Epistemic Justification

The standard formulation of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB) has outlived its usefulness. Though pedagogically convenient, JTB and its countless post-Gettier refinements reflect a fundamental misstep: treating knowledge as if it were a natural kind. This paper argues instead for the primacy of credencing: the act of proportioning belief to the degree of available evidence. Credencing provides the true epistemic primitive, whereas knowledge is a derivative, unstable linguistic construct-a coarse binary applied to a continuous evidential gradient. Its thresholds are context-bound, socially negotiated, and emotionally charged, reflecting pragmatic expediency and the human need for doxastic reassurance rather than epistemic fidelity. Philosophical energy has therefore been squandered on patching an inherently low-resolution concept, mistaking semantic compression for metaphysical depth. In place of this error, I propose a deflationary reorientation: credencing, articulated in explicit degrees of belief, should displace "knowledge" as the measure of epistemic evaluation. Knowledge-talk may retain utility in ordinary life, but its elevation to philosophical centrality is misguided. By recovering credencing as the first-order, semantically superior category, we free epistemology from the fruitless obsession with refining "knowledge" and restore its focus to the evidence-belief relation that genuinely tracks the world.

The major ethical theories---welfarist consequentialism, Kantianism, contractualism, common sense morality, and virtue ethics---appear to converge on the same practical advice in many situations. Such convergence seems epistemically significant. A natural thought would be that the convergence should assure us about the advice. However, what would be the rationale behind this---why should the convergence increase our assurance? That's the main question we pursue in this paper. As the question is only sparsely addressed in the existing literature, we begin by detailing various kinds and structures of convergence. In relation, we propose a specific way to think about the epistemic significance of convergence. The remainder of the paper is primarily negative. We argue that even granting nonskeptical assumptions that are common in moral epistemology, the epistemic significance of convergence is harder to account for than most would probably think.

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Public discourse often treats the burden of proof (BoP) as a dyadic duel between interlocutors. This paper develops a fully quantitative, audience-centric framework in which burden is allocated and tracked by changes in the pooled epistemic state of an attentive audience rather than by the intransigence of a debate opponent. We formalize: (i) responsiveness-tempered Bayesian updating at the individual level; (ii) attention-weighted logarithmic pooling for collective belief; (iii) a precise definition of remaining burden as the additional log-Bayes factor still required to reach a declared acceptance threshold; and (iv) complexity-constrained priors that deter prior-gaming while operationalizing the “extraordinary claims” maxim. We derive an efficiency criterion for evidence selection, a worst-case robustness metric across admissible priors and responsiveness bands, and provide schematic and trajectory figures that visualize how burdens shrink as cumulative evidence grows. The result is a compact, auditable, and extensible model that isolates the epistemic core of BoP for public-facing argumentation, independent of legal categories or non-quantifiable social factors.

Bilgi felsefesinin kendisine konu edindiği temel soru “Bilgi nedir?” sorusudur. Bu çalışma, Platon’un Theaetetus diyaloğunda bilginin tanımına dair ortaya koyduğu sorunları incelemektedir. Platon’un bilgi felsefesi, idealar teorisi temelinde şekillenmiş olup unutulan bilginin hatırlanması (anamnesis) ve diyalektik yöntemle bilginin neliğinin kavranması hususunu içerir. Theaetetus diyaloğunda, bilginin algı (aisthesis), doğru inanç (alêthê doxa) ve kanıta dayalı doğru inanç (logou alêthê doxan) olarak tanımlandığı üç farklı önerme ele alınır. Bu tanımların nasıl tartışıldığı ve çürütüldüğü detaylandırılırken, Platon’un bilgiye dair epistemik kaygıları ve bilgi tanımına eklediği “logos” koşulunun yansımaları da ele alınır. Platon’un, idealar dünyasındaki bilgi ile algılanabilir dünyadaki bilgiyi logos şartı özelinde birleştirme çabası, onun Theaetetus diyaloğu bağlamında bilgi tanımında kesin bir sonuca varamamasının nedenini de açıklar. Platon, her üç tanımın da yeterli olmadığını belirtir ve bilginin kesin bir tanımına ulaşmamayı tercih eder. Bu çalışma, Platon’un geleneksel bilgi tanımına dair epistemik kaygılarını ve bu kaygıların çağdaş epistemolojideki Gettier sorunu olarak karşımıza çıkan yansımalarını değerlendirir.

