Scholastic Philosophy

This article presents a reading of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (1776/1904) and The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759/2002) that uncovers the metaphysical assumptions embedded in his political economy. Drawing on Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) and intellectual history, it argues that Smith should be read as a metaphysician of economics. Labour, in his framework, functions as the ontological substance of value, conceptualised through metaphors of container, standard, time, energy and money. Scarcity, within his framework, is no longer a mere negative constraint. It emerges as the metaphysical driver of interdependence, specialisation and social bonds. Money, meanwhile, is demystified. It is not intrinsic value, but a token of labour and trust, essential to social cohesion. Finally, economic activity itself is framed as the force of civilisational progress, reinforcing moral sentiments and establishing institutions of honesty, civility and prudence. By repositioning Smith as a metaphysician, this article illuminates the deep structures that continue to underpin economic thought and practice.

This article examines the question of divine freedom in a little-known text by Suárez printed among his 'Opuscula theologica' (1599): 'De libertate divinae voluntatis'. The article then compares this brief work with two other publications by Suárez in which he also addresses the freedom of God: first, an earlier work, the 'Disputationes metaphysicae', and then his commentary on the first part of the 'Summa theologiae', published somewhat later. Examining the question of divine freedom provides us with an opportunity to consider Suárez's conception of free will from a more formal point of view.

Troisième Partie 5. Critères de l'édition critique et de traduction………………………………...p. 5.1 Description des manuscrits, colophons et histoire textuelle……………...p. 5.2 Les colophons…………………………………………………………….…..p.87 5.3 Analyse philologiques des manuscrits et stemma codicum………………p. Le Be'ur Sefer ha-Shir Edition du texte hébreu et traduction critique en langue française………….p. 6. Analyse des chapitres…………………………………………………….……p. 228 Pereq rishon………..……………………………………………………..…p.

Todros ben Meschoullam den David Todrosi (Arles 1314- ?) traducteur a Arles, de 1330 a 1340, est un des derniers protagonistes du mouvement de traduction de l’arabe a l’hebreu qui caracterise l’histoire intellectuelle juive en Provence au Moyen-Âge. L’edition que nous proposons ici, est sa traduction hebraique du Commentaire Moyen d’Averroes a la Poetique d’Aristote compare avec le texte arabe de depart et traduite, pour la premiere fois, en langue francaise. L’analyse comparee du corpus oriental du Commentaire a ete d’une grande importance pour saisir les specificites intrinseques de la traduction hebraique de Todrosi. La these comprend, l’etude du contexte philosophique dont Todros Todrosi a travaille, l’etude de la version hebraique du Commentaire, ainsi si que son edition accompagnee par et l’analyse paleographique et codicologique des manuscrits hebreux.

This work presents an English translation of Theophanes of Nicaea's Letter to Paul, answering questions about the Essence-Energy-Distinction (EED) raised by Paul (the Latin Patriarch of Constantinople) in 8 chapters. The translation was initially generated with the assistance of AI and subsequently edited by the translator to ensure accuracy to the original text.

In this article I intend to capture the flexions of the concept of "first principle" in Aristotle's posterity, until R. Descartes, insisting only on some moments that I consider important in this history: Aristotle, Neoplatonists [Plotinus, for example], Dionysius Areopagite, scholastics [Duns Scotus, for example] and R. Descartes. After this short historical excursion, I will try to highlight the fact that what the French philosopher calls cogito is close, from a functional point of view, at least, to the first Neoplatonic principle, i.e. it is a principle that generates knowledge, but not in an ontological paradigm, as it happens in the case of Neoplatonists, but in a gnoseological acceptance.

