Illicit Small Arms in the Pacific: Cause for Concern

2010

Though the spheres of security and development significantly overlap in fragile and conflict-affected countries, the respective responses remain largely disconnected. As an international group engaging more than USD$3 billion aid in fragile and conflict-affected countries, the World Bank recognizes that it is only by securing development that we can put down roots deep enough to break the cycle of fragility and violence. Firstly, to facilitate the transition from war to peace and later, to embed stability so that development can generate progress over a decade and beyond. In order to do this, we believe all development actors need to rethink development assistance creatively as well as learn from 'the other side': security-focused operations and programs. This paper reports on a consultative dialogue between the World Bank and Australia's whole-of-government spectrum of institutions, with a focus on development actors 'hearing' the security perspective. In this, we join a growing process of dialogue between 'accidental partners'development and security actors, unfamiliar with each other but faced with the same challenge of being engaged in fragile and conflict-affected environments. From our perspective, engaging in thinking about integration or coordination between development and security embarks on largely unknown territory. However, over the last fifteen to twenty years, Australia has engaged in several unprecedented models of crisis response, integrating security and development, and we welcome the opportunity to bring that experience into the broader global discussion. The objectives of this dialogue are:  To bring a security and rule-of-law perspective to the debate on statebuilding and peace-building, and  To anchor the World Bank's thinking in a richer and security focused understanding of the dynamics that influence external actors' interventions. Our hypotheses, tested through this dialogue are:  Knowing Each Other Would Support Working Together  Turning Boundaries into Bridges Would Increase Our Effectiveness This paper presents the results of this consultative dialogue: (1) describing models of engagement from Australia's operational experience integrating security and development, extracted from the experience in Solomon Islands and Bougainville (2) raising issues about knowing each other and working together, and (3) identifying emerging themes at the junction of security and development, and offering practical ideas to take further. The first section briefly outlines two case studies of Australia's approaches to integrating development and security. Because of the distant location, the low coverage in international media and the small size of the countries involved, cases of Australia's engagement in the Asia-Pacific region have been largely neglected in the global dialogue. However, challenges faced in these countries are in fact very relevant and as a multilateral agency with global reach, the World Bank strongly feels that Australia's experience and lessons should be widely understood. The section 'Knowing each other would support working together' focuses on cooperation between military, police and development organizations and personnel, which is the practical face of the security-development nexus. The common experience is that we mainly view each other through misperceptions and stereotypes, based on ignorance. Basic cross-information of how military, police and development work would be an extremely helpful starting point. Acknowledging differences and similarities as well as similar challenges should also help initiate constructive dialogue. To address the absence of a common language, several ideas were developed around joint workshops, exercises and training. Relevance and feasibility of shared planning and assessment were also analyzed in detail. 'Turning boundaries into bridges' means identifying areas within and at the margin of the security and development mandates, where responsibilities may overlap. Identifying boundary areas would require systematic mapping efforts from both security and development actors, including a detailed review of missed opportunities and successful cases of cooperation. All organizations involved in fragile and conflict-affected settings share the common challenge of understanding the 'context'can our respective strengths and perspectives be aggregated to create an optimal assessment of a complex situation? It was suggested that such questions could be addressed in a sustained and iterative workshop format, maybe under the auspices of partnering multilateral and/or regional organizations from both sides of the security-development nexus. v International vs. local intent: striking a united balance. How do external actors contribute to statebuilding? Launching reconstruction and ensuring security are seen as primary means of extending state visibility and authority; for external actors, a central challenge is the paradox of intervening efficiently while aiming to leave. This raises a number of questions and tensions, inherent to the nature of international interventions. How to intervene effectively but not weaken local institutions or make oneself indispensable? How to balance mission scope and objectives, yet not infringe on the local community process of determining their own priorities and direction? Is politics the missing link? The question of who holds (and should hold) ultimate responsibility for outcomes when multiple actors, agencies and countries are involved raises the issue of sovereignty. This raises many questions, and answers few, at this stage. Common ways forward were suggested: more realistic timeframes, mutual agreement between external and local partners, focus on technical strength and improving our understanding of local leadership. Renewed counterinsurgency and stabilization doctrines merge security and development into a single approach. It may or may not expand the soldier's role into development areas but it certainly proposes a new form of engagement, encompassing development, politics and security, risking 'blurring the line'. If armed soldiers not only patrol the streets but also heal the sick and deliver schoolbooks, how do traumatized populations learn to support and trust in civilian institutions, and what do they expect of their own military once the external security forces are gone? New actors unskilled in development climb up their own learning curve, possibly duplicating, creating dependencies or hindering long-term sustainable change. The Australian COIN and stabilization approach takes on this challenge through a whole-of-government engagement. Such a comprehensive approach recognizes that warfighting is different from statebuilding and raises questions about how security and development overlap, complement and (maybe) contradict. Security Sector Reform: Critical challenge of statebuilding. At the crossroads of security and development, Security Sector Reform (SSR) is about applying the development process to security and justice. SSR is one aspect of a wider political and social process, at the heart of social contract and as such a crucial component of development and statebuilding. As part of the public sector, SSR also addresses capacity, institutions and systems building If not addressed, unmanaged and uncontrolled security sectors in fragile and conflict-affected settings will inevitably trigger the next conflict or tension. By sidelining the security sector, as a result of both development and security community practices, we are hindering its development and therefore the future of the partners we are trying to assist. Police as a bridge. Police and justice are part of a continuum, a 'value chain' that bridges development and security. In all cases, policing must shift from a militarized organization to a community-based one. A key part of the social contract, police should mirror people's intent; by enforcing and supporting rule of law, police allow development activities to occur in a non-violent environment. Police are the ones who should and can 'hold', once the military has 'cleared', in order to allow development to 'build'. But policing is still an underfunded and somewhat 'taboo' topic in the development community, tarnished by association with repression and corruption in fragile countries. In many respects, we lack appreciation that socially stable and economically viable communities require enforceable rule of law and legal systems that reflect agreement within society, enforced by police and maintained by the justice sector. Recommendations Despite obvious differences, this consultative dialogue provides striking evidence of need and appetite for improved coherence between the development and security communities. The questions raised focus on what do we need to know, to remember, and to action? The recommendations are the following: For Australia 1. Seek a systematic way to institutionalize the experience of RAMSI initial phase and the PMG in Bougainville, into shared knowledge and improved future decisions. 2. Network the defense, police, foreign affairs and aid people who have experienced the security-development nexus to create knowledge. vi For the leading international development and security international organizations, such as the UN, the World Bank and NATO Develop a joint 'growth-path continuum' to jointly define the content and limitations of working together 3. Engage jointly in identifying 'boundary' areas through systematic joint mapping efforts 4. Organize joint workshops on differences and similarities, entry points, shared tools 5. Set up joint exercises to simulate interventions and identify issues that have to be addressed 6. Explore joint training, evaluations, assessment tools and guidance notes 7. Identify entry points between development post-conflict planning frameworks such as Transitional Results Matrices and PCNAs and military planning 8. Develop a joint work...

