Cognitive Ethology

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the fascinating hypothesis of animal religiosity. In this respect, we are interested in Donovan Schaefer ' s philosophical proposal, specifically his text Religious Affects. In Schaefer ' s conceptual framework, the ' theory of affects ' finds a privileged place, basically as an emphasis on the importance of the pre-linguistic affective sphere. Here, man and animal can learn about kinship, which, according to Schaefer, also implies religious experience. However, this kind of concept of ' religious feeling ' distances itself from the legacy of the phenomenology of religion. By criticizing this specific aspect, we will try to understand where this proposal can generate aporetic signs of discontinuity with a reliable concept of religiosity. In our concluding thesis, we will show that the importance given to animals, given correct ecological thinking, does not have an enemy in the religious specificity of man.

The 180-degree rule is thought to help smooth the change between film shots. When two individuals are speaking to each other, there is an imaginary axis of action running between them. If the camera crosses this axis, it breaks the 180-degree rule. A violation of the 180-degree rule is thought to have negative effects on viewers' enjoyment of films. The present study investigated this idea. Experiment 1 established that naive participants can detect violations in videos. Experiment 2 tested the putative negative effects of 180-degree rule violations. The results indicated that violations can confuse and disorient viewers. Critically, as revealed by Experiment 3, violations did not alter the viewers' liking of a video: Viewers were as likely to prefer a video with a 180-degree violation as one without. Collectively, these data shed light on fundamental beliefs regarding the 180-degree rule, which may help inform filming decisions around film enjoyment.

The 180-degree rule is thought to help smooth the change between film shots. When two individuals are speaking to each other, there is an imaginary axis of action running between them. If the camera crosses this axis, it breaks the 180-degree rule. A violation of the 180-degree rule is thought to have negative effects on viewers’ enjoyment of films. The present study investigated this idea. Experiment 1 established that naive participants can detect violations in videos. Experiment 2 tested the putative negative effects of 180-degree rule violations. The results indicated that violations can confuse and disorient viewers. Critically, as revealed by Experiment 3, violations did not alter the viewers’ liking of a video: Viewers were as likely to prefer a video with a 180-degree violation as one without. Collectively, these data shed light on fundamental beliefs regarding the 180-degree rule, which may help inform filming decisions around film enjoyment.

La mentalización es una capacidad que puede definirse como la habilidad de atribuir estados mentales que intervienen entre el comportamiento observable y la acción futura de otros. Esta capacidad ha sido estudiada durante décadas, pero las investigaciones al respecto no han logrado consolidar si es exclusivamente humana. Una vez dicho esto, surge la pregunta: ¿los chimpancés son capaces de atribuir estados mentales que intervienen entre el comportamiento observable y la acción futura o solo son capaces de leer el comportamiento? La respuesta a esta pregunta no ha logrado ser determinada debido a que la hipótesis de la mentalización y la hipótesis de lectura de comportamiento poseen las mismas variables experimentales para justificarse, lo cual da forma al problema lógico del debate entre ambas hipótesis. Este artículo introduce la discusión entre las hipótesis de la mentalización y la hipótesis de la lectura comportamental para explicar el comportamiento de los chimpancés. Para lograrlo, se analizará primero lo que se ha dicho sobre la mentalización y la lectura de comportamiento en filosofía, luego se delimitarán ambas hipótesis y, finalmente, se explicarán los enfoques experimentales que han investigado la resolución del problema lógico.

Els avenços recents dins del context de l’estudi biològic de la capacitat humana del llenguatge han fet palès que la unió reeixida de les disciplines rellevants —lingüística i biologia, enteses àmpliament— requerirà una seriosa revisió dels fonaments neurobiològics del llenguatge. El nostre objectiu en aquest article és oferir un esbós d'alguns dels resultats d'investigacions actuals dutes a terme pel nostre grup de recerca que creiem que poden contribuir a aquesta neurobiologia del llenguatge emergent.Recent advances in the context of biological studies of the human language capacity make it clear that a successful marriage of the relevant disciplines—linguistics and biology, broadly construed—will require a serious rethinking of the neurobiological foundations of language. It is our aim in this paper to give a taste of some of the results of current investigations carried out by our research group that we think contribute to this emerging neurobiology of language.Los avanc...