This paper critically examines Coliva and Palmira's characterization of the disagreement between Humean skeptics and hinge epistemologists as a distinctive kind of conceptual disagreement. Humean skepticism requires evidential justification for all rational beliefs, presenting a narrower conception of rationality. This contrasts with constitutivist hinge epistemology, which posits that our unwarranted hinge propositions-the basic certainties which makes the justifications for ordinary empirical propositions possible-are constitutive of the concept of epistemic rationality, thus they are also rationally accepted by us. Coliva and Palmira (2020, 2021) argue that this divergence reflects a conceptual disagreement over the conception of epistemic rationality, implying a dispute about how the concept of epistemic rationality should be understood. Their strategy is twofold: they first mentioned Stroud's (2019) categorization of conceptual disagreement, but contended that the disagreement between Humean skeptics and hinge epistemologists represents a novel kind of conceptual disagreement that Stroud's categorization cannot encompass. They suggest this new framing allows for a rational resolution of the disagreement; second, they argue that the extended conception of rationality is superior because it coherently accounts for the rationality of our epistemic practices. However, I contend that both parts of their twofold strategy fail. Even if the disagreement is conceptual, it can be understood as a type of disagreement within Stroud's categorization; therefore, it does not represent a novel type of disagreement. Additionally, I argue that they misinterpret the skeptic's stance. Skeptics do not assume that our epistemic practices are rational; rather, they doubt the rationality of these practices and the possibility of knowledge. Therefore, for a skeptic, there is no advantage from a conceptual proposal that makes a coherent account of the alleged rationality of our epistemic practices.

Among those who think that emotions can provide epistemic reasons for belief, there is disagreement about whether emotions provide foundational reasons (ones that are not based on further reasons) or non-foundational reasons (ones that are based on further reasons). I argue in this paper that considerations about evidence of emotional unreliability favour the non-foundational view of emotional reasons. The argument starts with a set of counterexamples to the claim that evidence of emotional unreliability always defeats emotional justification. I then show why only the non-foundational picture of emotional reasons is compatible with this finding. The upshot is 2-fold: first, the commonly held assumption that evidence of emotional unreliability always defeats emotional justification is false; and, second, this gives us a reason for preferring a non-foundational picture of emotional reasons.

Epistemic democrats indirectly evaluate democratic decisions by directly evaluating the inputs into the election. However, the fundamental problem of measurement in the philosophy of science shows that procedures are often as difficult to evaluate as outcomes. This paper brings this highly refined framework into political philosophy to show that epistemic democrats face an analogous 'fundamental problem of evaluation'. This crossfertilization of political philosophy with the philosophy of science shows that the quality of democratic mechanisms and their inputs regarding their ability to track the truths of justice is as difficult to evaluate as the quality of the resulting decisions themselves.

Some series can go on indefinitely, others cannot, and epistemologists want to know in which class to place epistemic chains. Is it sensible or nonsensical to speak of a proposition or belief that is justified by another proposition or belief, ad infinitum? In large part the answer depends on what we mean by 'justification'. Epistemologists have failed to find a definition on which everybody agrees, and some have even advised us to stop looking altogether. In spite of this, we submit a few candidate definitions. We argue that, although not giving the final word, these candidates tell us something about the possibility of infinite epistemic chains. And we show that they can short-circuit a debate about doxastic justification.

Resumo: O geracionismo epistêmico sobre a memória tem ganhado cada vez mais apoio entre os epistemólogos. Em contraste com a visão preservacionista tradicional, a qual sustenta que a memória meramente preserva o status epistêmico das crenças, o geracionismo argumenta que a memória pode preservar e gerar status epistêmico. Este artigo oferece um novo argumento para tratar a memória como uma fonte epistêmica generativa. Ele apresenta um dilema para os preservacionistas epistêmicos e defende que o geracionismo fornece a solução. A ideia central é reconhecer a neutralidade epistêmica do conteúdo perceptual inconsciente e o papel da memória na geração de status epistêmico. O conteúdo que não é inicialmente mantido como uma crença permanece epistemicamente neutro, até que seja recuperado e convertido em uma crença, por meio de um processo de memória confiável.

This paper argues that epistemic circularity is not a flaw but an inescapable feature of all knowledge systems. Building on recent work in coherentism (Olsson, 2017), structural realism (French, 2014), and virtue epistemology (Sosa, 2015), we demonstrate that even our most trusted epistemic frameworks-logic, mathematics, and empiricism-rely on selfvalidating structures. We propose a novel framework of "parameterized pluralism" that evaluates knowledge systems through measurable performance indicators rather than foundational certainty. Our central contribution is the "circular wrap" metaphor, which reconceptualizes knowledge as cognitive structures that achieve varying degrees of fit with reality's patterns, without requiring epistemic access to reality itself. This approach addresses key debates in contemporary epistemology: (1) it dissolves rather than resolves the coherentism-foundationalism debate, (2) it provides a graduated solution to the demarcation problem following Pigliucci (2013), and (3) it offers a middle path between scientific realism and anti-realism aligned with Chakravartty's (2017) semi-realism and Massimi's (2018) perspectival realism. We demonstrate how this framework legitimizes diverse epistemic practices while avoiding relativism through explicit, measurable parameters including predictive coherence, manipulative power, and intersubjective alignment. The paper concludes by showing how embracing circularity transforms epistemology from a quest for impossible foundations into an iterative process of pattern refinement, with implications for scientific methodology, institutional knowledge hierarchies, and cross-cultural epistemology.

