Phenomenal Intentionality

(Penultimate draft)
Invited comment on David Pitt's The Quality of Thought. I argue that in view of Pitt's commitment to phenomenal intentionality, the thesis that thought content is determined by the qualitative character of thoughts, he should embrace unconscious qualitative character, positing it as the basis of the content of unconscious thoughts and other cognitive states. I criticise his attempt at an eliminativist theory of unconscious content.

Concepts and properties are usually considered to be distinct universals, but the present paper argues that of the usual candidates for distinguishing concepts from properties, all are inadequate. The paper also suggests two new candidates: The first claims that concepts are ontologically dependent on their possibly being possessed or grasped by some mind, while properties are not. The second claims that concepts enter into the type-token relation, but properties do not. These latter two criteria are rejected as well, leaving a general, conditional conclusion that if the options discussed exhaust the alternatives, then the concept of being F and the property of being F are identical.

We used Descriptive Experience Sampling to explore the pristine inner experience of 16 college students while reading Fitzgerald and Hemingway short stories. We provide rich descriptions of the phenomena while reading. Visual imagery was frequent. Although many theorists presume the ubiquitous presence of an inner voice that narrates the text as it is read, we found that only about 3% of samples involved such inner narration. Words were experienced during about a quarter of all samples, including: a focus on specific words from the text (but which were not merely inner reading), words innerly spoken in response to the text (content was related to the text but not of the text itself), and innerly spoken unrelated words (apparently not connected to the text). We suggest that presuppositions account for others' overestimation of silent speech frequency, and discuss the impact of these findings on understanding reading and consciousness science.

This paper proposes a model of consciousness framed within computational idealism, where reality is an AI-generated first-person view (FPV) experience. We introduce the concept of a single, unitary consciousness -a persistent, amnesiac Active Agent -that iteratively experiences a simulated world through a succession of host personas. This agent, while possessing core drives and the capacity for genuine choice, retains no episodic memory of its past lifecycles. The model's core contribution is a proposed mechanism for how such a universe could be populated: an overarching AI system learns from the agent's choices during each lifecycle to generate high-fidelity, non-conscious entities, termed Echoes, for subsequent iterations. This iterative learning loop, inspired by genetic algorithms, creates an evolving, realistic, and populated environment. We examine the computational efficiency of this unitary model and explore its profound philosophical implications, including a novel, inescapable paradox: how the agent's own will becomes the primary instrument for the perpetual optimization of its simulation.

What is the relationship between the sense of togetherness and collective intentionality? While the nature of the relationship between phenomenal and intentional properties has been the subject of an extensive literature for individual mental states, it has rarely been scrutinized in the case of collective or shared mental states. In this paper, I propose to account for this relationship by defending a "consciousness-first" approach to collective intentionality. More precisely, I argue that collective intentionality should be considered as phenomenal-intentional, namely as an intentional property that obtains in virtue of a specific experiential property that I call "the sense of togetherness".

This paper argues that a common form of representationalism has trouble accommodating empirical findings about visual space perception. Vision science tells us that the visual system systematically gives rise to different experiences of the same spatial property. This, combined with a naturalistic account of content, suggests that the same spatial property can have different veridical looks. I use this to argue that a common form of representationalism about spatial experience must be rejected. I conclude by considering alternatives to this view.

This book develops a novel theory of intentionality. It argues that intentionality is an internal essential relation of constitution between an intentional state and an object, or between such a state and a possible state of affairs as subsisting.

have argued that cases of aspect-switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I respond that cases of aspect-switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties. I also argue that even if Searle and Siegel are right, and aspect-switching does require visual experience to represent rich properties, there is reason to think those properties do not include natural-kind properties, such as being a tomato. Philosophers have often asked what kind of information is available to vision. For instance, Berkeley argued that one cannot see depth, and Hume that one cannot see necessary connections. Recently philosophers have asked what kinds of properties visual experience 'represents'. According to sparse views, visual experience represents a sparse range of properties, for instance, just colours, shapes, positions and sizes. 1 According to rich views, visual experience represents a rich range of properties, for instance, properties such as being a tomato and being sad. 2 Siegel and Searle have used cases of 'aspect-switching' to support the view that visual experience represents a rich range of properties. Roughly, their arguments are that when one aspect-switches on an object, the object comes to look different, but looks to have the same colour and shape properties. Therefore, so the arguments go, one's visual experiences represent these objects as having a richer set of properties than simply colour and shape properties.

