Information Technology Ethics

We can learn about human ethics from machines. We discuss the design of a working machine for making ethical decisions, the N-Reasons platform, applied to the ethics of robots. This N-Reasons platform builds on web based surveys and experiments, to enable participants to make better ethical decisions. Their decisions are better than our existing surveys in three ways. First, they are social decisions supported by reasons. Second, these results are based on weaker premises, as no exogenous expertise (aside from that provided by the participants) is needed to seed the survey. Third, N-Reasons is designed to support experiments so we can learn how to improve the platform. We sketch experimental results that show the platform is a success as well as pointing to ways it can be improved.

Beginning with the well-known cyber-rape in LambdaMOO, I argue that it is possible to have real moral wrongs in virtual communities. I then generalize the account to show how it applies to interactions in gaming and discussion communities. My account is supported by a view of moral realism that acknowledges entities like intentions and causal properties of actions. Austin's speech act theory is used to show that real people can act in virtual communities in ways that both establish practices and moral expectations, and warrant strong identifications between themselves and their online identities. Rawls' conception of a social practice is used to analyze the nature of the wrong and the stage-setting aspect of engaging in a practice.

The essential difficulty about Computer Ethics’ (CE) philosophical status is a methodological problem: standard ethical theories cannot easily be adapted to deal with CE-problems, which appear to strain their conceptual resources, and CE requires a conceptual foundation as an ethical theory. Information Ethics (IE), the philosophical foundational counterpart of CE, can be seen as a particular case of ‘environmental’ ethics or ethics of the infosphere. What is good for an information entity and the infosphere in general? This is the ethical question asked by IE. The answer is provided by a minimalist theory of deserts: IE argues that there is something more elementary and fundamental than life and pain, namely being, understood as information, and entropy, and that any information entity is to be recognised as the centre of a minimal moral claim, which deserves recognition and should help to regulate the implementation of any information process involving it. IE can provide a valuable perspective from which to approach, with insight and adequate discernment, not only moral problems in CE, but also the whole range of conceptual and moral phenomena that form the ethical discourse.

Growing up in the late 1950’s in America, mechanical robots were part of my culture, but certainly not of industry (unless it was the toy industry, which capitalized on the delight young children—mostly boys—took in fictionalized hulking tons of intelligent steel). In film we had, among many instances of cinematic science fiction, the human-friendly Robbie the Robot (in “Forbidden Planet”) and the malevolent human-hater in “Gog”. In the science fiction literature, Isaac Asimov amazed us with his Foundation trilogy and his Three Laws of Robotics (which were, in ingenious ways, invariably violated). Since that time, robots in culture have become more sophisticated (R2D2 in Star Wars), more human-like (Terminator) and certainly more sinister as they acquire more intelligence and strength. But robots in industry have been mostly drones, capable of performing repetitive mechanical functions far better than humans (and that humans dislike doing): vacuums in the house, conveying bulk goods at

The paper presents, firstly, a brief review of the long history of information ethics beginning with the Greek concept of parrhesia or freedom of speech as analyzed by Michel Foucault. The recent concept of information ethics is related particularly to problems which arose in the last century with the development of computer technology and the internet. A broader concept of information ethics as dealing with the digital reconstruction of all possible phenomena leads to questions relating to digital ontology. Following HeideggerÕs conception of the relation between ontology and metaphysics, the author argues that ontology has to do with Being itself and not just with the Being of beings which is the matter of metaphysics. The primary aim of an ontological foundation of information ethics is to question the metaphysical ambitions of digital ontology understood as todayÕs pervading understanding of Being. The author analyzes some challenges of digital technology, particularly with regard to the moral status of digital agents. The author argues that information ethics does not only deal with ethical questions relating to the infosphere. This view is contrasted with arguments presented by Luciano Floridi on the foundation of information ethics as well as on the moral status of digital agents. It is argued that a reductionist view of the human body as digital data overlooks the limits of digital ontology and gives up one basis for ethical orientation. Finally issues related to the digital divide as well as to intercultural aspects of information ethics are explored -and long and short-term agendas for appropriate responses are presented.