This paper analyzes the explanatory structure of theistic ideologies that posit both a benevolent agent (God) and malevolent counterparts (demons and morally depraved humans) as exhaustive causes of worldly events. By granting every occurrence to one of these categories, such frameworks achieve explanatory closure at the cost of explanatory sterility. No event can fall outside the ontology: prosperity is attributed to divine favor, misfortune to demonic interference, and moral evils to human depravity construed as Satan's instrumentality. While this produces the semblance of coherence, it collapses into tautology. Using both symbolic logic and Bayesian formalism, the paper demonstrates that dual-agent causality systems admit no falsifiers and generate Bayes factors approximating unity across outcomes, leaving them evidentially inert. The analysis situates this flaw within mainstream Christian categories, but the formal critique generalizes to any ideology that immunizes itself against disconfirmation by exhaustive agentic attribution. The conclusion is that such systems, far from supplying explanatory power, exemplify the illogic of ontological overreach.

We advance the literature on environmental justice by examining colorblind rhetoric as a mechanism sustaining environmental racism. Through a case study of one agricultural community in California actively contesting pesticide exposure, we examine the colorblind rhetoric and tactics that agricultural growers and state regulators engage to sustain pesticide practices in the face of racial harm. We identify five epistemic maneuvers: a) elevating public good claims, b) projecting morality and solidarity, c) inverting narratives of victimhood and innocence, d) promoting a scientific narrative, and e) disparaging dissenting voices. These maneuvers normalize harm, minimize the negative impacts of pesticide exposure, absolve growers and state regulators from responsibility for racial harm, and discredit the knowledge and experience of farmworkers and their representatives. Our findings contribute to understanding how environmental racism is sustained in a colorblind context through rhetoric and tactics that promote racial ignorance.

O geracionismo epistêmico sobre a memória tem ganhado cada vez mais apoio entre os epistemólogos. Em contraste com a visão preservacionista tradicional, a qual sustenta que a memória meramente preserva o status epistêmico das crenças, o geracionismo argumenta que a memória pode preservar e gerar status epistêmico. Este artigo oferece um novo argumento para tratar a memória como uma fonte epistêmica generativa. Ele apresenta um dilema para os preservacionistas epistêmicos e defende que o geracionismo fornece a solução. A ideia central é reconhecer a neutralidade epistêmica do conteúdo perceptual inconsciente e o papel da memória na geração de status epistêmico. O conteúdo que não é inicialmente mantido como uma crença permanece epistemicamente neutro, até que seja recuperado e convertido em uma crença, por meio de um processo de memória confiável.
Palavras-chave: Epistemologia da Memória. Geracionismo Epistêmico. Percepção Inconsciente. Justificação Epistêmica. Neutralidade Epistêmica.

This article discusses two under-explored strands to the concept of ignorance. Firstly, how ignorance relates to a subject's degrees of belief; secondly how ignorance relates to a subject's evidence. I also consider a third alleged strand to the concept of ignorance, which is that ignorance requires some kind of normative failure. I argue that this is false; ignorance does not essentially require any such failure. I finish with some reflections on the extent to which conceptual analysis and linguistic intuitions about the English language concept 'ignorance' can be relied upon to illuminate the nature of ignorance itself.

The Raven Paradox, first formulated by Carl Hempel, illustrates a surprising tension in our understanding of evidence and confirmation. While intuitively observing a black raven seems to support the hypothesis that all ravens are black, formal analysis shows that even seemingly unrelated observations, such as a green apple, can be construed as confirming the same claim. This paper presents the paradox in an accessible way, explores its formalization in first-order logic and Bayesian terms, and discusses why intuitive notions of confirmation can clash with strict logical reasoning.

In his “An Epistemic Defense of News Abstinence” (2021), Sven Bernecker argues for a radical epistemic approach to counter the consumption of fake news. He suggests that a subject can be propositionally justified in ignoring the news under specific circumstances. This paper critically examines Bernecker’s account and  raises  essential  concerns  undermining  its  plausibility. Then,  it  proposes  a revision of the news abstinence account. It is argued that the original attitude of ignoring the news is epistemically inappropriate and should be replaced with a more suitable attitude of suspending judgment. This adjustment allows for the maintenance of Bernecker’s original idea of an epistemic defense strategy against the consumption of fake news while avoiding its associated issues.

Would a Rational God Endorse Faith Beyond Evidence? his paper examines whether a rational and benevolent God would endorse the kind of faith promoted in the Bible and many Christian traditions. Faith is defined not as "blind belief" but as a degree of conviction that surpasses the degree warranted by the available evidence. While Christian texts often valorize such faith, this analysis argues that it is inconsistent with divine rationality and benevolence. The paper considers the nature of faith and divine expectation, its historical role in social control, and its tension with evidence-based belief. It also addresses theological responses, including claims that faith transcends rationality or that exclusivity is part of divine order. Drawing on Bayesian epistemology, symbolic logic, decision theory, and likelihoodist methods, the analysis concludes that a rational deity would not endorse belief beyond evidence, but would encourage proportioning conviction to evidential support. Faith as traditionally promoted in Christian doctrine thus appears incompatible with the attributes of a God committed to truth and intellectual honesty.