Лучшее доказательство функционирования дифференцированных форм демонстраций (агрессии, ухаживания, предупреждения об опасности, о пище и пр.) как сигналов и знаков в коммуникации это, конечно, возможность "обмана". Распознавши специфическую форму сигнала, индивиды отреагируют его “эгоистически”: реализуют специфический ответ, т. е. “ пользуются” информацией без ретрансляции сигнала по сети дальше, или издают для манипуляции другими особями своего или иных видов, отнюдь не для “честного” информирования компаньонов о проблемных ситуациях внешнего мира (вторжение захватчика, угроза нападения с воздуха или земли, сближение с потенциальным партнерами пр. “предметы” коммуникации). Иными словами, “обманщики” адекватно воспринимают и точно воспроизводят сигнал, но в иной ситуации, для которой он исходно не предназначен, и он действует, поскольку это позволяет семантика сообщения, “кодируемая” типическими характеристиками форм демонстраций. Дальше в обзоре на разных примерах показывается, что подобный "обман" проявляется на каждом шагу, в том числе у тритонов, где его обучением и рассудочной деятельностью не объяснить, рассматривается несколько ярких примеров. Если этот "обман" подтверждает концепции сравнительной этологии (специфический результат коммуникации устанавливается специфическими средствами, сигнальность демонстраций с передачей ими информации идеального характера), то "обман" в смысле социобиологов практически не встречается, а при появлении сразу наказывается.

point that where risks to welfare are severe, strong evidence of sentience is sufficient to warrant protecting welfare. Crump et al.'s eight criteria for sentience are also useful. Flexible decision-making (5) and flexible behaviour (6) are consistent with Ng (1995). The concession that the "no-need-for-sentience" proposition is unnecessary also strengthens the importance of the target article's conclusions. Yew-Kwang Ng, emeritus professor in Economics, Monash University; fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, Distinguished Fellow of the Economic Society of Australia. Markets and Morals (CUP 2019), Happiness (Springer 2022) Website

Одни поведенческие инновации быстро распространяются «по горизонтали», в соседние районы города, поскольку легко «подхватываются» особями, не являющимися потомками «изобретателей» и прямо с ними не контактировавшими. Так было с прокалыванием синицами крышечек из фольги на молочных бутылках в Великобритании, потом и в Европе. В других случаях инновации «держатся» в месте возникновения, почти не распространяясь «в стороны», поскольку передаются лишь «по вертикали», к потомкам и/или ближайшим соседям особей, их «открывших». Таково воровство сахара из пакетиков, открыто выкладываемых в отелях; впервые его отметили не более 20 лет назад у двух видов снегирёвых овсянок, потом также и у других. Сответствующие исследования пересказаны в данном материале

We report a range of lateralized coping strategies adopted by large social groups of cattle in response to mild challenges posed by humans of varying degrees of familiarity. At either 14 or 18 pens at a commercial feedlot, with 90 to 200 cattle in each, we conducted a series of video recorded 'pressure tests'. 'Frontal' pressure tests involved walking from a position perpendicular to the concrete feed bunk of a given pen, towards the geometric centre of the line of feeding cattle. 'Bunk-side' pressure tests involved experimenters walking closely past a pen of feeding cattle in one direction, before returning in the opposite direction shortly afterwards. Experimenters wore white dust masks to alter their facial features in the bunk-side pressure tests. In both frontal and bunk-side pressure tests, distance from the experimenter influenced cattle's choice of binocular viewing, cessation of feeding, standing or stepping backwards to monitor the approach and leaving the feed bunk. The frequency of these coping strategies differed in a lateralized manner. The cattle were more likely to accept the close positioning of a generally familiar, unmasked human on their left, which is traditionally referred to as the "near" side. By contrast, when responding to the approach of an unfamiliar, masked human, cattle conformed to the general vertebrate model and were more likely to remove themselves from the potential threat viewed within the left and not right visual field. We argue that the traditional terms for livestock sidedness as "near" (left) and "off" (right) sides demonstrate a knowledge of behavioural lateralization in domestic livestock that has existed for over 300 years of stock handling.

Veit (2023) provides a framework for modelling and empirically investigating varieties of consciousness as a Darwinian phenomenon, based on abduction from life histories of animals. The alleged 'hard problem' is exposed as an artefact of ignoring mechanisms by which increasingly complex varieties of consciousness evolved under selection pressure over evolutionary time. I illustrate Veit's approach through a case study of a highly complex but non-human variety, consciousness in African elephants. This is useful for specifying more exactly the kind of anthropocentrism that Veit criticises.