This paper discusses basic concepts and recent developments in intellectual property ownership in the United States. Various philosophical arguments have previously been put forward to support the creation and maintenance of intellectual property systems. However, in an age of information, access to information is a critical need and should be guaranteed for every citizen. Any right of control over the information, adopted as an incentive to encourage creation and distribution of intellectual property, should be subservient to an overriding need to ensure access to the information. The principles underlying intellectual property regimes in the United States recognize and embody this. In addition, the philosophical/ethical dimensions of this debate could also be structured to support this attitude as well. Intellectual property is fast becoming digital property. New technologies allow owners to extend their control of both legitimate uses and misuses of the intellectual property. Recent trends demonstrate that the access principle has not always been paramount in judicial or legislative applications. The trend rather is to allow a proprietarianism factor to dominate the analysis. Finally, several principles are forwarded which would assist adjudicators and policy makers in reaffirming the basic purpose of the intellectual property law, which is to benefit the public at large.

This lesson is the second of a three-session unit on privacy and information technology. The first session introduced some general considerations in the philosophy of privacy, and how different ethical theories (namely, utilitarianism and deontology) can be used in arguments defending or denying that we all have a moral right to privacy. This lesson introduces further details from privacy regulations in the USA, Canada, and the EU, then asks students to apply these concepts to a specific case in information technology ethics. The lesson is broken into three p arts: [1] Lecture (20 min), [2] Small Group Discussion (40 min), [3] Class Discussion (20 min).

Plagiarism is the misuse of and failure to acknowledge source materials. This paper questions common responses to the apparent increase in plagiarism by students. Internet plagiarism occurs in a contextusing the Internet as an information tool -where the relevant norms are far from obvious and models of virtue are difficult to identify and perhaps impossible to find. Ethical responses to the pervasiveness of Internetenhanced plagiarism require a reorientation of perspective on both plagiarism and the Internet as a knowledge tool. Technological strategies to ''catch the cheats'' send a ''don't get caught'' message to students and direct the limited resources of academic institutions to a battle that cannot be won. More importantly, it is not the right battleground. Rather than characterising Internet-enabled plagiarism as a problem generated and solvable by emerging technologies, we argue that there is a more urgent need to build the background conditions that enable and sustain ethical relationships and academic virtues: to nurture an intellectual community.

The paper aims at exploring if we have sound philosophical reason to embrace a human right to Internet access. While attempts to make Internet access a candidate for the standing of human right have become popular in both the political and legal arenas, we still lack serious philosophical reflection on this issue. The paper first evaluates the arguments made by various authors, and then moves to provide its own conclusions. Its logic is that if (i) Internet access is crucial for enabling democracy, and (ii) democracy is a basic human right, then we may have at least prima facie reason to see such a technology as a derived human right whose normativity supervenes on the right to democracy.

Copyright law in recent years has undergone a process of privatization. While weakening the enforceability of conventional legislation (copyright rules), cyberspace facilitates alternative types of regulation such as contracts and technical self-help measures. Regulation by the code is significantly different from traditional types of public ordering (copyright law) and private ordering (contracts). Norms that technically regulate the use of information are not merely self-made they are also self-enforced. Furthermore, the law was recruited to uphold the superiority of such technical self-help measures. The recently adopted U.S. Digital Millenium Copyright Act (DMCA) 1998 prohibits the development and use of technologies designed to circumvent copyright management systems. The underlying assumption of this legislation is that in Cyberspace, the target of regulation should become the technologies that affect users' behavior rather than the behaviors themselves. This paper critically examines this regulatory approach and highlights its shortcomings.

A principal goal of the discipline of artificial morality is to design artificial agents to act as if they are moral agents. Intermediate goals of artificial morality are directed at building into AI systems sensitivity to the values, ethics, and legality of activities. The development of an effective foundation for the field of artificial morality involves exploring the technological and philosophical issues involved in making computers into explicit moral reasoners. The goal of this paper is to discuss strategies for implementing artificial morality and the differing criteria for success that are appropriate to different strategies.

Abstract: It has been recommended that parents monitor their children's Internet use, including what sites they visit, what messages they receive, and what they post. In this paper, I argue that parents ought not follow this advice, because to do so would violate a child's right to privacy over their on-line information exchanges. In defense of this claim, I argue that children have a right to privacy from their parents, because it respects their current capacities and fosters their future capacities for autonomy and relationships.

