General Theory of Law

Nudging is one of the avant-garde directions of legislation around the world. This study outlines the theoretical and practical advantages and disadvantages of nudges by drawing attention to the paradigmatic area of recent precautions and vaccinations against Covid-19. The starting point of the analysis is a minimal definition of ‘nudging’, according to which it is a deliberate intervention based on behavioral, psychological and empirical surveys devoted to chance the concrete context where people make decisions and act. The “legislator” as nudger intervenes on the premise that the individual’s decision-making process in relation to certain predetermined policy goals would otherwise not be satisfactory. By changing the specific decision-making context, the intervention aims to influence individual behavior in the direction desired by the nudger. A distinctive feature of nudges is that the desired behavior is not expressed directly or stated explicitly, but is sought indirectly and bypassing authoritative, coercive or otherwise binding means. In light of this idea, the current debate on whether vaccination should be mandatory or rather recommended will be examined, as will the world-shaking debate on precautionary measures to reduce risk of coronavirus infection. The analysis will show the extent to which nudges can increase preparedness and be a fruitful tool in the hands of “legislators” to promote a more participatory approach to legislation. As large-scale behavioral change is required and biases and uncertainties increase, the added value of nudges becomes more important. From a prescriptive perspective, the analysis aims to show why and to what extent “legislators” can take advantage of
nudges to avoid ineffective laws and align people behavior with public goals. In particular, the study will defend the idea that nudges, although criticised by both proponents and opponents of liberal paternalism, play an important role in the legislative framework of constitutional systems and can contribute to a better implementation of the ideal of the Rule of Law. Although nudging is sometimes dismissed as a trivial phenomenon, a far-sighted combination of nudges and regulatory laws is beneficial. It should be planned especially for exceptional situa tions where the same resilience of the legal system might fail.

An increasing number of Italian scholars are beginning to share the idea that the conceptual basis of legal positivism (LP) is wrong, particularly in the field of Public Law. According to a group of theories called “neoconstitutionalism,” constitutionalism is to be understood not only as a principle based on the need to impose legal limits to political power, but also as an aggregation of values capable of continually remodelling legal relationships, positioning itself as a “pervasive” point of reference for legal experience. A recent essay by Professor Antonio Baldassarre, President Emeritus of the Constitutional Italian Court, about the “misery of legal positivism” is a good expression of this view. In this article, the ideas outlined by Baldassarre are examined and criticized. The paper also tries to defend a version of legal positivism, which has both a conceptual and prescriptive meaning, relating to decisions made on the basis of rules. This view is based on the two correlated concepts of primary formalism and secondary formalism of “competence and procedure.”

Juristische Grundlehre is the representative work of Felix Somló's oeuvre and is an early classic in the general theory of law. The book takes a clear position on the necessity of such a general theory. A scientific study of the law cannot be based on explanations of theories focusing on the content of positive law since these theories are necessarily particular. The question is, however, how to explain the substance of general concepts: should one do so within the framework of a general theory, one that is independent of the content of positive law, as suggested by Somló, or by referring it explicitly to the explanation of that content? In contrast, theories of positive law, such as the doctrinal approach to public law, argue for the latter and regard the scientific study of the law as related to the explanation of its content. Thus, the development of general legal concepts would also be linked to that explanation. It will be shown that Somló takes position on a number of conceptual issues within the framework of his foundational legal doctrine, which were in the focus of contemporary debates on Hungarian public law. It is for this reason that the present paper focuses on the chapters of Somló's book that make arguments similar to those of public-law theories. These considerations show closer links to the debates of contemporary public-law scholarship than what would follow from Somló's formalist theoretical aims as formulated in Grundlehre. Keywords: general theory of law, doctrinal theory, the doctrinal school in hungarian public law scholarship, doctrinal method, legal character of the constitution, legal obligation

Research on the prevalence of interests and values of higher social groups over interests and values of lower social groups even in judicial decisions between two individuals only, author and defendant. Individual rights, by which modern State has been structured, tends to prevail. This prevalence is as well determinant in Robert Alexy’s theory of fundamental rights, by which is given same importance either to individual our social rights and, due to proportional balancing, there is chance social rights to win. It is possible to assert that each collision of rights will be decided differently, but proportionality does not attribute rationality to the criterion needed to give ratio decidendum to the decision. The proportional decision is more related to the chosen criterion than to the rights in conflict.

