This article aims to sketch a new integrative perspective on what I call change-ability. I define... more This article aims to sketch a new integrative perspective on what I call change-ability. I define change-ability as skilled ways of coordinating with a rapidly changing world. Many urgent societal challenges – from climate change to obesity, from the mass extinction of species to fraying social cohesion – require people to collectively change everyday patterns of behaviour they take for granted. The key insight I start from is that to durably change undesirable patterns of behaviour, we could start by changing the affordances the environment offers – the possibilities for action offered to us by the living environment. The aim of this article is to sketch an integrative conceptual framework for understanding change-ability in terms in terms of a dynamical ‘brain ↔ body ↔ community ↔ landscape of affordances’ system. This Change-Ability Conceptual Framework starts from the idea that individuals and communities are situated in the same rich landscape of affordances and suggests that making communities more change-able entails transforming the material ‘grooves’ that have formed in this landscape of affordances.
The predictive processing theory refers to a family of theories that take the brain and body of a... more The predictive processing theory refers to a family of theories that take the brain and body of an organism to implement a hierarchically organized predictive model of its environment that works in the service of prediction-error minimization. Several philosophers have wondered how belief-like states of prediction account for the conative role desire plays in motivating a person to act. A compelling response to this challenge has begun to take shape that starts from the idea that certain predictions are prioritized in the predictive processing hierarchy. We use the term "first priors" to refer to such predictions. We will argue that agents use first priors to engage in affective sense-making. What has been missing in the literature that seeks to understand desire in terms of predictive processing is a recognition of the role of affective sense-making in motivating action. We go on to describe how affective sensemaking can play a role in the context-sensitive shifting assignments of precision to predictions. Precision expectations refer to estimates of the reliability of predictions of the sensory states that are the consequences of acting. Given the role of affect in modulating precision-estimation, we argue that agents will tend to experience their environment through the lens of their desires as a field of inviting affordances. We will show how PP provides a neurocomputational framework that can bridge between first-person phenomenological descriptions of what it is to be a desiring creature, and a third-person, ecological-enactive analysis of desire.
We draw on insights from ecological psychology, explorative architecture, and psychiatry to provi... more We draw on insights from ecological psychology, explorative architecture, and psychiatry to provide an analysis of basic trust in relation to urban places. We use the term basic trust to refer to the attitude of certainty we express when we act in skilled, often unreflective, habitual ways in the living environment. We will argue that the basic trust of people living in cities should be understood in relation to what we will call trusted urban places. Trusted urban places can be understood similarly as what Giovanna Colombetti and Joel Krueger have called "affective niches" that provide affordances for amplifying, dampening, and sustaining affective states. The basic trust of people living in cities, we will argue, depends upon people moving through and engaging with trusted urban places. In urbanism and architecture, it is barely recognized how the city affords places of affective significance that the person incorporates into their bodily way of existing. Persistent exposure to urban stressors can disturb basic trust in one's living environment, resulting in a person no longer being at home in the world. We provide examples in which people, as a consequence of the repeated exposure to stressors, no longer move through and engage with trusted urban places, and the impact this has on their basic trust. Our aim is to understand how the urban environment can contribute to the path from stress to anxiety and mood disorders, and how a person can regain their openness to possibilities for regulating their emotions skilfully.
Causal cognition is a core aspect of how we deal with the world; however, existing psychological ... more Causal cognition is a core aspect of how we deal with the world; however, existing psychological theories tend not to target intuitive causal engagement that is done in daily life. To fill this gap, we propose an Ecological-Enactive (E-E) affordance-based account of situated causal engagement, that is, causal judgments and perceptions. We develop this account to improve our understanding of this way of dealing with the world, which includes making progress on the causal selection problem, and to extend the scope of embodied cognitive science to causal cognition. We characterize identifying causes as selectively attending to the relevant ecological information to engage with relevant affordances, where these affordances are dependent on individual abilities. Based on this we construe causal engagement as based on a learned skill. Moreover, we argue that to understand judgments of causation as we make them in our daily lives, we need to see them as situated in sociocultural practices....
