new brand of realism. Here instead I argue that (a) Doppelt has not shown that Deployment Realism cannot solve the problems raised by the history of science, (b) explaining explanatory success does not add much to explaining novel predictive success, and (c) Doppelt is right that truth is not a sufficient explanans, but for different reasons, and this does not refute Deployment Realism,...

There are two possible realist defense strategies against the pessimistic meta-induction and Laudan's meta-modus tollens: the selective strategy, claiming that discarded theories are partially true, and the discontinuity strategy, denying that pessimism about past theories can be extended to current ones. A radical version of discontinuity realism is proposed by Gerald Doppelt: rather than discriminating between true and false components within theories, he holds that superseded theories cannot be shown to be even partially true (except insofar they agree with current ones), while present best theories are demonstrably completely true. I argue that this position, running counter both the cumulativity of science and fallibilism, is untenable; it cannot account for the success of past theories, nor for the failures of current theories, and rather than shutting the door to the pessimistic historical objections it opens it wide. The best strategy, instead, joins the selective idea there was both some truth and some falsity in discarded theories, like in current ones, with the moderate discontinuity idea that the truth rate in present best theories is much greater than in past ones. Keywords Gerald Doppelt • Best theory realism • Selective realisms • Pessimistic meta-induction • No miracles argument • Historical meta-modus tollens 1 Two pessimistic arguments against realism and two defence strategies We can broadly understand scientific realism (ScR; as opposed to van Fraassen's constructive empiricism) as the claim that there can be compelling reasons to believe in the at least partial and/or approximate truth of scientific theories.

The fact that many scientific models are idealised, and therefore incorporate known falsehoods, seems to undermine the idea that science aims at truth. Various authors have proposed different solutions to this problem: they have claimed that idealisations are harmless because models can be "deidealised", that the function of idealisations is to isolate explanatory relevant factors, or that idealised models still convey veridical modal information. I argue that even if these strategies succeed in making idealisations compatible with theoretical truth, a deeper problem remains: the fact that idealisations improve the explanatory power of models contradicts the main argument for scientific realism, which is based on the idea that explanatory virtues are truth-conducive. There does not seem to be any simple solution to this problem.

Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold Sommerfeld’s ([1916]) derivation of the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. Not only were his predictions good, he derived exactly the same formula that would later drop out of Dirac’s 1928 treatment (something not possible using 1925 Schrödinger–Heisenberg quantum mechanics). And yet the most central elements of Sommerfeld’s theory were not even approximately true: his derivation leans heavily on a classical approach to elliptical orbits, including the necessary adjustments to these orbits demanded by relativity. Even physicists call Sommerfeld’s success a ‘miracle’, which rather makes a joke of the so-called ‘no miracles argument’. However, this can all be turned around. Here I argue that the realist has a story to tell vis-à-vis the discontinuities between the old and the new theory, leading to a realist defence based on sufficient continuity of relevant structure. 1Introduction2No Realist...

In this paper, I wish to connect the recent debate in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wave function to the historical debate in the philosophy of science regarding the tenability of scientific realism. Advocating realism about quantum mechanics is particularly challenging when focusing on the wave function. According to the wave function ontology approach, the wave function is a concrete physical entity. In contrast, according to an alternative viewpoint, namely the primitive ontology approach, the wave function does not represent physical objects. In this paper, I argue that the primitive ontology approach can naturally be interpreted as an instance of the so-called explanationist realism, which has been proposed as a response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism. If my arguments are sound, then one could conclude that: (1) contrary to what is commonly thought, if explanationism realism is a good response to the pess...

The paper seeks to answer two new questions about truth and scientific change: (a) What lessons does the phenomenon of scientific change teach us about the nature of truth? (b) What light do recent developments in the theory of truth, incorporating these lessons, throw on problems arising from the prevalence of scientific change, specifically, the problem of pessimistic meta-induction? In physics the truth is rarely perfectly clear. Richard Feynman Two central questions raised in this paper are: To focus on those aspects of truth that are pertinent to scientific change, I will approach truth from an epistemic perspective. What I mean by this, however, is different from what philosophers usually mean when they speak about an epistemic conception of truth. Normally, what they mean is that truth is reduced to some other, distinctly epistemic, norm or concept, e.g., superassertibility (see Wright 1992) or justifi cation (see Rorty 1995) or 1 I use bold font in citations to indicate my emphases. 2 This section incorporates and, in the case of truth, further develops, several aspects of a theory of knowledge and truth developed in .

The paper addresses the so-called miracle argument in favor of scientific realism and examines the viability of scientific reahsm as an explanation for the success of science. Scientific realism is committed to the claims that the theoretical terms in the mature sciences typically refer to real objects and that the theoretical laws in such sciences are typically approximately true. Instrumentalism or non-realism draws an the principles that factual claims need to be confirmed empirically and that experience fails to single out true assumptions. The miracle argument says that if a theory referred to fictitious objects, it would he miraculous that it is able to correctly predict observable effects. This argument transforms scientific realism into a hypothesis that is testable by the history of science. 1 perform such tests and conclude that the only type of realism that appears to be in agreement with the historical record is "reahsm of natural Kinds." Theories that enjoy distinguished explanatory success truthfully establish equivalence relations among phenomena.

Virtually all prominent critics of the Pessimistic Induction have so far assumed that in order to defeat the argument, one must show that there is a degree of continuity in the history of science at the level of theory. In my dissertation I challenge this assumption and argue for three theses: (I) The assumption in question can lend support to at best a very impoverished form of optimism about only bits and pieces of our best scientific theories is warranted. (II) A more promising strategy is possible: The Pessimistic Induction can be defeated if we can show that the evidence today's scientific community has for our best theories is qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the evidence past scientists had for their best theories. (III) The evidence today's scientific community has for some of our best theories (such as the Fermi-Landau Liquid theory) is unequivocally better than its historical predecessors.

My current opinion is that the selective realist is in a strong position vis-à-vis the historical challenges. Certainly the realist needs to invoke some careful criteria for realist commitment, and various nuances concerning the nature of her epistemic commitment, and this may raise the ‘death by a thousand qualifications’ question mark. But the concern is unfounded: the qualifications are all independently motivated, and indeed necessary given the philosophical complexity. Qualifications are to be welcomed here; often the truth is far from simple!