Питання захисту суб'єктивних цивільних прав вже не перше деся тиліття залишається об'єктом ретельної уваги цивілістів. При цьому акценти докт ринального обґрунтування набувають неповторного вираження у зв'язку з харак тером приватноправової політики, що проявляється в основному акті цивільного законодавства. Прийняття Цивільного кодексу України (ЦК України) у 2003 р. як конституції приватного права для майбутнього громадянського суспільства з роз виненою ринковою економікою мало наслідком значну активізацію наукових по шуків у сфері відповідної проблематики. Положення чинного ЦК України, якими значною мірою було сформовано сучасний інститут захисту суб'єктивних цивіль них прав, стали суттєвим чинником розвитку вітчизняної цивілістичної доктрини у пострадянський період. Метою статті є аналіз та визначення загального вектору розвитку доктрини при ватного права у сфері захисту суб'єктивних цивільних прав з урахуванням змін, які відбулися у правовому регулюванні інституту захисту суб'єктивних цивільних прав у результаті прийняття чинного ЦК України та реформування процесуального законодавства України в межах здійснення судової реформи. Акцентовано увагу на необхідності розмежування права на захист від захисту прав як реальних дій, безпосередньо спрямованих на захист порушеного права. Зроблено висновок про необхідність розгляду категорії захисту прав, передусім у системі механізму здійснення цивільних прав. При цьому стадію захисту права визнано факультативною стадією механізму здійснення суб'єктивного цивільного права та відокремлено від інших стадій, оскільки їй властиві характерні риси, що унеможливлюють її об'єднання зі стадією формування суб'єктивного права, так само як і його реалізації. Розкрито співвідношення між захистом прав та іншими цивілістичними категоріями, такими як охорона прав, охоронюваний законом інте рес і цивільно-правова відповідальність. У межах дослідження інституту захисту прав проаналізовано правовий феномен зловживання правом. Запропоновано під хід до юридичних наслідків кваліфікації способу захисту як загального чи спеціаль ного в контексті правозастосовної практики. ПРАВО 'КРАЇНИ

This paper aims to discuss the harmonization of family regulations at European level and also to analyse to what extent the Principles of European Family Law regarding Divorce have been included in the family regulations at national level. In order to reach the objectives, there were two research methods that have been used: document analysis and comperative research. At European level there is no definition of "family" and this fact makes the concept of family very difficult to define. Considering the various sociological, anthropological, historical and religious factors, the definition and the meaning attributed to this institution differs from state to state. The analysis has reveald that in the last decade there is a growing interest for harmonisation in the field of family law. It has also revelaed that, at national level, steps have been made in order to integrate the european principles in the national regulations. The importance of this study is that has provided detailed information of the European norms and also a through analysis about the national regulation and the improvements that can be made.

The research is dedicated to the analysis of law enforcement civil aspects in legal regulation of public relations, determination of its character and value as security instrument of their effectiveness. It is set that law realization is considered in such forms as law fulfillment, law application, law enforcement, law fulfillment and law termination accompanying the motion of civil-law relations. It is proved that the reason for law enforcement in the course of civil-law relations realization is such character of their development, reality and affiliation of which in view of their social value is provided individually-legal instructions given by public authority. Realization of subjective civil rights and legal obligations in private relation is provided by the acceptance of individual legal act issued by governmental authority. Authority's activity in law enforcement mechanism is provided by the system of legal measures (mechanism elements), the total amount of which shall be naturally implemented in law realization mechanism the component of which is law enforcement mechanism in synchronically directed at provision of its effectiveness. To such elements of law enforcement mechanism each of which is specified within the appropriate law realization may be included: legal provision, legal relations and judicial fact. RESUMEN: El estudio está dedicado al análisis de los aspectos civiles de la aplicación de la ley en las relaciones jurídico-públicas, y a la determinación de su naturaleza y significado como herramienta para garantizar su eficacia.

The article is devoted to the study of the structure of the normative element of the mechanism of legal regulation of social relations.
The mechanism of legal regulation of relations is considered as a system of legal means, methods and forms which regulate social relations. At the same time, under current conditions of the society development such regulation is achieved with minimal normative of the state. Scientists claim the variability of the normative element of the mechanism of legal regulation of social relations. The normative regulator is not the only way of influence on the subject’s assessment of abilities in the social environment. The abovementioned is manifested in the field of relations free of the state imperative pressure – relations, which formation is conditioned by the sphere of a person’s private life. Legal regulation of social relations in this field is achieved through the mediation of other regulators which have a common nature with the legal norm but a subjective limitation of their obligation.
Variability of the parameters making their content and essence may not always be fit into previously established normative regulators. Therefore, the legal norm may not regulate certain types of social relations. Moreover, the disposition of legal norms may not even meet the real needs of the subjects of a particular relationship. Or vice versa, a legal norm may contain only declarative principles or definitions, complicating the appropriate level of legal regulation of relations.
It is proved that legal norm is not a fundamental element of the mechanism of legal regulation of social relations, through which relations between the society members from the essential field to the real field and formation of corresponding legal relations between them are regulated. Corresponding regulatory influence is provided by other regulators of various legal nature, but of identical axiological significance.
The author argues that along with the legal norm the legal means for ensuring the mechanism of legal regulation of public relations include alter-normative regulators (agreement, practice), which represent a mutually agreed formation and further application of a corresponding normative structure to the specific model of behaviour of the participants of legal relations. Besides, over-normative (legal principles) and quasi-normative (judicial acts) regulators are distinguished along with normative and alter-normative regulators.
Since regulatory influence on public relations goes beyond the legal norm, the corresponding element of the mechanism of legal regulation requires its structural adjustment. The scientist coins a term a normative construct as set of legal concepts identical to the legal norm for description of an element of the mechanism of legal regulation of social relations