Être cartésien au xviie siècle, est-ce philosopher entre plusieurs mondes ? Fabula / Les Colloques, « », © Tous les textes et documents disponibles sur ce site, sont, sauf mention contraire, protégés par une licence Creative Common. dérèglement moral, comme une mise en tension entre le voyage et l'enracinement. De ce fait, la mobilité a rarement été prise au sérieux par les études cartésiennes, trop occupées à vouloir fonder une identité intellectuelle française sur la figure cartésienne. À l'inverse, cet article se veut une tentative pour faire de la mobilité une clef permettant de déplacer les thèmes traditionnels des études cartésiennes (autobiographie du discours, rapport entre sciences et sagesse, rapport à la coutume, pratiques empiriques contre méthode mathématique, rapport à la langue, etc.) et pour réarticuler l'intériorité du doute cartésien avec une ouverture au monde, pour passer de la reconnaissance à la connaissance. Alors que j'avais accordé beaucoup d'attention à la diachronie, à la temporalité de la réception cartésienne dans cet autre travail, je me propose de prendre au sérieux ici un jeu d'espaces. Les débats soulevés par la littérature comparée autour du French Global me semble déplacer le cadre des analyses que j'avais menées il y a vingt ans. Une philosophie itinérante : lire le « grand livre du monde » L'expérience de rupture dans la formation de la philosophie cartésienne a rarement été associée à l'expérience du voyage et à la sédentarité . Le Discours de la méthode a ainsi souvent été présenté comme une autobiographie intellectuelle dans la veine des Confessions d'Augustin ou des Essais de Montaigne. Or la place prépondérante faite au récit d'expérience personnelle invite aussi à relire le Discours comme un récit de voyage, comme un récit de mobilité et d'exil 3 . Selon Daniel Roche, « Descartes lui fait une place dans le Discours de la Méthode. Les métaphores spatiales habituelles abondent au moment décisif où l'itinéraire suivi auparavant par le philosophe va se transposer en modèle discursif et en impératif pour parvenir à la vérité » (Roche, 2003, p. 61). La mise en récit du Discours de la méthode se présente comme un récit de voyage.

Domingo Báñez participated in the trial against the Hebraists, expressing considerable disdain for the study of biblical languages. However, when he published his commentary on Aquinas’ Summa in 1584, he recommended the study of Hebrew and aligned himself with Fray Luis on the question of the Vulgate. This did not prevent him from maintaining a theological view of Scripture that gave the Church (and not the human sciences) the final word on biblical matters.

enim quod seipsum perfecte intelligit, alioquin suum esse non esset perfectum, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Si autem perfecte aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod virtus eius perfecte cognoscatur. Virtus autem alicuius rei perfecte cognosci non potest, nisi cognoscantur ea ad quae virtus se extendit. Unde, cum virtus divina se extendat ad alia, eo quod ipsa est prima causa effectiva omnium entium, necesse est quod Deus alia a se cognoscat." Cf. Francisco Suárez, De div. sub. 2.2.3 (ed. Vivès, vol. 1,. (modi imitationis) of His essence, and in these modes consists the plurality of ideas.1 Henry of Ghent will later coin the term respectus imitabilitatis (respects of imitability). In other words, there is only one cognitive act, but as the object of this act is the divine essence, which is the ultimate cause of all things, all things are cognized in this act as well: It is necessary that God knows things other than Himself. Because it is manifest that He knows Himself perfectly, otherwise His being would not be perfect, as His being is His knowing. But for something to be known perfectly, it is necessary that its power (virtus) is known perfectly. But the power of a thing cannot be known perfectly, unless those to which the power extends are known. Therefore, as the divine power extends itself to other things, insofar as it is the first effective cause of all beings, it is necessary that God knows things other than Himself.2 This description creates the impression that one's cognitive relation has only two elements: the act of thought and its object. This is not entirely accurate, however, since each act of cognition also involves the production of an intentio intellecta, which becomes especially apparent in the case of human cognition: I call intentio intellecta that which the intellect conceives in itself of the thing known. In us, this can be neither the thing known itself nor the substance of the intellect. Rather, it is some similarity of the thing, conceived by the intellect (similitudo concepta intellectu de re intellecta).

Cet ouvrage est issu du colloque « Les bibliothèques des juristes / Law's Libraries » organisé les 18 et 19 novembre 2022 par le Centre Paul-André Crépeau de droit privé et comparé (Université McGill) et le Groupe de recherche sur les humanités juridiques

La teoria degli oggetti immateriali di Thomas Braun) Citerò Nikola Tesla: "Ciò che un uomo chiama Dio, un altro chiama le leggi della fisica"
Ripropongo questo breve saggio del  giovane scienziato Thomas Braun che spiega la legge di causalità in maniera semplice.
Le Leggi bisogna ripeterle per poterle capire...

This study will present the relation between belief and knowledge in the course of history of thinking. It attempts, at first, to think about these two phenomena in general, and then later, in Early modern philosophy. Therefore, tentatively, it begins with Tales’ abandonment of mythology and includes Kant’s abandonment of dogmatism. Following this line of reasoning, Kant’s abandonment of dogmatism, which has got its explanation in his capital work Kritik der reinen Vernunft, will be presented beginning with his pre-critical, then metaphysical and finally critical period. Hypothesis, as a presupposed truthful judgment in order to explain certain facts or as a supposition based on facts, manifests in thesis that the relation between belief and knowledge in Immanuel Kant’s epistemology best materializes its explication after a critique of rational theology; namely the one that has proven to have lost every possibility and credibility for materializing tendencies of proclaiming itself a science.

