The existence of multiple interpretations of quantum mechanics appears to pose a serious challeng... more The existence of multiple interpretations of quantum mechanics appears to pose a serious challenge for knowledge claims about the quantum domain. Hoefer (2020) argues that a scientific realist epistemology must be abandoned in this context, while Callender (2020) argues that the realist's only option is to break the underdetermination between rival interpretations by appealing to extraempirical virtues. We develop a different response to the quantum underdetermination problem based on identifying statements about the unobservable which all the major ontic interpretations of quantum mechanics agree on. It is commonly believed that Everettian, Bohmian and GRW quantum mechanics share nothing but empirical content. We argue that, while they say very different things about the fundamental nature of quantum systems, they can be understood as agreeing on a plethora of more abstract theoretical claims. In our view, focusing on this descriptive overlap represents the most promising strategy for defending knowledge claims in the quantum domain. We close by considering how this overlap strategy relates to working posits formulations of scientific realism.
It has been argued that we can identify future-proof science via scientific consensus, with crite... more It has been argued that we can identify future-proof science via scientific consensus, with criteria that must be met. But actually applying those criteria to a specific case can sometimes be extremely challenging; how is one to ascertain whether there is a 95 per cent consensus in the relevant community of experts? An instructive contemporary case concerns the claim that an asteroid impact caused the dinosaur extinction. Many scientists have been tempted to state the claim as a fact, and in 2010 a review article was published in Science hinting at a consensus. There was a significant community reaction to this piece, however. In addition, there has been plenty of opposition to the claim in both the published literature and activity at (some) major conferences. This chapter navigates some of the challenges that can arise when we ask after the strength of feeling in the relevant scientific community vis-à-vis a specific claim.
Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics – those who spread doubt about science – often empl... more Is science getting at the truth? The sceptics – those who spread doubt about science – often employ a simple argument: scientists were sure in the past, and then they ended up being wrong. Such sceptics draw on dramatic quotes from eminent scientists such as Lord Kelvin, who reportedly stated at the turn of the 20th century “There is nothing new to be discovered in physics now,” shortly before physics was dramatically transformed. They ask: given the history of science, wouldn’t it be naïve to think that current scientific theories reveal ‘the truth’, and will never be discarded in favour of other theories? Through a combination of historical investigation and philosophical-sociological analysis, Identifying Future-Proof Science defends science against such potentially dangerous scepticism. It is argued that we can confidently identify many scientific claims that are future-proof: they will last forever, so long as science continues. How do we identify future-proof claims? This appe...
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2018
Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold Sommerfeld’... more Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold Sommerfeld’s ([1916]) derivation of the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. Not only were his predictions good, he derived exactly the same formula that would later drop out of Dirac’s 1928 treatment (something not possible using 1925 Schrödinger–Heisenberg quantum mechanics). And yet the most central elements of Sommerfeld’s theory were not even approximately true: his derivation leans heavily on a classical approach to elliptical orbits, including the necessary adjustments to these orbits demanded by relativity. Even physicists call Sommerfeld’s success a ‘miracle’, which rather makes a joke of the so-called ‘no miracles argument’. However, this can all be turned around. Here I argue that the realist has a story to tell vis-à-vis the discontinuities between the old and the new theory, leading to a realist defence based on sufficient continuity of relevant structure. 1Introduction2No Realist...
Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theor... more Kirchhoff’s diffraction theory is introduced as a new case study in the realism debate. The theory is extremely successful despite being both inconsistent and not even approximately true. Some habitual realist proclamations simply cannot be maintained in the face of Kirchhoff’s theory, as the realist is forced to acknowledge that theoretical success can in some circumstances be explained in terms other than truth. The idiosyncrasy (or otherwise) of Kirchhoff’s case is considered. The sole virtue of Kirchhoff’s theory of diffraction lies in its correct predictions and not in its false assumptions.
Two successes of old quantum theory are particularly notable: Bohr’s prediction of the spectral l... more Two successes of old quantum theory are particularly notable: Bohr’s prediction of the spectral lines of ionised helium, and Sommerfeld’s prediction of the fine-structure of the hydrogen spectral lines. Many scientific realists would like to be able to explain these successes in terms of the truth or approximate truth of the assumptions which fuelled the relevant derivations. In this paper I argue that this will be difficult for the ionised helium success, and is almost certainly impossible for the fine-structure success. Thus I submit that the case against the realist’s thesis that success is indicative of truth is marginally strengthened. 1. Introduction. Most
The semantic approach to scientific representation is now long established as a favourite amongst... more The semantic approach to scientific representation is now long established as a favourite amongst philosophers of science. One of the foremost strains of this approach—the model-theoretic approach (MTA)—is to represent scientific theories as families of models, all of which satisfy or 'make true ' a given set of constraints. However some authors (Brown 2002, Frisch 2005) have criticised the approach on the grounds that certain scientific theories are logically inconsistent, and there can be no models of an inconsistent set of constraints. Thus it would seem that the MTA fails to represent inconsistent scientific theories at all, and this raises concerns about the way it represents in general. In a series of papers (1990, 1993, 1995) and a recent book (2003) da Costa and French have developed a variant of the MTA approach which they call 'partial structures', and which they claim can accommodate inconsistent theories. I assess this claim, looking to two theories w...
