Information Warfare

In this essay I have highlighted a number of areas that are of concern
and give us reason to remain vigilant and prepared to act quickly, collectively
and clearly - and always with consideration of the core values
of democracy, which it is our joint task to protect. However, there are
also positive things that are worth pointing out. Swedish democracy
stands up strongly in international comparisons. We have begun the rebuilding
of our total defense and we as a nation are very united behind
the idea that imperialist powers do not have the right to create spheres
of interest and attack neighboring countries in violation of international
law. We also stand united behind the effort to give Ukraine the support
it needs. By joining NATO, we stand stronger together with others in a
defense alliance, whose effect is deterrent and thus peacekeeping. The
international cooperation to create democratic resilience and to counteract
information threats is continuously strengthened. Within the EU,
the term FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) has
been established which provides a good framework and starting point
for continued work. In recent years we have seen a markedly increased
public awareness of how information can be used as a weapon even in
peacetime. Of course, we are by no means finished. This is work that we
need to continue - together and continuously - to create resilience and
the ability to protect our open democratic society, the free formation of
opinions and Sweden’s freedom and independence.

L’Union européenne face au MAGA et au technocapitalisme disruptif : quand les valeurs ne suffisent plus
À l’ère de la disruption géopolitique et technologique, l’Union européenne se retrouve dépassée par les dynamiques du pouvoir brut — celles d’un libertarianisme radical américain, porté par le mouvement MAGA, et d’un technocapitalisme chinois, tous deux déterminés à redéfinir les règles du jeu mondial. Alors que Bruxelles persiste à croire en la force du droit, des institutions et des valeurs démocratiques, les États-Unis et la Chine imposent leur hégémonie par la technologie, la finance et la coercition économique.
Ce document démonte les illusions européennes :
Pourquoi l’UE ne comprend pas la radicalité du projet MAGA, qui fusionne nationalisme, dérégulation extrême et privatisation de l’État ?
Comment les GAFAM et les cryptomonnaies sapent la souveraineté européenne, tandis que l’UE se contente de régulations symboliques ?
Quels scénarios attendent une Europe dépourvue de champions technologiques, dépendante des États-Unis et de la Chine, et paralysée par ses divisions internes ?
À travers une analyse sans concession, ce texte montre que l’Europe n’a plus les moyens de ses ambitions. Il ne s’agit plus de savoir si elle déclinera, mais comment elle peut encore limiter les dégâts — et quels acteurs (États, villes, citoyens) pourraient incarner une résistance, même locale.
Une lecture indispensable pour comprendre pourquoi les valeurs ne suffisent plus, et comment l’Europe pourrait — peut-être — éviter de devenir un simple protectorat technologique.

This article delves into the protection of economic and social rights in
Central and Eastern Europe from the United Nations (UN) human rights
protection system perspective. We analyse the extent to which the broad
inclusion of economic and social rights in domestic constitutions translates
into Central and Eastern European states’ ways of approaching the interna-
tional protection of economic and social rights. In particular, we examine whether the recognition of the justiciability of economic and social rights in
these countries’ domestic constitutions are borne out by their acceptance of
human rights treaties that protect economic and social rights, especially those that enable individuals to bring communications at the international level.
Based on the concluding observations of the UN Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, we also study Central and Eastern European
countries’ approach to the domestic implementation of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. We argue that there is a
discrepancy between the extensive constitutional protection of economic and social rights by Central and Eastern European countries on the one hand,
and their reluctant acceptance of the international law counterparts of these
constitutional rights on the other.

Generating credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is premised upon the ability of the US and its allies/partners to act collectively and operate together effectively.  Whilst this is important across all natures of operations, this particularly significant for operations in the information environment (OIE).  A key means to achieve this outcome is by doctrinal alignment:  using compatible terms and concepts in doctrine to minimise friction and to build a shared vision of intended  ways, means, and ends.  This entails more than merely understanding the ontology (the ‘what’) of partner doctrine, but also its aetiology (the ‘why’).  The purpose of this paper is to contribute to such a shared understanding to enhance US-Australian interoperability in the OIE.

