Criminology and Law

The phenomenon of trafficking in human beings has become a legitimate concern in the E.U. Most (around 62 %) of the victims are trafficked for sexual or labour exploitation.1 Poverty, unemployment, the collapse of the social system, gender violence, etc., are the main push factors that make people vulnerable to trafficking. In contrast, market demand, the presence of racial diasporas in the countries of exploitation, etc.,2 should be considered among the pull ones.

Obchodovanie s ľuďmi predstavuje v súčasnosti jednu z najrozšírenejších foriem medzinárodného organizovaného zločinu, ktorá je spojená so závažným porušovaním základných ľudských práv, slobôd a ľudskej dôstojnosti. Myšlienka neobmedzenej slobody je negovaná otroctvom, nevoľníctvom a obeťami obchodovania s ľuďmi, ktoré prinášajú vysokú kvalitu života vymedzenej skupine ľudí.

The phenomenon of trafficking in human beings has, in the last decade, changed from a marginal "nonissue" to a legitimate concern of the European Union. All countries have developed (or are in the process of developing) their anti-trafficking policies to suppress this type of criminality effectively. Apart from this effort, there are several international organizations with the phenomenon in one way or another. Displaying an increasing activity within the institutional architecture constituting the EU Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice since its modest beginning in 1994, today's Europol is at the forefront of implementing and developing the EU, internal security model. Working towards eradicating THB cannot be done without placing the victim at the center of any actions and initiatives. Following so, the new EU Directive takes a human-based-gender-specific-approach with the center of interest on victims and the child's best interest. It contains substantial criminal law provisions, extensions of jurisdiction, provisions on victim support and their rights in criminal proceedings, etc. THB is a complex transnational phenomenon. Based on findings of the SOCTA 2013, Europol recommended that the operational response to serious and organized crime in the EU should also focus on this priority threat to weaken OCGs involved in this crime area, "including those groups using LBS to facilitate or disguise criminal activities." i Practise proves that the scale and nature of THB in the EU are not easy to define as they can be hidden within other criminality, such as forced prostitution or labor disputes. Also, the remaining variation of the THB definition (and its acknowledgment among law enforcement practitioners) and low diversity of information versus standardized data collection seem to allow significant gaps in numbers and knowledge. Fast-aging methodologies used for analyses of the nature and causes of human trafficking also contribute to the named trend.

The Master's work in International Criminal Justice at Portsmouth in 2010 explores various security issues concerning Iran's alleged nuclear weapons program and the potential threat of WMD usage by terrorist groups, specifically focusing on Hezbollah. The research undertakes a detailed analysis of open-source intelligence data to examine Iran's nuclear ambitions' genesis, growth, and current standing while highlighting the significant factors that have shaped these pursuits within its foreign security policy and strategic decision-making. It critically evaluates the international community's varying responses to Iran's nuclear program, spotlighting the contrasting approaches of countries like the U.S. and Israel that favour military intervention against the diplomatic solutions preferred by France, China, Germany, and Russia. It delves into the potential regional ramifications of Iran's nuclear program and assesses its chances of success. The study's consensus is that a one-dimensional approach towards Iran's nuclear aspirations could intensify regional and international security risks. Instead, the research advocates for a more sophisticated, multifaceted strategy to alleviate the nuclear crisis and safeguard regional stability. The work presents a multi-layered analysis to help understand the intricacies surrounding Iran's nuclear program and the world's reaction to it. It also meticulously assesses the risks associated with the potential use of WMDs by terrorist organisations, emphasising Hezbollah and the consequent threat level for the European Union. It thoroughly explores the connection between WMD proliferation and the global security climate. This aspect of the research broadens the scope of the discussion, shedding light on the complex challenges tied to nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The need for comprehensive, globally unified strategies is underlined, highlighting the importance of collaboration in maintaining international peace and security.

The European Union’s current provisions on the trafficking of human beings are provided for, inter alia, in Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating the trafficking of human beings and protecting its victims and the EU Strategy towards the eradication of trafficking in human beings 2012-2016. Adopting contextual understandings of the different forms of THB, the Directive seeks a new –upgraded legal normativity aimed at the prevention, prosecution, and protection of victims’ rights from various angles. This multilateral and harmonised normativity, however, does not indeed avoid the problems of an effective application of a procedural law when running an international investigation with a country that remains outside of the 2011 Directive.

Legalization/decriminalization of prostitution increases demand for prostitution. Alongside the market, demand also rises market supply, facilitating the simultaneous trafficking of humans for sexual exploitation. With demand and supply both increasing, the quantity of prostitution is higher in the legalized regime compared to its criminalized scenario. The same increasing trend should be seen in child prostitution versus trafficking.