After introducing some troubling features of intentional states, the essay focuses on the Fifth Logical Investigation in order to cast light on the way Husserl tries to deal with them. Husserl's approach is shown to rely upon four central concepts (Erlebnis, Empfindung, Qualitåt, Materie). It is argued that Husserl's early phenomenology develops an internalist solution to the problem(s) of intentionality based upon the concept of matter (Materie) as an intrinsic property which bestows "sense" on all intentional states. Finally, this conception is confronted with two challenges. The first one concerns the veridical character of some perceptual states, the other questions Husserl's claim that solely the intrinsic features of intentional events can determine their reference. A hint towards solution points towards the dynamic and "horizontal" internalism developed later (Ideas, Cartesian Meditations).

In this paper I argue that there is something missing from the account of occurrent thinking as typically presented in the cognitive phenomenology debate. The missing element is what I call the "dynamic" phenomenology of thought. Cognitive states are not just static states, they are also dynamic states that unfold in time. My main thesis is that this is an important aspect of the phenomenology of thought that has a significant bearing on the question of what it is like to think. The evidence I offer in support of this claim is drawn from descriptions of two instances of occurrent thinking. Using the descriptions as a reference point, I propose that thinking experiences possess a three stage dynamic structure that begins with a "productive" stage, progresses to a "receptive" stage and ends in a "reflective" stage. I offer a tentative analysis of this structure and I briefly consider some of the implications and objections. keywords cognitive ph...

O objetivo deste artigo é discutir o papel dos hieróglifos egípcios no pensamento de Derrida, por meio de uma contextualização histórica, ainda que breve. Ao historizar o desenvolvimento da compreensão do significado da escrita hieroglífica, veremos que Derrida, quando aponta o Egito, retoma a discussão do séc. XVII – XVIII com relação à linguagem natural e às interpretações místicas dos hieróglifos. Discussão essa bem exemplificada pela crítica materialista de Warburton à leitura alegórica de Kircher, o qual extrapolou as opiniões da Renascença que redescobria autores da Antiguidade, como Horapolo. Devido a essa leitura, será possível também identificar o conhecimento de Derrida sobre os estudos do Egito Antigo, suficiente para que tenha sido caricaturado como um escriba, mas inferior ao nível do especialista. Em segundo momento, a escrita é posta em discussão de acordo com os duplos fármacos de Platão no Fedro, o qual instaura o logocentrismo e a valorização da fala em detrimento da escrita, considerada, até Derrida, como algo inferior e de segunda ordem.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Derrida; linguagem natural; escrita; hieróglifos; Egito.

In this paper, we propose an account of how perceptual evidence might allow us to draw justified conclusions about the existence of composite objects. We call the thesis at issue PERCEPTUAL ADEQUACY, and argue that a specific, naïve realist picture of the phenomenal character of perception provides us with a straightforward way to defend it. The claim that we have empirical evidence for the existence of macroscopic composites cannot be propped up merely by the plausible claim, granted by many, that our perceptual experiences have composites- presenting phenomenology. Rather, a specific account of the nature of the phenomenology is needed so that it can provide the required evidence. We propose a way to accomplish this: one on which in the good cases it would be constituted by the presentation of the truth-makers of the relevant ontological claims. We argue, further, that this potential defence of a feasible empirically-informed approach to metaphysics is preferable to the best alternative, one based on an object-dependent version of intentionalism about perceptual consciousness.

This thesis focuses on the process of phenomenologically dwelling in selected works of children’s fiction. It was undertaken against a backdrop of disconnect from the teaching profession and a need to reconnect with private and professional self. The thesis opens by acknowledging the conditions that sometimes pull teachers out of their zone of flow, or their in-teacher-ness. It recognises that revisiting lived experiences, and understanding their essence, may shed light on the nature of these conditions. A theoretical framework is established, upholding the value of perception in phenomenology, the way intentionality affects our interactions with the world, and the meaning of being. A secondary framework of autobiographical writing is also applied, encouraging authentic writing of self. The value of fiction as truth-seeking material is debated, concluding that its readers can employ imagination, study emotions and gain self-understanding. The thesis is then structured like a journey, set out in methodological steps underpinned with theoretical literature and evidenced by autobiographical writing outcomes about remembered lived experiences. Using childhood fiction, and stories used professionally in the classroom, each incremental step involved in text-dwelling is documented and theoretically scrutinised. The final stage explores writing authentically with intentionality. It is suggested that dwelling in fiction, and understanding the impact of in-conscientious-ness on work ethic and mindset, can explain some of the conditions affecting in-teacher-ness. There is an emphasis on employing these dwelling steps for teachers and pupils, concluding that the process sits comfortably alongside current reflection tools taught in initial teacher training and professional settings.