In this paper I provide an account of the evolution of information-based operating concepts (IBOC), as instantiated in Australian joint operations doctrine.  In the first part of the paper, I address fundamental conceptual matters:  key definitions; the relationship between operating concepts and doctrine; the place of doctrine in generating military capability; and the role of doctrine in generating multi-national interoperability.  In the second part of the paper, I provide an account of the origins and evolution of IBOC in Australian joint operations doctrine – from an ontological and aetiological perspective – from the mid-1970s to the present.  In the third part of the paper, I propose how understanding the ontology and aetiology IBOC in Australian joint operations doctrine can enhance US-Australian interoperability for OIE.  The paper concludes with some closing words on the increasing significance of OIE in the context of the evolving security environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

Este artigo aborda a guerra cognitiva digital sob uma ótica tático-operacional, focada nas implicações para as Forças Armadas e nas medidas práticas de detecção, prevenção e resposta. Parte-se da premissa de que Tecnologias da Informação e Comunicação (TICs)-Operações de Informações-, e, Operações Psicológicas (Op. Psy) convergem para criar capacidades de influência em grande escala, capazes de degradar prontidão, comando e controle, moral e coesão social. Propõe-se um conjunto de diretrizes operacionais, medidas de inteligência e propostas de política para mitigar riscos e integrar capacidades defensivas e ofensivas no espectro cognitivo.

This study examines the interplay between cyberspace and traditional foreign policy, addressing two key questions: (1) How does cyberspace influence foreign policy decision-making? and (2) What framework can integrate factors from real and cyber politics to guide leaders during conflicts? Using a rationalist lens, this study proposes a model centered on leadership, emphasizing two variables: perceived hostility and balance of power dynamics. The model categorizes state-led cyber actions into three levels-cyber espionage, destabilization, and conflict-based on attribution risks and geopolitical conditions. Empirical analyses of cases such as Stuxnet, Russia-Ukraine, and U.S.-China cyber activities demonstrate how leaders rationally select cyber actions to navigate complex geopolitical and cyber landscapes. This research advances our understanding of cyber-enabled statecraft and offers a structured framework for policymakers to address emerging challenges in the digital age.

Executive Summary
The war launched by the Russian Federation against Ukraine has caused the most severe geopolitical rupture in Europe since 1945, bringing high-intensity conventional confrontation back to the forefront and testing the resilience of the entire Western security architecture. Predictions of a swift victory collapsed, and the conflict evolved into a war of attrition and adaptation, where success was not determined by numerical or technological superiority, but by the ability to integrate resources, intelligence, logistics, and willpower into a coherent and resilient system.
From a geopolitical perspective, the conflict has accelerated the transition toward a competitive multipolar order, strengthening NATO and reinforcing Euro-Atlantic cohesion, while also prompting states in the Global South to adopt more autonomous positions. Europe reacted with unity, yet revealed structural vulnerabilities: dependence on the United States, industrial fragmentation, and slow decision-making. For Romania and the entire Eastern Flank, the war has confirmed that geography is both an asset and a vulnerability, demanding urgent investment in national resilience.
At the military level, the war has shown that doctrine and technology must be supported by the human factor and by support infrastructure — otherwise they lose their value. Operations combined archaic tactics (trenches, artillery barrages) with cutting-edge innovations (mass drone deployment, integration of satellites and encrypted communications). Information superiority, logistical resilience, and coordinated international support enabled Ukraine to withstand the assault and even reclaim territory, while Russia was forced to reconfigure its doctrine, mobilization system, and defence industry.
In essence, the conflict has demonstrated that military power can no longer be separated from geopolitical power, and victory is no longer decided exclusively on the battlefield, but by the economic, informational, and political networks that sustain it. The fundamental lesson is that in the 21st century, resilience, adaptability, and the capacity to mobilize durable external support are more decisive than raw massed force.
The Russia–Ukraine war fits into the broader framework of the conflict between the older trend of globalization with its postmodernist dimension (including its DEI, “Cancel”, #MeToo, “Black Lives Matter” components, etc.) and multipolarity, represented mainly by the Global South and sovereigntism. The way this war ends will significantly influence the future course of human society. And let us not forget China.

The paper critically surveys the role of the information component of national power (ICNP) in Australian national security policy. The paper commences with a review of the post-Cold War global security environment and the implications of the Information Revolution for national security. Following this, the paper proposes a model of the ICNP which operationalises the ICNP in terms of five interdependent national tasks. The paper then examines the Australian national security system and provides an initial assessment of its effectiveness at employing the ICNP. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the Australian national security system might be reformed so as to enhance employment of the ICNP in support of Australia's national security objectives.