" Not everything needs a solution at European level. Europe must focus on where it can add most value. Where this is not the case, it should not meddle. The EU needs to be big on big things and smaller on smaller things-something we may occasionally have neglected in the past. The EU needs to show it has the capacity to set both positive and negative priorities. " José Manuel Durão Barroso Key judgements: • Commonly shared denominator of the Principle of Subsidiarity indicates the search for an optimal allocation and exercise of (governmental) authority in terms of efficiency and legitimacy. • The Subsidiarity Principle facilitate decrease of autonomy between higher and lower institutional units, boosting this way vertical institutional balance and its further centralisation. • Each operational intervention of EUROPOL depends on a scale and desired effect of the trans-national action that cannot be regulated by the Member States acting separately; although enough scope for national decision in coherence with respect of national arrangements and legal systems is left. • Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality is of equal legal status to the Lisbon Treaty, establishing 'constant respect for the principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality' and giving specific roles to certain institution. However, there are differences in the powers given to national parliaments in relation to their capacity to monitor legislative proposals on the grounds of those principles. The European Union (" the EU " hereinafter) must act in accordance with fundamental rights, following the reading of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and with the principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality applicable whenever there is a choice between EU and national action. Under the cross – cutting Principle of Subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, 1 the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, it can only act if the objectives of an action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union level due to the scale or effects of the proposed action. Under the Principle of Proportionality, the content and form of EU action must not exceed its necessary level to achieve the intended outcome of the EU treaties. This includes a requirement that where there are differing ways to achieve an objective, the least onerous should be taken. Two main treaties set out together the competences of the EU:-The Treaty on European Union (" TEU " hereinafter); and-The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (" TFEU " hereinafter), forming this way the basis for any actions the EU institutions take. Where the Treaties do not confer competences on the EU, they remain with the Member States. Given that subsidiarity is one of basic organizing principles that matters ought to be handled by the smallest, lowest or least centralized competent authority, reference in the EU Treaties2 assures that competence is exercised 1 1 1 There are different types of competence sat out after the changes made by the Treaty of Lisbon: exclusive (such as customs union), shared (such as single market, energy) and supporting (such as industry, culture, etc.). Only the EU can act in areas where it has exclusive competence. In areas of shared competence, either the EU or the Member States may act, but the Member States may be prevented from acting once the EU has done so. In all other areas covered by the EU Treaties, the primary responsibility for action rests with Member States, with the EU playing a supporting role; action by the EU does not prevent the Member States from acting. In other areas, the EU has no competence; 2

With the inherent difficulties of negotiating bilateral instruments and yet the clear advantages of having some form of instrument that could serve as a base for procedural issues exercising jurisdictions, there has been increasing resort to the more comprehensive scenario of alternative instruments that would involve multilateral agreements (conventions) signed by several signatories.

The centralized scenario of executing JIT (keeping in mind that JIT with Member States representatives having national functions/powers and Europol in a coordinating or support role) is far more common than its decentralized counterpart based on the project-based approach.

• The evidence requested in the framework of the EIO does not have an ability to affect national security interests as well as classified information cant alone justify the non-execution of the requested EIO and thus impede the access to evidence that could be essential for the cross border criminal proceedings. • The instrument doesn't specify the meaning of the coercive measures to be used when executing the EIO, bringing handicap to the efficiency of the transnational procedures as well as potential harm to the persons involved in it. • Eurojust does not seek to entirely finance individual JITs but assists by reimbursing the costs of two common areas of expenditure such as travel and accommodation, and interpretation and translation. In addition, to address the lack of facilities and infrastructure, Eurojust may provide logistical support to a JIT too. • The EIO strongly relies on mutual trust between the Member States, thus their judicial authorities providing that investigative measures carried out in the executing State do respect the national procedural requirements. Considering the United Kingdom common law tradition versus the European continental one, there is a risk that the evidence obtained in the requested State does not comply with the issuing State's standards and, thus, cannot be used by the issuing authority.

A prominent role in a criminal investigation(s) is reserved for police performance; therefore, based on certain procedural steps at the national level, JIT could be seen mainly as a form of police cooperation, while in fact, it is a judicial instrument, used in an executive law enforcement environment. Furthermore, the choice of a legal basis for the establishment of JIT may significantly influence the operational ability of JIT.

Stressing the external dimension of internal security and related to it the EU's external actions in the operational implementation of the EU policy cycle, the involvement of third countries and parties should fully take into account the operational needs of Member States that are in the primary position to decide whether the support from third countries/parties is needed and to what extent

▲ Among the main obstacles to the use of JITs with third States remains length of procedures for negotiating/signing the agreement; diverse national perceptions of the JIT concept at national levels; the insufficient legal basis for setting up JITs with third States; and already acknowledged different stages of domestic criminal investigations; ▲ Independently from all reasons that would prevent to establish any JIT with a third State but also independently from the operational or strategic agreements established between Third Countries and EUROPOL/EUROJUST, the successful joint investigations depend mainly on motivation and willingness to cooperate with the same aim and similar objectives. It is to be said in this connection that the rest comes soon afterwards; ▲ As the non EU member, the UK might not be able to directly participate, (as a third State) in EU security measures, such as EUROPOL, EUROJUST and if so, only upon the consideration of Member States. But in light of the EU Treaties, thus EU JHA agencies, a 'third State' can only be non-EU Member State, which is not case of the UK either.