We organized our reply to the rich set of commentaries on Erik’s inaugural lecture—The affordance... more We organized our reply to the rich set of commentaries on Erik’s inaugural lecture—The affordance of art for making technologies—around the following five themes. (1) The experience of artworks and whether such experiences can be described in terms of the affordances of artworks. (2) The possibility that engagement with artworks offers for the transformation of ourselves and the sociomaterial practices we take part in. (3) The claim that artworks can serve as what Annemarie Mol describes as “material propositions” that can be used to engage philosophical reflection. (4) The temporality of making practices and how art installations can be thought of as places in which past, present, and future meet. (5) How art could potentially enable a better embedding of technologies in society.
There is a difference between the activities of two or more individuals that are performed jointl... more There is a difference between the activities of two or more individuals that are performed jointly such as playing music in a band or dancing as a couple, and performing these same activities alone. This difference is sometimes captured by appealing to shared or joint intentions that allow individuals to coordinate what they do over space and time. In what follows we will use the terminology of we-intentionality to refer to what individuals do when they engage in group ways of thinking, feeling and acting. Our aim in this paper is to argue that we-intentionality is best understood in relation to a shared living environment in which acting individuals are situated. By the “living environment” we mean to refer to places and everyday situations in which humans act. These places and situations are simultaneously social, cultural, material and natural. We will use the term “affordance” to refer to the possibilities for action the living environment furnishes. Affordances form and are mai...
Radical collective behavior change is required to develop sustainable forms of urban life. This d... more Radical collective behavior change is required to develop sustainable forms of urban life. This demands redesign of everyday environments. However, the ways in which our material world shape our behaviors are still understudied and underappreciated. Not much is known about how collective behaviors are facilitated through infrastructural or material interventions. Here, we draw upon 15 years of experience at RAAAF, an Amsterdam-based collective for visual art and architecture, to introduce ten practical lessons for developing strategic design interventions for affordance-based behavior change in urban environments. Affordances are the possibilities for action provided by the environment. Strategic design interventions aim to set collective social change in motion by developing sustainable affordances and dismantling unsustainable behavioral constraints. Strategic design interventions seek to inspire policies and public imagination. Whereas scientific studies aim to describe reality as it is, RAAAF's material interventions help imagine how the shared urban environment could be in the future.
In everyday situations, and particularly in some sport and working contexts, humans face an inher... more In everyday situations, and particularly in some sport and working contexts, humans face an inherently unpredictable and uncertain environment. All sorts of unpredictable and unexpected things happen but typically people are able to skillfully adapt. In this paper, we address two key questions in cognitive science. First, how is an agent able to bring its previously learned skill to bear on a novel situation? Second, how can an agent be both sensitive to the particularity of a given situation, while remaining flexibly poised for many other possibilities for action? We will argue that both the sensitivity to novel situations and the sensitivity to a multiplicity of action possibilities are enabled by the property of skilled agency that we will callmetastable attunement. We characterize a skilled agent’s flexible interactions with a dynamically changing environment in terms of metastable dynamics in agent-environment systems. What we find in metastability is the realization of two com...
Deep brain stimulation not only treats psychiatric disease – it changes the whole person, boostin... more Deep brain stimulation not only treats psychiatric disease – it changes the whole person, boosting self-confidence and openness to the world.
In ecological psychology language use is not about inferring pre-existing meaning in the mind of ... more In ecological psychology language use is not about inferring pre-existing meaning in the mind of the speaker, but it is tied to a practical process of adapting to the environment shared with others. A tension with such a processual account of language appears when we notice that affordances, i.e. the possibilities for action that the environment offers, are often considered meaningful prior to the activities of any particular organism. In this paper we start from affordances as temporally constituted: they are processes that set up the conditions for their own continuation by inviting individuals to participate in them. We explore the contribution of talking to that process. By looking closely at three examples of situated talking in the real-life practice of making an architectural art installation, we show how talking has a double 'situated-situating' character. In our observations we see utterances as invited by an ongoing process: talking is situated. It establishes practical continuity between activities that unfolded earlier and those that are unfolding now. Doing so, talking is also situating: it achieves this practical continuity from past to present so that future activities are enabled to continue the process further. By running different threads of unfolding affordances together, talking can contribute to determining an affordance of a larger timescale. Talking skillfully can thus concurrently bring multiple affordances across timescales closer to enactment. The paper suggests that thinking of language as inextricably bound up with affordances in this way, opens ecological psychology to a wide range of distinctively human activities.