Cet article est un hommage, un coup de chapeau à cette ONG Bellingcat dont les enquêteurs ont déjà effectué un travail d’enquête remarquable en Open source sur les guerres de Syrie et d’Ukraine mais aussi sur l’élimination des opposants à Poutine, en dévoilant les crimes commis par les dictateurs syriens et russes, au péril de leurs vies, car ils sont menacés de mort par les tueurs du FSB et du GRU lancés à leurs trousses par Vladimir Poutine.

This thesis examines the concept of winning hearts and minds from a historical analysis to a contemporary framework. The literature on the concept fell short of success to implement the practice of winning hearts and minds. The concept did not solely attribute to security studies but to religion and political science as well in history. Therefore, within a historical outlook, winning hearts and minds has a robust conceptualization. Moreover, this thesis attempts to formulate the components of the concept of winning hearts and minds. To analyze the components, two sets of case studies, Vietnam War and Malayan Emergency, and London attack and Madrid bombings are taken into consideration with regard to the success and failure of state policies.

The article reveals the specific features of using artificial intelligence technologies in modern information wars and conceptualises the political phenomenon of «smart polemos». Within the framework of the new concept of «smart polemos», it is proposed to focus the attention of researchers on the practices of using algorithms in information confrontation, including armed conflicts. A wide range of «smart polemos» technologies is shown (from digital manipulations, digital propaganda, crea ting deepfakes to combat operations support systems and cyberweapons use practices). It is concluded that, despite the challenges and risks of developing «smart polemos» in the field of supporting information and combat operations, intelligent systems are more often used in digital psychological manipulations. Cases of political intrigue created through the use of artificial intelligence in information operations are studied; the use of a multi-move strategic scenario, the presence of a customer, his goals and a «target»-victim in the structure of these intrigues are noted. In response to the challenges, threats and risks of «smart polemos», an ecumenical approach is proposed which implies the formation of a digital ecumene of the state and its allies.

In their hybrid actions against Poland, Russian intelligence services have been known to carry out various acts of sabotage. Due to the increase in immigration to Poland of the population from the post-Soviet area, it has become a potential asset for the Russian services in their cognitive activities. These activities are aimed at creating specific mental processes, attitudes and behaviours among Polish society that are in line with Russia's objectives. Russia's cognitive activities in the context of its strategic objectives in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia's strategic objective in relation to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is to expand its political influence within the region to the greatest extent possible. In terms of international security, this objective is pursued by means of a number of initiatives, including the attempts to expel Anglo-Saxon influence from the region, to halt regional integration processes and to replace them with its own political projects; to minimise Western support for

This week, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen unveiled her latest flagship initiative: a bold push to “strengthen EU democratic resilience,” backed by a new centre dedicated to the cause. But there’s one glaring problem: it doesn’t have a budget — not this year, anyway. And Russia has been given another year to get ready to counter the European grand plans.

The study covers ten Central and Eastern European countries, four of which belong to the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) and six to the Eastern Partnership (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine). Each country chapter follows an identical structure, and in addition to an abstract and a concluding recommendations section, they consist of the following sections:  Overview of the latest topical studies, Effect of the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine on national resilience to disinformation, Changes in the national media landscape, Changes in the legal and institutional framework, and Responses by the media and civil society. A quantitative Disinformation Resilience Index was measured based on online expert surveys (a minimum of 10 responses per country).

This paper proposes the G⁰–G³ framework to characterize overlapping regimes of global power and argues that the contemporary shift is best captured as a transition from G²⁺—institutional globalization under strain—to G³, where symbolic and algorithmic governance shape legitimacy and leverage. We operationalize two core constructs—symbolic governance and algorithmic colonialism—and translate them into measurable signposts across three families: Institutions (e.g., SIB, CID, TL, CEA), Protocols (AC, DQA, MAOI, CPL, ADR), and Narratives (PIF, FIR, NIA). Using 2019–2025 data and mini-cases (e.g., WHO/UNESCO decisions, SCO summit and Beijing’s Victory Day, platform dynamics on TikTok/Telegram), we document a quantifiable re-weighting from alliance-centric and rule-enforcement mechanisms to standards, audits, provenance, and recommender systems. Policy implications include a toolbox for standards diplomacy, auditable algorithms, content provenance, and digital-sovereignty safeguards for small and mid-size states. We discuss normalization choices, coder reliability (Cohen’s κ), and limitations stemming from platform-reported transparency, and provide robustness checks for composite indices (e.g., ±20% weighting for MAOI). Rather than replacing mainstream IR theories, the framework extends them into the digital domain and offers a replicable measurement scheme for future comparative work.