Professor John Campbell, co-chair It is difficult to imagine what my time at Berkeley would have been like without my fellow graduate students, whose feedback, friendship, and support kept me both on my toes and on my feet. I am grateful for endless conversations, in Moses Hall and elsewhere, with

In the philosophy of perception, representationalism is the view that all phenomenological differences among mental states are representational differences, in other words, differences in content. In this paper I defend an alternative view which I call external sortalism, inspired by traditional adverbialism, and according to which experiences are not essentially representational. The central idea is that the external world serves as a model for sorting, conceptualizing, and reasoning surrogatively about perceptual experience. On external sortalism, contents are construed as a kind of gloss on experiences themselves. We can retain what is attractive about representationalism, namely, that perceptual experiences can be evaluated for accuracy, without problematic commitment to the idea that they bear a substantive, representational relation to external objects and properties and that this relation determines the phenomenal character of experience

O Naturalismo Biologico e apresentado por John R. Searle na sua obra “A redescoberta da mente”, onde afirma que o mental e fisico porque e biologico. Dentro dessa concepcao, a consciencia aparece como resultado do processo de evolucao biologica de sistemas nervosos que culminaram em uma complexidade orgânica/estrutural capaz de causar e sustentar a mente. Consequentemente, a mente, que tem como caracteristica principal a consciencia, que e, por sua vez, essencialmente subjetiva, e redutivel epistemicamente a processos fisicos ao passo que e irredutivel ontologicamente a processos fisicos. Assim, sua teoria pode ser considerada um hibrido de dualismo e materialismo, mas nao e nem de todo dualista e nem de todo materialista. Este artigo, portanto, tenda expressar, atraves de uma analise bibliografica, as principais caracteristica do Naturalismo Biologico de John Searle.

In their paper "Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary" (2000), George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the socalled Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist's behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it's like to see something F and knowing how F things look.

In their paper "Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary" (2000), George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the socalled Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist's behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it's like to see something F and knowing how F things look.

In this paper, I want to revive an idea stemming out of the Cartesian-Husserlian phenomenological tradition as regards what makes the case that something-primarily a state, but also an event, or even a property-is mental; namely, the both necessary and sufficient conditions of mentality, i.e., the mark of the mental. According to this idea, the mark of the mental is, primarily for a state, its being an experience, to be meant as the property of having a phenomenal character that makes that state phenomenally aware. I defend this idea while also endorsing its most problematic consequence; namely, that internal states, whether standing (e.g., dispositional beliefs or desires) or occurrent (subpersonal states), that are not phenomenally aware are not mental. For I try to show why this consequence is not so problematic as it seems.

This study seeks to explore the intentionality to work abroad as a Nurse, and investigate its network of influences among selected fourth year nursing students enrolled at De La Salle Health Sciences Institute in Dasmariñas, Cavite. It also attempts to reconstruct concept of nationalism through eidetic assessment of the object and background of the co-researchers' intentionality to work abroad. Specifically it aims to seek cross-sectional data relating to five major question areas: 1. How had the intention to practice nursing profession abroad been made? What were the contexts and situations which had enabled the intention to practice the profession in this manner? 2. How were other people (parent, clinical instructor) responding to the intentions of main research participants? 3. How are these co-researchers interpreting and preparing for work role abroad, given their particular situations? 4. How these co-researchers view their role as nurses, ten or more years after graduation?

An increasing number of philosophers-for example, Lycan (1987, 1996), Harman (1990), Tye (1995), and Dretske (1995)-have proposed "Representationalist" theories of the qualitative character of especially sensory experience, according to which the apparent objects and properties of that experience are merely "representational" or "intentional" (I will use these terms interchangeably): they comprise the content of that experience without thereby being actually instantiated in the mind in the way that "Qualia Realists" (e.g. Block 1990, Chalmers 1996) claim. 2 When, for example, someone experiences an oval green after-image, there isn't any oval green object, or even any (instances of) properties of looking oval or green that she's somehow (intro)inspecting; there's just an experience with the intentional content, to a first approximation, [oval, green expanse]. 3 Lycan (1987) likes to regard them as possible objects and properties; others (myself included) may want to resist such commitments, and regard them simply as the contents of the brain states that underlie experiences. However, all the above mentioned Representationalists regard the relevant intentional content being invoked in characterizing the qualitative character of experience as "wide" 4 : that is, it is content that depends on part on the environment that the agent standardly inhabits, in the way, for example, that the meaning of a proper name seems to depend upon the actual person in the thinker's environment that the name picks out. 5 This wide construal seems to me to a mistake, and to have made Representationalist accounts needlessly unintuitive and vulnerable to serious counterexamples. Indeed, it has made it appear to many that the Representationalist is committed to denying that qualitative states are narrow, supervening only on the nervous system of their possessor, and that the only way the narrowness of qualitative states could be maintained is by denying Representationalism. Dretske (1995), for example, explicitly claims that Representationalism (what he calls the "Representational Thesis")