The Politics of Species: Reshaping our Relationships with Other Animals (hereafter, The Politics of Species) is an interdisciplinary anthology that addresses the plight of nonhuman humans in a cultural landscape dominated by anthropocentric worldviews and institutional practices. Not a paralyzed lamentation on the past and current state of human-animal relations, the book tries to understand how these relations came to be in order to transform them into relationships that do fuller justice to animals' capacities and our human moral sensibilities. The Politics of Species is the material result of an interdisciplinary, closed roundtable of prominent scholars in Animal Studies, broadly construed, held in New York in August 2011. The Arcus Foundation -a private, global organization that promotes social justice, particularly LGBTQ equality, and biological conservation, which also has the distinction of being the world's largest private funder of great ape sanctuaries and conservation -organized the roundtable "to explore how humans define 'others' and position themselves in relation to those others…. [I]n the context of this debate, it is defined by species" (xiii). The anthology includes

In this paper I will review one of the prevailing arguments used to refute that animals can be considered subjects of rights-that animals cannot be subjects of rights because they cannot assume duties. The canonical way to respond to this question is to appeal to the arguments of "species overlap" (i.e. there are humans without certain abilities that are nonetheless subject of rights); and the "moral relevance" argument (highlighting the irrelevance of that incapability to gain right's protection). At the legal level, both arguments suggest that de facto incapacity to assume obligations is not an obstacle to being a subject of rights (at least in matters involving humans). Although obviously flawed, the argument from obligations persists in rulings and doctrine. In this paper, I will take a critical look at the obligations argument and propose that the best way to address the argument is to examine the political theory that supports it. That political theory will be evaluated in light of Donaldson and Kymlicka's proposal of citizenship for other animals whereby the authors argue that animals can and do fulfill some obligations in today's interspecies societies.

Despite extensive scholarly attention, the meaning of 'gender' remains contested. This dissertation advances a phenomenological Thomistic account, positing gender as the self-aware relationship between the phenomenal 'I' and its living body that is characterised by a dynamism between biological sex, the rational soul, and socio-cultural contexts. Critiquing gender essentialism and social constructivism as products of dualistic and monistic anthropologies, I argue that Edith Stein's concept of Entfaltung (unfolding) reveals gender to be an experience unique to the human person as embodied spirit, lived in tension with internal and external otherness. By synthesising Stein's phenomenology and W. Norris Clarke's metaphysics of personhood, I demonstrate how gender expression transcends solipsism, requiring engagement with intersubjective horizons. This framework not only counters Judith Butler's performative model but also offers bioethical insights for addressing gender dysphoria, advocating a relational understanding of identity rooted in MacIntyre's ethics of dependence.

In this essay, William Clifford explores the nature of reality and consciousness through the concepts of object, eject, and mind-stuff. He proposes that all matter, including the physical world, is ultimately composed of elementary units of experience—what he calls "mind-stuff." Clifford argues that consciousness arises not from special substances, but from complex organizations of these fundamental experiential elements. Through this lens, matter is not separate from mind but a reflection of it, suggesting a universe fundamentally composed of experience and thought.

Social entities only exist in virtue of collective acceptance or recognition, or acknowledgement by two or more individuals in the context of joint activities. Joint activities are made possible by the coordination of plans for action, and the coordination of plans for action is made possible by the capacity for collective intentionality. This paper investigates how primitive is the capacity that nonhuman animals have to create social entities, by individuating how primitive is the capacity for collective intentionality. I present a novel argument for the evolutionary primitiveness of social entities, by showing that the collective intentions upon which these social entities are created and shared are metaphysically reducible to the relevant individual intentions.

n recent years, critical perspectives in the social sciences have highlighted serious issues with current research practices and made appeals for methodological reform. It has been noted, for instance, that psychological studies overwhelmingly rely on the use of an extremely limited sample pool (North American college undergraduates) to make generalizations about human nature. As it turns out, however, that sample pool is particularly atypical so much that both cross-culturally and historically it consists of outliers, as can be seen in numerous behavioral and cognitive tasks 2 . Another recently identified issue is what has come to be known as the replication crisis 3 , that is, the finding that the results of many classical social scientific experiments fail to replicate. This has dire implications, as it undermines the foundations of social scientific theories that had previously been thought to be solid. As a result of these realizations, there are now coordinated efforts to address these problems through expanding subject pools and systematic replication projects. However, I worry that these efforts are often misguided, because they do not address the underlying problem. At its core, the problem is one of ecological validity. It pertains to the relationship between the local and the global, between specifics