Este conteúdo está protegido pela lei de direitos autorais. É permitida a reprodução do conteúdo, desde que indicada a fonte, como "Conteúdo da Revista Digital de Direito Público". A RDDP constitui veículo de excelência, criado pelo Departamento de Direito Público da FDRP/USP, para divulgar pesquisa em direito público em formato de artigos científicos, comentários a julgados, resenhas de livros e considerações sobre inovações normativas.

Resumen: El deporte constituye un hecho social definitivamente normado, reglado, endógena y exógenamente. Sin embargo, el mismo ha permanecido, cual protagónico social ausente, demorado o retardado de interés profundo por parte de los juristas, quienes, al estudiar el Derecho y compararlo con el resto de los sistemas normativos en la sociedad, evidencian una preferencia por las normas morales, religiosas, económicas. Consecuentemente, la incidencia que esta normativa provoca en la vigencia jurídica del derecho al deporte, constitucional o legalmente reconocido, exige su ineludible abordaje, toda vez que el insuficiente tratamiento recibido por el mismo, desde la perspectiva de la dogmática general de los derechos fundamentales, ocasiona serias y no pocas lesiones, disminuciones o amenazas a su ejercicio legítimo, o pleno y efectivo alcance, por parte de sus titulares. Palabras clave: Constitución, normas de ordenación deportiva, derechos fundamentales, derecho al deporte.

Abstract: Sport is a clearly regulated social fact, both endogenous and exogenously. Notwithstanding , it has been relegated and neglected by lawyers who, upon studying law and comparing it with the other social regulating systems, prefer to deal with moral, religious and economic norms. Therefore, the impact legal sports regulations have on the validity of the right to sport, constitutionally and legally recognized, calls for a mandatory approach. This is because the poor treatment sport has received if viewed from the doctrine of the fundamental rights damages and threatens seriously people's legitimate practice as well as their full and effective capability.

Fattispecie, comportamenti, rimedi. Per una teoria del fatto dovuto SOMMARIO: 1. I fattori che spingono ad abbandonare la logica della fattispecie. -2. Ideologia e tecnica della fattispecie. -3. Le due fattispecie della norma. Il « fatto dovuto ». -4. La proporzione tra le due fattispecie. -5. I rimedi. Introduzione. -6. (Segue): il contratto non è una fattispecie. -7. (Segue): « Ingresso libero ai maggiori di 18 anni ». Prime conclusioni. -8. (Segue): unitarietà e vastità del tema dei rimedi nel confronto tra la disciplina del contratto e quella del fatto illecito. -9. Specificazione e norme speciali. -10. Conclusione.

This paper is part of a broader enquiry into three main models (or concepts) of individual, which appear in philosophical and legal discourse: the Reasonable Person, the Biased Nudged Human, the Homo OEconomicus (or the Economic Rational Man), The overall research aims to clarify the differences and similarities between such models as used by the relevant classical literature. The general purpose of the research is mainly to understand whether these models overlap or resemble each other and, if so, to what extent. The paper focuses on the theses that: (i) the different literatures concerned with these models of individual should be confronted more critically and, in particular, a closer dialogue between studies concerning reasonableness and nudging should be fruitful; (ii) a significant distance exists between the legal uses of these models and their use in theoretical and philosophical speculation. This is particularly true with regard to the Reasonable Person and the Homo OEconomicus concepts. Although legal scholars refer to them, such references are often nothing more than embellishments. In many instances, they import concepts and conceptions from other fields of investigation or literature by making a spurious and superficial analogy.

In this article, I explore potential connections between law and spirituality as well as some of the legal implications of these connections. After arguing that spirituality is conceptually autonomous from religion and morality, I explain why the spiritual triad of love, communion, and gift is deeply interconnected with the legal triad of justice, agreement, and right. I also make clear why individual and collective intentions and cultural values are the main channels of interaction between law and spirituality. In the second part of the article, I argue that legal systems evolve through spiritualization, among other ways, promoting the dematerialization of the legal system, encouraging the limitation of domination, inspiring the reduction of coercion, stimulating communion and consensus in society, or increasing respect for the law and the legal systems. Spiritualization demands a recognition of the higher dimension of the law and, therefore, helps rethink, reorient, renew, reform, and reimagine law and legal systems. Finally, I sketch a pattern of five levels to measure the degree of spiritualization of concrete legal systems. This pattern can be also applied to legal actors and institutions.

