Papers by Martin Peterson
Can Technological Artefacts Be Moral Agents?
Science and Engineering Ethics, Jan 1, 2010
In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, ‘moral agency is distributed over both humans and t... more In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, ‘moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts’, recently proposed by Peter-Paul Verbeek. We present some arguments for thinking that Verbeek is mistaken. We argue that artefacts such as bridges, word processors, or bombs can never be (part of) moral agents. After having discussed some possible responses, as well as a moderate view proposed by Illies and Meijers, we conclude that technological artefacts are neutral tools that are at most bearers of instrumental value.
Risk Management, 2002
The de minimis principle prescribes that decision-makers ought to neglect sufficiently improbable... more The de minimis principle prescribes that decision-makers ought to neglect sufficiently improbable risks in the decision making process. In this paper we discuss three popular explications of this principle, and argue that none of these is satisfactory. It is concluded that the concept of negligible risk is vague, i.e. that there is no sharp line to be drawn between negligible and non-negligible risks.
Nonbayesian Decision Theory
Transformative decision rules and axiomatic arguments for the principle of Maximizing Expected Utility
From consequentialism to utilitarianism
Journal of Philosophy, 2003
... its consequences. Derek Parfit's priority viewz is an example of a nonutilitarian versio... more ... its consequences. Derek Parfit's priority viewz is an example of a nonutilitarian version of consequen-tialism, which prescribes that benefits to the worse off should count for more than benefits to the better off. Another example ...
New Technologies And The Ethics Of Extreme Risks
Ends and Means, 2001
Philosophy of Probability
International Encyclopedia of Statistical Science, 2011
Can Technological Artefacts Be Moral Agents?
Science and Engineering Ethics, 2010
In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, 'moral agency is di... more In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, 'moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts', recently proposed by Peter-Paul Verbeek. We present some arguments for thinking that Verbeek is mistaken. We argue that artefacts such as bridges, word processors, or bombs can never be (part of) moral agents. After having discussed some possible responses, as well as a moderate view proposed by Illies and Meijers, we conclude that technological artefacts are neutral tools that are at most bearers of instrumental value.
Parity, Clumpiness and Rational Choice
Utilitas, 2007
An argument for the principle of maximizing expected utility
Theoria, 2008
Transformative Decision Rules, Permutability, and Non-Sequential Framing of Decision Problems
Synthese, 2000
The concept of transformative decision rules provides auseful tool for analyzing what is often re... more The concept of transformative decision rules provides auseful tool for analyzing what is often referred to as the`framing', or `problem specification', or `editing' phase ofdecision making. In the present study we analyze a fundamentalaspect of transformative decision rules, viz. permutability. A setof transformative decision rules is, roughly put, permutable justin case it does not matter in which order the rules
Nuclear Power is Neither Right Nor Wrong: The Case for a Tertium Datur in the Ethics of Technology
Science and Engineering Ethics, 2013
The debate over the civilian use of nuclear power is highly polarised. We argue that a reasonable... more The debate over the civilian use of nuclear power is highly polarised. We argue that a reasonable response to this deep disagreement is to maintain that advocates of both camps should modify their positions. According to the analysis we propose, nuclear power is neither entirely right nor entirely wrong, but rather right and wrong to some degree. We are aware that this non-binary analysis of nuclear power is controversial from a theoretical point of view. Utilitarians, Kantians, and other moral theorists make sharp, binary distinctions between right and wrong acts. However, an important argument speaking in favour of our non-binary analysis is that it better reflects our considered intuitions about the ethical trade-offs we face in discussions of nuclear power. The aim of this article is to make this argument sharp by explaining how it can be rendered compatible with, and supported by, the Capability Approach, which is quickly becoming one of the most influential frameworks for thinking about human development.
Ratio, 2012
This article introduces and explores a distinction between multidimensional and one-dimensional c... more This article introduces and explores a distinction between multidimensional and one-dimensional consequentialist moral theories. One-dimensional consequentialists believe that an act's deontic status depends on just one aspect of the act, such as the sum total of wellbeing it produces, or the sum total of priority-or equalityadjusted wellbeing. Multi-dimensional consequentialists believe that an act's deontic status depends on more than one aspect. They may, for instance, believe that the sum total of wellbeing produced by an act and the degree to which the wellbeing is equally distributed in the population affect the act's deontic status independently of each other. These two aspects cannot be reduced into any single (composite) aspect. Wellbeing and equality are two separate considerations that cannot be merged into some novel entity that accurately reflects both intuitions. On the multi-dimensional view I defend, such clashes between separate aspects are irresolvable and are best accounted for by claiming that moral rightness and wrongness are non-binary concepts. Some acts are, literally speaking, a little bit right (because they maximise wellbeing) and a little bit wrong (because they do not maximise equality). 1 1 I would like to thank Joel Katzav, Rosemary Lowry, Nicolas Espinoza and the participants of the Eindhoven Ethics Workshops for valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper.
Philosophical Studies, 2006
It is commonly assumed that preferences are determinate; that is, that an agent who has a prefere... more It is commonly assumed that preferences are determinate; that is, that an agent who has a preference knows that she has the preference in question and is disposed to act upon it. This paper argues the dubiousness of that assumption. An account of indeterminate preferences in terms of self-predicting subjective probabilities is given, and a decision rule for choices involving indeterminate preferences is proposed. Wolfgang Spohn's and Isaac Levi's arguments against self-predicting probabilities are also considered, in light of Wlodek Rabinowicz's recent criticism.
The Last Man Argument Revisited
The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2013
The Mixed Solution to the Number Problem
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2009
Ethics and Information Technology, 2012
Based on a modern reading of Aristotle's theory of friendship, we argue that virtual friendship d... more Based on a modern reading of Aristotle's theory of friendship, we argue that virtual friendship does not qualify as genuine friendship. By 'virtual friendship' we mean the type of friendship that exists on the internet, and seldom or never is combined with real life interaction. A 'traditional friendship' is, in contrast, the type of friendship that involves substantial real life interaction, and we claim that only this type can merit the label 'genuine friendship' and thus qualify as morally valuable. The upshot of our discussion is that virtual friendship is what Aristotle might have described as a lower and less valuable form of social exchange.
Foreign Aid and the Moral Value of Freedom
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2000
A Royal Road to Consequentialism?
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 2010
Uploads
Papers by Martin Peterson