Mind Uploading

From a behaviorist perspective, the desire to upload “minds” is already being realized on a mass, hyper-industrial scale thanks to the convergence of cognitive computing and Big Data. The accusation is that the “mind” is not an entity that exists intracranially. Instead, it is conceived as a process of individuation, which occurs in different modes and numbers. Some narratives of mind-uploading and technics in popular culture are explored: Transcendence (2014, dir. Wally Pfister) and Player Piano by Kurt Vonnegut. The discussed issues consider Bernard Stiegler’s phenomenological notion of originary default and Thierry Bardini’s analysis of junk. Several questions are raised regarding miscalculations, accidents, in addition to Nicolas Agar’s discussion on the end of humanity, and Daniel Dennett’s Multiple Drafts theory within the context of exteriorization, which is considered as constitutive of interiority.

Intelligence Unbound explores the prospects, promises, and potential dangers of machine intelligence and uploaded minds in a collection of state-of-the-art essays from internationally recognized philosophers, AI researchers, science fiction authors, and theorists.

Compelling and intellectually sophisticated exploration of the latest thinking on Artificial Intelligence and machine minds
Features contributions from an international cast of philosophers, Artificial Intelligence researchers, science fiction authors, and more
Offers current, diverse perspectives on machine intelligence and uploaded minds, emerging topics of tremendous interest
Illuminates the nature and ethics of tomorrow’s machine minds—and of the convergence of humans and machines—to consider the pros and cons of a variety of intriguing possibilities
Considers classic philosophical puzzles as well as the latest topics debated by scholars
Covers a wide range of viewpoints and arguments regarding the prospects of uploading and machine intelligence, including proponents and skeptics, pros and cons

Mind uploading speculation and debate often concludes that a procedure described as gradual in-place replacement preserves personal identity while a procedure described as destructive scan-and-copy produces some other identity in the target substrate such that personal identity is lost along with the biological brain. This paper demonstrates a chain of reasoning that establishes metaphysical equivalence between these two methods in terms of preserving personal identity.

Most contemporary scholarly work on posthumanism and transhumanism rests on the idea that both perspectives are part of an ontological continuum. This article, however, acknowledges and explores the differences between them. In order to prove that evident theoretical –and, therefore, practical– differences exist between both positions, a genealogy of their development from the 1980s is proposed. The definition of the two different ontologies associated to each of the discussed positions is followed by an analysis of the consequences that this theoretical separation would have for research. This paper also lays out a revision of their epistemologies and their ethical and practical implications. To conclude, we offer a contextualized justification of why the two discussed positions are actually antithetic, and how considering them as such would be useful for future research in the field.

Advocates of transhumanism envision a future in which we achieve immortality by “mind-uploading” our consciousness and identity onto digital substrates. Utilizing functionalist (and sometimes dualistic) accounts of the mind, the roadmap towards this goal involves high-resolution brain scanning followed by programming the scanned brain to “wake up” in a virtual environment. There are several philosophical challenges that must be overcome for the success of such a program. I investigate and analyze the challenges to mind-uploading in the following categories: (a) problems from emergence and embodiment; (b) problems from computability; (c) problems from functionalism; and (d) problems from personal identity. The challenges from computability, emergence and embodiment could potentially be adjusted for, albeit with great difficulty. The resolution to challenges from functionalism and especially personal identity has a weaker prognosis. I present the assumptions under which the proponents of mind-uploading operate, review the classical philosophical approaches that challenge these assumptions, and analyze their synthesis.

This paper highlights the concept of “mind-uploading” and what defines this hypothetical idea. The process of uploading one’s consciousness in a synthetic level is indicated as well as the effects it can have in a social, scientific, and personal level. Questions regarding the personal impact on an individual, as well as it’s actual functionality will be addressed. The research required to delve deep into this topic was extensive and multiple sources had to be inquired to fully flesh out and inform of this process. Mind-uploading is a very complex and arduous topic to discuss, and covers many neurological concepts that mesh with the technological world of computers. It’s intricate in nature, but can prove to be an effective way to extend the immediate consciousness and/or life of a human. While it is capable of expanding one’s life, the complete science behind studying the brain is difficult in it of itself, and the technology required to fulfill such a feat is monumental. The process is effective, and life changing, but is not widely known to many.