The paper examines the aspects of the formation of a legal situation in which civil rights and obligations can not only emerge but also modify and terminate on various grounds. The relevance of the study is determined by the fact that civil rights and
responsibilities usually rely on basic normative acts, which formalize the structure of public relations. The problem calls for further investigation of the doctrinal aspects of the emergence, modification and termination of civil rights and obligations.
Within regulation of social relations rights and responsibilities can also emerge in the absence of a relevant framework and get shaped in the course of the development of the legal system of the state. The purpose of the article is to offer classifications and to discuss the sustainable ways of regulation of civil rights and obligations for the state and participants of the legal process. The subject of the study is civil rights and duties within the legal environment for their implementation. Our interest is in the description of the conditions for improving the structure of the legal environment and the sustainable development of civil society in the future. The results of the research describe the directions and the forms of development of long-term legal regulation in the social state system and its integration into international social and environmental legislation.

Following the seminal work of J.L. Austin, we can consider speaking as a social communicative interaction: when we say something (for instance, "Today I am in Zagreb" or "Go home!") we also do something (describing in the first case, prescribing in the second case) and, normally, we produce certain effects on the audience (in the second case, maybe you will really follow my order). The action is threefold: 1 1) We say something, that is we put forward a representational content -glossed also as the "locution", or the "sense" of an utterance; 2) We do something in saying something (ordering, suggesting, asserting, asking, etc.) -and this is the "illocutionary force" (or simply "force" of the utterance); 3) We do something by saying something: that is, we produce psychological or behavioural consequences by means of our utterance (which are imputed to our speech) -Austin called this third element "perlocution". Austin's minimal scheme can be enriched with more levels, in order to map further salient features. For instance, following Grice, we can introduce in our picture 4) the notion of conversational implicature, in order to describe what is meant by the speaker (a content that is inferentially constructed by virtue of the so-called conversational maxims). We can also add 5) the notion of linguistic presupposition, which can provide a powerful tool for the analysis of those contextual elements which are taken for granted by the participants to a communication process, and implicitly associated to certain linguistic expressions. Progressive refinements are possible, but, generally speaking, legal philosophers do not get so far. It is commonly thought that Austin's account (or, more often, the reformulation offered by Searle) 3 can be profitably used also for the analysis of law, starting from the assumption that legal phenomena can be considered as a peculiar form of institutionalized normative speech. This move requires important theoretical choices. One of them is really puzzling: we have to take a stand on the complicated relations between what is said (the locution, or, if you prefer, the sense of an utterance) and what we do in saying something (the illocutionary force: ordering, asking, saying, etc.). The boundaries of this relation are far from being clear: analytic philosophers have proposed many alternative solutions, reaching a very high level of complexity. In spite of the great variety of proposals, all legal philosophers seem to adopt one of the following two strategies:

The Constitution of Republic Indonesia is absent to describe Pancasila as the rule that forms an underlying basis for a legal system in Indonesia. It might become a problem when the majority number of statesmen is difficult to find a legal reference regarding Pancasila as the basic norm in Indonesia.
This article aims to discover the position of Pancasila as the basic norm in statutory system in Indonesian, and how Pancasila is implemented in the construction of Indonesia legal system.
Pancasila as the basic norm is reflected in the preambule of 1945 Constitution and in article 1 (3) of 1945 Constitution. Prior to the amendment of 1945 Constitution, explaination regarding Pancasila as a basic norm was stipulated in MPRS Decree XX/MPRS/1966 regarding Source of the Law Governance Republic Indonesia and Hieararchy of Law and Regulatin in Indonesia, also MPR Decree II/MPR-RI/1978 regarding Guidline of Implementation Pancasila or Eka Prasetya Pancakarsa. Furthermore, after the amendement of 1945 Constitution, Pancasila as the basic norm might be found in Law Number 12 Year 2011 regarding Establishment of Legislation and Presidential Regulation Number 87 Year 2014 regarding Implementation Regulation of Law Number 12 Year 2011 regarding Establishment of Legislation. The concept of Pancasila as the basic norm is implemented as micro aspect which is in the principle of statutory making, and macro aspec as the foundation of rule of law as well as legal development in Indonesia.

The features of the substantiation as a method of determination right-deprival legal facts in legal civil relations are analyzed, the means of fixation of the results of such determination and its importance for the mechanism of legal regulation of property relations are determined.

This book discusses the designs and applications of the social systems theory (built by Niklas Luhmann, 1927–1998) in relation to empirical socio-legal studies.

This is a sociological and legal theory known for its highly complex and abstract conceptual apparatus. But how to change its scale in order to study more localised phenomena, and to deal with empirical data, such as case law, statutes, constitutions and regulation? This is the concern of a wide variety of scholars from many regions engaged in this volume. It focuses on methodological discussions and empirical examples concerning the innovations and potentials that functional and systemic approaches can bring to the study of legal phenomena (institutions building, argumentation and dispute-settlement), in the interface with economy and regulation, and with politics and public policies. It also discusses connections and contrasts with other jurisprudential approaches – for instance, with critical theory, law and economics, and traditional empirical research in law. Two decades after Luhmann’s death, the 21st century has brought countless transformations in technologies and institutions. These changes, resulting in a hyper-connected, ultra-interactive world society bring operational and reflective challenges to the functional systems of law, politics and economy, to social movements and protests, and to major organisational systems, such as courts and enterprises, parliaments and public administration. Pursuing an empirical approach, this book details the variable forms by which systems construct their own structures and semantics and ‘irritate’ each other.

