Articles by Aaron Segal
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Despite the affinity of monism and monotheism–and despite monism’s
recent philosophical renaissan... more Despite the affinity of monism and monotheism–and despite monism’s
recent philosophical renaissance–few have defended the conjunction of the two claims, of what we might call ‘theistic monism’. I argue, first, that
monism and monotheism are consistent, and second, that each one provides good reasons to accept the other one. Monotheists, qua monotheists, have good reason to be monists; and monists, qua monists, have good reason to be monotheists. There should be much greater overlap between the monist camp and the monotheist camp than there is at present.
Ergo: An Open Access Journal in Philosophy
The Mental Problem of the Many suggests that Materialism implies Mental Manyism: if human beings ... more The Mental Problem of the Many suggests that Materialism implies Mental Manyism: if human beings are material objects, then there are millions of conscious human subjects everywhere that we thought there was just one. Previous discussions of this problem focus on Mental Manyism, and whether it is substantially harder to live with than ordinary Manyism (about clouds, chairs, trees, etc.). But even if it is, that'll count against materialism only if none of the other solutions to the Problem of the Many solves the Mental Problem of the Many. If some other solution works, then Materialism won't imply Mental Manyism after all. I contend that Materialism does in fact imply Mental Manyism. Here I argue here that two of the leading solutions to the Problem of the Manysupervaluationism and vague objecthood-fail to address the Mental Problem of the Many, even if they succeed in addressing the ordinary Problem of the Many. It turns out that we (and consciousness) are a special case in more ways relevant to this problem than just one.
American Philosophical Quarterly, 2024
The fact that philosophy is systematic-that philosophical issues are thoroughly interconnected-wa... more The fact that philosophy is systematic-that philosophical issues are thoroughly interconnected-was a commonplace among nineteenth century idealists, then neglected by analytic philosophers throughout much of the twentieth century, and has now finally started to get some renewed attention. But other than calling attention to the fact, few philosophers have tried to say what it consists in, or what its implications are. I argue that the systematicity of philosophy has disastrous epistemological implications. In particular, it implies philosophical skepticism: philosophers are rationally prohibited from believing any philosophical thesis. The argument goes by way of a new principle that connects inquiry with what is rational to believe. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between my argument and other, more well-trodden arguments for philosophical skepticism.
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2024
According to certain views about human ontology, the way we seem is very different from the way w... more According to certain views about human ontology, the way we seem is very different from the way we are. The appearances are a threat to such views. Here I take up and defuse the threat to one such view.
Pure immaterialism says that each of us is wholly immaterial. The appearances suggest otherwise. I argue that despite the fact that we might sometimes appear to be at least partly material, and that we can be perceptually justified in believing something solely on the basis of having a perceptual experience as of its being the case, none of us is ever perceptually justified in believing that we are even partly material (or that we’re not). Bottom line: we might be able to know whether we’re material, but we can’t know just by looking.
Faith and Philosophy, forthcoming, 2023
All adherents of hard determinism face a number of steep challenges; those with traditional relig... more All adherents of hard determinism face a number of steep challenges; those with traditional religious commitments face still further challenges. In this paper I treat one such further challenge. The challenge, in brief, is that given hard determinism, it's very difficult to say why God couldn't, and why God wouldn't, just immediately and directly realize the final end of creation. I develop the challenge, and a number of solutions, through the work of the medieval Jewish philosopher, Hasdai Crescas. After arguing that Crescas is indeed a hard determinist, and showing that he forecloses all the easy solutions to our challenge, I piece together from his work two solutions. They both start from the assumption that the purpose of creation is creaturely love of God. Each then lays down a constraint on proper love of God, which can be satisfied only if God demands of us to realize some state of affairs other than loving Him.
