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Philosophy of Science

Induction Science and Morality

Profile image of Seungbae ParkSeungbae Park

2025, Springer

Abstract

I attempt to refute Hume's problem of induction. I raise the problem of counter-induction. I develop a template for generating philosophical problems. I develop and defend stage theory of scientific development for scientific realism. I develop and defend two new metaethical theories: cultural emotivism and moral functionalism. I argue that to compare morality to mathematics is to lose credibility. I develop the problem of moral induction against moral realism.

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