Critical questions (CQs) generation for argumentative texts is a key task to promote critical thinking and counter misinformation. In this paper, we present a two-step approach for CQs generation that i) uses a large language model (LLM) for generating candidate CQs, and ii) leverages a fine-tuned classifier for ranking and selecting the top-k most useful CQs to present to the user. We show that such usefulness-based CQs selection consistently improves the performance over the standard application of LLMs. Our system was designed in the context of a shared task on CQs generation hosted at the 12th Workshop on Argument Mining, and represents a viable approach to encourage future developments on CQs generation. Our code is made available to the research community.

In the digital age, information warfare and digital diplomacy have become pivotal in shaping national security. This research investigates the role of the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) of Pakistan in utilizing digital media for crisis communication. The study explores how ISPR's engagement on platforms like Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram has influenced public perception during national security crises. It examines the strategic use of digital media in countering misinformation, managing crises, and reinforcing national security narratives. Through content analysis and case studies, the research identifies the effectiveness of ISPR's strategies and offers recommendations for enhancing digital communication in the context of fifth-generation warfare (5GW). This research contributes to understanding military-led communication in the digital era and provides insights into best practices for global military PR strategies.

Fordow' is the name of a village located in the mountainous Qom province in North-West Iran. It is also the site of a former nuclear enrichment plant which is likely to become familiar among students of international law. On the 22 of June this year the US military targeted Fordow and other facilities at Natanz and Isfahan. These American operations were the latest example in an accelerating erosion of international legal constraints on states' use of force. This decline carries implications nd

With the rise of social media, disinformation has become an important instrument in information warfare at the state level. The article aimed to determine the dominant directions of the Russian Federation's disinformation and propaganda activities on the Internet concerning Poland and its citizens. The study used content made available as part of Twitter's Information Operations project. It focused on the dynamics of the communication, the range of topics discussed and the emotions they evoke in recipients. From four databases containing almost 10 million tweets from 2009-2020, a sample related to Poland was extracted and analysed using data mining techniques. The findings showed that the discourse promoted by Russian services focused on undermining public trust, stoking social tensions and feeding anxiety. The impact of messages included both institutional (EU countries, NATO members) and interpersonal relationships (ethnic groups, representatives of professions, individuals). The research also illustrated the functioning of some disinformation mechanisms in practice. Its results may constitute a reference point for future studies of online hostile communication activities .

El paradigma de la seguridad y el conflicto ha experimentado una transformación irreversible. La superioridad militar ya no se mide únicamente por la capacidad de ejercer fuerza en los dominios físicos tradicionales (tierra, mar, aire, espacio, etc.). Como se postula en la "Seguridad con Visión Multidominio", el poder efectivo en el siglo

Established in 1927 and reconstituted in 1949 after the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the armed wing of China's ruling party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP controls all levers of power in China, and its control of the military is absolute. As a "party army", the PLA serves the party rather than the state, making the PLA unique among modern advanced militaries. As a Party-Army, the PLA is a political actor.

The use of deception to achieve advantage in conflict and competition is as old as civilisation.  But recent technological advances – particularly those relating to social media – have empowered deception-based stratagems to a historically unprecedented extent.  The employment of deception by malign actors has societal-level consequences, impacting upon the work of many professions.  But arguably the profession most impacted here is the intelligence analyst:  whose core role is to separate falsehood from truth and to advise accordingly.  It is therefore critical that intelligence analysts are appropriately prepared to recognise and counter deception in the contemporary era.

In this paper we investigate the increased significance of deception in the contemporary era, and how to build analyst capacity and resilience to address it.  The paper opens by describing the drivers that have increased the utility of deception in the contemporary era.  The paper then discusses the success mechanisms of deception arising from cognitive psychology.  The paper then uses three vignettes – drawn from the military, public health, and whole of nation security domains - to demonstrate the requirement for analysts to identify and counter deception.  The paper then concludes with a discussion of how to foster increased analyst capability and resilience to detect deception.