Engaging Luhmann’s theoretical apparatus with empirical research in law, this book will be of interest to students and researchers in the field of socio-legal studies, the sociology of law, legal history and jurisprudence.

Table of Contents
An Empirical Agenda for the Social Systems Theory?
Lucas Fucci Amato, Marco Loschiavo Leme de Barros and Celso Fernandes Campilongo

Part I: Theoretical bases for systemic empirical studies

The Sociological Investigation of Law in Systems Theory
Raffaele De Giorgi

Is There a Need for a Critical Systems Theory?
Lukas K. Sosoe

Changing Maps: Empirical Legal Autopoiesis
John Paterson and Gunther Teubner

Part II: Analysing law through systemic approaches: the economic and regulatory interface

Regulation without Interests? An Introduction to Luhmannian Empirical Mapping of System-Environment Relationships
Bettina Lange

Free Floating or Free Riding? Recursive Norm Building in the German Energy Transition Using the Example of the Approval of e-scooters in German Cities
Cristina Besio and Margrit Seckelmann

Law and Economy without ‘Law and Economics’? From New Institutional Economics to Social Systems Theory
Lucas Fucci Amato

Part III: Analysing law through systemic approaches: the political interface

Observing Courts: An Organisational Sociology for Socio-Legal Research
Marco Antonio Loschiavo Leme de Barros

Casting off from the Rock of Uncertainty: Observations on the Empirical Application of Luhmann’s Sociological Theory and a Case Study on the Concept of Normative Expectations
Mark Hanna

Integration and Disintegration: Protest, Social Movements and Legal Interpretation
Celso Fernandes Campilongo

Politics, Law and Legitimacy: Reconstructing Brexit from a Systems Theory Perspective
John Paterson

A historical sociology of constitutions and democracy: an interview
Chris Thornhill

The image has a fundamental role in the construction of social reality. Three major functions can be traced. First of all, there is an alethic function. The image serves to prove the existence of something. It is the function, for example, of the photo on the passport, or the identification drawings of institutional entities such as banknotes, or even religious symbols to ascertain the belonging of individuals or associations to a religious creed. Then there is a deontic function. The images express principles, rules, commands that sometimes language could not otherwise formulate. There are a lot of cases: road signs, land use plans, comic contracts, creative commons licenses, cadastral maps, border maps. In short, it is the world of visual rules discussed in this special issue of TCRS. Finally, the image has an axiotic function. In the Policraticus (1159) John of Salisbury embodies the image of aequitas in the "princeps iudex". The image does not simply aim to describe sovereign power, but to ideally represent justice to be celebrated and imitated. Imago aequitatis. It is, among other things, the extraordinary value of art. In these introductory pages, the poignant photo of Moro in the so-called "prison of people" (the photo was delivered on 19 March 1978 with the first terrorist com-muniqué) demonstrates it alongside the work Qui ne se grime pas? (1923) by Georges Rouault. The image here does not describe or order anything, but separates good from evil. Miserere mei, Domine! Parole-chiave: Image; Social Reality; Rules; Justice; Function Perché le immagini al posto delle parole? E, soprattutto: vi sono immagini che le parole non sanno sostituire? Fin dove sono necessarie? Drawing Social Reality tenta di rispondere a questi interrogativi. Le immagini (preferiamo parlare di im-magini in senso lato) non sono l'ennesimo oggetto della parola, ma la sua origine e il suo compimento. In principio la parola non è in grado di descrivere il mondo. Lo scorge Hegel all'aurora della "Coscienza". È la coscienza della "certezza sensibile" nella Fenomenologia dello Spirito. Con quali parole si è detto il mon-do all'inizio? Domina il senso ambiguo del linguaggio. La doppiezza prevale. Sono equivoci il "qui" [Hier] (diciamo: "qui è Socrate, ma qui è anche l'asino"),

The article is devoted to the research of legal mechanism of right deprivation, its elements and its place in mechanism of legal regulation the property relations. The definition of legal mechanism of right-deprivation, its elements ant their connections are analyzed, the place of legal mechanism of right-deprivation in mechanism of legal regulation the property relations are determined.