As we near a time when robots may serve a vital function by becoming caregivers, it is important to examine the ethical implications of this development. By applying the capabilities approach as a guide to both the design and use of robot caregivers, we hope that this will maximize opportunities to preserve or expand freedom for care recipients. We think the use of the capabilities approach will be especially valuable for improving the ability of impaired persons to interface more effectively with their physical and social environments.

Principles of fairness and solidarity in AI ethics regularly overlap, creating obscurity in practice: acting in accordance with one can appear indistinguishable from deciding according to the rules of the other. However, there exist irregular cases where the two concepts split, and so reveal their disparate meanings and uses. This paper explores two cases in AI medical ethics-one that is irregular and the other more conventional-to fully distinguish fairness and solidarity. Then the distinction is applied to the frequently cited COMPAS versus ProPublica dispute in judicial ethics. The application provides a broader model for settling contemporary and topical debates about fairness and solidarity. It also implies a deeper and disorienting truth about AI ethics principles and their justification.

The paper addresses several ethical issues in online communication research in light of digital ontology as well as the epistemological questions raised by the blurring boundary between fact and theory in this field. The concept of ontology is used in a Heideggerian sense as related to the human capacity of world construction on the basis of the givenness of our being-in-the-world. Ethical dilemmas of Internet research thus arise from the tension between bodily existence and the proper object of research, i.e., online existence. The following issues are being considered: online identity, online language, online consent and confidentiality. We also argue that research ethics in the US follows the utilitarian tradition, while European researchers are deontologically oriented. A guideline of best practice in online research ethics is proposed.

Technical design can produce exclusionary and even discriminatory effects for users. A lack of discriminatory intent is insufficient to avoid discriminatory design, since implicit assumptions about users rarely include all relevant user demographics, and in some cases, designing for all relevant users is actually impossible. To minimize discriminatory effects of technical design, an actively anti-discriminatory design perspective must be adopted. This article provides examples of discriminatory user exclusion, then defining exclusionary design in terms of disaffordances and dysaffordances. Once these definitions are in place, principles of anti-discriminatory design are advanced, drawing upon a method of phenomenological variation employed in the context of standpoint epistemology.

Dean Cocking and Steve Matthews' article ' 'Unreal Friends'' (Ethics and Information Technology, 2000) argues that the formation of purely mediated friendships via the Internet is impossible. I critique their argument and contend that mediated contexts, including the Internet, can actually promote exceptionally strong friendships according to the very conceptual criteria utilized by Cocking and Matthews. I first argue that offline relationships can be constrictive and insincere, distorting important indicators and dynamics in the formation of close friends. The distance of mediated friendships mitigates this problem by promoting the courage to be candid. Next, I argue that the offline world of largely oral exchanges is often too shallow and hasty to promote deep bonds. The deliberateness of written correspondence acts as a weight to submerge friendships to greater depths and as a brake to enhance attentiveness to and precision about one's own and one's friend's character. Nonetheless, close friendships may fail to develop on the Internet. Insofar as this failure occurs, however, it would be for reasons other than those identified by Cocking and Matthews.

Traditionally, the manufacturer/operator of a machine is held (morally and legally) responsible for the consequences of its operation. Autonomous, learning machines, based on neural networks, genetic algorithms and agent architectures, create a new situation, where the manufacturer/operator of the machine is in principle not capable of predicting the future machine behaviour any more, and thus cannot be held morally responsible or liable for it. The society must decide between not using this kind of machine any more (which is not a realistic option), or facing a responsibility gap, which cannot be bridged by traditional concepts of responsibility ascription.

Social networking sites like Facebook are rapidly gaining in popularity. At the same time, they seem to present significant privacy issues for their users. We analyze two of Facebooks's more recent features, Applications and News Feed, from the perspective enabled by Helen Nissenbaum's treatment of privacy as ''contextual integrity.'' Offline, privacy is mediated by highly granular social contexts. Online contexts, including social networking sites, lack much of this granularity. These contextual gaps are at the root of many of the sites' privacy issues. Applications, which nearly invisibly shares not just a users', but a user's friends' information with third parties, clearly violates standard norms of information flow. News Feed is a more complex case, because it involves not just questions of privacy, but also of program interface and of the meaning of ''friendship'' online. In both cases, many of the privacy issues on Facebook are primarily design issues, which could be ameliorated by an interface that made the flows of information more transparent to users.