Expert knowledge, heuristics, Michael Polanyi, social epistemology, democracy, consilience There is a large literature on social epistemology, some of which is concerned with expert knowledge. Formal representations of the aggregation of decisions, estimates, and the like play a larger role in these discussions. Yet these discussions are neither sufficiently social nor epistemic. The assumptions minimize the role of knowledge, and often assume independence between observers. This paper presents a more naturalistic approach, ...

El poco interés para dotar a nuestro país de un cuerpo penal orgánico, una vez iniciado el periodo republicano, se debió probablemente a las luchas que por el poder libraron entre sí nuestros compatriotas; aprender a vivir en libertad y democracia, sacrificó y distrajo, acaso, las mentes más ilustres y prometedoras 1 . El primer proyecto de codificación penal, en América, se debe al peruano Vidaurre. En efecto, proclamada la independencia (28/7/1821), publica, lejos de su patria (Puerto Principe, 1821-1822) el texto punitivo que, elaborado a título personal, llevará el sello de su original maestría, no obstante la influencia que recibe del Código Napoleónico (1810). El influjo de éste último será pertinaz durante todo el siglo XIX, a través de los códigos españoles de 1822 y 1848, los cuales, "enfeudados" al código francés, según aseveración de Jiménez de Asúa 2 , inspiraron los códigos de

According to scientific realism one goal of research is to provide accurate descriptions of various domains of nature. In this paper I argue that there is no philosophical bar to achieving this goal but also no way of deciding if we have achieved it. Still, pursuit of the realist goal has been a significant source of useful results. ***** According to scientific realism (SR), as I will understand it in this paper, one aim of the sciences is to provide accurate descriptions of nature in specific domains. Since humans are a part of nature, this goal includes providing an accurate account of our intellectual capabilities and limits. SR operates on two levels: a) the claim that some currently accepted account is a correct description of its domain; b) the claim that we are capable of finding, eventually, such a correct account

Abstract: From Fear and Trembling by Kierkegaard, the text explores the paradox of renunciation as a form of ethical commitment. It considers the “knight of faith” as the embodiment of radical subjectivity: an ordinary individual, yet one who carries a spiritual singularity, living without anxiety or apparent rules, through an inner commitment to a faith that transcends the universal and the objective. Renunciation does not mean abandonment but transcendence: refusing immediate possession makes it possible to access an eternal truth, freed from finitude. This choice expresses a conscious decision of the individual who acts singularly in the face of despair and anxiety. Truth is never universal or systemic, but always subjective and situated. Commitment consists, through an act of faith, in inscribing the ephemeral into eternity, by detaching oneself from common morality and philosophical speculation. This movement, absurd in appearance, nevertheless grounds genuine autonomy. The Kierkegaardian paradox is thus clear: to renounce is to engage spiritually and to preserve one’s inner truth intact.

Résumé: À partir de Crainte et tremblement de Kierkegaard, le texte explore le paradoxe du renoncement comme forme d’engagement éthique. Il considère le « chevalier de la foi » comme l’incarnation de la subjectivité radicale : un individu ordinaire mais qui est porteur d’une singularité spirituelle, il vit sans inquiétude ni règles apparentes, à travers un engagement intérieur dans une foi qui dépasse le général et l’objectivité. Le renoncement ne renvoie pas à l’abandon mais au dépassement : refuser la possession immédiate permet d’accéder à une vérité éternelle, affranchie de la finitude. Ce choix exprime une décision consciente de l’individu qui agit singulièrement face au désespoir et à l’angoisse. La vérité n’est jamais universelle ou systémique, mais toujours subjective et locale. L’engagement consiste, par un acte de foi, à inscrire l’éphémère dans l’éternité, en se détachant de la morale commune et de la spéculation philosophique. Ce mouvement, absurde en apparence, fonde pourtant une véritable autonomie. Le paradoxe kierkegaardien est donc clair : renoncer, c’est s’engager spirituellement et préserver intacte la vérité intérieure.

In this article, we examine the determinants of citizens' democratic preferences in federal states with politically significant national or linguistic diversity. Using original survey data from Belgium, Canada and Switzerland, we test whether members of national or linguistic minorities prefer different (electoral, direct or deliberative) forms of decision-making than majority memberssince some give advantage to them more than others. While we find effects of citizens' objective and subjective minority-majority position on their democratic preferences, individual-level predictors such as satisfaction with the current functioning of democracy, economic well-being and political ideology remain at least as strong predictors. These findings enrich the literatures on democratic fatigue, reform and innovation by showing that even in states with significant national-linguistic diversity, democratic preferences seem to transcend communities, indicating room for cross-group consensus. Yet, since group-level factors have some relevance, democratic reforms need to pay attention to them to be inclusive of all societal segments.