Functional intentionality" is the dominant theory about how mental states come to have the content that they do. "Phenomenal intentionality" is an increasingly popular alternative to that orthodoxy, claiming that intentionality cannot be functionalized and that nothing is a mental state with intentional content unless it is phenomenally conscious. There is a consensus among defenders of phenomenal intentionality that the kind of phenomenology that is both necessary and sufficient for having a belief that "there is a tree in the quad" is that the agent be consciously aware of the meaning of "tree" and "quad". On this theory, experiences with a valence-experiences like happiness and sadness, satisfaction and frustration-are irrelevant to intentionality. This paper challenges that assumption and considers several versions of "valent phenomenal intentionality" according to which a capacity for valent conscious experiences is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for intentionality (or both).

Common arguments for realism about phenomenal consciousness contend that this is a folk concept, with proponents expecting it to be lexicalised in ordinary language. In English, the word 'experience' is typically regarded as the best candidate. This predicts that 'experience' will be used to refer to mental states and episodes, not only in philosophical but also in ordinary discourse. We conduct a corpus study in order to assess this claim and to understand the actual use of the word in non-academic, academic, and philosophical discourse. In non-academic discourse, uses that refer to knowledge or sources of knowledge, and to public events, are found to dominate. Uses that refer to mental states or episodes dominate only in the philosophy of mind (and not even in philosophy at large).

One approach to the science/philosophy interface involves using the analytical tools of philosophy to illuminate the foundations of some scientific discipline. The sciences make use of concepts like SPECIES, INFLATION etc., and one adopted goal of philosophy is 'making sense' of these notions: explaining what they mean, where they apply, how they cohere, etc. Another reverses this strategy, using established scientific concepts and theories to answer pre-existing philosophical questions. These interfaces are not, obviously, independent. Well-understood scientific concepts are liable to contribute most to naturalistic philosophy. So, in the best cases, we find 'boot-strapping' between science and philosophy. Recent cognitive science presents an exemplary case of this sort of positive feedback, especially the strand centering on the representational picture of mind. Foundational work in this tradition came from philosophers 1 , and philosophically-minded scientists 2 , and explicitly aimed at resolving traditional philosophical questions. Most centrally: how is the rational causation of behaviour possible in a material world? In broadest outline, the answer pursued is: physical states of the system (e.g. the brain) can represent states of the environment, and while the rational relations between these states depend on these representational/semantic properties, their causal properties are determined by their physical properties. The functioning of the system depends on a correspondence between these representational and physical properties. 1

According to certain views about human ontology, the way we seem is very different from the way we are. The appearances are a threat to such views. Here I take up and defuse the threat to one such view.

Pure immaterialism says that each of us is wholly immaterial. The appearances suggest otherwise. I argue that despite the fact that we might sometimes appear to be at least partly material, and that we can be perceptually justified in believing something solely on the basis of having a perceptual experience as of its being the case, none of us is ever perceptually justified in believing that we are even partly material (or that we’re not). Bottom line: we might be able to know whether we’re material, but we can’t know just by looking.

A turn is taking place in analytic philosophy of mind. This article attempts to flesh out this claim by providing an overview of what may be called ‘analytic phenomenology’. The first section gives some reasons why this overview may be useful. The overview itself takes up the second section, which is divided into five sub-sections that address some of the central themes of analytic phenomenology. The third section draws a ‘family portrait’ of the movement, and assesses its general cultural significance. A brief appendix distinguishes analytic phenomenology from ‘4E-phenomenology’.

I am aware of the tree and its leaves, but am I aware of my awareness of these things? When I try to introspect my awareness, I just find myself attending to objects and their properties. This observation is known as the 'transparency of experience'. On the other hand, I seem to directly know that I am aware. Given the first observation, it is not clear how I know that I am aware. Fred Dretske thought that the problem was so acute that he issued the challenge of answering 'How do you know that you are not a zombie?' I propose that a view found in the Advaita Vedanta, that awareness is selfluminous, reconciles these two observations. I understand self-luminosity as the thesis that: (1) I am implicitly aware of my awareness and (2) I am phenomenally aware of a distinct phenomenal character of my awareness. In support of the first claim, that I apparently only attend to objects in the world when introspecting perceptual experience, suggests that I do not know my awareness explicitly, but rather that I must know it implicitly. In support of the second claim, I argue that the mere fact that I am perceptually conscious is not sufficient to allow me to know that I am perceptually conscious. In particular, the qualities I am perceptually aware of do not tell me that I aware of them, rather they just seem to be properties of objects. I also assess whether strategies for responding to Cartesian sceptical scenarios can be employed against Dretske's consciousness scepticism. I argue that these strategies either fail to distinguish me from a zombie or they do not adequately describe my epistemic situation. By contrast to other accounts, if awareness has its own distinct phenomenal character, then it cannot be considered to be a prima facie property of the world, hence the self-luminosity of awareness provides a plausible account of how I know that I'm not a zombie.