One of the most challenging positions in contemporary philosophy of animal consciousness is that proposed by Peter Carruthers (2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2020). According to Carruthers, there is no fact of the matter about whether animals instantiate conscious states. This radical conclusion arises from the conjunction of two theses he endorses: the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. This paper argues against Carruthers' radical viewpoint. Its structure is as follows. First, I will present Carruthers' theses on consciousness, such as the all-or-nothing characterization of consciousness and the distinction between 'qualia realism' and 'qualia irrealism'. Subsequently, I will provide a brief overview of the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. Next, I will reconstruct the arguments that underpin Carruthers' skepticism about attributing consciousness to animals. Finally, I will present two arguments that challenge Carruthers' position, highlighting inherent contradictions within his project. Contrary to Carruthers' controversial assertion (2020, p.18), I will conclude that animal consciousness deserves attention from both philosophy and the cognitive sciences.

In humans, at least some of our ability to coordinate our actions with the timing of events in our world is due to our capacities for temporal cognition. However, controversy arises when we turn our attention to the animal world. In this paper, we will argue that apes, especially Taï Chimpanzees, are capable of genuine temporal cognition. That is, they are able to mentally represent and reason about time in cognition. We do this by developing a novel analysis of the mental representation of time.

Heredero de una tradición intelectualista, McDowell sostiene que los animales nohumanos carecen de orientación hacia el mundo externo debido a que la noción de experiencia depende de una segunda naturaleza, a la que ingresamos por medio del lenguaje. Esta concepción resulta desafiada por los distintos avances teóricos sobre la mente animal. El objetivo de este trabajo es esbozar una posición filosófica alternativa a la de McDowell. Para ello, tomaremos la propuesta de Bermúdez, extensible a los animales no-humanos, quien sostiene que la experiencia supone una dimensión temporal. A partir de algunos estudios empíricos sobre navegación espacial y memoria episódica, sostendremos que los animales no-humanos no sólo evidencian compresión temporal sino además satisfacen una versión desintelectualizada de las condiciones exigidas por McDowell, para trazar la distinción entre objetivo y subjetivo.

В последние 10-15 лет выяснилось, что действие экологических факторов (определяющих конкуренцию между видами, отношения «хищник-жертва», выбор местообитаний, мест гнездования, убежищ, микростаций, кормовых методов и т.д.) неизменно предваряется информационными, так что реакция на них опережающая, а не ответная. Животные оценивают риск нападения хищника, доступность корма в разных местообитаниях, обилие или, наоборот, редкость убежищ, мест для кормления, гнездования, ночлега, других значимых центров активности не по прямой стимуляции случаями охоты на них, успешных или неудачных кормлений в разных стациях и пр., т.е. не по прямому действию экологических факторов, а опосредовано, по сигналам-предвестникам. Ориентируясь на них, животные оценивают уровень риска или, наоборот, благоприятность местообитания |(рождается карта его субъективного качества, "с точки зрения данного вида и особи"), их же используют в выборе поведения в проблемной ситуации.

Сигналом может стать всякий компонент внешнего мира животного:

    — непосредственно видимое и счётное обилие корма;

    — сами по себе особи вида-хищника, конкурента или мутуалиста, также как их помёт, гнезда, подолбы, порои, задиры, сурчины, шишки или орехи в дятловых «кузницах» и пр. следы жизнедеятельности. Всё это оказывается "сигналом присутствия";

    — их типическая активность в типической ситуации взаимодействия (токование, гнездостроение, яйцекладка, контактные или «охотничьи» крики, мочевые, каловые или иные метки в связи с этой активностью), т. е. всякая характерным образом изменённая среда обитания, позволяющая распознать, «кто это сделал» и «с какой целью/чем был здесь занят».

Что это значит? Обычная вещь, вовлечëнная в деятельность индивида, как самообеспечивающую, так и в особенности взаимодействие с социальными компаньонами, может восприниматься не как вещь, а как знак, сигнал или символ в меру типичности исполнения (=характерности образа и узнаваемости при восприятии). Как любой знак, она информирует о ситуации, управляет поведением, "сделавшим" именно эту часть внешнего мира особи из вещи символом.

Животные же (как и люди) своей деятельностью превращают разные объекты внешнего мира из вещей в знаки, управляющие их активностью — какие и как именно, рассказывается в трёх характерных примерах символического поведения, с разных сторон отражающих символическое восприятие внешнего мира разными видами позвоночных.

Mind and Behavior" anointer disciplinary approach of the biological antecedents to religiousness. The written material investigates cognitive, neurological, and sociobiological paradigms as a means to provide a non-pathological explanation of religious activity. This book review summarizes ideas presented in the text, evaluates the role of that text within the context of evolutionary anthropology, and discusses further research prospects.