The second Gulf War will become synonymous with the emergence of fully-fledged information warfare where the military-entertainment complex has so influenced strategic and logistic possibilities that it becomes apparent that the war was waged as entertainment. This is entertainment not as an amusement or diversion but utilising the techniques and tropes of the burgeoning entertainment industry as a means to achieve military objectives. This paper offers a short history of the military-entertainment complex as reality and ...

Vortrag von Schoresch Davoodi auf den Tübinger Tagen der digitalen Freiheit 2025 Über die Tübinger Tage der digitalen Freiheit Die Tübinger Tage der digitalen Freiheit (TDF) sind ein offenes Chaos-Community-Event. Das Event richtet sich bei weitem nicht nur an Nerds, sondern an alle, die an einem Leben in Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung interessiert sind. Dazu möchten wir mit Werkzeugen zur Selbstbefähigung in Form von Workshops und Vorträgen anreizen. Die Veranstaltung wird vom ChaosTreff Tübingen (CTT) organisiert, einem registrierten Verein und eng verbunden mit dem Chaos Computer Club e.V. Am 26. und 27. Juli 2025 fanden zum vierten Mal die Tübinger Tage der digitalen Freiheit statt ("TDF", vormals bekannt als Tag der digitalen Freiheit). Das Event ging erstmals über zwei volle Tage. Die Veranstaltung fand in der Westspitze Tübingen (Eisenbahnstraße 1, 72072 Tübingen) statt und war kostenlos zugänglich. Der vorliegende Vortrag wurde am 27.07.2025 auf der Bühne 2 (6. OG) gehalten.

Freely accessible at: https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/21/08/2025/countering-weaponized-interdependence-co-optive-interdependence
This article investigates to what extent China’s Belt and Road Initiative could be seen as a collaborative alternative to coercive interdependence.

This article delves into the intricate interplay between artificial intelligence (AI) and information warfare during the Ukraine War, exploring the evolution of strategies and technologies that have reshaped the dynamics of modern conflicts. Against the backdrop of historical context, the study investigates the role of AI in shaping narratives, influencing public opinion, and driving military operations. The Ukraine War serves as a compelling case study, highlighting the pervasive impact of information warfare on the global stage. From the weaponization of social media platforms to the dissemination of propaganda and disinformation, the article analyses the multifaceted dimensions of the information landscape in the conflict. Central to this examination is the integration of AI, which has emerged as a critical force in military operations, leveraging machine learning algorithms for predictive analysis and cybersecurity solutions. The article scrutinizes AI's involvement in the propagation of misinformation, with a focus on deepfake technology and AI-generated content. Ethical considerations are explored in-depth, shedding light on the ethical dilemmas posed by the use of AI in information warfare and advocating for responsible AI practices within the realm of international regulations. Drawing on case studies from the Ukraine War, the article provides a nuanced analysis of specific instances where AI played a pivotal role, offering insights into its effectiveness and consequences. Cybersecurity measures and countermeasures against AI-driven attacks are discussed, emphasizing the imperative of international collaboration to address security threats in this evolving landscape. As the article unfolds, it navigates through the ethical considerations surrounding AI, striking a balance between security concerns and the preservation of human rights and privacy. Looking forward, the study anticipates future implications, exploring the potential advancements in AI and their impact on global geopolitics and conflict resolution. This article serves as a comprehensive exploration of the intricate relationship between AI and information warfare, providing valuable insights for policymakers and the international community. The study underscores the need for responsible AI use, ethical considerations, and collaborative efforts to navigate the evolving landscape of conflicts in the AI era.

The 21st-century international system functions according to a poorly understood logic. This lack of clarity does not stem from excessive complexity but from its fundamentally new nature. Our inherited intellectual frameworks are no longer sufficient for this new reality. The grand theories of International Relations, Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism, while foundational to our understanding of history, now offer only partial and increasingly inadequate explanations.