Phenomenal Conservatism is an internalist theory of justification that upholds the idea that justification arises from a distinct picture of epistemic warrant based on seemings. Recently, it has enjoyed an ever-growing number of defenders due to its advantages over traditional internalist perspectives. One of its main merits resides in its promise to avoid long-standing challenges to foundationalism. Phenomenal Conservatism supposedly holds the resources to reject an infinite regress of reasons while simultaneously avoiding making the subject's beliefs arbitrary. This paper aims to show that Phenomenal Conservatism fails to dispel the accusation of arbitrariness and that this failure ultimately undoes its viability as an internalist theory of justification. The arbitrariness objection here developed is lifted from Stewart Cohen's bootstrapping problem. It argues that by being unable to handle bootstrapping inferences, seemings fail to function as non-arbitrary reasons to believe. Additionally, it is suggested that bootstrapping-related considerations provide better support to one of the main internalist alternatives to Phenomenal Conservatism.

This paper argues that while belief serves practical adaptive purposes, it is in essence, a flawed and often destructive cognitive mechanism. Belief functions as a placeholder for uncertainty and can facilitate decision-making under incomplete information, but left unchecked, it resists evidence, obstructs truth, and impedes collective advancement. Knowledge, by contrast, is probabilistic, verifiable, and cumulative; qualities essential for personal and societal progress. Belief, like conflict/violence based coercion, may once have been indispensable for survival, but in the modern context it should be confronted, constrained, and subordinated to knowledge.

The direct way to argue for scepticism is to take a sceptical hypothesis (H) like Descartes' Evil Demon and argue that nothing is known (~Kp) since H is true. IA 1. H 2. H entails ~Kp (definition) 3. ~Kp This direct argument for scepticism, the Argument For Ignorance (IA) as it might be called, is obviously indefensible since the premise, H, can never be known to be true. That, however, is more of a pragmatic, procedural objection to scepticism than a substantive refutation, since scepticism might still be true even if it is indefensible. We might still be being deceived by an evil demon even if philosophers assure us that it is indefensible to say so. It is this modal dimension of the problem that philosophers have found most troubling. 1 What makes radical scepticism indefensible makes it irrefutable and possibly true. Now if "irrefutable" and "possibly true" mean anything more than that the sceptical hypothesis is logically possible (not contradictory), it must be that it is not known to be false, the alternative to maintaining that it is true. It's thus really just a continuation of the defense of scepticism: since H entails ~Kp and H is not known to be false, it follows that it is not known that anything is known (~K~~Kp, ie. ~KKp) in accordance with the principle that knowledge is closed under entailment (CP), hence that nothing is known, ~Kp, in accordance with the principle that ~KKp is virtually equivalent to ~Kp (KK). AI 1. ~K~H (by definition) 2. H entails ~Kp (by definition) 3. ~KKp (CP) 4. ~Kp (KK) This indirect argument has been called the "Argument From Ignorance" (DeRose, 1995) because it opens quietly with a demurrer instead of a dogmatic affirmation of H, in keeping with scepticism's spirit of agnosticism. While it begins unassumingly with a shift of epistemic modality, AI still somehow manages to produce the radical sceptical conclusion at the end-the very thing it was supposed to get around the problem of arguing directly for. How is it possible to get ~Kp from ~K~H and ~KKp, when we know a priori that any argument for ~Kp is selfdefeating? If it looks like a mouse has come into being by spontaneous generation out of gray rags and dust, we would do well (says Wittgenstein) to examine the rags carefully to see how a mouse may have hidden in them. Here the mouse is hiding in the rules of inference-not CP, but KK. 1 Pritchard (2005) says that the modal dimension of the sceptic's conclusion is what makes it so troubling: '... regardless of whether we are ... the victim of a sceptical hypothesis, it remains that we do not know ... everyday propositions ...' (p2) He means that the mere possibility of H implies that we know nothing (~Kp).

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This study aims to demonstrate the link between Artificial Intelligence and Naturalised Epistemology. Artificial neural networks simulate natural neural networks, which is a bio-psychological process. The central thesis of this research is that Artificial Intelligence and Naturalised Epistemology share a nexus in Cognitive Psychology.

This article examines rationality in American evangelicalism through the prism of epistemic politics, focusing on how believers navigate the ethical demands of living among others who claim different access to truth. Whereas existing research on the cultural psychology of belief highlights how evangelicals manage skepticism about their own supernatural beliefs and experiences, I focus instead on how they navigate competing knowledge claims in view of ordering collective life. I argue for more analytical attentiveness to clashing forms of intellectual authority within evangelicalism. Drawing on fieldwork at a traditionally noncharismatic congregation in Nashville, Tennessee, I examine members' efforts to assuage their distrust of subjective religious experiences as they debate polarizing doctrinal reforms. I show how their situation reflects persistent ethical tensions between charismatic and noncharismatic spirituality, despite the former's dominance in contemporary evangelicalism. Religious knowing is not just a matter of personal faith. It is also about reconciling one's own experiences, beliefs, and commitments with those of others.

This paper draws on aspects of Kant’s epistemology to investigate the potential contribution of his conceptual distinctions to contemporary discourses concerning disinformation, fake news, and public discourse. Focusing on the Canon of Pure Reason in the first Critique , I examine Kant’s distinction between opinion, belief, and knowledge, as well as the role of transcendental reflection in clarifying these levels of epistemic legitimacy. The hypothesis is that this conceptual structure may clarify the confusion between different forms of assent in digital environments, where misinformation, disinformation, and conspiracy theories, for example, blur epistemic boundaries and raise questions about freedom of expression, the conditions of Enlightenment, and the viability of rational public discourse.

Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has provided a new expression of its threat. The Debasing Demon appears to generate a novel form of radical doubt, one that has gained prominence in recent debates. Instead of targeting the connection between belief and truth, it undercuts the link between belief and evidence (or its reasons). This contribution presents the Debasing Demon Problem, analyzing its reach. It will provide an account for explaining how its threat is raised, explore its relationship to classical varieties of skepticism, and assess some of the main objections against it. It will be argued that Schaffer's Demon institutes a consistent epistemic threat, one that might represent the main variety of skepticism to be tackled in epistemology. Some consequences of this analysis are then presented concerning how to face this open problem.

Indigenous knowledges have received increased attention in environmental governance issues over the last decade, especially biodiversity. Epistemic injustices, however, remain. Forms of knowledge that differ from dominant ‘Western’ knowledge are either not recognized and valued as equal, or are misused for land reoccupation and knowledge appropriation that further settler colonialism. Drawing on the conceptual framing of epistemic justice, biopiracy and biocolonialism we introduce the concept of bioepistemicide and analyse possible implications of the rising bioeconomy agenda for Indigenous peoples in the Brazilian Amazon. While many argue the value of Indigenous knowledges in the context of bioeconomy, it remains unclear how issues concerning epistemic plurality and epistemic injustices will be addressed. Among the most seriously questioned issues are intellectual property rights and ownership. Focusing on the Indigenous medicine Kambo, the secretion of a tropical frog (Phyllomedusa bicolor), we explore if and how bioeconomy governance and initiatives in Brazil address the epistemic injustices that may arise in Amazonian Indigenous territories. We take the perspective that epistemic plurality and conflicts may trigger the transformations needed to tackle epistemic injustices. Based on our case study, we argue that bioeconomy can only challenge epistemic hierarchies if it steps outside of colonial settler rationality and sovereignty regarding the very ideas of nature and ‘traditional knowledge’ which in the first place enable new forms of colonialism, like biocolonialism. We conclude with suggestions on how to embrace epistemic pluralism and strengthen the role and positionality of Indigenous knowledges in the implementation of bioeconomy in the Amazon

In An Epistemic Theory of Democracy, Robert E. Goodin and Kai Spiekermann offer a systematic argument articulating the epistemic value of democracy, aiming to show that democracies have an important advantage over other forms of government due to their truth-tracking potential. This instrumental argument in favour of democratic institutions is an important contribution to debates surrounding the value of democracy at a time of political turbulence and abundant scepticism about the operation of politics, writes Camilo Ardila

What kind of mental state is suspension, according to Sextus Empiricus? Recently, this question has been addressed by attributing to Sextus a metacognitive account of suspension (Dunphy 2023). Roughly, this means that, for Sextus, suspension constitutively involves a particular attitudenamely, a higher-order belief about one's own epistemic standing. This reading clashes with the standard view, on which Sextan suspension is not a distinctive doxastic attitude. In this paper I challenge that revisionary interpretation and use it as a springboard to argue that Sextan suspension should instead be understood as a kind of affective state.

The notion of danger is ubiquitous in our everyday practical judgments. Yet discussions of danger and its normative role in guiding our actions are rare in contemporary philosophy. This could be partially explained by the frequent conflation of danger with risk. This paper aims to address this gap by clarifying what danger is and how it differs from risk. Drawing on various conceptual, linguistic and formal considerations, I argue against standard risk-based accounts of danger and in favor of a modified version of Timothy Williamson's modal account. The upshot is a partial model of danger, along with a list of features that distinguish danger from risk. I also explore the normative dimension of danger and how it differs from that of risk. I conclude by providing a partial justification for accepting norms of danger alongside norms to avoid risk.

It is uncontroversial that testimony that p can give the hearer of the testimony an epistemic reason to believe p, and indeed make the hearer epistemically justified in believing p. 1 Call evidentialism the view that testimony gives such a reason by giving evidence that p, or at any rate by allowing the hearer justifiedly to take it that there is evidence that p. In its simplest version, evidentialism is a reductive individualist view of testimonial justification: the testimony gives such a reason because the hearer can infer that p from his or her belief that the testimonial act indicates that p, and the latter belief is justified either inductively or by a priori reasoning from a principle of charity in interpretation. 2 This view is reductive in understanding the reasons given in testimony to be based on the hearer's non-testimonially (in this case, inductively or a priori) justified beliefs. And it is individualist in understanding the giving of testimonial reasons to depend only on the belief p's being based on epistemically justified beliefs of the hearer. Contrasting with such a reductive view are non-reductive and non-individualist views. 3 I focus in this chapter on one non-reductive and non-individualist 216 view-the assurance view of testimony. 4 On this view, testimonial reason-giving or justification depends in some instances on the testifier's speech act of assuring the addressee that p, or on the addressee's acceptance of that assurance. Assurance allows an epistemic reason to be given to the addressee even when no evidence is given. The testifier's assurance may be understood in various ways-as the testifier's presenting himself or herself as having an adequate epistemic reason to believe p or as epistemically responsible in asserting p, or as inviting the addressee to trust him or her that p, or as offering to take responsibility for p's being true.

