My main concern in this paper is to provide an account of the aspectuality of propositional attit... more My main concern in this paper is to provide an account of the aspectuality of propositional attitudes. After having made the negative point that aspectuality cannot be accounted for in purely semantic terms, I shall maintain that what accounts for aspectuality are phenomenal modes of presentation. The fundamental difference between my modes of presentation and those employed in the several variants of the standard account of aspectuality is that while the latter are properties (taken to be true) of the objects which are involved in the content, my modes of presentation are properties of the subject’s experience of the objects and in this sense qualify as “subjective”. My thesis is that only phenomenal modes of presentation are suited to account for aspectuality because they incorporate that peculiar way of appearing of the object to the subject which explains whether or not he takes different attitudes towards contents which concern the same object. That modes of presentation have t...
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2016
█ Abstract In this paper, we want to support Kriegel’s argument in favor of the thesis that there... more █ Abstract In this paper, we want to support Kriegel’s argument in favor of the thesis that there is a cognitive form of phenomenology that is both irreducible to and independent of any sensory form of phenomenology by providing another argument in favor of the same thesis. Indeed, this new argument is also intended to show that the thought experiment Kriegel’s argument relies on does describe a genuine metaphysical possibility. In our view, Kriegel has not entirely succeeded in showing that his own argument displays that possibility. We present our argument in two steps. First, we attempt to prove that there is a cognitive phenomenology that is irreducible to any form of sensory phenomenology. Our proof relies on a kind of phenomenal contrast argument that however does not appeal to introspection. Second, by showing that the link between this form of cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology of having thoughts, and sensory phenomenology in general is extrinsic, we also aim to demo...
There are many ways in which a subject can think about an object. One of these occurs when the su... more There are many ways in which a subject can think about an object. One of these occurs when the subject can perceive the object: perceiving an object makes it possible to think about it in a very direct and straightforward way. This is so because perception of the object makes a subject aware of the object itself. But what is it to be (perceptually) aware of something? Moreover, how does such an awareness have to be accounted for? According to a very influential proposal leading back to Gareth Evans (1982), the kind of awareness that can home a subject’s thought on an object has to be cashed out in terms of singular object-dependent modes of presentation understood as ways of having discriminating (albeit non-descriptive) knowledge of the object. Contra Evans I shall claim that modes of presentation thus characterized do not account for perceptual awareness, but rather presuppose it.
The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even... more The paper’s main target is strong and reductive “representationalism”. What we claim is that even though this position looks very appealing in so far as it does not postulate intrinsic and irreducible experiential properties, the attempt it pursues of accounting for the phenomenology of experience in terms of representational content runs the risk of providing either an inadequate phenomenological account or an inadequate account of the content of the experience.
According to a position which has dominated the theoretical landscape in the philosophy of mind u... more According to a position which has dominated the theoretical landscape in the philosophy of mind until recently, only sensory states exhibit a characteristic phenomenal dimension, whereas cognitive states either utterly lack it, or inherit it from some of their accompanying sensory states. This position has recently been challenged by several scholars who have stressed the irreducibility of cognitive phenomenology to a merely sensory one. The aim of this introductory paper is to provide a general overview of the debate on cognitive phenomenology in order to give the reader a flavor of the richness of the themes that surround this area of investigation centered on the relationship between consciousness and cognition.
My main aim in this paper is to consider what methodology is best suited to adopt for one who bel... more My main aim in this paper is to consider what methodology is best suited to adopt for one who believes that there is cognitive phenomenology (CP) in order to argue for its irreducibility to sensory phenomenology. I shall first present and criticize a methodology widely adopted by the deniers of CP in order to reject the irreducibility claim, the so called “exclude-and-isolate” methodology. I shall use my criticisms against it as a lever for backing up a certain conception of the nature of cognitive phenomenal properties. The key notion in this conception is that of factual intimacy which I shall mobilize to put forward the idea that cognitive phenomenal properties are inseparable, in practice and in ordinary cases, from sensory phenomenal properties (leaving open the possibility of their explanatory and metaphysical independence). I shall then present a strategy to prove irreducibility which is compliant with the inseparability claim. One such strategy is in my view provided by comb...
Objective Large acute ST-elevation myocardial infarction (STEMI) sometimes leaves extensive ische... more Objective Large acute ST-elevation myocardial infarction (STEMI) sometimes leaves extensive ischemic damage despite timely and successful primary angioplasty. This clinical picture of good recanalization with incomplete reperfusion represents a good model to assess the reparative potential of locally administered cell therapy. Thus, we conducted a randomized controlled trial aimed at evaluating the effect of intracoronary administration of CD133 R stem cells on myocardial blood flow and function in this setting. Methods Fifteen patients with large anterior STEMI, myocardial blush grade 0-1 and more than 50% STelevation recovery after optimal coronary recanalization (TIMI 3 flow) with stenting were randomly assigned to receive CD133 R cells from either bone marrow (group A) or peripheral blood (group B), or to stay on drug therapy alone (group C). The cells were intracoronary injected within 10-14 days of STEMI. Infarct-related myocardial blood flow (MBF) was evaluated by NH 3 positron emission tomography 2-5 days before cell administration and after 1 year. Results MBF increased in the infarct area from 0.419 (0.390-0.623) to 0.544 (0.371-0.729) ml/min per g in group A, decreased from 0.547 (0.505-0.683) to 0.295 (0.237-0.472) ml/min per g in group B and only slightly changed from 0.554 (0.413-0.662) to 0.491 (0.453-0.717) ml/min per g in group C (A vs. C: P U 0.023; B vs. C: P U 0.066). Left ventricular volume tended to increase more in groups B and C than in group A, ejection fraction and wall motion score index remained stable in the three groups. Conclusion These findings support the hypothesis that intracoronary administration of bone marrow-derived, but not peripheral blood-derived CD133 R cells 10-14 days after STEMI may improve long-term perfusion.
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Papers by Sole Luna