El príncipe predestinado por la astrología: tradición y fortuna de un motivo literario y folclórico


This article examines the literary and folkloric motif of the predestined prince, whose destiny is foretold by divine or astrological powers, and traces its development from Ancient Egypt to the medieval Castilian tradition. Beginning with the Egyptian tale of the “Doomed Prince,” preserved in the Harris Papyrus, the study explores the structural parallels and transformations of this narrative in Barlaam and Josaphat and Sendebar. Through comparative analysis, the paper highlights recurring narrative patterns: the king’s longing for an heir, the prophetic announcement of a tragic fate, the prince’s isolation in a palace, and his inevitable confrontation with destiny. Variations in the role of deities, astrologers, and narrative outcomes are discussed as reflections of cultural and religious contexts. The article concludes by situating the motif within both monogenetic and polygenetic interpretative frameworks, arguing for its Egyptian origins while acknowledging its universal appeal. Ultimately, the study demonstrates how this tale type functioned as a vehicle of moral instruction, adapting across civilizations while preserving its core symbolic tension between fate and human agency

These two sections are extract from a larger, incomplete book about the heresy of the Free Spirit and the later Protestant Family of Love, which in my opinion was a continuation of the same, albeit mixed with radical Anabaptist thought. There are many more chapters beyond this, but this is the only one where the notes exist in a completed form. The full document, as it is, can be found on Scribd, under the title of "The Family of Love, the Free Spirit, Anabaptism, Christian Mysticism", under the account name "Madziar".

Chapter 5, Bonaventure and His Theology. Bonaventure Bonaventure of Bagnoregio (1221-1274) became one of the most celebrated Franciscan thinkers and ministers general. As a child, he had a serious illness for which his family brought him to Saint Francis to pray for him. Saint Francis did this, and the young Bonaventure was healed. Bonaventure entered the Franciscan Order in his early 20s, and received training in philosophy at the University of Paris. Bonaventure became a Master of Theology, and, as a Master, taught at the University of Paris, eventually coming to occupy the highest chair allotted for Franciscans at the University. After this, Bonaventure was selected as Minister General of the Order, which office he served in from 1257-1274. However, his generalate was not without controversy.

Section I repugnance, or by physical potency through extrinsic denomination from active or passive potency, as has also often been touched upon in the above discussions. Finally, real potency taken broadly, whether active or passive, is predicated of any principle of acting or being acted upon, and thus it is attributed to substantial principles, such as prime matter insofar as it is a receptive potency of forms, and to substantial form insofar as it is the principal principle of acting, and to God himself insofar as he is omnipotent. This name is also attributed to habits, which are principles of operating; for thus Aristotle in Metaphysics IX, chapter 5, numbers arts and virtues among potencies. Qualities of the third species also, such as heat and cold, which are proximate principles of acting, are comprehended under this transcendental acceptance of potency. And finally, whatever is a principle of acting or receiving is called potency by this general notion; concerning which acceptance enough has been said while disputing about material and efficient cause. But we here dispute more strictly about potency, namely about potency as it is the second species of quality. For since enough has been said about the other acceptances in the cited places, this alone remains and is proper to this place, as we noted in the preceding disputation. But because act corresponds to potency with proportion, therefore we shall speak simultaneously about the act accommodated to this potency, although that pertains to the first species of quality, as was said above. Concerning this potency, therefore, we must first see what it is and how manifold, then how it compares to act. SECTION I WHETHER POTENCY IS CORRECTLY AND SUFFICIENTLY DIVIDED INTO ACTIVE AND PASSIVE, AND WHAT EACH IS ( ) ( ) Section IV passive potency which is in natural things to artificial forms, and this way of speaking is taken from St. Thomas, II Phys., lect. 1. Because that potency also is not for its perfection or natural inclination. Hence under this aspect such potency can also be called neutral, because it neither inclines to the act naturally, nor is repugnant to it. But because it is not reduced to act by a merely natural agent, but by an intellectual one, operating both through art, which is in some way superadded to nature, and through the motion of the will, which is usually called command, therefore such potency is called obediential; for, as we said above, passive potency corresponds to active, hence it also receives a denomination proportionate to it. But there is a wide difference between obediential potency to artificial and to supernatural forms, for the former can be reduced to act by a created agent operating through natural powers, but the latter only by an uncreated agent, at least as principal. Likewise, because the action concerning the former potency, although it is not merely natural, as natural action is distinguished from free, nor is it natural as owed to nature, is nevertheless absolutely contained in the order of nature, as distinguished from the order of supernatural grace, and not miraculous, for in that action no effect or motion intervenes which cannot be made through natural virtues and potencies. Nor through that action is any form made which pertains to a superior grade or order of things. But the posterior potency is not reduced to act except through supernatural or miraculous action, either in mode or in substance. Finally the prior capacity is very limited, and to imperfect forms; but the posterior is most ample, so much so that it cannot be fully satisfied and filled, even by the absolute power of God, as is taken from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 7, and q. 29 de Verit., a. 3. For whatever God operates in it, it always remains capable of receiving more, for this very thing pertains to the infinite power of God.