Many computer users are happy to be oblivious of the workings within the machine and yet on some level it is important to know what is occurring therein. This paper discusses an unusual type of surveillance software which may be installed in many computers. The strange aspect of this software is that it has often been downloaded and installed by the user, but without her knowledge. The software is mainly designed to collect information about the user of the computer and relay this information back to the software manufacturer. The download, installation, data collection and data transfer all take place within the users own computer but very seldom with the users knowledge. It is the intention of this paper to describe the technology involved and thereafter discuss how this new technology is affecting the online privacy debate. The paper continues to discuss the basis for legitimacy of technology and also the current level of technological deterrents available. The paper concludes with a comparison of two approaches at resolving the current problem, via legislation or the market approach.

This book equips readers with the knowledge, insights and key capabilities to understand and practice business activities from ethical and sustainable vantage points.
In our interconnected global business environment, the impacts of business activities are under increased ethical scrutiny from a wide range of stakeholders. Written from an international perspective, this book introduces the theory and practice of ethical and sustainable business, focusing in particular on eco-environmental sustainability, intergenerational responsibilities, current disruptive technologies, and intercultural values of the business community and consumers. Written by an expert author who also brings to the fore non-Western concepts and themes, this book:
• features positive case studies, as well as transferrable and applicable key insights from such cases;
• highlights the importance of taking cultural differences into account;
• takes a transdisciplinary approach which considers findings from research fields including conceptual and empirical business ethics, behavioral economics, ecological economics, environmental ethics, and the philosophy of culture;
• weaves in pedagogical features throughout, including up-to-date case studies, study questions, thought experiments, links to popular movies, and key takeaways.
Written in an accessible and student-friendly manner, this book will be of great interest to students of business ethics, environmental ethics, applied ethics, and sustainable development, as well as business practitioners striving toward ethical, sustainable, and responsible business practice.

Based on a modern reading of Aristotle's theory of friendship, we argue that virtual friendship does not qualify as genuine friendship. By 'virtual friendship' we mean the type of friendship that exists on the internet, and seldom or never is combined with real life interaction. A 'traditional friendship' is, in contrast, the type of friendship that involves substantial real life interaction, and we claim that only this type can merit the label 'genuine friendship' and thus qualify as morally valuable. The upshot of our discussion is that virtual friendship is what Aristotle might have described as a lower and less valuable form of social exchange.

There are many reports about the digital divide and many discrepant interpretations of what the reports indicate. This pattern of competing analyses, often in relation to identical data sets, has endured for a good part of the last decade. It is argued here that a major problem with much of the digital divide research is a failure to include ethical concerns as an explicit part of analyzing and interpreting digital divide gaps. If researchers include more recognition of ethics with their findings about divide gaps, it is likely that they will produce better research and findings as well as more defensible linkages between study reports and policy deliberations.

In this paper, we focus attention on the role of computer system complexity in ascribing responsibility. We begin by introducing the notion of technological moral action (TMA). TMA is carried out by the combination of a computer system user, a system designer (developers, programmers, and testers), and a computer system (hardware and software). We discuss three sometimes overlapping types of responsibility: causal responsibility, moral responsibility, and role responsibility. Our analysis is informed by the well-known accounts provided by Hart and Hart and Honore´. While these accounts are helpful, they have misled philosophers and others by presupposing that responsibility can be ascribed in all cases of action simply by paying attention to the free and intended actions of human beings. Such accounts neglect the part played by technology in ascriptions of responsibility in cases of moral action with technology. For both moral and role responsibility, we argue that ascriptions of both causal and role responsibility depend on seeing action as complex in the sense described by TMA. We conclude by showing how our analysis enriches moral discourse about responsibility for TMA.

Many people have a strong intuition that there is something morallyobjectionable about playing violent video games, particularly withincreases in the number of people who are playing them and the games'alleged contribution to some highly publicized crimes. In this paper,I use the framework of utilitarian, deontological, and virtue ethicaltheories to analyze the possibility that there might be some philosophicalfoundation for these intuitions. I raise the broader question of whetheror not participating in authentic simulations of immoral acts in generalis wrong. I argue that neither the utilitarian, nor the Kantian hassubstantial objections to violent game playing, although they offersome important insights into playing games in general and what it ismorally to be a ``good sport.'' The Aristotelian, however, has a plausibleand intuitive way to protest participation in authentic simulations ofviolent acts in terms of character: engaging in simulated immoral actserodes one's character and makes it more difficult for one to live afulfilled eudaimonic life.