Carrasco, M.A.; Alegría, Daniela
In the first section, we briefly present the essential elements of Murdoch’s ethics. In the second section we do the same for Adam Smith, in order to show in the third section both their similarities and the analysis they inspire. Although these coincidences may at first appear to be accidental due to the distance between these authors, they cease to appear so when we realize that these authors conceived of morality in a relational way, which is one of the indispensable elements of the ethics of care. Studying the proposals of these philosophers, then, reveals some of the essential features of a viable ethics of care.

This paper examines the unprecedented decimation of sharks. We develop a Ricardian Gordon-Schaefer model with a continuum of heterogeneous species which are subject to combined harvesting and perfect substitutability in consumption. The model implies that slow-growing species, surviving in autarky, will be driven to extinction in an open trade regime. In the empirical analysis, we show that the model is in line with observations of shark biology and the international shark market. In particular, the likelihood of extinction turns out to be significantly greater for shark species which are part of trade in shark fins and exhibit low intrinsic growth. (JEL F14, F18, Q27, Q57

En este trabajo rechazo la posibilidad de que el razonamiento animal, en particular la negacion, involucre necesariamente la representacion de Ausencia, como sugiere Jose Luis Bermudez, pues esta operaria como una negacion logica (no disponible para criaturas no linguisticas). Experimentos de creencias falsas, fingimiento y comunicacion muestran que animales no humanos (al menos ciertos primates) tienen dificultades para representar entidades o propiedades ausentes. Ofrezco una explicacion alternativa recurriendo a los juicios sub-simbolicos de semejanza propuestos por Vigo & Allen e introduzco la nocion de expectativa: la negacion se da a traves de la incompatibilidad entre una representacion esperada y la actual. Finalmente, sostengo que el paradigma de expectativas puede ser extrapolado a otros experimentos en psicologia cognitiva (tanto con ninos prelinguisticos como con animales) para disenar experimentos ―justos‖ que examinen otras mentes considerando sus habilidades reales. A...

‘Silence’ as a linguistic expression has evaded contemporary literature on the philosophies of language and concepts. To curate a fuller picture of the nature of language, we need to confront the deeper role that ‘silence’ plays as a concept. Conceptual tokens of ‘silence’ can be in the sense of recognising word/sentence segmentation (the faculty of language in the narrow sense) or in the sense that we perceive silence as expressions that can refer (the faculty of language in the broad sense). However, philosophical quandaries appear when we aim to understand the nature of it. Firstly, we are never taught sentence segmentation yet we acquire the conceptual use of it. We designate different role-fillers in the form of spacebar, dots, etc. From this view, ‘silence’ appears recursive, constitutive as the pieces of the furniture of language. However, ‘silence’ in symbolic representations like a blank sheet or a (non)verbal expression appears as a singular unit that we can only break down if we fill it with information. Perhaps, the metaphor of ‘silence’ is a testament to the fact that there are some gaps in understanding language. This paper is an effort to start addressing this mysterious phenomenon.

Обсуждаются изменения жизненной стратегии при урбанизации, особенно связанные с изменением положения в r-K-континууме. В новообразованных городских популяциях самых разных видов стратегия движется к «более К-» за счёт комплекса изменений, взаимно обуславливающих и усиливающих друг друга:
1) Размножаемость особей падает, но рост популяций поддерживается превосходящим эффектом удлинения среднеожидаемой продолжительности жизни (СОПЖ). Это сближает их демографию с таковой Homo sapiens;
2) Примат будущего размножения в лучших условиях, с направленным перемещением для их поиска «вслед» за динамикой урбосреды, над максимизацией репродуктивного усилия «здесь и сейчас»;
3) Большая «дробность» реализации репродуктивного потенциала «городских» особей: они делят её на большее число попыток размножения, при большей «подвижности» и контекстуальности каждой из них, если сравнивать с исходной («лесной») популяцией.
Показана универсальность таких изменений, их приложимость к популяциям, успешно осваивающим другие изменённые человеком ландшафты (при меньших выраженности и специфичности).
Changes in the life strategy during urbanization are discussed, especially those associated with a change in position in the r-K continuum. In newly formed urban populations of various species, the strategy moves towards “more K-” due to a set of changes that reinforce each other.
1) The number of offspring per breeding attempt falls, but population growth is maintained due to a more significant effect of lengthening the average life expectancy. This brings their demographics closer to that of Homo sapiens.
2) Preference for future reproduction in the best conditions compared to the efforts invested in the reproduction "here and now", for which a directed movement is carried out to search for them, "following" the dynamics of the urban environment.
3) "Urban" individuals make more breeding attempts, "splitting" the realization of their reproductive potential more than "forest" ones.
At the same time, "urban" individuals are more plastic, both in terms of variability in the timing and size of the clutch, and in terms of fidelity to the territory, depending on the situation around, on whether the biotope remains unchanged or its disturbances occur. We show the universality of such changes in relation to different urbanizing species, their applicability also to populations that develop other landscapes modified by man.