2003

This study examines a wide range of small arms-related issues in 20 nations of the southern Pacific. It investigates the status of existing firearm legislation, the extent of legal stockpiles and illicit trade, and the socio-economic impacts of armed conflict on Pacific communities. Case histories examine more closely the disarmament process in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands, along with the widespread disruption wrought with small arms in Fiji and Papua New Guinea. Current initiatives to combat small arms trafficking in the region are also examined.

Contemporary PNG Studies

Abstract: This article explores security issues in the South Pacific Region and the notion of forming a regional security force to address security issues which may be beyond the capacity of small Pacific island countries. In particular it focuses on the participation of Papua New Guinea ...

The end of the Cold War brought about new security challenges for the conventional arms control field. Many conflicts, interstate and intrastate ones, started to emerge (or better re-emerge) around the globe. Especially in countries of the developing world, numerous armed clashes occurred based on ethnic and religious divisions. These conflicts benefited from a deregulated arms market, which made the nature of the conventional arms trade more vigorous than ever before, thus created new security challenges for the agenda of conventional arms control field. Taking into account that human life and dignity are being threatened worldwide by the circulation and accumulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs), new tasks for the Military and particularly the Naval Operations Doctrines started to take effect and be implemented through the Naval Blockade and Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) during the recent interstate and intrastate conflicts. Therefore, the old-fashioned arms control agenda must be expanded under a comprehensive and holistic approach to include issues like the effective control of arms transfers at a global level and combating illicit arms trafficking and arms brokering, especially in the category of SALWs.