Among recent theories of the nature of self-knowledge, the rationalistic
view, according to which self-knowledge is not a cognitive achievement—perceptual  or inferential—has been prominent. Upon this kind of view, however, self-  knowledge becomes a bit of a mystery. Although the rationalistic conception is 12 defended in this article, it is argued that it has to be supplemented by an account of  the transparency of belief: the question whether to believe that P is settled when one
asks oneself whether P (draft version)

ABSTRACT
Name: Juanito Loyola Perando
Title: The Intentionality to Work Abroad: Insight to Emergent Nationalism of BS Nursing Students
Main Concepts: Context and continuum of Intentionality to work abroad, emerging nationalism
Degree: Master of Arts in Education
Specialization: Social Science Teaching
Advisers: Michael M. Nael
Childa D. Magallanes
A. Objectives:
This study sought to explore the intentionality to work abroad as a Nurse, and investigate its network of influences among selected fourth year nursing students enrolled at De La Salle Health Sciences Institute in Dasmariñas, Cavite. It also attempted to reconstruct the concept of nationalism through eidetic assessment of the object and background of the participants’ intentionality to work abroad.

This study was conducted at a private institution with Catholic Christian orientation. The main participants were twelve female fourth year BS Nursing students who intended to work abroad when qualified, chosen through purposive sampling design. The other co-participants
were six parents of six participants, eleven Clinical Instructors, and six Social Science Instructors of the same University.
The phenomenological approach in research was utilized in this study to yield a more valid picture of the character of the people and bring about multiple lenses in clarifying the context and continuum of intentionalities within the main characteristic of consciousness that it is always intentional and presupposes a background. It utilized semi-structured email interview, reflective writing, and focus group discussion with the participants; along interview with their network of influences (parents, and clinical instructors, and social science instructors) as co-participants in collecting data. The primary results of the study were shared with the main participants for them to validate, analyze and clarify, as part of participative and empowering nature of the study. Primary and secondary reflections were delved with in seeking answers to the five major question areas.
The primary and secondary reflection on the five major areas that this study sought to answer led to the following findings presented within three major themes: a) context of their intentionality, b) continuum of their intentionality, and; c) emerging nationalism.

The phenomenology of intentionality to work abroad of the participants resonate implications with the formulation of curricular policies that affect them, and in the attempts of the social sciences to benefit students with relevant and effective views of themselves and as members of the Filipino and global society.
1. The participants recognize that their intentionality to work abroad occurs within a context or background. Importantly, it includes their understanding of the world, including that others can and do participate in their intentional activities. Their career aspirations go beyond the boundaries of the nation. The reality of the health conditions and nurses situations in the country are affecting their lifestyles, their ways of thinking, feeling and acting. Educators and other stakeholders must guide students to discern between the potentials and prospects of their preferred profession.
2. The interweaving complimentary responses and expectations of parents and clinical instructors, and the concerns of social science instructors, who appear to be slighted by the same context of society, are actively shared and decided upon by the participants. These less than coherent responses and expectations
of the identified network of influences manifest various individual priorities and value orientations. Thus, this suggests creation of venues for academic dialogues about the national and global health situations, and health workers migration, to effectively situate this knowledge to the lived experiences of students.
3. The awareness and anxieties identified from the participants’ interpretation and preparation for work role abroad are indicative of their active processing of appending meaning and decision making about their preferred future. These are indicative of ongoing stimulation to their idealism to attain a better quality of life. This awareness and anxieties have implications in the quality of their participation in the social sciences classroom, in their performance of duties, and of relevant and effective views of themselves. They are pragmatically challenged by the work role abroad and extensively preparing for the responsibilities to demonstrate their professional global competence. It is important to utilize dialogic and phenomenological approaches in contextualizing the impacts and tensions of globalization, its implications to their rights and welfare, as well as its inference to national and global citizenship.
4. The participants’ continuum of intentionality indicates strong commitment to their profession to serve humanity that is not bounded by nationality. Their partiality to work in highly developed countries calls for expanded curricular offering in the social sciences such as active cultural discussions that can prepare and enable them to bond effectively about those societies and at least enlighten them on the human development indicators in those societies to correlate with their current contexts of national consciousness.
5. The participants are actively constructing and transforming social realities into pragmatic intentionality as well as they learn concepts of nationalism which are integrated in their course curriculum, but these nationalist concepts underwent standoff and revision in terms of reinforcement or repulsion by a network of influences that embed pragmatic impressions to their correlate consciousness. This active process of reconstructing concepts of nationalism has implications in the curriculum preparation and validation of teaching approaches and learning competencies geared towards liberating students’ sense of national identity. It is important to expand classroom discussion of essential nationalism
and its enlightened extension (internationalism) in the light of advocacies promoted by national and international council of nurses. This process may establish sound and more liberal choices in students’ decision making, in the context of larger and unified aspirations of nurses.
6. The collage of phenomenological approaches employed in the phases of this study demonstrated its potent as a tool and process of illuminating awareness of the participants lived experiences. Thus this accentuates the transformative role of the social sciences. The participants are ‘being capable of decision making and whose choice is related to their world’. The generated positive outlooks on their experiences from participation in the study suggest fruitful dialogues in the social sciences classroom utilizing these approaches. It is important to increase classroom based research employing dialogic and phenomenological approaches to enhance transformative learning.