Cyber technology represents digital military capability with the purpose of causing damage to the military strength and the social infrastructure of a potential enemy. War using conventional weapons may be preceded by or combined with a war using cyber technology. This paper introduces such technology into the theory of conflicts, suggesting the striking proposal that the expected return on cyber investment is convex. It is shown that an asymmetric successful cyber program results in an option for a pre-emptive cyber attack. These features of the model make the cyber technology a first-ranked military investment. The optimal scale of a cyber program of a country expected to have access to a superior cyber capability is derived. It is shown that the asymmetric cyber capability reduces the international arms race but nevertheless raises the likelihood of a war reducing the deterrence. JEL Classification: H12, H56

A guerra russo-ucraniana, intensificada a partir de fevereiro de 2022, em decorrência da invasão territorial em larga escala da Ucrânia por forças militares russas, assinala um evento referencial na dinâmica geopolítica global do século XXI. O mencionado conflito armado proporciona cenário notável para a análise do impacto de tecnologias emergentes, bem como para o exame do desempenho estratégico, operacional e tático do aparato bélico tanto de Moscou quanto de Kiev. Este trabalho tenciona sintetizar os ensinamentos de maior relevância na referida dialética de forças, extraídos das ações de combate no domínio terrestre, indicando possíveis caminhos para a transformação das instituições militares do Brasil. Destarte, o capítulo foi desenvolvido, após a introdução, em duas seções principais – a guerra de movimento e a guerra de atrição – enfatizando as táticas, técnicas e procedimentos que mais se destacaram em cada fase da supracitada beligerância.

This study examines how a communist agent of influence, Pham Xuan An, shaped Western media narratives from within Time magazine during the Vietnam War, and what that means for contemporary information warfare. Using mixed methods and natural language processing, we analyzed 245 Time articles and found high levels of rhetorical convergence with Vietnamese communist propaganda. Strategic failure framing, moral ambiguity, and civilian victimhood appeared in over 60% of the coverage, aligning closely with themes emphasized in North Vietnamese propaganda. The most predictive element of convergence was not emotional language, but how journalists framed cause, blame, and moral weight. This highlights framing as a primary vehicle for narrative influence. Though causality cannot be proven, the patterns reveal how adversaries can exploit open information systems through trust-based manipulation. This case demonstrates that narrative dominance can be achieved without lies or censorship, making agents of influence a critical threat vector in the cognitive domain of irregular warfare.

The advent of anti-radiation missiles (ARMs) marked a transformative moment in aerial warfare, as these weapons specifically target radar emissions to suppress or destroy an adversary’s air defense systems. Designed to home in on electromagnetic signals emitted by radar installations and other sources, ARMs exploit a fundamental vulnerability in modern militaries’ reliance on radar for early warning, guidance, and engagement. Yet, as with nearly all military technologies, the rise of ARMs provoked a parallel development of countermeasures. Jet fighters and other aircraft, recognizing the profound threat posed by these specialized missiles, developed a variety of techniques to evade or neutralize them. These countermeasures combine both tactical maneuvers and sophisticated electronic warfare (EW) technologies. In this paper, I will examine the basic working mechanisms of ARMs, outline how military aircraft counter them, and highlight examples from the United States, Russia, and China. It will argue that the interplay between ARMs and their countermeasures exemplifies the larger dialectic of measure and countermeasure that has long shaped the history of military innovation.

Paper was written for class during academic studies.

Abstract:

The evolution of warfare has turned into an unpredictable landscape where asymmetrical tactics dominate strategies exploiting vulnerabilities of stronger adversaries by utilizing unconventional activities such as cyber-attacks and psychological operations. Building off previous work in class, it is the intent of this brief research paper to consider such tactics and demonstrate how they constitute the most dangerous form of conflict globally via examples provided with the advent of cyber warfare and Al-Qaeda’s operational structure. In turn, this will illustrate the need to implement comprehensive countermeasures.

The 47th President of the United States of America, Donald Trump, announced to end the war in Ukraine in 100 days, after his pledge in the US presidential election to end it even in hours. These thin rhetorics play foul both to the mainstream as well as the margin narrative in International Relations Theory. Neither the dominant thesis of an imperialist Russia nor the marginal proposition (at least in the 'West') that Russia basically reacted to eastward NATO expansion with militarily enforcing its security interests fit well with Trump's displayed will (and hope) to peace. In this essay I will develop a third explaining narrative that will underpin some peace skepticism by applying a Global Political Economy Approach to the whole process of the Ukrainian War. It is analytically based on the premise of a dialectic contradiction of a globalized world economy and a particularized plethora of nation states that rests on different power resources and can only be balanced both by diplomatic power bargaining politically and by the implementation of a generalized recycling mechanism of balance of payments imbalances economically. The enfolding baseline thesis is therefore, that the whole process towards, first, civil war, and then, internationalized war could only be understood if seen in the light of the US geoeconomic as well as geopolitical strategies to safeguard its (declining) hegemonic role in a transforming global context. The rise of the China and the other BRICS state afterwards alter the global power balance away from the 'Old West'. To understand the Ukrainian War Theater makes it necessary to include this GPE perspective into the whole picture. What makes a fast peace settlement more improbable is the US neocons' strategy to not allow ‚contender states‘ to become (successful) global rivals. Therefore, the outbreak of the Ukrainian War as well as its development to this end is also about the politics of divide et impera the US governments of the last twenty years were willing to apply to both enemies (BRICS) and friends alike (European Union). Only if the 'American Empire' adopts peacefully to the enfolding realities of a multipolar world order peace in Ukraine will have a chance to last for long and not being settled in possible Nuclear Armageddon.