The article is devoted to the research of legal mechanism of right deprivation and its elements in sphere of private legal relations. The elements of legal mechanism of right-deprivation ant their connections are analyzed, the place of legal mechanism of right-deprivation in mechanism of legal regulation the property relations are determined

The phenomenon of deficiency of right-depriving jural facts in a civil law and its forms are explored in the article, the influence of defects on ability of right-depriving jural facts to cause the proper consequences are analyzed, the forms that display the deficiency of right-depriving jural acts and legal actions were found out

Article is devoted functionality of the legal facts with reference to elements of the mechanism of legal regulation.
The author results kinds of functions of the legal facts, generated by scientific lawyers. In article existing sights on investigated subjects are analyzed, and also in-depth study of the maintenance of the given functions is spent. The author results own classification of functions of the legal facts. The essence of functionality of the legal facts in the mechanism of legal regulation is shown.

A question of the features of fixing of legal models of right-depriving jural facts in the conditions of civil legal agreement is explored, the order of fixing of such models in the conditions of civil agreement and the order of fixing of such models in the conditions legal proposition are compared, the influence of the appearance of right-depriving jural fact to possibility of causing the proper legal consequences is analysed

The article is dedicated to research of terms in a civil law as right-depriving jural facts. The types of terms and forms of their influence on the legal occurrences are analysed. The mechanisms of deprivation of rights, duties and legal relationships as a result of ending of terms in the civil legal relationships are explored.

The object of the article is the determination of classification criteria of right-depriving jural facts and their features in the aspect of conducted division. The classifications on the basis of criteria of quantity of consequences, belonging to the sphere of law, the character of influence to the legal status of the participants of legal civil relationships and other criteria are analyzed in the article. This research is the first in Ukraine that is completely devoted to the classification of right-depriving jural facts.

We consider the issues properly to protect the legitimate rights and interests of civil relations defective committed transactions. The attention is paid to defects subjects, form and content of the transaction. It is indicated that failure to comply with the subject composition almost never leads to nothingness transaction. As for the flaws of the transaction form as the basis of its invalidity, it is mentioned that first we must determine the role played by the legal fact conditions and how they affect his ability to create legal consequences. The disadvantages of the content include flaws of law terminating legal fact — in the form of the transaction agreement. It is proved that the absence of purpose when all other elements of behavior meet the corresponding legal model, creates a fictitious or imaginary transactions. Proposed is the sequence for installation of law terminating legal facts in the form of contracts: 1) legal model of fact; 2) the actual fact of the parties; 3) legal conditions for the existence of facts; 4) real conditions of fact existence; 5) objective legal fact; 6) legal and factual consequences of the transaction.

The article is devoted to research of right depriving kind of jural facts, that is to possibilities to cause the consequence as depriving the rights, duties or legal relationships. An author examines all forms of actions and events from point of this kind and formulates suggestions concerning the legislative fixing of right depriving kind in the legal texts of Ukraine. In the article every form of actions and events is considered for the purpose of possibility of serving of right depriving function. The features of wrong and legitimate acts, which have a right depriving character, are determined by author. The results of the scientific research conducted in the article is presented a basis for the further improvement of points of views on properties of jural facts in a civil law.

The article is devoted to the problem of research of mechanism of the legal adjusting of public relations, and also one of its elements — legal proposition. An author examines the legal proposition through the prism of juridical facts, in particular — discontinuing juridical facts, that, sure, is a new look on legal nature of the cited mechanism.

The article aims at investigating the historical development of scientific ideas of legal facts in the private law doctrine. The authors particularly focus on the approaches used to define the concept of “legal fact” in the institutions of Gaius, the Civil Code of Eastern Galicia of 1797, the Austrian Civil Code of 1811, the Civil Code of France of 1804, the German Civil Code of 1899.
The authors analyze “classical” approaches to the definition of the “legal fact” concept in works by F. Savigny, H. Dernburg, R. Sohm, G. Puchta, А.Ton, Ye. Tsytelman, L. Enneccerus, B. Windscheid, K. Lorenz, F. Wieacker, R.Knieper and others.
It is argued that the concept of “legal fact” enshrined in Part 2, Article 11 of the Civil Code of Ukraine (Ukraine’s CC) evidences the perception of a settled theoretical position according to which it is legal facts that lay the basis for the origination of civil rights and obligations.
According to the conclusion made on the basis of the study findings, the authors maintain that legal facts have a wider capability than just to ensure the movement of legal relations. Legal facts can also give rise to legal capacity, legal competence, subjective rights and legal obligations which do not correspond to each other, and separate legal authorities.
It is proved that the modern view on the legal fact’s nature is shifting from the position according to which the State recognizes a respective phenomenon of the outside world as such a fact towards recognition of a consequence of a respective phenomenon of reality as a legal fact. In this context, the grounds for imparting legal significance to such a fact are, along with a legal rule, other legal regulators of behavior of participants to civil relations (in particular, contract).
Special attention is paid to the study of the set of facts. In this article, the “set of facts” refers to a set of legal facts, which in the structural unity entail the consequence in the form of establishment, exercise and termination of subjective civil rights, legal obligations, civil legal relations in general etc. In this context, separate legal facts are incorporated in the set of facts as its elements. The article defines general and special features of a legal fact. Common features of the legal fact are defined as follows: 1) it is specific; 2) it has subject-object causation; 3) attribution; 4) individuality; 5) spatial and temporal certainty; 6) normative formalization; 7) consequence. A legal fact also has special features, namely: 1) the nature of consequences it entails; 2) regressivity of information; 3) combination of legal facts.
The concept of legal fact is revealed through the role of a body of general philosophical and special legal features (and thus the definition of legal fact is based on its understanding as a consequence of a fragment of reality, the establishment of which in a normatively formalized manner affects the development of law-absorbent constructs in social relations).
Given the latest approaches to defining the nature of legal facts in civil law, the authors believe that it is crucial to make a recodification of civil legislation of Ukraine and improve the relevant provisions of the current Civil Code of Ukraine, with due regard for the developments of modern civil doctrine

