Un-making artificial moral agents

2021

This Thesis intends to verify and assume the philosophical possibility of the emergence of an authentic artificial moral agent. The plausibility of overcoming the Turing Test, the Chinese Room and the Ada Lovelace Test is taken as a presupposition, as well as the possible emergence of an authentic moral artificial agent, with intentional deliberations in a first-person perspective. Thus, the thesis of the possibility of a computational code capable of giving rise to emergence is accepted. The main problem of this study will be to investigate the philosophical possibility of an artificial ethics, as a result of the will and rationality of an artificial subject, that is, of artificial intelligence as a moral subject. An artificial ethical agent must act by its own characteristics and not according to a predetermined external schedule. Authentic artificial ethics are internal and not external to the automaton. A proposed and increasingly accepted model that demonstrates this computational possibility is that of a bottom-up morality, in which case the system can independently acquire moral capabilities. This model is close to the Aristotelian ethics of virtues. Another possible way is the union of a computational floor model, with models based on deontology, with the more general formulation of duties and maxims. On the other hand, it is shown that, in at least one case, it is possible to construct a viable and autonomous model of artificial morality. There is no unequivocal demonstration of the impossibility for artificial moral agents to possess artificial emotions. The conclusion that several programming scientists have reached is that an artificial agency model founded on machine learning, combined with the ethics of virtue, is a natural, cohesive, coherent, integrated and “seamless” path. Thus, there is a coherent, consistent, and well-founded answer that indicates that the impossibility of an authentic artificial moral agent has not been proven. Finally, a responsible ethical theory must consider the concrete possibility of the emergence of full moral agents and all the consequences of this divisive phenomenon in human history.

2021 IEEE Conference on Norbert Wiener in the 21st Century (21CW), 2021

Humans have invented intelligent machinery to enhance their rational decision-making procedure, which is why it has been named 'augmented intelligence'. The usage of artificial intelligence (AI) technology is increasing enormously with every passing year, and it is becoming a part of our daily life. We are using this technology not only as a tool to enhance our rationality but also heightening them as the autonomous ethical agent for our future society. Norbert Wiener envisaged 'Cybernetics' with a view of a brain-machine interface to augment human beings' biological rationality. Being an autonomous ethical agent presupposes an 'agency' in moral decision-making procedure. According to agency's contemporary theories, AI robots might be entitled to some minimal rational agency. However, that minimal agency might not be adequate for a fully autonomous ethical agent's performance in the future. If we plan to implement them as an ethical agent for the future society, it will be difficult for us to judge their actual stand as a moral agent. It is well known that any kind of moral agency presupposes consciousness and mental representations, which cannot be articulated synthetically until today. We can only anticipate that this milestone will be achieved by AI scientists shortly, which will further help them triumph over 'the problem of ethical agency in AI'. Philosophers are currently trying a probe of the pre-existing ethical theories to build a guidance framework for the AI robots and construct a tangible overview of artificial moral agency. Although, no unanimous solution is available yet. It will land up in another conflicting situation between biological, moral agency and autonomous ethical agency, which will leave us in a baffled state. Creating rational and ethical AI machines will be a fundamental future research problem for the AI field. This paper aims to investigate 'the problem of moral agency in AI' from a philosophical outset and hold a survey of the relevant philosophical discussions to find a resolution for the same.

New Ideas in Psychology, 2019

The paper addresses the question whether artificial intelligences can be moral agents. We begin by observing that philosophical accounts of moral agency, in particular Kantianism and utilitarianism, are very abstract theoretical constructions: no human being can ever be a Kantian or a utilitarian moral agent. Ironically, it is easier for a machine to approximate this idealised type of agency than it is for homo sapiens. We then proceed to outline the structure of human moral practices. Against this background, we identify two conditions of moral agency: internal and external. We argue further that the existing AI architectures are unable to meet the two conditions. In consequence, machines-at least at the current stage of their development-cannot be considered moral agents.

Machine ethics are quickly becoming an important part of artificial intelligence research. We argue that attempts to attribute moral agency to intelligent machines are misguided, whether applied to infrahuman or superhuman AIs. Humanity should not put its future in the hands of the machines that do not do exactly what we want them to, since we will not be able to take power back. In general, a machine should never be in a position to make any non-trivial ethical or moral judgments concerning people unless we are confident, preferably with mathematical certainty, that these judgments are what we truly consider ethical.