Wormatiense, 1 in confessionibus fidei, et alii Patres infra referendi. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 314." "VII de Trinit." 2 "In VI Synod., act. 4." 3 ( ) "V. Synod., collat. 3; VI Synod., act. 11; Conc. Ephes., can. 4. Cf. 4 BHF, t. V, p. 381." ( ) ( )

This, with a briefer introduction and an additional comment on Latinisms, is the text of a talk, a lectura Dantis, presented to the Dante Alighieri Society of Manchester on 15 October 2022. This lyrical canto recalls visions of the glorified Jesus and of Mary, his mother, and provides an insight into Dante’s spiritual life.

Francisco Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations (Vol. VIII, Disputations 48–54). The closing volume treats action/passion, the categories of “when,” “where,” “position,” “having,” and beings of reason. Disp. XLVIII analyzes action: whether it essentially refers to a principle of acting, whether it essentially refers to a terminus (even immanent) and so belongs in a predicament, which reference is more essential and what specifies action, whether it implies a subject of inherence, its nature/causes/properties, and its genera/species under one genus. Disp. XLIX treats passion: whether it really differs from action, how it relates to motion/change and what it is, whether actual or only aptitudinal inherence belongs to its essence, and the distinction of successive vs. instantaneous passions. Disp. L considers the category “when” and durations: whether duration is distinct from a thing’s esse, the formal notion of duration, eternity and its distinction from created duration (and whether eternity includes a relation of reason), the aevum and its difference from successive durations, the intrinsic duration of permanent corruptibles, time as a proper successive duration and whether distinct from motion, the notion of time as measure and what it measures, and what duration constitutes the “when” category. Disp. LI treats where/ubi: whether ubi is intrinsic or extrinsic to the located body, whether ubi is (just) place, whether it applies only to bodies or also to spirits, the proportion between bodily and spiritual ubi, whether ubi belongs to substances or also to accidents, and the ordering/properties of the category. Disp. LII defines position and its difference from where, and surveys its subjects, species, and properties. Disp. LIII treats habitus (having) as a genus of accident: whether it denominates extrinsically and of what sort, and which subjects/species/properties it bears. Disp. LIV examines beings of reason: whether such beings exist and what their essence is, whether and what causes they have, the division into negation, privation, and relation (its sufficiency), how negation and privation compare, and how relations of reason are devised in various ways.

Francisco Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations (Vol. VII, Disputations 43–47). The focus shifts to act/potency, habits, contrariety, intensification, and relation. Disp. XLIII addresses potency and act: their division into active and passive, whether they differ in reality or only in reason, the divided term and definition, whether every potency is natural/implanted, the correspondence of potencies to acts, and the priority of act to potency (in duration, perfection, definition, and knowledge). Disp. XLIV treats habits: their existence, nature, and subject; whether locomotive powers acquire habits; whether brutes have habits; intellectual habits; whether habits are for effecting acts, what they do to acts, which acts they affect, whether acts efficiently cause habits, whether one or many acts cause them, how habits are perfected, their extensive augmentation and unity, their diminution and corruption, and the genera/species of habits (especially practical vs. speculative). Disp. XLV analyzes contrariety of qualities: kinds of opposition, the proper definition of contraries and how they differ from other opposites, whether contrariety is found in all and only qualities, and whether contraries can coexist. Disp. XLVI studies the intensification of qualities: whether intensible qualities are indivisible or composed of degrees, why intensification belongs to some accidents and not all, by what action/change intensive latitude is acquired, and whether there are definite termini of increase/remission. Disp. XLVII develops real relation: whether relation is a true genus distinct from the others; its real or modal distinction from substance and absolute accidents; kinds of relation and which are predicamental; how predicamental and transcendental respects differ; the essence/definition of relation; its subject, foundation, and terminus (and the distinction between foundation and terminus); Aristotle’s threefold foundation; relations founded on number/unity, power/action, and measure; the sufficiency of this division; whether third-kind relations are non-mutual; what the formal terminus of relation is; how the category is constituted down to individuals; and the common properties of relatives.