This introduction to a groundbreaking volume on media and communication technology in the Russia-Ukraine War presents one of the most detailed and systematic theoretical reflections to date on the development of digital war since 2022. It explores the integration of digital technologies into warfare, emphasizing the blurring boundaries between civilians and combatants, the role of participatory media, and the transformative impact of technological innovation. ​ The text examines the Russo-Ukrainian War as a "totalizing war," highlighting its transitional nature between limited and total war, shaped by infrastructural, algorithmic, and societal constraints. ​ It delves into the dual role of technology as both a tool for empowerment and a mechanism of control, while addressing the ethical and strategic challenges of digital participation. By analyzing the interplay of connectivity, disinformation, and resilience, this introduction sets the stage for a comprehensive exploration of the augmented realities of modern warfare.

Throughout history, victory in war has rarely gone to the largest or most powerful. Instead, success favors those who adapt to terrain, technology, and changing conditions. This situation created a timeless dynamic, which could be called the struggle between dinosaurs and insects. The dinosaurs, often powerful but inflexible, fall before smaller, nimbler insects whose strength lies in adaptability...
The enduring truth: victory belongs not to the strongest, but to the most adaptable. Whether in snowy Russian plains, Middle Eastern deserts, or digital cyberspace, survival favors those who evolve faster than their enemies.

A cross-eye jammer based on a phase-conjugating (PC) retrodirective array is proposed. Such PC cross-eye jammers eliminate the delay inherent in traditional Van-Atta (VA) cross-eye jammers and induce errors in radars that use the same antenna beam for transmission and reception, while VA cross-eye jammers do not. Validated simulations are provided to confirm the effectiveness and retrodirective properties of the PC cross-eye jammer.

The effect of platform skin return on retrodirective cross-eye jamming is analysed, allowing the parameters of a cross-eye jammer in the presence of skin return to be determined. The inherently unknown phase of the platform skin return is accounted for, and the effect of variations in Jammer-to-Signal Ratio (JSR) is investigated. The widely-held, though unsubstantiated, view that a JSR of 20 dB is required for effective cross-eye jamming is found to be reasonable, though conservative.

A cross-eye jammer based on a phase-conjugating (PC) retrodirective array is proposed. Such PC cross-eye jammers eliminate the delay inherent in traditional Van-Atta (VA) cross-eye jammers and induce errors in radars that use the same antenna beam for transmission and reception, while VA cross-eye jammers do not. Validated simulations are provided to confirm the effectiveness and retrodirective properties of the PC cross-eye jammer.

The effect of platform skin return on retrodirective cross-eye jamming is analysed, allowing the parameters of a cross-eye jammer in the presence of skin return to be determined. The inherently unknown phase of the platform skin return is accounted for, and the effect of variations in Jammer-to-Signal Ratio (JSR) is investigated. The widely-held, though unsubstantiated, view that a JSR of 20 dB is required for effective cross-eye jamming is found to be reasonable, though conservative.

Shannon's Information Theory provides a robust and quantifiable model for explaining the fundamental paradigm of Information Warfare. This paper reviews the four canonical strategies of Information Warfare, in the context of Shannon's models and further extends these models into the domain of hypergame theory.

This paper reviews the four canonical strategies of Information Warfare and asserts that Information Warfare is an artifact of evolution in biological systems: the use of Information Warfare techniques by organisms aids survival in a competitive environment. A range of specific biological examples are explored to support this assertion.

Wireless ad-hoc networks are vulnerable partly due to the absence of a clear physical boundary. A simple yet robust network layer security protocol has been proposed previously for Suburban Ad-Hoc Networks. It secures network layer packets at each hop, and ...