Situated normativity is the ability of skilled individuals to distinguish better from worse, adeq... more Situated normativity is the ability of skilled individuals to distinguish better from worse, adequate from inadequate, appropriate from inappropriate, or correct from incorrect in the context of a particular situation. Situated normativity consists in a situated appreciation expressed in normative behaviour, and can be experienced as a bodily affective tension that motivates a skilled individual to act on particular possibilities for action offered by a concrete situation. The concept of situated normativity has so far primarily been discussed in the context of skilled unreflective action. In this paper, we aim to explore and sketch the role of the concept of situated normativity in characterising more reflective forms of norma-tivity. The goal of the paper is twofold: first, by showing more reflective forms of normativity to be continuous with unreflective situated normativity, we bring these reflective forms into the reach of embodied accounts of cognition; and second, by extending the concept of situated normativity, new light is thrown on questions regarding reflective forms of cognition. We show that sociomaterial aspects of situations are crucial for understanding more reflective forms of normativity. We also shed light on the important question of how explicit rules can compel people to behave in particular ways.
Cognition has traditionally been understood in terms of internal mental representations, and comp... more Cognition has traditionally been understood in terms of internal mental representations, and computational operations carried out on internal mental representations. Radical approaches propose to reconceive cognition in terms of agent-environment dynamics. An outstanding challenge for such a philosophical project is how to scale-up from perception and action to cases of what is typically called ‘higher-order’ cognition such as linguistic thought, the case we focus on in this paper. Perception and action are naturally described in terms of agent-environment dynamics, but can a person’s thoughts about absent, abstract or counterfactual states of affairs also be accounted for in such terms? We argue such a question will seem pressing so long as one fails to appreciate how richly resourceful the human ecological niche is in terms of the affordances it provides. The explanatory work that is supposedly done by mental representations in a philosophical analysis of cognition, can instead be...
Imagination is often considered the pinnacle of representational cognition. Looking at the concre... more Imagination is often considered the pinnacle of representational cognition. Looking at the concrete details of imagining in context, this paper aims to contribute to the emerging literature that is challenging this representational view by offering a relational and radically situated alternative. On the basis of observing architects in the process of making an architectural art installation, we show how to consider imagination not as de-contextualized achievement by an individual but as an opening up to larger-scale “affordances,” i.e. the unfolding possibilities for action. We show how the architects coordinate the enactment of multiple affordances across different timescales, from small-scale affordances of picking up a mobile phone to the large-scale affordance of making the installation that takes months to unfold. These affordances get co-determined as they are jointly enacted. It is within this determining process that imagination too finds its place. On our view it is the ind...
In this article, we investigate the foundations for a Gibsonian neurosci-
ence. There is an incr... more In this article, we investigate the foundations for a Gibsonian neurosci- ence. There is an increasingly influential current in neuroscience based on pragmatic and selectionist principles, which we think can contrib- ute to ecological psychology. Starting from ecological psychology, we identify three basic constraints any Gibsonian neuroscience needs to adhere to: nonreconstructive perception, vicarious functioning, and selectionist self-organization. We discuss two previous attempts to integrate affordances with neuroscience: Reed’s ecological rendering of Edelman’s selectionism as well as Dreyfus’ phenomenological inter- pretation of Freeman’s neurodynamics. Reed and Dreyfus face the problem of how to account for “value.” We then show how the free-energy principle, an increasingly dominant framework in theoretical neuroscience, is rooted in both Freeman’s neurodynamics and Edelman’s selectionism. The free-energy principle accounts for value in terms of selective anticipation. The selection pressures at work on the agent shape its selective sensitivity to the relevant affordances in the environment. By being responsive to the relevant affordances in the environment, an agent comes to have grip on its interactions with the environment and can thrive in its ecological niche.