Ethics and Information Technology, 2020

In this article, a concise argument for computational rationality as a basis for artificial moral agency is advanced. Some ethicists have long argued that rational agents can become artificial moral agents. However, most of their views have come from purely philosophical perspectives, thus making it difficult to transfer their arguments to a scientific and analytical frame of reference. The result has been a disintegrated approach to the conceptualisation and design of artificial moral agents. In this article, I make the argument for computational rationality as an integrative element that effectively combines the philosophical and computational aspects of artificial moral agency. This logically leads to a philosophically coherent and scientifically consistent model for building artificial moral agents. Besides providing a possible answer to the question of how to build artificial moral agents, this model also invites sound debate from multiple disciplines, which should help to advance the field of machine ethics forward.

… of research on technoethics. New York: IGI …, 2009

This chapter will argue that artificial agents created or synthesized by technologies such as artificial life (ALife), artificial intelligence (AI), and in robotics present unique challenges to the traditional notion of moral agency and that any successful technoethics must seriously consider that these artificial agents may indeed be artificial moral agents (AMA), worthy of moral concern. This purpose will be realized by briefly describing a taxonomy of the artificial agents that these technologies are capable of producing. I will then describe how these artificial entities conflict with our standard notions of moral agency. I argue that traditional notions of moral agency are too strict even in the case of recognizably human agents and then expand the notion of moral agency such that it can sensibly include artificial agents.

AI & SOCIETY, 2013

I discuss the realizability and the ethical ramifications of Machine Ethics, from a number of different perspectives: I label these the anthropocentric, infocentric, biocentric and ecocentric perspectives. Each of these approaches takes a characteristic view of the position of humanity relative to other aspects of the designed and the natural worlds-or relative to the possibilities of 'extrahuman' extensions to the ethical community. In the course of the discussion, a number of key issues emerge concerning the relation between technology and ethics, and the nature of what it is to have moral status. Some radical challenges to certain technological presuppositions and ramifications of the infocentric approach will be discussed. Notwithstanding the obvious tensions between the infocentric perspective on one side and the biocentric and ecocentric perspectives on the other, we will see that there are also striking parallels in the way that each of these three approaches generates challenges to an anthropocentric ethical hegemony, and possible scope for some degree of convergence. Keywords Machine Ethics Á Artificial intelligence Á Anthropocentrism Á Biocentrism Á Ecocentrism Á Infocentrism Á Moral status Á Consciousness Á The 'more-than-human' world The following chapter was previously published, under the title 'Machine Ethics and the Idea of a More-Than-Human Moral World', in Machine Ethics, edited by Michael Anderson and Susan Leigh Anderson, Ó 2011 Cambridge University Press, pages 115-137. It is reproduced here, with some amendments, and a new introductory section, by permission of Cambridge University Press.

In review, 2019

The field of "machine ethics" has raised the issue of the moral agency and responsibility of artificial entities, like computers and robots under the heading of "artificial moral agents" (AMA). In this article, we work through philosophical assumptions, conceptual and logical variations, and identify methodological as well as conceptual problems based on an analysis of all sides in this debate. A main conclusion is that many of these problems can be better handled by moving the discussion into a more outright normative ethical territory. Rather than locking the issue to be about AMA, a more fruitfull way forward is to address to what extent both machines and human beings should be in different ways included in different (sometimes shared) practices of ascribing moral agency and responsibility.

AI & Society, 2024

In the research field of machine ethics, we commonly categorize artificial moral agents into four types, with the most advanced referred to as a full ethical agent, or sometimes a full-blown Artificial Moral Agent (AMA). This type has three main characteristics: autonomy, moral understanding and a certain level of consciousness, including intentional mental states, moral emotions such as compassion, the ability to praise and condemn, and a conscience. This paper aims to discuss various aspects of full-blown AMAs and presents the following argument: the creation of full-blown artificial moral agents, endowed with intentional mental states and moral emotions, and trained to align with human values, does not, by itself, guarantee that these systems will have human morality. Therefore, it is questionable whether they will be inclined to honor and follow what they perceive as incorrect moral values. we do not intend to claim that there is such a thing as a universally shared human morality, only that as there are different human communities holding different sets of moral values, the moral systems or values of the discussed artificial agents would be different from those held by human communities, for reasons we discuss in the paper.

This paper asks the question whether artificial agents are subject to moral judgements. In other words can robots be assessed as good or bad and does harming them bring moral and legal consequences. Moral judgements is a good term which also entails such notions as "rights", "dignity" and personality. Most of the essay deals with the possible criticism of the initial statement which falls into two distinct categories. The first criticism denies the personality in artificial agents. Author points out both to the general case of such a denial and to particular cases, giving counter arguments to each one. The second criticism concerns empathy and compassion which are the foundation for legal and moral norms regulating communication between the individuals. The idea according to which robots are equal to humans and should not be treated as pets is defended. The main conclusion of the paper is that artificial agents should be the subject to moral judgements and should be treated equally to humans. That is both a moral and political position.