Francisco Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations (Vol. VI, Disputations 34–42). This volume treats the supposit/person, immaterial and material substances, and the opening of the doctrine of accidents (quantity and quality). Disp. XXXIV studies first substance or suppositum and its distinction from nature: identity with person/hypostasis; whether the supposit adds a positive real mode; whether the distinction from nature is by accidents/individuation (and so absent in spirits); the nature and relation of created subsistence to nature and supposit; its indivisibility/incommunicability; its efficient/material causes; whether subsistence has causality; attribution of actions to supposita; and, for second substances, concrete vs. abstract and how to constitute the highest notion of substance and its predicamental coordination. Disp. XXXV treats created immaterial substances: whether their existence can be proved by natural reason, what can be known of their quiddity and essential attributes, and what can be known of their intellect, knowledge, will, power, and efficacy. Disp. XXXVI considers material substance: its essential notion and relation to corporeal substance; whether its essence is in form alone or also in matter; and whether substance is something over and above matter, form, and their union. Disp. XXXVII asks whether “accident in general” expresses one objective nature and whether inherence constitutes its common nature. Disp. XXXVIII compares accident to substance regarding priority in time and in knowledge. Disp. XXXIX divides accident into nine supreme genera, assessing immediacy, sufficiency, and whether the division is univocal or analogical. Disp. XL treats continuous quantity: what quantity is; whether bulk-quantity is distinct from substance and qualities; whether quantity’s essence consists in measure; whether its formal effect is divisibility/distinction/extension; whether points, lines, and surfaces are real entities distinct from bodies and from one another; whether line and surface are proper species; whether place is its own species; whether motion or its extension is a proper species; and whether time is per se a distinct quantity. Disp. XLI treats discrete quantity and the coordination of the category: whether it is a proper species, whether found in spiritual things, whether speech is a true species, how the genus/species are ordered, and the properties of quantity. Disp. XLII treats quality in general: its common notion; division into four species; whether this division is sufficient and the species mutually distinct; how duplicated terms signify differences; and the properties that belong to quality.

Francisco Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations (Vol. V, Disputations 30–33). This volume develops natural theology and the essence–existence problematic in creatures. Disp. XXX surveys what natural reason can know about the First Being: that God is altogether perfect, infinite, pure act and simple; lacks substantial and accidental composition; whether “attributes” are properties of God or of the divine essence; and the demonstrations of immensity, immutability and eternity (with the question of immutability’s compatibility with freedom), unicity, invisibility, incomprehensibility and ineffability, life and intellect, and finally divine knowledge, will, power, and action. Disp. XXXI treats the essence–existence question in finite being: whether they are really distinct, what essence “is” prior to production, potency and act, whether an intrinsic “existence” actuates essence, the causes of created existence (especially the proximate efficient cause), the effects of existence and its difference from essence, its subject and simplicity/composition, separability, the nature of composition from being and essence, and created being’s dependence on the First Being. Disp. XXXII divides created being into substance and accident, asking about immediacy/sufficiency and analogical status. Disp. XXXIII considers created substance in general: what “substance” signifies, its division into incomplete/complete, and whether substance is rightly divided into first and second.

Francisco Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations (Vol. IV, Disputations 21–29). Here Suárez develops conservation, concurrence, and finality before turning to God and the first division of being. Disp. XXI considers conservation: whether natural reason proves creatures’ continual dependence on the First Cause, what conservation is and how it differs from creation, and whether God alone conserves. Disp. XXII examines divine concurrence: whether God immediately operates in all creaturely actions, whether concurrence is a principle or an action, how it relates to secondary causes and their subjects, how God bestows it, and whether second causes depend essentially on God alone or also on others. Disp. XXIII treats final cause in general—its reality, kinds, effects, the nature of final causality and its formal principle, which things can cause finally, whether cognition is required, whether the end moves as real or as known, and its place in divine and in natural/irrational actions. Disp. XXIV argues about the ultimate end: whether an ultimate final cause can be shown and whether it per se concurs with all proximate ends so that all agents intend it. Disp. XXV considers exemplar causality: whether there are exemplars, what and where they are, and whether exemplar is a proper causal kind or reducible to another. Disp. XXVI compares causes to effects regarding nobility and priority, the possibility of several causes for one effect, simultaneous total causes of one species, alternate total causes, and whether the same cause can bear multiple—especially contrary—effects. Disp. XXVII compares causes among themselves, asking which of the four is more perfect and whether causes can be mutually causative. Disp. XXVIII divides being into infinite and finite (and equivalent divisions), asking about adequacy and whether the division is univocal or analogical. Disp. XXIX considers God as First Being and uncreated substance, treating demonstrations of existence by physical/metaphysical reasoning, a posteriori via the unicity of the uncreated, and, in some way, a priori.