In our study, after establishing the general framework of apatheism, it is aimed to describe the conceptions of atheism and agnosticism and to compare the common and different aspects of these conceptions. Although apatheism, which can be defined as indifference to God, is generally discussed as a type of atheism, it is different from atheism itself or a type of atheism because it has its own characteristics. On the other hand, it is claimed that apatheism is similar to agnosticism in the ontological and epistemic context. However, in agnosticism, God's existence or non-existence cannot be known, whereas in apatheism, there is an indifference and apathy towards God rather than an ontological and epistemic questioning or belief in God's existence or nonexistence.

The critical hegemony pronounces it's crusade in search of indubitables that form the foundation of rational practices and education, morality and justice, Truth and certainty. We must have veracity-veracity and intelligence, and a God of pure intelligence that we are called upon to know by knowing God's Truth (as God knows Truth). Knowledge and what's demonstrable is severed from opinion which is simply another word for faith. All belief is reduced to the level of subjectivity.

En este trabajo vamos a sostener: a) que Neurath fue, contrariamente a la imagen que nos presentan, un filósofo muy avezado en lógica; b) que Neurath, contrariamente a la imagen que nos presentan, no postuló una teoría de la verdad; c) que el concepto de justificación ocupa un lugar preponderante en la epistemología de Neurath, un lugar aún no del todo revelado ni valorado; d) que su oposición a la verdad o al enfoque semántico de la lógica tiene una justificación epistémica, anclada, a su vez, en tres de los postulados que hicieron a la identidad filosófica del Círculo de Viena.
Aprovecharemos todo esto para conectar las ideas de Neurath con desarrollos lógicos modales en los cuáles pueden ser expresadas. En estas lógicas denominadas Lógicas de

This paper argues that the dominance of English as the de facto language of global science constitutes a form of epistemic injustice and linguistic dictatorship. Drawing on the theory of Post-Science and Post-Language, this work critiques the systemic exclusion of non-English intellectual contributions and calls for a pluralistic, multilingual scientific paradigm. Through personal and structural examples, the paper exposes the interconnection between language, power, and knowledge production in a globalized yet deeply unequal academic system .

According to veridicalism, your beliefs about the existence of ordinary objects are typically true, and can constitute knowledge, even if you are in some global sceptical scenario. Even if you are a victim of Descartes' demon, you can still know that there are tables, for example. Accordingly, even if you don't know whether you are in some such scenario, you still know that there are tables. This refutes the standard sceptical argument. But does it solve the sceptical problem posed by that argument? I argue that it does not, because we do not know substantively more about the external world according to veridicalism than we do according to the sceptical argument. Rather, veridicalism merely reformulates what little knowledge we have. I then draw some general conclusions about the nature of the sceptical problem, the formulation of the standard argument, and the significance of this for some other, nonveridicalist strategies.

One common criticism of virtue epistemology is its perceived individualism. This paper aims to present a robustly social account of virtue epistemology, framed within the context of the epistemic social environment. To achieve this, it draws on key insights from feminist epistemology and vice epistemology, particularly the work of Johnson, Grasswick, and Kidd. It argues that we can socialize epistemic virtues by broadening our focus from individual epistemic goods to the wider variety of goods that improve our epistemic social environment. In that way, it makes place for reproductive epistemic goals, which have been largely neglected in existing literature. Moreover, it offers a new perspective on the ongoing debate concerning the relationship between epistemology and intellectual ethics.

Dynamic Categorization, emerging from the principle of Ontological Instability, represents a revolutionary approach to philosophical categorization that embraces uncertainty and fluctuation as fundamental features of reality rather than problems to be solved. However, this framework's flexibility and recognition of instability create significant vulnerabilities to misuse in contemporary contexts characterized by disinformation campaigns, algorithmic bias, and hyper-fragmented political epistemologies. This paper provides the first comprehensive Safeguards (professional education, public engagement, ethical reflection, community building). This multi-layered approach provides protection against misuse while preserving the creative potential that makes Dynamic Categorization valuable for addressing complex contemporary challenges. The analysis demonstrates that legitimate Dynamic Categorization can be distinguished from its pathological distortions through systematic application of three core principles: the Integrity Principle (maintaining systematic coherence through creative consistency), the Transparency Principle (employing open methodological procedures), and the Responsibility Principle (ensuring ethical accountability in application). These principles provide practical criteria for evaluating categorical applications and preventing exploitation. The paper concludes that Dynamic Categorization, when properly safeguarded, represents an essential tool for navigating contemporary complexity and uncertainty. Rather than abandoning the framework due to its vulnerabilities, the analysis demonstrates that sophisticated defensive mechanisms can protect against misuse while preserving the innovative potential necessary for addressing climate change, technological disruption, global interconnection, and cultural transformation. This work establishes the foundation for responsible development and application of post-essentialist philosophical frameworks in the twenty-first century.