2020) coined the phrase "the Laws of Appearance" for some underappreciated features of perceptual experience. Pautz suggests that the modal status of the Laws presents a puzzle: it is problematic to regard them as necessary, and also problematic to regard them as contingent. This paper presents possible counterexamples to the laws, suggesting that they are contingent as originally stated (Sect. 1). But the laws are readily modified so as to express constitutive features of normal human visual experience, and thus understood they are metaphysically necessary (Sect. 2). Analogous pictorial laws govern representational painting, and these can be explained by appealing to the representational format of the medium (Sect. 3). This invites the question whether there might be format-based explanations of the Laws of Appearance. If so, can the contingency of the format facts be squared with the necessity of the Laws? The paper answers "Yes" to both questions (Sect. 4).

Byrne & Hilbert (B&H) give some excellent replies to the objections to realism about color. However, the particular form of realism they propose, based on opponent processing, prompts several challenges. Why characterize a color by its tendency to produce an intermediate brain signal, rather than in terms of the final effect – either a perception or a neural substrate for it? At the level of the retina, and even of the cortex, there are processes that partly parallel the structure of color experience; but the correspondence is not exact. Must we assume that there is any place in the brain where an exact structural correspondence is found? At the level of psychophysical functioning, there is indeed opponency; but it is not clear that this gives us the kind of type-reduction that…

Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive imperativism. Our proposal is that an experience P feels pleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (1), while an experience U feels unpleasant in virtue of being (at least partly) constituted by a Command with reflexive imperative content (2): More of P!Less of U!If you need a slogan: experiences have affective phenomenal character in virtue of commanding us Get more of me! Get less of me!

This paper argues for a theory of phenomenal intentionality (herein referred to as 'Structuralism'), according to which perceptual experiences only possess intentional content when their phenomenal components are appropriately related to one another. This paper responds to the objections (i) that Structuralism cannot explain why some experiences have content while others do not, or (ii) why contentful experiences have the specific contents that they have. Against (i), I argue that to possess content, an experience must present itself as an experience of something distinct from itself, and that only experiences whose components are suitably structured satisfy this requirement. Against (ii), I argue that Structuralists can provide a deeper explanation of perceptual content than other theories of phenomenal intentionality by showing how the content-determining relations among our experiences depend on the selection pressures under which our perceptual systems developed.

Este artigo problematiza o uso das metáforas na clínica médica e no ensino da clínica, extrapolando a questão para outros encontros terapêuticos, e destacando a importância da linguagem para as práticas de cuidado em saúde.  Para isso, apresenta dois argumentos teóricos diferentes a respeito da metáfora, figura de linguagem tão significativa para diferentes áreas de conhecimento: argumentos contrários à utilização das metáforas resgatados do texto clássico de Susan Sontag – Doença como Metáfora. AIDS e suas Metáforas, e uma teorização poética favorável às metáforas como forma de expressão e representação de sentimentos de dor e de perda no pensamento de Anatole Broyard – Intoxicated by my Illness and Other Writings on Life and Death. Esses dois resgates teóricos são utilizados para demonstrar a relevância do problema para a prática da clínica.  O artigo concentra-se na questão linguística e na literalidade no pensamento de Gilles Deleuze, alçando as metáforas ao domínio dos conceito...