In cognitive science, long-term anticipation, such as when planning to do something next year, is... more In cognitive science, long-term anticipation, such as when planning to do something next year, is typically seen as a form of 'higher' cognition, requiring a different account than the more basic activities that can be understood in terms of responsiveness to 'affordances,' i.e. to possibilities for action. Starting from architects that anticipate the possibility to make an architectural installation over the course of many months, in this paper we develop a process-based account of affordances that includes long-term anticipation within its scope. We present a framework in which situations and their affordances unfold, and can be thought of as continuing a history of practices into a current situational activity. In this activity affordances invite skilled participants to act further. Via these invitations one situation develops into the other; an unfolding process that sets up the conditions for its own continuation. Central to our process account of affordances is the idea that engaged individuals can be responsive to the direction of the process to which their actions contribute. Anticipation, at any temporal scale, is then part and parcel of keeping attuned to the movement of the unfolding situations to which an individual contributes. We concretize our account by returning to the example of anticipation observed in architectural practice. This account of anticipation opens the door to considering a wide array of human activities traditionally characterized as 'higher' cognition in terms of engaging with affordances.
The free-energy principle is an attempt to explain the structure of the agent and its brain, star... more The free-energy principle is an attempt to explain the structure of the agent and its brain, starting from the fact that an agent exists (Friston and Stephan, 2007; Friston et al., 2010). More specifically, it can be regarded as a systematic attempt to understand the 'fit' between an embodied agent and its niche, where the quantity of free-energy is a measure for the 'misfit' or disattunement (Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2014) between agent and environment. This paper offers a proof-of-principle simulation of niche construction under the free-energy principle. Agent-centered treatments have so far failed to address situations where environments change alongside agents, often due to the action of agents themselves. The key point of this paper is that the minimum of free-energy is not at a point in which the agent is maximally adapted to the statistics of a static environment, but can better be conceptualized an attracting manifold within the joint agent-environment state...
According to the free energy principle biological agents resist a tendency to disorder in their i... more According to the free energy principle biological agents resist a tendency to disorder in their interactions with a dynamically changing environment by keeping themselves in sensory and physiological states that are expected given their embodiment and the niche they inhabit (
Social coordination and affordance perception always take part in concrete situations in real lif... more Social coordination and affordance perception always take part in concrete situations in real life. Nonetheless, the different fields of ecological psychology studying these phenomena do not seem to make this situated nature an object of study. To integrate both fields and extend the reach of the ecological approach, we introduce the Skilled Intentionality Framework that situates both social coordination and affordance perception within the human form of life and its rich landscape of affordances. We argue that in the human form of life the social and the material are intertwined and best understood as sociomateriality. Taking the form of life as our starting point foregrounds sociomateriality in each perspective we take on engaging with affordances. Using ethnographical examples we show how sociomateriality shows up from three different perspectives we take on affordances in a real-life situation. One perspective shows us a landscape of affordances that the sociomaterial environmen...
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Papers by Erik Rietveld
ence. There is an increasingly influential current in neuroscience based
on pragmatic and selectionist principles, which we think can contrib-
ute to ecological psychology. Starting from ecological psychology, we
identify three basic constraints any Gibsonian neuroscience needs to
adhere to: nonreconstructive perception, vicarious functioning, and
selectionist self-organization. We discuss two previous attempts to
integrate affordances with neuroscience: Reed’s ecological rendering of Edelman’s selectionism as well as Dreyfus’ phenomenological inter- pretation of Freeman’s neurodynamics. Reed and Dreyfus face the problem of how to account for “value.”
We then show how the free-energy principle, an increasingly dominant framework in theoretical neuroscience, is rooted in both Freeman’s neurodynamics and Edelman’s selectionism. The free-energy principle accounts for value in terms of selective anticipation. The selection pressures at work on the agent shape its selective sensitivity to the relevant affordances in the environment. By being responsive to the relevant affordances in the environment, an agent comes to have grip on its interactions
with the environment and can thrive in its ecological niche.