This auto-ethnographic study reflects on my participation in the 11th Nishan Forum on World Civilizations (2025/07/09-10, Qufu, China), themed "Beauty in Diversity: Nurturing Understanding Among Civilizations for Global Modernization." As an Australian intercultural communication (IC) educator with 14 years in China, my panel contribution on "Mutual Assistance in Pursuing Modernization" bridged personal experience-rooted in Xinjiang teaching (2011-12)-with global dialogue. Utilizing a trans-media approach, this paper integrates written reflection with a video narrative, drawing on Jenkins' (2006) storytelling framework and Walley's (2015) template. Data from field notes and consented footage, edited into a montagist, split-screen video, explore cultural shifts from Western individualism to collectivist harmony. Thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) reveals mutual learning as a pedagogic imperative, informed by Hofstede's cultural dimensions and Xi Jinping's Global Civilization Initiative. The study situates this epiphany within Australia's evolving China policy, post-Nishan Forum, and initiates both a trans-media video-graphic complement "Reflections on the 11th Nishan Forum" and a longitudinal video series, "From Xinjiang to Harmony." Reflexivity (Eichsteller & Davis, 2022) underscores my role as a cultural bridge, additionally situating AI/human dialogue to enhance potential future discourse analysis, inviting further trans-media exploration.

It is possible that one is currently radically deceived-that one is a BIV, say-and that one has no inkling of this because one cannot distinguish between being a BIV and having normal unenvatted experiences. One would thus occupy, entirely unbeknownst to one, what we might refer to as the epistemic shadowlands, where one's experiences seem like normal veridical experiences of the world around one, but are in fact highly deceptive. What is the rational standing of one's beliefs in the shadowlands? According to the new evil demon intuition, the rational standing ought to be on a par with-and certainly no worse than-the rational standing of the beliefs of one's unenvatted counterpart. This intuition is in direct conflict with epistemological disjunctivism since this view holds that the rational support that one's beliefs enjoy, in the best case, can be factive reasons which entail the truth of the (empirical) belief in question. This is clearly not a kind of rational support which is going to be available to one's envatted counterpart. This paper explores the relationship between epistemological disjunctivism and the new evil demon intuition and argues for a principled way of accounting for why the rational standing of one's envatted counterpart's beliefs is impoverished in comparison to the rational standing of one's own beliefs. Along the way, we also explore how epistemological disjunctivism is related to the more general-and, I argue, completely distinctproject of offering a theory of knowledge.

En tant que laboratoire politique, économique et social, l’Amérique latine est un terrain d’investigation privilégié, notamment pour les chercheurs étrangers. Depuis une quinzaine d’années cependant, ces derniers ont pu être accusés de contribuer à un « extractivisme épistémique » décrié. Ce concept désigne la quête effrénée d’informations brutes par des chercheurs peu sensibilisés à la nécessité de se montrer reconnaissants vis-à-vis des interlocuteurs auprès desquels et grâce auxquels ils ont conduit leurs recherches. Loin des faux-semblants que peuvent constituer les comités d’éthique universitaires, nous proposons de privilégier une forme de contrat moral personnel. Ainsi nous paraît-il nécessaire de s’engager à exprimer notre reconnaissance à nos interlocuteurs, d’une manière ou d’une autre, via un « retour » sur les conditions d’exercice de la recherche, qui pourra se faire, par exemple, sous la forme d’un rapport a minima oral. Nous qualifions ce type de communication de « rétrospective ».

The argument against private language seeks to dismantle the Cartesianism inherent in the traditional view of mind in philosophy—a view seemingly entangled with numerous skeptical quandaries. Particularly regarding how objects acquire meaning for us: whether this framework of signification can be characterized as internal or not. Wittgenstein's position endorses the latter response. For him, a private language is impossible because the meaning of linguistic objects is intrinsically bound to their use. Consequently, according to the philosopher, we could not refer to mental states—understood here as sensations—as bearing a priori subjective meaning without employing their governing rules of usage. Such rules are, ultimately, dictated by the public sphere. In other words, we must concede that there is nothing private about language; rather, the opposite holds true. The central question is to understand the precise sense in which Wittgenstein argued against private language.

Available here: https://www.uffs.edu.br/uffs/editora-uffs/linguagem-e-mente-estudos-sobre-identidade-e-percepcao

The Shifting Ground is a hybrid philosophical-creative anthology that explores the concept of ontological instability-not through rigid definitions or academic argument-but through fables, poetic reflections, metaphors, and fictional dialogues. In an age where reality is increasingly perceived as fluid, fragmented, and emergent, this collection invites readers to dwell not in certainty, but in becoming. From stories of scholars undone by too much knowledge to metaphors of cracked mirrors and dancing compasses, each piece challenges the fixedness of truth, identity, and morality. The text meanders across shifting terrains of epistemology, ethics, pedagogy, and metaphysics, offering a gentle yet subversive invitation to reconceive reality as process rather than substance. Rather than resolving the tensions of instability, the book embraces them-cultivating a poetics of resonance, responsiveness, and improvisation fit for the flux of our times.