Die Reihe Einführungen Philosophie soll vor allem den Studienanfängern Orientierung bieten. Auf dem neusten Stand der Forschung werden die wesentlichen Theorien und Probleme aller Hauptgebiete der Philosophie dargestellt. Dabei geht es nicht um Philosophiegeschichte, sondern um das Philosophieren selbst. Nicht Namen und Epochen stehen im Vordergrund, sondern Argumente. Jeder Band steht für sich und ermöglicht einen systematischen Überblick über das jeweilige Gebiet. Die didaktische Aufbereitung (Zusammenfassungen, Übungsaufgaben, Literaturhinweise ... ), eine übersichtliche Gliederung und die gute Lesbarkeit machen die Bände zu einem hervorragenden Hilfsmittel für Studierende. Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. Das Werk ist in allen seinen Teilen urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlags unzulässig. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung in und Verarbeitung durch elektronische Systeme.

Desde la extensión del uso de internet, las redes sociales virtuales han tenido un crecimiento vertiginoso.  No sólo se utilizan para la comunicación entre personas sino también como medios de educación, trabajo y negocios.  En un mundo globalizado, las redes sociales virtuales lo envuelven como una gran red de redes que puede resultar imprescindible para el desarrollo de las más diversas actividades.
En lo que va del 2024 las redes sociales cuentan con casi 5000 millones de usuarios a nivel mundial, lo que equivale a más del 60% de la población.
• El número de usuarios de redes sociales aumenta un 6.6% por año en todo el mundo.
• El usuario global promedio pasa 2 horas 30 minutos en las redes sociales cada día.
Es éste un fenómeno que atañe a la vida cotidiana de los individuos, sumado al uso de teléfonos celulares como apéndices adheridos a sus cuerpos.  ¿Hasta dónde los nuevos comportamientos son producto de decisiones tomadas de manera consciente y autónoma? 
Juguemos a ser un Sócrates contemporáneo, parado frente al pórtico del Templo a Apolo en la antigua Delfos, que observa la inscripción “Conócete a ti mismo” y actualicemos sus preguntas:
• ¿Qué mueve a conectarse y ser parte de las redes virtuales?
• ¿Por qué resulta tan difícil dejar de estar conectados?
• ¿Cómo participar de las “redes sociales” sin quedar atrapados?

Der Vortrag versucht, drei Begriffe zu klären, den der Person, den des Selbst und den des Ich, und zwar aus der Perspektive der Handlungstheorie; zur Entscheidung der verbleibenden offenen Fragen wird zudem auf eine Rekonstruktion der Ontogenese des Personen-und Selbstbegriffs rekurriert. In der Handlungstheorie wird der Personenbegriff an zwei zentralen Stellen verwendet: Personen sind die Subjekte von Handlungen; und Personen sind Objekte von Handlungen mindestens in dem Sinne, daß Handelnde meist u.a. darauf zielen, sich selbst Vorteile zu verschaffen. Aus den Bedingungen dieser beiden Funktionen des Personenbegriffs ergibt sich schon der größte Teil seiner Definition. Allerdings bleiben noch einige Parameter offen, vor allem zu den Bedingungen der diachronen Personenkontinuität. Diese werden durch eine Rekonstruktion der Ontogenese des Selbstbegriffs und die sich dabei zeigende Verwobenheit von Körper und Geist geklärt, wobei hier unter "Selbst" die Person aus der Perspektive des jeweiligen Subjekts verstanden wird. Der traditionelle Handlungsbegriff unterstellt, daß in Handlungen (meistens) der Körper von einem mentalen Kern der Person gesteuert wird, der das innere Subjekt ist. Dieser mentale Kern wird hier "Ich" genannt. Z.T. unter Rückgriff auf Elemente des Freudschen Ich-Begriffs, z.T. durch eine handlungstheoretische Analyse wird schließlich ein handlungstheoretischer Ich-Begriff festgelegt. 1. Person, Selbst, Ich -Fragen und Ansätze zu ihrer Beantwortung In diesem Beitrag geht es um Fragen der Personentheorie: Was sind Personen, d.h. wie ist der Begriff 'Person' definiert? Was sind die Kriterien für die Kontinuität von Personen, d.h. wann können wir sagen, A und B seien dieselbe Person? Was ist der Kern der Person? Diesen Kern der Person nenne ich das "Ich". Was also ist das Ich? Wie hängen der Begriff der Person und des Ichs mit dem des Selbst zusammen? Dies sind erst einmal ziemlich technische Fragen. Warum sollten sie uns interessieren? Nun, der Hintergrund für die technische Diskussion sind sehr praktische Fragen mit unmittelbarer Relevanz für unser Leben. Nach vielen Ethiken haben Personen einen 1 Vortrag in der Sektion "Handlungstheorie" am 29.9.2014 auf dem XXIII. Kongreß der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie 2014 in Münster.

