Scientific Realism and Scientific Understanding

New Approaches to Scientific Realism, 2020

Scientific realism plays a central role in the philosophico-methodological discussions on research. Two are the main directions in the contributions made to scientific realism: the "internal" line and the "external" path. Following the first line, there are new visions of realism focused on central aspects of science: semantic, logic, epistemological, methodological, ontological, axiological, and ethical components. When the route follows the second path, realism in science is seen as interrelated with realism in technology and as connected to a philosophical approach to society. Altogether there is now a plethora of characterizations of scientific realism, and this paper presents the main contemporary versions of scientific realism. The analysis of the central tenets of the recent views on scientific realism contributes to present this book, which offers novelty to the ongoing debate on scientific realism.

dialectica, 1989

This paper argues that the much discussed issue between "scientific realism" and "instrumentalism" has not been clearly drawn. Particular attention is paid to the claim that only realism can "explain" the success of scientific theories andmore especiallythe progressively increasing success of such theories in a coherent line of inquiry. This claim is used to attempt to reach a clearer conception of the content of the realist thesis that underlies it; but, it is here contended, that attempt fails, and the claim itself hangs in the air. A series of increasingly sophisticated versions of the "instrumentalist" thesis is considered, and both these and the contentions of realism are placed in relation both to particular examples of scientific development and positions historically maintained by philosophers and by scientists. The author's conclusion is that, when the positions are assessed against the background of the actual history of science, (a) each of the contrary doctrines, interpreted with excessive simplicity, is inadequate as a theory of the dialectic of scientific development; (b) each, so interpreted, has contributed in important instances to actual damage to investigations by great scientists (Huygens, Kelvin, PoincarC); whereas (c) in both the theoretical statements and the actual practice of (in the author's opinion) the most sophisticated philosophers/scientists, important aspects of realism and instrumentalism are present together in such a way that the alleged contradiction between them vanishes.

2007

Scientific realism is the view that our best scientific theories give approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of a mind-independent world. Debates between realists and their critics are at the very heart of the philosophy of science. Anjan Chakravartty traces the contemporary evolution of realism by examining the most promising strategies adopted by its proponents in response to the forceful challenges of antirealist sceptics, resulting in a positive proposal for scientific realism today. He examines the core principles of the realist position, and sheds light on topics including the varieties of metaphysical commitment required, and the nature of the conflict between realism and its empiricist rivals. By illuminating the connections between realist interpretations of scientific knowledge and the metaphysical foundations supporting them, his book offers a compelling vision of how realism can provide an internally consistent and coherent account of...

Synthese, 2011

The papers collected in this special issue are written versions of talks delivered at the Theoretical Frameworks and Empirical Underdetermination workshop which we organised at the University of Duesseldorf on April 11-12 2008. Early in the summer of 2007 we were still immersed in the planning stages of the workshop. At the time our main concern was to invite philosophers that were making and would continue to make significant contributions to the scientific realism debate. With this aim in mind, we prepared a list of invitees. One of the names at the top was that of Peter Lipton. His work on inference to the best explanation had established him as one of the most prominent and formidable defenders of scientific realism. When Peter accepted the invitation our confidence in the workshop's prospects was greatly enhanced. Alas it was not meant to be. Peter unexpectedly passed away in November 2007. His absence from the workshop was strongly felt not least because quite a few of the participants had known Peter both on a professional as well as on a personal basis. David Papineau was drafted in as a replacement. Since David had a long and entwined history with Peter he was entrusted with the honourable task of delivering a eulogy on the opening day of the workshop. We are very thankful to David for delivering a moving eulogy as well as for agreeing to replace Peter at such short notice. We would like to dedicate this special issue of Synthese to the memory of Peter Lipton, a fellow philosopher and to some of us a dear friend.

Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science

Decades of debate about scientific realism notwithstanding, we find ourselves bemused by what different philosophers appear to think it is, exactly. Does it require any sort of belief in relation to scientific theories and, if so, what sort? Is it rather typified by a certain understanding of the rationality of such beliefs? In the following dialogue we explore these questions in hopes of clarifying some convictions about what scientific realism is, and what it could or should be. En route, we encounter some profoundly divergent conceptions of the nature of science and of philosophy.

Even to the beginning student of the philosophy of science, it is apparent that philosophy has ‘failed to deliver the goods’ (Laudan 1983) of establishing a demarcation criterion between what we call ‘science’ and ‘pseudo-science’; the first task of this essay will be to attempt to explain why such a programme should fail. Following the demise of the demarcation problem, a void has been left in which ‘relativism’ and ‘anti-realism’ has thrived. Countering this, the ‘no miracles argument’ (Putnam 1975) seems to defend a realist interpretation of the theories of science and the entities to which they ‘refer’; the ‘success’ of science could not be explained other than that there is a ‘truth’ content to theories. This essay will show that this realism/antirealism debate is in fact not a real philosophical problem at all; rather, it is a logically ungrounded metaphysical debate – the result of philosophers construing grammatical claims as if they were scientific claims. It will then establish that although realism is an ‘ungrounded’ metaphysical position, unlike antirealism, it actually has an important practical use – it is a position that functions well and is in fact essential within the ‘language game’ of science (Wittgenstein 1953).

Studia philosophica Estonica, 2013

Synthese, 2024

In recent years there has been a noticeable yet largely unacknowledged 'pragmatic turn' in the scientific realism debate, inspired in part by van Fraassen's work on 'epistemic stances'. Features of this new approach include: an ascent to the meta-level (the focus is not so much on whether scientific realism is true, but on the prior questions of the nature of the positions in this debate, how to decide whether to be a scientific realist, etc.); a reinterpretation of scientific realism and anti-realism as (or as closely associated with) stances, frameworks, rather than theories or beliefs; a move away from the previously dominant empirical-explanatory (i.e. quasiscientific or naturalistic) conception of scientific realism, anti-realism, and their justification; and a stress on the pragmatic and values-based elements in the debate. The traditional scientific realism debate is concerned with determining which position is true, or most epistemically justified. The new approach by contrast is concerned with determining which position best serves certain values, e.g. is most useful, fruitful, or otherwise prudentially preferable. In this paper we try to bring together the various strands in this new orientation, summarise its key features, contrast it with superficially similar but opposing views, and explore the similarities and differences among some of its adherents. Given we are advocates of the turn, we also offer a defence of the value and fruitfulness of this reconceptualization of the debate.