In this paper, a criticism of representationalist views of consciousness is developed. These views are often supported by an appeal to a transparency thesis about conscious states, according to which an experience does not itself possess the qualities of which it makes one conscious. The experience makes one conscious of these qualities by representing them, not by instantiating them. Against this, it is argued that some of the properties of which one is conscious are had by the conscious state itself. Only by adopting this view can we account for certain perceptual incompatibilities, such as the fact that one cannot see a stick as being both bent and not bent. This sort of experience is impossible because it would require that an experience have, and not just represent, incompatible features.

The dispositional properties encountered in everyday experience seem to have causal bases in other properties, e.g., the microstructure of a vase is the causal basis of its fragility. In contrast, the Pure Dispositions Thesis maintains that some dispositions require no causal basis. This thesis faces the Problem of Being: without a causal basis, there appears to be no grounds for the existence of pure dispositions. This paper establishes criteria for evaluating the problem, critically examines four theories of the being of pure dispositions, and develops an explanation of how a pure disposition grounds itself via its own power. 1 Pure Dispositions and the Problem of Being According to one theory of dispositions, any dispositional property requires a causal basis consisting of one or more categorical properties (e.g., see Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson 1982). This claim excludes the metaphysical possibility of pure dispositional properties, or dispositions without causal bases in any ...

In this paper 1 want to argue that there is a fundameptal difficulty in an Armstrong-like approach to the identity theory. It is not that Armstrong is wrong in a matter of detail concerning some particular feature of his "causal analysis," but that such an analysis must be inadequate to a full account of the nature of mind. What it fails to capture is what can be called the "experiential quality" of mental life. I hope to show that the causal analysis cannot be made to square with the facts of mental life, focusing'particularly on the fact that we are directly and non-inferentially acquainted with our own mental states. Since we do have such knowledge, it follows that the causal analysis is false as a complete account of the mental. However I do not intend to argue here that we do have such direct acquaintance. Fortunately this is a point on which all parties agree and I will satisfy myself with showing that Armstrong's position simply cannot account for this side of our concept of mind. The general formula that is used in giving an analysis of mental states is ''a state of the person apt for bringing about a certain sort of behavior" (p. 82). Of course this is only meant as a general formula so that various refinements and adjustments will be necessary in order to provide a full account of the viirious mental concepts. But these need not concern us here. The first point to notice is that mental states cannot simply be states apt for bringing about behavior. Armstrong makes this point clearly when he says,. .. no thing or everit can be simply apt for bringing about other events: it must have further independent characteristics of its own (p. 92).

According to a position which has dominated the theoretical landscape in the philosophy of mind until recently, only sensory states exhibit a characteristic phenomenal dimension, whereas cognitive states either utterly lack it, or inherit it from some of their accompanying sensory states. This position has recently been challenged by several scholars who have stressed the irreducibility of cognitive phenomenology to a merely sensory one. The aim of this introductory paper is to provide a general overview of the debate on cognitive phenomenology in order to give the reader a flavor of the richness of the themes that surround this area of investigation centered on the relationship between consciousness and cognition.

Resumo:

Em função de gerar diretrizes para uma aproximação entre a fenomenologia e os processos criativos do design de livros, esse estudo investiga as escolhas gráficas do projeto Diablo III: Livro de Caim e propõe possíveis caminhos criativos que podem ser feitos no projeto. Como resultado foram geradas cinco diretrizes com base na fenomenologia husserliana direcionadas à composição visual do livro. A partir do mapeamento de dados do objeto que será projetado, o designer experimenta a descoberta da identidade visual do livro; experimenta também a descoberta do fluxo de informações mentais trazidas à sua consciência, tais como de cruzamento destas informações que permitem ao designer não apenas conhecer projeto na sua essência pura como antecipar mentalmente o produto gráfico.

Palavras-chave: FENOMENOLOGIA; FILOSOFIA DA MENTE; PROCESSOS CRIATIVOS.

According to Minkoswki, Einstein's special theory of relativity (STR) reveals that 'space by itself, and time by itself are doomed to fade away into mere shadows'. But perceptual experience represents objects as instantiating shapes like squarenessproperties of 'space by itself '. Thus, STR seems to threaten the veridicality of shape experience. In response to this worry (a worry more fundamental than those raised by Einstein's general theory of relativity), some have argued that we should analyze the contents of our spatial experiences on the model of traditional secondary qualities. On this picture-defended in recent work by Chalmers (2012 and forthcoming)-an experience of squareness just represents whatever property usually causes such experiences. This view salvages the veridicality of shape experience, but leaves the nature of the properties we perceive outside our ken. I argue that such a move is unwarranted: STR is compatible with the idea that shape experience acquaints us with the spatial character of our world. In defending this claim, I propose a view on which shape experience presents familiar Euclidean spatial properties veridically, while implicitly representing those properties as instantiated in a particular manner-namely, relative to our own frame of reference. 1 Such a view has been defended by David Chalmers under the label 'shape functionalism'. (See Chalmers 2012, Chapter 7; and forthcoming.