Las ‘cuatro preguntas’ con las que Niko Tinbergen delimitó los objetivos epistémicos de la Etología, también son pertinentes a la Etología Cognitiva; pero es necesario consi¬derar la peculiaridad de las cuestiones que ellas plantean cuando referidas al estudio de habilidades cognitivas y disposiciones emocionales de los animales conforme ellas son consideradas desde la perspectiva propia de ese dominio disciplinar. Esto, además de ser particularmente importante en el caso de las preguntas por los mecanismos involu¬crados tanto en la ejecución de dichas habilidades cognitivas como en la configuración y manifestación de esas disposiciones emotivas, también resulta de relevancia crucial en la comprensión y caracterización de las preguntas que cabe formular sobre el desarrollo, el valor de supervivencia y la historia evolutiva de esas habilidades y disposiciones.

What is learned during mastery of a serial task: associations between adjacent and remote items, associations between an item and its ordinal position, or both? A clear answer to this question is lacking in the literature on human serial memory because it is difficult to control for a “naive” subject's linguistic competence and extensive experience with serial tasks. In this article, we present evidence that rhesus monkeys encode the ordinal positions of items of an arbitrary list when there is no requirement to do so. First, monkeys learned four nonverbal lists (1–4), each containing four novel items (photographs of natural objects). The monkeys then learned four 4-item lists that were derived exclusively and exhaustively from Lists 1 through 4, one item from each list. On two derived lists, each item's original ordinal position was maintained. Those lists were acquired with virtually no errors. The two remaining derived lists, on which the original ordinal position of each...

El trabajo propone un examen crítico de la hipótesis de Damasio sobre los marcadores somáticos en "El error de Descartes" a la luz de distinciones conceptuales recientes sobre racionalidad práctica. Luego de realizar una introducción general (I) y de reconstruir la hipótesis damasiana de los marcadores somáticos (II) se ponen de relieve algunos de sus problemas conceptuales (III). Se analiza entonces esta hipótesis desde la distinción entre racionalidad interna y externa (IV) y desde una distinción entre tipos de razones explicativas (V). Finalmente, se discute la idea pascaliana de que existen «razones en el corazón» bajo una luz crítica que recoge argumentos
vertidos a lo largo del trabajo (VI).

Саванные овсянки Passerculus sandwichensis — обычнейший вид Северной Америки, примерно как наши весничка или пухляк. Однако у неё есть узкоареальные подвиды, отличающиеся размером и формой клюва, уникальные в ряде других морфологических характеристик. Клюв крупнее, сильнее, более вздут, увеличены почки, ибо пьёт солёную воду, ест обитающих там рачков и т. д. Почти всегда они связаны с приморскими солёными болотами, подпитываюшимися приливами. Это типичный пример локальной адаптации, когда новизна, возникшая в эволюции, создаётся приспособлением особей к узколокальным обстановкам, включающим как изменения морфологии, так и обособление новой внутривидовой формы, ими «маркированной».

Приморские формы самые редкие и уязвимые. Океанические побережья наиболее предпочтительны для жилой и коммерческой застройки, создания складов и перевалочных пунктов для глобальных цепочек поставок. Болота же внутри и вокруг городов из природных ландшафтов исчезают первыми, тают как снег под весенним солнцем. Всего вид образует 17 подвидов, большинство обычны, наиболее угрожаемых два, связанных именно с приморскими маршами тихоокеанского побережья: один подвид в Северной Калифорнии (P. s. alaudinus), живущий в том числе в Bay Area1, вокруг Сан-Диего и Тихуаны (P. s. beldingi).