Francisco Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations (Vol. III, Disputations 15–20). This volume pivots from form to efficient causality and culminates in creation. Disp. XV treats the formal substantial cause: whether substantial forms exist in material things, how they are educed from matter, whether matter must temporally precede, whether the form is made per se, what the proper nature and causality of substantial form are, how forms cause, what their effects are, how matter depends on form (and vice versa), whether one substance has only one form, and what “metaphysical form” is with its corresponding “matter” and causality. Disp. XVI addresses the accidental formal cause: whether all accidents truly cause formally (and what), and whether accidental forms are educed from a subject’s potency. Disp. XVII defines the efficient cause and maps its principal distinctions. Disp. XVIII analyzes the proximate efficient cause and the requisites for causing: whether created things truly produce effects; by what principles substances act on substances and accidents; which accidents can be principles of action; whether accidents alone can produce accidents and whether merely instrumentally; and the conditions for action (real distinction from the patient, simultaneity/proximity, proportion/dissimilarity), including whether action itself is the efficient cause’s proper causal principle and whether acting implies corruption. Disp. XIX investigates necessary vs. free operation, including whether any created causes act by necessity, whether some act freely, how such freedom stands under the First Cause’s concurrence, where freedom formally resides, how reason determines free causes, the root of defect, the scope of indifference, whether freedom persists in actu, whether cosmic contingency depends on free causes, and the standing of fate, chance, and fortune among causes. Disp. XX treats the First Efficient Cause and creation: whether creation is possible or even necessary by natural reason, whether infinite power is required (and thus creation is proper to God), whether any instrument can create, whether creation is something in the creature distinct from the creature itself, and whether “newness of being” belongs to creation.

Francisco Suárez’s Metaphysical Disputations, (Volume II Disps. 6–14) surveys seven interconnected areas of first philosophy. Disputation VI examines formal and universal unity, the status of universals (their foundation in things, dependence on intellectual operations, kinds, and predication among genus, species, and difference). Disputation VII maps kinds of distinctions, criteria for discerning them, and how sameness/diversity relate to being. Disputations VIII–IX treat truth and falsity: where truth lies (judgment, simple concepts, speculative vs. practical intellect), whether things themselves are called true, the origins of falsity, and why truth is difficult to attain. Disputations X–XI address good and evil at the transcendental level, detailing meanings, varieties, causes, and the relation of each to being. Disputation XII outlines a general theory of causes, distinguishing cause from principle, identifying a common notion of cause, and classifying causal types. Disputations XIII–XIV develop the material cause: for substances, questions include the existence, unity, and nature of prime matter, its knowability and causality, and the comparison of elemental with incorruptible/celestial matter; for accidents, they consider whether and how substance or one accident can serve as the immediate material cause of another.

Sažetak U radu autori analiziraju i prikazuju filozofsko-teološko tumačenje istine u djelu De veritate Roberta Grossetestea, u kojem se srednjovjekovni filozof isključivo bavi pitanjem istine, iako teoriju istine prikazuje i u drugim djelima. Njegovo se razumijevanje istine, prije svega, odnosi na prvenstvo ontološke istine, jer je Bog protumačen kao najviša istina (summa veritas). Polazeći od klasičnih pristupa problemu istine, istina nije samo podudaranje govora i stvarnosti nego i podudaranje cjelokupne stvarnosti s Riječju (sermo Patris), jer sve stvoreno posjeduje svoju istinu (rectitudo rectificata) u odnosu na potpuno ispravnu istinu (rectitudo rectificans), tj. na Boga. Osim toga, istina je zapravo punina bitka (plenitudo essendi), a do istine se dolazi prosvjetljenjem (illuminatio), pri čemu se ne misli na izravno prosvjetljenje. Osim toga, u radu se jasno vidi da Grossetestovo tumačenje istine nije samo filozofsko nego i teološko jer se konačna istina nalazi u Isusu Kristu.