This theme issue has the founding ambition of landscaping Data Ethics as a new branch of ethics that studies and evaluates moral problems related to data (including generation, recording, curation, processing, dissemination, sharing, and use), algorithms (including AI, artificial agents, machine learning, and robots), and corresponding practices (including responsible innovation, programming, hacking, and professional codes), in order to formulate and support morally good solutions (e.g. right conducts or right values). Data Ethics builds on the foundation provided by Computer and Information Ethics but, at the same time, it refines the approach endorsed so far in this research field, by shifting the Level of Abstraction of ethical enquiries, from being information-centric to being data-centric. This shift brings into focus the different moral dimensions of all kinds of data, even the data that never translate directly into information but can be used to support actions or generate behaviours, for example. It highlights the need for ethical analyses to concentrate on the content and nature of computational operations—the interactions among hardware, software, and data—rather than on the variety of digital technologies that enables them. And it emphasises the complexity of the ethical challenges posed by Data Science. Because of such complexity, Data Ethics should be developed from the start as a macroethics, that is, as an overall framework that avoids narrow, ad hoc approaches and addresses the ethical impact and implications of Data Science and its applications within a consistent, holistic, and inclusive framework. Only as a macroethics Data Ethics will provide the solutions that can maximise the value of Data Science for our societies, for all of us, and for our environments.

This paper focuses on the role of punishment as a critical social mechanism for cheating prevention in MMORPGs. The role of punishment is empirically investigated in a case study of the MMORPG Tibia (http://www.tibia.com) and by focusing on the use of bots to cheat. We describe the failure of punishment in Tibia, which is perceived by players as one of the elements facilitating the proliferation of bots. In this process some players act as a moral enterprising group contributing to the reform of the game rules and in particular to the reform of the Tibia punishment system by the game company. In the conclusion we consider the ethical issues raised by our findings and we propose some general reflections on the role of punishment and social mechanisms for the governance of online worlds more generally

In October 2016, the White House, the European Parliament, and the UK House of Commons each issued a report outlining their visions on how to prepare society for the widespread use of artificial intelligence (AI). In this article, we provide a comparative assessment of these three reports in order to facilitate the design of policies favourable to the development of a 'good AI society'. To do so, we examine how each report addresses the following three topics: (a) the development of a 'good AI society'; (b) the role and responsibility of the government, the private sector, and the research community (including academia) in pursuing such a development; and (c) where the recommendations to support such a development may be in need of improvement. Our analysis concludes that the reports address adequately various ethical, social, and economic topics, but come short of providing an overarching political vision and long-term strategy for the development of a 'good AI society'. In order to contribute to fill this gap, in the conclusion we suggest a two-pronged approach.

The widespread and growing use of new social media, especially social networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter, invites sustained ethical reflection on emerging forms of online friendship. Social scientists and psychologists are gathering a wealth of empirical data on these trends, yet philosophical analysis of their ethical implications remains comparatively impoverished. In particular, there have been few attempts to explore how traditional ethical theories might be brought to bear upon these developments, or what insights they might offer, if any. In attempting to address this lacuna in applied ethical research, this paper investigates the ethical significance of online friendship by means of an Aristotelian theory of the good life, which holds that human flourishing is chiefly realized through ‘complete’ friendships of virtue. Here, four key dimensions of ‘virtue friendship’ are examined in relation to online social media: reciprocity, empathy, self-knowledge and the shared life. Online social media support and strengthen friendship in ways that mirror these four dimensions, particularly when used to supplement rather than substitute for face-to-face interactions. However, deeper reflection on the meaning of the shared life (suzên) for Aristotle raises important and troubling questions about the capacity of online social media to support complete friendships of virtue in the contemporary world, along with significant concerns about the enduring relevance of this Aristotelian ideal for the good life in the 21st century.

The era of the Cyborg is now upon us. This has enormous implications on ethical values for both humans and cyborgs. In this paper the state of play is discussed. Routes to cyborgisation are introduced and different types of Cyborg are considered. The author's own self-experimentation projects are described as central to the theme taken. The presentation involves ethical aspects of cyborgisation both as it stands now and those which need to be investigated in the near future as the effects of increased technological power have a more dramatic influence. An important feature is the potential for cyborgs to act against, rather than for, the interests of humanity.