On p. 10 of the 2018 National Academies Exoplanet Science Strategy document (NASEM 2018), ‘Expect... more On p. 10 of the 2018 National Academies Exoplanet Science Strategy document (NASEM 2018), ‘Expect the unexpected’ is described as a general principle of the exoplanet field. But for the next 150 pages, this principle is apparently forgotten, as strategy decisions are repeatedly put forward based on our expectations. This paper explores what exactly it might mean to ‘expect the unexpected’, and how this could possibly be achieved by the space science community. An analogy with financial investment strategies is considered, where a balanced portfolio of low/medium/high-risk investments is recommended. Whilst this kind of strategy would certainly be advisable in many scientific contexts (past and present), in certain contexts – especially exploratory science – a significant disanalogy needs to be factored in: financial investors cannot choose low-risk high-reward investments, but sometimes scientists can. The existence of low-risk high-impact projects in cutting-edge space science sign...
Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science
My current opinion is that the selective realist is in a strong position vis-à-vis the historical... more My current opinion is that the selective realist is in a strong position vis-à-vis the historical challenges. Certainly the realist needs to invoke some careful criteria for realist commitment, and various nuances concerning the nature of her epistemic commitment, and this may raise the ‘death by a thousand qualifications’ question mark. But the concern is unfounded: the qualifications are all independently motivated, and indeed necessary given the philosophical complexity. Qualifications are to be welcomed here; often the truth is far from simple!
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) an... more and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. Additional information: Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
This paper emphasises the sheer scale of this movement: we start by summarising twenty debates wh... more This paper emphasises the sheer scale of this movement: we start by summarising twenty debates which have been affected, thus illustrating how often debates have been transformed by the introduction of pluralist and/or eliminativist thinking. We then provide an explanation of why this shift of philosophical terrain has occurred, an explanation which in turn predicts that its reach will extend to other debates currently unaffected, and for good reasons. We go on to detail the landscape of various different pluralist and eliminativist positions one may favour. We ultimately argue for pluralism at the meta-level: whether one should implement (some stripe of) pluralism or eliminativism depends on the context of discussion and the details of the debate at hand. We use this analysis to dissolve debates between 'pluralists' and 'eliminativists' in various domains. 4. Intelligence. INTELLIGENCE is a classic case of a concept which once had-or was thought to have-a single meaning: intelligence tests were common and taken very seriously. Today 'intelligence' is usefully described as an umbrella term for many (importantly) different respects in which a human being might cognitively perform in a favourable way: emotional intelligence, social intelligence, IQ, analytical intelligence, general knowledge, etc. Many of these individual concepts are also thought to further fragment. Although pluralism about INTELLIGENCE is quite widely accepted, the extent of the plurality is much debated. Further, some have suggested that 'intelligence' really is only an umbrella term, such that 'general intelligence' doesn't exist in any significant sense (e.g. Howe 1990, Schlinger 2003). 5. Race. Whether we are eliminativists or realists about the race concept, it is widely accepted that there are many different conceptions in the literature. 2 A few of the more prominent conceptions are: (i) cladistic race (which focusses on ancestry), (ii) biological race (with a focus on one or another feature of human biology-there are several options here), (iii) one or another 'purely social' conception of race, and (iv) a 'folk' conception of race. In academic circles, it is increasingly rare to see somebody argue that just one of these conceptions is 'correct' or 'best' in all contexts. 6. Consciousness. Ned Block (1995) describes CONSCIOUSNESS as a 'mongrel' concept. Block's main claim is that there are at least two importantly different concepts of 'consciousness' (to use Block's terminology, 'P-consciousness' and 'A-consciousness') and that various theories in cognitive science purport to explain the former, but they only really explain the latter. 3 However, it has also been argued that there are at least nine different concepts of consciousness (Hill 2009, Ch.1). Increasingly, the claim that CONSCIOUSNESS is a single unified concept that refers to only one kind of thing is
Fluorescent aporetics' : Book review of 'Aporetics: rational deliberation in the face of inconsistency' by Nicholas Rescher, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009
One of the popular realist responses to the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) is the 'selective' m... more One of the popular realist responses to the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) is the 'selective' move, where a realist only commits to the 'working posits' of a successful theory, and withholds commitment to 'idle posits'. Antirealists often criticise selective realists for not being able to articulate exactly what is meant by 'working' and/or not being able to identify the working posits except in hindsight. This paper aims to establish two results: (i) sometimes a proposition is, in an important sense, 'doing work', and yet does not warrant realist commitment, and (ii) the realist will be able to respond to PMI-style historical challenges if she can merely show that certain selected posits do not require realist commitment (ignoring the question of which posits do). These two results act to significantly adjust the dialectic vis-à-vis PMI-style challenges to selective realism. 1 I follow the convention of using 'approximate truth' as shorthand for 'approximate truth or truth'.
Pluralist and eliminativist positions have proliferated within both science and philosophy of sci... more Pluralist and eliminativist positions have proliferated within both science and philosophy of science in recent decades. This paper asks the question why this shift of thinking has occurred, and where it is leading us. We provide an explanation which, if correct, entails that we should expect pluralism and eliminativism to transform other debates currently unaffected, and for good reasons. We then consider the question under what circumstances eliminativism will be appropriate, arguing that it depends not only on the term in question, but also on the context of discussion and details of the debate at hand. The resultant selective eliminativism is an appealing compromise for various ‘pluralists’ and ‘eliminativists’ who are currently locking horns.
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Papers by Peter Vickers