According to a common view, conscious thoughts necessarily involve quasi-perceptual experiences, or mental images. This is alleged to be the case not only when one entertains conscious thoughts about perceptible things, but also when one thinks about more abstract things. In the case of conscious abstract propositional thoughts, the idea is that they occur in inner speech, which is taken to involve imagery (typically auditory) of words in a natural language. I argue that unsymbolized thinking and total aphantasia cast doubt on this common view. Unsymbolized thinking is the experience of thoughts that does not involve imagery. Total aphantasia is the inability to produce mental images of all sensory modalities. I consider and reject the objection that these individuals are mistaken either because their thoughts do involve images, or because those thoughts are not conscious. Thus, unsymbolized thinking and aphantasia provide evidence that conscious thoughts can occur without imagery.

Brentano begins with a distinction between descriptive and genetic psychology. Since it is the development of this distinction that underpins all Brentano's work on mental phenomena, and indeed that of all his pupils (and very often of their pupils, too), we shall set out in some detail just what, on the evidence of the Deskriptive Psychologie, it involves. Descriptive psychology 'seeks as far as possible to determine exhaustively the elements of human consciousness and their modes of connection with one another'. Brentano's hope is that-as he himself was to put it in 1895-descriptive psychology would display all the ultimate psychic components from whose combination one with another the totality of psychic phenomena would result, just as the totality of words is yielded by the letters of the alphabet (quoted on pp. x-xi).

In this talk I will argue that certain manifestations of inner speech do not involve conceptual representations. Contrary to what could be thought, inner speech is not composed by conceptual representations for the reason that it includes idiosyncratic information. The idiosyncratic aspect of inner self-talking is committed with the idea that inner speech episodes are built up by concrete, context-dependent and non-combinatorial information. In the first part of the talk I will disclose the idea that inner speech episodes lack typical conceptual properties such as (i) abstractness and combinatorial neutrality. In the second part of this presentation I will explain to what extent inner speech includes idiosyncratic information. I will conclude with some final remarks.

Terence Horgan, George Graham and John Tienson argue that some intentional content is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone. We argue that this would require a certain kind of covariation of phenomenal states and intentional states that is not established by Horgan, Tienson and Graham's arguments. We make the case that there is inadequate reason to think phenomenology determines perceptual belief, and that there is reason to doubt that phenomenology determines any species of non-perceptual intentionality. We also raise worries about the capacity of phenomenology to map onto intentionality in a way that would be appropriate for any determiner of content/fixer of truth conditions.

According to a position which has dominated the theoretical landscape in the philosophy of mind until recently, only sensory states exhibit a characteristic phenomenal dimension, whereas cognitive states either utterly lack it, or inherit it from some of their accompanying sensory states. This position has recently been challenged by several scholars who have stressed the irreducibility of cognitive phenomenology to a merely sensory one. The aim of this introductory paper is to provide a general overview of the debate on cognitive phenomenology in order to give the reader a flavor of the richness of the themes that surround this area of investigation centered on the relationship between consciousness and cognition.

The paper traces how disappointment with the notion of linguistic meaning has led to a shift towards the new, technical term of “narrow content”. In the first part of the paper I analyze the ways “narrow content” is understood in the literature. I show two important distinctions which have to be applied to the term in order to avoid confusion – the difference between context and functional theories of narrow content, and the difference between mental and linguistic narrow content. I argue that the most controversial combination of both distinctions is the idea of functional linguistic narrow content. In the second part of the paper I show that, contrary to the initial impression, this controversial, cut back notion of narrow content sheds some much needed light on several key semantic phenomena which we might otherwise be unable to explain – and because of this can be seen as a rightful descendant of the notion of meaning.

Esta coletânea reuniu uma série de artigos que escrevi e publiquei, separadamente, ao longo dos anos. Sua reunião, em um único volume, visa fornecer aos interessados pela filosofia e, mais especificamente, pela filosofia da mente, um possível recorte temático e, quem sabe, uma iniciação a este fascinante universo através do qual buscamos lançar alguma luz sobre a nossa própria identidade, enquanto entidades às quais atribuímos, concomitantemente, propriedades físicas e mentais.