В последние 128 лет, которые можно документировать тушками в музейной коллекции, северный подвид потерял более 90% площади солёных болот, на которых жил. На счастье, с 1990-х годов спохватились и начали его среду обитания сохранять, потом и активно восстанавливать поэтому площадь приморских солёных болот в и вокруг Фриско растёт. Но: время уже упущено. Десятилетия коллапса жизненного пространства вызвали нечто худшее, нежели просто падение численности. Овсянки залива стали всё чаще скрещиваться с птицами внутренних областей континента, пополняющих сокращающуюся популяцию, т. е. хотя адаптации приморских форм локальны, угроза их жизнеспособности, созданная человеком, вызвала отнюдь не локальный, но всеобщий ответ: в их восстановлении принимают участие особи из других популяций, и тем больше, чем сильней сокращается эта. Что было подробно изучено Phred M. Benham с соавт. (2024). Оказывается, жизнеспособность приморским формам важнее специализированных адаптаций: внутренние регуляторы в популяционной системе вида «работают» так, что, спасаясь, их популяции утрачивают собственную уникальность.

Study animals…………………………………………………….…113 Call acquisition………………………………………………………113 Playback procedure…………………………………………...……114 Behavioural and statistical analysis of responses………………115 Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………116 References…………………………………………………………………..117 8 Article II: Cross-modal recognition of humans by domestic horses (Equus caballus) shows hemispheric specialisation……….120

Experimental studies of animal episodic memory test the behavioural expression of a what-where-when 'memory content'. This is to say, autobiographical memory in some species (mainly birds, rodents, and great apes) has been understood on the basis of how the subject's actions demonstrate their long-term awareness of already enacted and yet-to-be enacted scenarios. However, such behavioural focus has come at the expense of discussing the interdependent role of two equally important episodic hallmarks: 'memory structure' (mental representations), and 'memory flexibility' (adaptive choice-making). This paper provides a semiotic characterization of those less discussed hallmarks, in terms of the Peircean concept of virtual habit or the mental enactment of non-present episodes. It is argued that the behavioural expression of a 'memory content' (as object in a process of semiosis) cannot be accounted for without understanding the phenomenological or experiential support of memory structure (as a representamen), and the teleological or purposeful self-control of memory flexibility (as interpretant). Based on this, a new cognitive model of animal episodic memory is proposed, consisting of interrelated modalities called Virtualiter, Habitualiter, and Actualiter. Capitalizing on multispecies evidence, possible applications and new directions of the model are suggested.

From Paleolithic artifacts to contemporary comic book superheroes, zoomorphic representations play a significant role in the cultural products of humanity. We often think of cultural creation as the result of an autonomous, purely human ideational process. However, this autopoietic view of culture is due to an anthropocentric bias. Studying the human fascination with other species-a fascination that goes beyond mere curiosity-is essential for understanding the origins and diversity of cultural products, as well as the deeply relational and introjective nature of human beings. It's important to explore how this fascination has shaped humanity, being a source of inspiration and revealing new existential possibilities. In fact, the encounter with animal otherness can be seen as a catalyst for change, sparking what we might call an anthropo-poietic process-an expressive metamorphosis that gives rise to what we commonly call culture.

Griffin's The Question of Animal Awareness (1976) and Animal Minds (2001) enabled and emboldened other disciplines to expand their research to include non-human animals. The creation of a dedicated section on human-animal relationships in sociology's national professional organization is but one example.

The mindset and openness within us for 'Lifelong Learning' can undergo a full or partial reset during the vocational journeys we travel along in life. Personal and professional practice oriented around lifelong learning can open doors and build new competencies enabling us to turn our hand 'at the drop of a hat' to the next opportunity that emerges.

Two things central to the Antarctic Treaty System fill the minds of ethicists and political theorists the more often they reflect upon them: territorial sovereignty (AT, IV.2) and the intrinsic value of Antarctica (Protocol, art.3). Regarding its intrinsic value, in the first half of the paper I argue that to give adequate consideration to the different morally significant constituent parts of Antarctica, it is necessary to recognise sentient animals as a fundamental source of intrinsic value. In the second part of the paper, I look at the implications this interpretation would have particularly, but not only, for those States with sovereignty claims over the continent. The conclusion I draw is twofold. On the one hand, State sovereignty in Antarctica would have to become conditional to acting on the continent in ways that are consistent with the respect owed to wild sentient animals. On the other hand, claimant States and State parties would be required to revisit and amend domestic policies that generate direct harm or unreasonable risk to wild animals in the white continent, even when performed far away from Antarctica.