In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, the first part, Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements, and the subsequent Transcendental Aesthetic clearly form a propaedeutic to his transcendental philosophy, to the philosophical-programmatic transcendentalism in general. Like his predecessors in early modern philosophy, Kant deploys the method of epistemological negation and separation in the first part of his Critique of Pure Reason in order to completely apriorise the domain of sensibility and thereby to give it an infallible transcendental status. In a two-stage method of negation and separation, which seems to mark an extension and continuation of the epistemological negation initiated by Descartes in the early modern period, Kant dares to declare the primary-qualitative forms of sensibility, namely space and time, ultimately as merely subjective a priori representations, and thereby subsume them under a superordinate context of transcendentalism. However, Kant does not mention a purely aesthetic space of sensibility, that is, the spatiality of the senses, especially of vision, which differs from the geometrically abstract Euclidean space, from which alone Kant gives examples for the a priori status of spatial perception within the framework of a transcendental aesthetic. That the Euclidean-geometric space is an a priori conception of space is a tautology. By programmatically apriorising space and time as forms of sensibility, Kant tacitly suppressed the discourse prevalent in early modernity on the spatial extension of senses, especially of vision. The a priori nature of space and time, as emphasised by Kant, should therefore be re-examined. Since the senses directly connect the subject to the body and extra-bodily objects, sensory spaces cannot be reduced to mere subjective a priori representations; that is, the senses can hardly be ascribed a completely transcendental status.

La Hispanidad se ha presentado como la obra civilizadora de la Cristiandad. La concepción de la naturaleza por el conocimiento y el concepto de persona, son elementos que nos han llegado purificados y elevados por la reflexión cristiana. La Hispanidad está ordenada a la verdadera realización de la felicidad por medio del conocimiento y el amor de la Bondad divina.

Hispanicity has been presented as the civilizing work of Christianity. Conceiving nature through knowledge and the concept of the person are elements that have been passed onto us purified and uplifted by Christian reflection. Hispanicity is directed to the true realization of happiness through the knowledge and love of divine Goodness.

repasan algunas contribuciones del cristianismo a la economía moderna. Se muestra que el cristianismo valoró positivamente el trabajo productivo; facilitó la inversión; admitió el préstamo a interés y permitió constatar que el mercado resulta el mecanismo más adecuado para satisfacer las necesidades humanas.

I am going to analyse a treatise from the Pseudo-Lullian corpus entitled Liber de secretis naturae seu de quinta essentia (DSN). According to the results of the research carried out so far by specialists, the text was written in the second half of the 14th century. It is the first text in the corpus to display a clear intention of being a pseudepigraphy: in several places, the author introduces himself as Ramon Llull; the text is set in locations that are significant in Llull's biography, such as the Abbey of Vauvert near Paris; and several of Llull's works are referenced as his own. The widely accepted current hypothesis is that the forger used two main sources. One is the post-1348 treatise De consideratione quintae essentiae rerum omnium (DCQ) by Johannes de Rupescissa, which the forger partially plagiarised. The other source is the Magister Testamenti, an alchemical text influenced by Llull and originally written around 1330–1340. The forger would have been linked to this text through quotations. The final result is a work comprising five major sections (A, B, C, D and E). Here, I will present an extended thesis. The Magister Testamenti would have authored several versions, or primitive strata, of the DSN dating from 1330–1332. We will reconstruct two of these. The first has the structure B1 + CI.a–b + CII + CIII and the second has the structure B1 + CI.a–b + CII + CIII + CIV.a–b + CV. A copy of the latter is preserved in manuscript BNF, Lat. 7177, which contains no pseudo-Lullian elements and is fully integrated into the Magister Testamenti's textual corpus. Rupescissa would have used this second version to compose his DCQ. Magister Testamenti later composed a third layer consisting of several recensions under the general structure B + C + D1/D2 + Q1/Q2. His implementation of Lullian logic is more sophisticated and complex. In the second half of the 14th century, a group of Catalan pseudepigraphers manipulated this version in order to attribute it to Lull.