2005

JERRY SINGIROK The use of illegal guns in Papua New Guinea is of growing concern, with broad ranging social and economic impacts. In the following paper, Major General Jerry Singirok explores the dimensions of illegal gun use in Papua New Guinea, examining patterns of gun use, sources of guns and firearms administration and control. Drawing upon a variety of sources, including personal experience, Singirok calls for a collaborative approach to gun control between state and society.

2008

The views expressed in this paper, as in any of the Centre’s publications, do not represent the official position of the Centre. The ACPACS Occasional Papers Series and all other ACPACS publications present the views and research findings of the individual authors, with the aim of promoting the development of ideas and discussion about major concerns in peace and conflict resolution studies.

Controlling Small Arms: Practical Lessons in Civilian Disarmament and Ati-Trafficking, 2018

This Knowledge Note is an outcome of a practitioners’ workshop held at the German Federal Foreign Office in Berlin on 26/27 February 2018. Among its 29 participants were 19 practitioners from West and southern Africa, United Nations organizations, European Union institutions and EU member states as well as 10 leading researchers and consultants. The present publication aims to identify practical lessons learned in civilian disarmament and cooperation across borders to stop trafficking in firearms. It draws on the knowledge and experience of practitioners at the Berlin workshop in order to help other practitioners. Its intended audience consists of people who plan, design and manage projects to control small arms, as well as officials involved in making policy. Bearing this audience in mind, this Knowledge Note begins with the lessons learned in civilian disarmament and the trafficking in small arms and light weapons (sections 2 and 3). It then focusses on points raised during the workshop that illustrate the lessons or adds to them (section 4). Section 5 reflects on the difference between gun control and arms control. In its conclusions (section 6), the Knowledge Note shows that lessons learned will only make a real difference if they are widely shared, taught and applied.

Austral Policy Forum, 2006

Philip Alpers from the University of Sydney writes that “five years after the adoption of the UN Programme of Action to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons”, the recent UN PoA Review Conference closed “without so much as an outcome document.” A spin-off Arms Trade Treaty, argues Alpers, “could distract from more direct and localised efforts to curb gun violence.” In Pacific Islands Forum countries, “civilians alone hold 3.1 million firearms, or one gun for every ten people”, writes Alpers. “After disastrous leakages of government guns in Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, Australia led the charge to help island nations lock up their small arms, building secure state armouries across the region. But of late, regional implementation of the UN PoA has lagged.”

International Politics

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) are the mundane material of armed violence. Firearms, for instance, are used in approximately 200,000 killings in crime and conflict each year (Geneva Declaration Secretariat, 2015). ii SALW control is now central to Humanitarian Arms Control (HAC) that include bans on anti-personnel landmines (APM) and cluster munitions and emerging processes concerned with 'killer robots', depleted uranium, and nuclear weapons. Yet SALW control seeks to regulate (often minimally) rather than prohibit these weapons, with the reduction in the illicit trade (rather than the trade or use overall) being the principal aim-most recently emphasised in the inclusion of a target (16.4) of reducing illicit arms flows in the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals. Global SALW control is not as a single unified regime but a 'regime complex' (Greene and Marsh 2012) consisting of numerous agreements at both global and regional levels. While the 2001 Firearms Protocol to the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime is legally binding, it is the politically binding 2001 UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) and related instruments that is most prominent. These, and many regional agreements, have produced widely varying 'norms' in different areas: with stronger and more detailed forms of action on the management of stockpiles and surplus arms, arms brokering, and marking and recordkeeping than on issues of transparency, and failed attempts to incorporate issues of civilian gun ownership or to ban arms transfers to non-state actors (Garcia, 2006). As it has developed it has forged links with other areas of practice such as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Security Sector Reform (SSR), wider armed