The research is dedicated to the analysis of law enforcement civil aspects in legal regulation of public relations, determination of its character and value as security instrument of their effectiveness.
It is set that law realization is considered in such forms as law fulfillment, law application, law enforcement, law fulfillment and law termination accompanying the motion of civil-law relations.
Law enforcement legal nature is stipulated by the objective necessity to influence on the behavior of participants of such civil-law relations to ensure their compliance with the legal model. It is proved that the reason for law enforcement in the course of civil-law relations realization is such character of their development, reality and affiliation of which in view of their social value is provided individually-legal instructions given by public authority. Realization of subjective civil rights and legal obligations in private relation is provided by the acceptance of individual legal act issued by governmental authority.
Law enforcement mechanism in a private law was considered whereby the combination of legal measures through which public activity of governmental authority is adjusted should be understood, which involves adjustment of civil-law relations in the course of their legal regulation, provision of stable public society development.
Authority’s activity in law enforcement mechanism is provided by the system of legal measures (mechanism elements), the total amount of which shall be naturally implemented in law realization mechanism the component of which is law enforcement mechanism in synchronically directed at provision of its effectiveness. To such elements of law enforcement mechanism each of which is specified within the appropriate law realization may be included: legal provision, legal relations and judicial fact.

The article is devoted to the problem of research of mechanism of the legal adjusting of public relations, and also one of its elements – legal relationships. An author examines the legal relationships through the prism of juridical facts, in particular – discontinuing juridical facts, that, sure, is a new look on legal nature of the cited mechanism.

The means of establishment of rightdepriving jural facts, which are used by parties of civil legal relations for the determination of jural facts and their kinds which take place in these legal relationships, are the article of consideration of the article. An author analyses actions of parties of legal relations which have a searching informativelyanalytical character and are directed on transformation of possible knowledge in reliable one.

The process of rule-making is analysed in the article as a method of fixing of legal part of jural fact and as a method of establishment of jural facts. An author analyses the mechanism of action of jural fact from point of actual actions and legal model that is fixed in the legal proposition.

The article is devoted to the question of discount as a right-depriving jural fact. The analysis of conditions of the discount as a right-depriving jural fact si conducted. The moment of termination of obligation on the basis of such type of right-depriving jural fact is certain.

Che cos'è il diritto? Il libro traccia linee astratte: semplici, orizzontali o verticali di realtà multiformi, disperse, forse inarrestabili nel loro divenire; linee però sufficienti a ricavare idee universali. Si parte dal linguaggio. Sono tante le parole del diritto per dire che ogni giuspositivismo è ingenuo se confonde la vita del diritto con la volontà di chi "comanda". Non sono pochi i principî incondizionati, né il normativo è scevro dal cognitivo. Tutt'altro. Pure il bene è more geometrico se si sta allo scopo del diritto. E sullo sfondo la terra. La terra è sempre stata di ostacolo al lógos. Eppure i mondi informazionali di oggi, i mercati sconfinati, la globalizzazione senza ritorno non hanno smarrito la regola. Si può osservarlo nell'Explicit di questa nuova edizione del libro. La terra ha perso la sua fisica. Sono subentrati la meta-fisica, il non-luogo, o l'u-topia. Ci sono punti fermi? Dov'è l'equilibrio eterno delle cose? Le risposte hanno innanzitutto simboli come nel quadro in copertina di Marino di Teana. È l'Équilibre dans l'Éternel. La verità stenta nella differenza di mondi che si dichiarano opposti tra loro, ma può trovare in ogni caso il "settimo sigillo" di profondissimi cieli. Se ne sono accorti i sistemi politici nella nuova "primavera" di paesi all'aurora della loro democrazia; lo hanno concepito i sistemi giuridici nella scoperta irretrattabile dei diritti umani. Annientare ogni determinazione e ripetere all'infinito lo Scetticismo è come cadere nel groviglio della coscienza. Essa vede ogni cosa mutevole, nondimeno mostra di avere come essenza l'immutabile (almeno l'io esiste!), e quando infine scorge che l'immutabile è la sua essenza, non fa che mostrarsi ancóra mutevole. È la coscienza infelice. "Gran Decorazione d'Onore" [Großes Ehrenzeichen] per meriti culturali. Lo stesso autore ha pubblicato per i tipi di Cacucci: Validità funzionale di norme (2001); Metafisica del Processo. Idee per una critica della ragione giuridica (2010); Universality of Punishment, con W. Żełaniec (2015); Giudizio penale e ragionevole dubbio, con A. Scalfati (2017). Dirige la collana editoriale Unità del sapere giuridico. Quaderni di scienze penalistiche e filosofico-giuridiche.