Mind, 2021
Mind, forthcoming 1 Three Doctrines 1.1 Two Core Doctrines
Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly, 2021
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2020
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming 1 For a suspicion of what would come to be known as ... more Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming 1 For a suspicion of what would come to be known as the synthetic a priori, see Hume [1998, §12.3]; for a discussion of the inevitable conflict between common sense and any fleshed-out metaphysical theory (with a focus on the metaphysics of mind), see Schwitzgebel [2014]; for a discussion of the relentless persistence of metaphysical disagreement (especially among experts), see, inter alia, Van Inwagen [2004], Frances [2005], Van Inwagen [2009], Kornblith [2013], and Nolan [2016].
Philosophers' Imprint, 2019
Philosophical Perspectives, 2016
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 2015
Philosophical Studies, 2014
Several philosophers have recently defended Causal Essentialism—the view that every property conf... more Several philosophers have recently defended Causal Essentialism—the view that every property confers causal powers, and whatever powers it confers, it confers essentially. I argue that on the face of it, Causal Essentialism implies a form of Monism, and in particular, the thesis I call ‘Mereological Monism’: that there is some concretum that is a part of every concretum. However, there are three escape routes, three views which are such that if one of them is true, Causal Essentialism does not imply any form of Monism at all. I survey the costs associated with taking these escape routes along with the costs associated with accepting Mereological Monism.
Sceptical theism and divine truths
Religious Studies, 2011
Sceptical theism has been employed by its adherents in an argument aimed at undermining the so ca... more Sceptical theism has been employed by its adherents in an argument aimed at undermining the so called ‘noseeum inference’. Erik Wielenberg (2010) has recently argued that there is an equally plausible argument for the conclusion that sceptical theism implies that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. Thus, sceptical theists need to give up their argument against the noseeum inference or accept the conclusion that we do not know any proposition that has word-of-God justification only. I claim that sceptical theists need not face such a difficult choice because the argument that Wielenberg offers is not as plausible as their argument against the noseeum inference.(Online publication February 09 2011)
Philo, 2010
Paul Churchland argues that Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism is unsuccessful ... more Paul Churchland argues that Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism is unsuccessful and so we need not accept its conclusion. In this paper, we respond to Churchland's argument. After we briefly recapitulate Plantinga's argument and state Churchland's argument, we offer three objections to Churchland's argument: (1) its first premise has little to recommend it, (2) its second premise is false, and (3) its conclusion is consistent with, and indeed entails, the conclusion of Plantinga's argument.
Book Chapters by Aaron Segal
Routledge Companion to Jewish Philosophy, 2024
This paper examines the question of what we are, maps the possible answers, and locates those ans... more This paper examines the question of what we are, maps the possible answers, and locates those answers in certain classical Jewish sources. It then develops a distinctively Jewish approach to that question-an idiosyncratic version of dualism-that hasn't been seriously explored in the general philosophical literature. After defending its Jewish bona fides, the paper motivates it based on more neutral philosophical considerations. It will emerge that there's a well-motivated, deeply Jewish, and heretofore neglected contender on the question of human ontology.
Norton Introduction to Philosophy of Religion (eds. Lara Buchak and Dean Zimmerman), 2024
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Articles by Aaron Segal
recent philosophical renaissance–few have defended the conjunction of the two claims, of what we might call ‘theistic monism’. I argue, first, that
monism and monotheism are consistent, and second, that each one provides good reasons to accept the other one. Monotheists, qua monotheists, have good reason to be monists; and monists, qua monists, have good reason to be monotheists. There should be much greater overlap between the monist camp and the monotheist camp than there is at present.
Pure immaterialism says that each of us is wholly immaterial. The appearances suggest otherwise. I argue that despite the fact that we might sometimes appear to be at least partly material, and that we can be perceptually justified in believing something solely on the basis of having a perceptual experience as of its being the case, none of us is ever perceptually justified in believing that we are even partly material (or that we’re not). Bottom line: we might be able to know whether we’re material, but we can’t know just by looking.
Book Chapters by Aaron Segal