The fluidity of an (undercover) agent as a means of proof "Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope of the phrase "due process of law" there can be no doubt that it embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial, with an opportunity to be heard.

Taking the shape of an intelligence cycle which relied on inputs from EUROPOL and Member States, the concept of European criminal intelligence shifted from reactive policing to a problem-solving approach; ➢ The most relevant changes between the last two EU policy cycles' strategies include a focus on common horizontal minimum strategic goals for all crime priorities as well as the external dimension of EU internal security, which calls for developing a more structured approach towards third countries/parties involvement; ➢ The latest definition of organized crime in SOCTA 2017 remains unchanged. Terms of definition are very broad and highly flexible and do not provide any legal certainty. Furthermore, the absence of a clear definition creates a potentially very extensive scope of criminalization of organized crime across the EU; ➢ Stressing the external dimension of internal security and related to it the EU's external actions in the operational implementation of the EU policy cycle, the involvement of third countries and parties should fully take into account the operational needs of Member States that are in the primary position to decide whether the support from third countries/parties is needed and to what extent; ➢ Police and judicial cooperation of several third countries with EU Member States and EU agencies in combating terrorism remains limited due to the absence of a personal data protection law in line with European standards and differences over the definition of and penalties for terrorism. Recent years have witnessed new and complex threats that have emerged from instability in the EU's immediate neighborhood, highlighting the need for further synergies and closer cooperation at all levels. Spamming the territory of the EU dangerously, these threats require an effective and coordinated response. The European Agenda on Security aims to preserve the EU area where individuals feel secure and are fully compliant with fundamental rights. It drives a solid range of EU policies and tools, ensuring that security's internal and external dimensions work in tandem. Seeing them as interlinked areas with a strong cross-border dimension where EU action can be effective, the Agenda prioritizes organized crime, terrorism, and cybercrime. 1 The Lisbon Treaty provides legal and practical arrangements to establish operational cooperation between Member States effectively. Member States authorities coordinate common priorities and operational actions through the EU policy cycle for serious and organized crime. Based on joint threat assessments (SOCTAs) coordinated within EUROPOL and with the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) playing a central role, Policy Cycle provides a methodology for an intelligence-led approach to internal security. 2 Being used more and more by Member States to launch concrete law enforcement operations to tackle organized crime, including with third countries, it targets available resources given immediate, midterm, and long-term security threats and risks. Supported thoroughly by FRONTEX and INTERPOL, Operation Archimedes, coordinated by EUROPOL in September 2014, provided a practical example of how to successfully address various serious organized crimes across 34 Member States and third countries. 3 Contributing to the assessment of common security threats, EU agencies play a crucial role in supporting operational cooperation. They help to define common priorities for operational action, and they facilitate cross-border collaboration and prosecution.

Islamic finance is a well-established, vibrant industry that is an important pillar of the international financial system. It has been one of its fastest-growing components over the last decades, with Sharîah -compliant banks being gradually established in the EU territory. Indeed the system uses principles based on Islamic law and associated legal opinions or pronouncements made by a Sharîah board, a mufti or a faqih with a focus on the appropriate methodology. In general, the Islamic financial model operates with risk sharing between the participating parties, individuals' rights and duties, property rights and the sanctity of contracts.

Globalisation is one of the twenty-first century's most important and influential forces. Despite its many advantages, like stronger economic growth and cross-cultural interaction, it has also been linked to the emergence of extreme movements and ideas. Extremism and globalisation have a complicated and diverse relationship that has generated a lot of discussion and study in recent years.

By examining how globalisation has affected economic disparity, cultural conflict, political instability, and technology, this content will examine how it has contributed to the growth of extremist movements and ideas. To address the underlying roots of extremism and advance a more peaceful and inclusive world, it will also offer policy recommendations and point out areas for further research.

Recent security issues in Europe have included anything from terrorism and cybercrime to organised crime and border security. Due to these difficulties, it is now more important than ever to take strong institutional security measures to protect people, businesses, and institutions. The EU has established a complete system of institutional security measures to address these issues. These steps, which aim to improve the ability of law enforcement organisations to prevent and combat crime, particularly transnational crime, comprise a variety of agencies, databases, and collaboration mechanisms.

This paper gives a general review of institutional security measures in Europe from the lens of law enforcement. The function of the European Police College, Joint Investigation Teams, European Arrest Warrant, Schengen Information System, and European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats will be covered. It examines the significance of these actions as major contributing elements to the safety and security of European citizens and institutions. Additionally, it will examine the drawbacks and restrictions of these actions and talk about potential future advancements in institutional security in Europe.

The overall goal is to give readers a thorough grasp of European institutional security measures and their role in preserving public safety and order.

Global security threats are a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that poses significant national and international security challenges. Multiple factors and root causes contribute to the emergence and persistence of global security threats. These include political instability, economic inequality, climate change, cybersecurity vulnerabilities, nuclear proliferation, globalisation, and interconnectedness. Political instability can create conditions that allow extremist groups to gain a foothold and thrive, leading to regional and global security threats. Understanding the interconnected factors and root causes of these threats is essential for developing effective strategies to mitigate and address them.