Personality, legal personality, the philosophical and legal concept of personality: the types of legal personalities in general.
Texto da prova escrita redigida pelo autor como etapa do concurso público de livre-docência de Direito Civil, realizado em dezembro de 2017, no âmbito do Departamento de Direito Civil da Faculdade de Direito da USP.

Resumo: O presente texto trata, inicialmente, de uma abordagem metadogmática dos aspectos filosóficos, históricos e jurídicos da pessoa e personalidade. Em seguida, aborda as espécies de pessoas no Direito em geral, inclusive analisando o tratamento dado às pessoas e suas espécies pelo Código Civil. Por fim, traz considerações sobre os fundamentos do conceito de pessoa em face das novas realidades do século XXI e o papel de preeminência do Direito Civil nesta tarefa.

Abstract: The present text primarily analyses, through a " meta-dogmatic " approach, the philosophical, historical and legal aspects of " person " and " personhood ". Then, it analyses the types of legal persons in general, as well as how the current Brazilian Civil Code has dealt with such referred types of legal persons. Finally, the text discusses the foundations of the concept of " person " in face of the new realities of the 21st century, and the preeminence of Private Law in this regard.

Nel presente articolo l’autore muove la sua analisi partendo dall’interrogativo se il diritto internazionale possa scongiurare le guerre. Il diritto internazionale ha sempre ricercato l’obiettivo di dirimere le controversie tra gli Stati in maniera pacifica. La spinta verso questo fine si avverte in misura maggiore dopo i grandi conflitti bellici. La Lega delle Nazioni vede la propria nascita in funzione di questo intento pacificatore. Anche se viene definita come una impresa fallimentare, l’autore ritiene che abbia posto le basi per i successivi progressi. Importanti passi vengono compiuti dall’Organizzazione delle Nazioni Unite, la quale cerca di salvaguardare la pace attraverso l’utilizzo di misure che contemplano l’uso della forza e misure che non prevedono l’utilizzo della forza. In particolare, l’autore esamina entrambe le tipologie di strumenti e giunge alla conclusione che anche questo approccio sembra non essere del tutto efficace. Egli esamina il concetto di pace giusta ed il diritto dei popoli alla pace. Infine, l’attenzione si concentra sulla tendenza più recente alla promozione dell’educazione alla cultura della pace.

This article investigates how the neuroscientific studies can become useful to unveil the “mute” dimension of law and determine its “appearance”. It is not a coincidence that a sensible anthropologist such as Roderick MacDonald imagined law as an iceberg where its emerged peak, visible above the water, represents the written law, while the most substantial submerged part represents all the implicit and inferential aspects of the law. Looking at the historical reality, the image is far from being defined. After broadly rethinking some of Rodolfo Sacco's reflections about the existence of "mute law", here the following considerations attempt to highlight the importance that neurosciences could have in forming the theoretical basis of the sources of law by better defining the physiology of the regulatory production processes.

Il presente lavoro ha l'obiettivo di ricomporre, seppur per sommi capi, il dibattito che si è aperto nell'ordinamento giuridico italiano a seguito dell'irrompere delle neuroscienze nel diritto giurisprudenziale. Difatti, tecniche di neuroimaging e indagini di genetica comportamentale sono entrate nelle aule giudiziarie italiane avvicinando il nostro Paese agli Stati Uniti d'America, mentre, tutto sommato, negli altri Stati europei la giustizia continua a mostrare una certa prudenza rispetto all'utilizzo endoprocessuale di queste nuove tecniche. Le riflessioni che seguono, pertanto, riguarderanno alcune problematiche inerenti il rapporto tra diritto e neuroscienza in una prospettiva di ordine costituzionale.

Riassunto: In questo articolo l'autore indaga il contenuto dei diritti fondamentali, in particolare la loro genesi. L'ipotesi formulata è che il contenuto dei diritti nasca nei sogni reali o metaforici, si affermi in ideali che sono portati dinnanzi ad un attento legislatore con istanze sociali e assumono il rango di diritti su testi normativi. Il sogno non esige solo l'uguaglianza formale degli individui, ma va oltre verso l'uguaglianza sostanziale.

Abstract: In this article the author investigates the content of fundamental rights, in particular their genesis. The hypothesis is that the content of the rights arises in real or metaphorical dreams and is affirmed in ideals that are brought before a careful legislator with social issues and assume the rank of rights of legal texts. The dream requires not only the formal equality of human beings, but it goes further towards substantive equality.