A global information ethics that seeks to avoid imperialistic homogenization must conjoin shared norms while simultaneously preserving the irreducible differences between cultures and peoples. I argue that a global information ethics may fulfill these requirements by taking up an ethical pluralism -specifically AristotleÕs pros hen [''towards one''] or ''focal'' equivocals. These ethical pluralisms figure centrally in both classical and contemporary Western ethics: they further offer important connections with the major Eastern ethical tradition of Confucian thought. Both traditions understand ethical judgment to lead to and thus require ethical pluralism -i.e., an acceptance of more than one judgment regarding the interpretation and application of a shared ethical norm. Both traditions invoke notions of resonance and harmony to articulate pluralistic structures of connection alongside irreducible differences. Specific examples within Western computer and information ethics demonstrate these pluralisms in fact working in praxis. After reviewing further resonances and radical differences between Western and Eastern views, I then argue that emerging conceptions of privacy and data privacy protection laws in China, Hong Kong, Japan, and Thailand in fact constitute a robust, pros hen pluralism with Western conceptions. In both theory and in praxis, then, this pluralism thus fulfills the requirement for a global information ethics that holds shared norms alongside the irreducible differences between cultures and peoples.

Trust can be understood as a precondition for a well-functioning society or as a way to handle complexities of living in a risk society, but also as a fundamental aspect of human morality. Interactions on the Internet pose some new challenges to issues of trust, especially connected to disembodiedness. Mistrust may be an important obstacle to Internet use, which is problematic as the Internet becomes a significant arena for political, social and commercial activities necessary for full participation in a liberal democracy. The Categorical Imperative lifts up trust as a fundamental component of human ethical virtues – first of all, because deception and coercion, the antitheses of trust, cannot be universalized. Mistrust is, according to Kant, a natural component of human nature, as we are social beings dependent on recognition by others but also prone to deceiving others. Only in true friendships can this tendency be overcome and give room for unconditional trust. Still we can argue that Kant must hold that trustworthy behaviour as well as trust in others is obligatory, as expressions of respect for humanity. The Kantian approach integrates political and ethical aspects of trust, showing that protecting the external activities of citizens is required in order to act morally. This means that security measures, combined with specific regulations are important preconditions for building online trust, providing an environment enabling people to act morally and for trust-based relationships.

This article presents the first, systematic analysis of the ethical challenges posed by recommender systems. Through a literature review, the article identifies six areas of concern, and maps them onto a proposed taxonomy of different kinds of ethical impact. The analysis uncovers a gap in the literature: currently user-centred approaches do not consider the interests of a variety of other stakeholders-as opposed to just the receivers of a recommendation-in assessing the ethical impacts of a recommender system.

The purpose of this article is to illuminate the conceptualisations and applications of the Belmont Report's key ethical principles of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice based on a document analysis of five of the most relevant disciplinary guidelines on internet research in the social sciences. These seminal documents are meant to provide discipline-specific guidance for research design and implementation and are regarded as key references when conducting research online. Our analysis revealed that the principles of respect and beneficence were explicitly conveyed in the documents analysed, offering nuanced interpretations on issues of informed consent, privacy, and benefits and risks as well as providing recommendations for modifying traditional practices to fit the online setting. However, the invocations of the principle of justice were rather implicit and reflect an important shift from the Belmont Report's protectionist ethical position towards more situational and dialogic approaches. With the rapidly evolving nature of internet technologies, this analysis is projected to contribute to the ongoing developments in research ethics in the social sciences by outlining the tensions and implications of the use of the internet as a methodological tool. We also seek to provide recommendations on how disciplinary associations can proceed to facilitate ethically sensitive internet research.

Abstract Floridi and Sanders, seminal work,“On the morality of artificial agents” has catalyzed attention around the moral status of computer systems that perform tasks for humans, effectively acting as “artificial agents.” Floridi and Sanders argue that the class of entities considered moral agents can be expanded to include computers if we adopt the appropriate level of abstraction. In this paper we argue that the move to distinguish levels of abstraction is far from decisive on this issue. We also argue that adopting certain levels of ...