O curso oferece uma análise do tema da intencionalidade em seu desenvolvimento histórico e sistemático, desde Aristóteles e a filosofia antiga e medieval, até sua retomada e transformação em Brentano. O objetivo principal da disciplina é o conhecimento deste tema fundamental que atravessa a história da filosofia europeia, estudando os principais teóricos da intencionalidade da mente, tanto do ponto de vista da sua ontologia como da sua epistemologia. O seminário se empenhará em reconstruir o debate a partir da teoria das relações em Aristóteles, que trata de forma evasiva a relação mental como uma relação real, passando pelos seus diferentes intérpretes medievais, até Franz Brentano e a retomada deste conceito que fundamenta a fenomenologia contemporânea e ainda está no centro do debate sobre a natureza da mente

In discussing, supporting or opposing a proposal, idea, or policy, we need to define the parameters we can identify as valid and true, or at least truthful, especially when relating to the behaviors of others. Often, those parameters rely on pre-established hierarchies, in which case we need to understand where those hierarchies originate. This is the case of policies, rules, and regulations, but is also the case of principles and laws, ethical and civil, secular, and religious, subjective and objective, human and personal, but also moral, social, and philosophical. But this is the case, only if one believes that those areas are, or ought to be, separated. In other words, those who believe that they are not one and the same, at least in the sense that they originate from the same core, and are thus so deeply interconnected, that taking them apart would nullify them, would remove the very foundations upon which they are based, thus making them impossible to follow.

Video: https://youtu.be/kJUiRGokUM4

Submitted as part of / Citation: Tomasi, D. (2025). The importance of Objective Truth. EdX / HarvardX / Harvard University. AESTHINT15: Rhetoric: The Art of Persuasive Writing and Public Speaking

Scholasticism is the term given to the theology of the Middle Ages that developed in the ‘schools’ and which had its own characteristic methodology. “The term ‘scholastic’ is derived from the Latin word ‘Scholasticus’ and the Greek ‘scholastikos’ literally means ‘devoting one's leisure to learning’ or ‘scholar’ and the Greek ‘scholion’ which means ‘school”.  This is a medieval school of philosophy, more accurately a method of learning, taught by the academics of medieval universities and cathedrals in the period from the 12th to the 16th century. It combined logic, metaphysics, and semantics into one discipline and is generally recognised to have developed our understanding of logic significantly. It attempted to reconcile the philosophy of the ancient classical philosophers, particularly Aristotle’s, with Christian theology. “However, in the scholastic period of the 14th Century, it moved beyond theology and had applications in many other fields of study, including epistemology, Philosophy of science, philosophy of nature and psychology and even economic theory.

Die Lehre von der Dreifaltigkeit, die oft als abstrakt und obskur gilt, nahm im Leben mittelalterlicher Christen eine durchaus konkrete Rolle ein. Die Trinität wurde im Gebet, bei Gottesdiensten und Rechtsakten angerufen, in der Kunst in Bilder übersetzt und in schriftlichen Visionsberichten der Vorstellungskraft erschlossen. Besonders ab dem 12. Jahrhundert wurde die Vorstellung eines dreifaltigen Gottes jedoch zunehmend inter- und intrareligiös problematisiert, sodass es erforderlich wurde, die Trinitätsfrage auch argumentativ anzugehen. Diese interdisziplinäre Studie rekonstruiert, wie verschiedene kultur- und religionshistorische Entwicklungen in den Gelehrtenkonstellationen des 12. Jahrhunderts eine Vielfalt philosophischer Neuentwürfe motivierten, die das Ziel verfolgten, die Dreifaltigkeit auf rein rationalem Weg zu erweisen.

The doctrine of the Trinity, which is often considered abstract and obscure, played a very concrete role in the lives of medieval Christians. The Trinity was invoked in prayer, during church services and legal ceremonies, translated into images in art and opened up to the imagination in written visionary accounts. From the 12th century onwards, however, the idea of a triune God was increasingly problematised both inter- and intra-religiously, making it necessary to address the question of the Trinity in an argumentative manner. This interdisciplinary study reconstructs how various developments in the history of culture and religion motivated a variety of new philosophical approaches in the scholarly constellations of the 12th century, which pursued the goal of proving the Trinity in a purely rational way.

L’Hérésie des cathares en Lombardie est un document consacré au catharisme
italien, contemporain des faits qu’il rapporte. Le texte se divise en trois parties : la première raconte comment les cathares italiens sont passés d’une Église unique à six ; la deuxième expose les doctrines des trois principales ; la troisième énumère, pour quatre d’entre elles, les évêques et leurs coadjuteurs à la date de rédaction du document.
Le texte a été redécouvert par Antoine Dondaine au milieu du XX siècle, dans un manuscrit conservé à la bibliothèque universitaire de Bâle, sous la cote C.V.17. Ce dominicain, pourtant issu de l’ordre même
qui combattit le catharisme avec le plus de zèle, s’était pris de passion pour cette « hérésie » honnie.
C’est également à lui que l’on doit la découverte du Liber de duobus principiis,  fameux traité de théologie cathare, retrouvé à Florence.