Explores the possibility of a naturalist afterlife via mind-uploading and simulationism. Argues that the main problem is that we don't understand if and how selfhood is connected to the computational processes of the brain.

Now published in: Gäb, Sebastian; Harion, Dominic; Welsen, Peter (Hgg.): Person und Identität. Regensburg: S. Roderer, 2018, 45-63.

Humans have long wondered whether they can survive the death of their physical bodies. Some people, including some prominent billionaires and tech entrepreneurs, now look to technology as a means by which this might occur, using terms such “whole brain emulation”, “mind uploading” and “substrate independent minds” to describe a set of hypothetical procedures for transferring or emulating the functioning of a human mind on a synthetic substrate. There has been much debate about the philosophical implications of such procedures for personal survival. Most participants to that debate assume that the continuation of identity is an objective fact that can be revealed by scientific enquiry or rational debate. We bring into this debate a perspective that has so far been neglected: that personal identities are in large part social constructs. Consequently, to enable a particular identity to survive the transference process, it is not sufficient to settle age-old philosophical questions about the nature of identity. It is also necessary to maintain certain networks of interaction between the synthetic person and its social environment, and sustain a collective belief in the persistence of identity. We defend this position by using the example of the Dalai Lama in Tibetan Buddhist tradition and identify technological procedures that could increase the credibility of personal continuity between biological and artificial substrates.

A discussion of a most devastating calamity potentially befalling on humanity in the near future has been presented that is referred to as the transhumanism movement, which also involves alien hybridization. It is explicated that despite the usual paltering intent by the negative aliens trying to portray transhumanism and alien hybridization as something that will someday exalt humanity to the status of superhumans, that it may be construed as upgrading humanity in light of acquiring much higher intelligence as a way of gaining physical immortality or putting an end to all forms of diseases, ageing, pains and sufferings, and in order to gain enhancement of all kinds through use of artificial intelligence machinery and interfaces by a way of upgrading our body parts, replacing them with new cloned organs, etc., as well as through alien hybridization, its true underlying intent is to rob humanity of its soul-spirit and, leaving a husk for the negative aliens to possess. The negative aliens have for long lost their connection to the SOURCE and can only survive through parasitism and energetic vampirism. Most of them are in the grave danger of having annihilated their species altogether through demise of their female counterparts and as a result of having diluted their genetic pool due to excessive and repeated cloning as a way of reproduction. This is why they so much covet our organic physical bodies. Through transhumanism as a soul capture technology, they hope to be able to eventually evict us from our bodies

The ‘Mind-Upload’ hypothesis (MU), a radical version of the Brain- in-a-Vat thought experiment, asserts that a whole mind can safely be transferred from a brain to a digital device, after being exactly encoded into substrate independent informational patterns. Prima facie, MU seems the philosophical archenemy of the Embodied Mind theory (EM), which understands embodiment as a necessary and constitutive condition for the existence of a mind and its functions. In truth, whether and why MU and EM are ultimately incompatible is unobvious. This paper, which aims to answer both questions, will not simply confirm that MU and EM actually are incompatible. It will also show the true reason of their incompatibility: while EM implies that a mind’s individual identity is contingent upon the details of its physical constituents, MU presup- poses that minds can be relocated from one material vessel to another. A systematic comparison between these conflicting assumptions reveals that the real shortcoming of MU is not the one usually discussed by the philosophical literature: it has nothing to do with MU’s functionalist or computationalist prerequisites, and is only secondarily related to the artificial implementability of consciousness; the real problem is that MU presupposes that minds could still be individuated and numerically identified while being reduced to imma- terial formal patterns. EM seems committed to refute this assumption, but does it have sufficient resources to succeed?

What if one could build a virtual world with effective open borders, in a consensual and cooperative way? The Virternity project proposes a benign and positive outlook to the future of humanity’s adventure into the virtual realm and the increasing mergence with the digital world. There is perhaps a sense of inevitability about the move towards a future where humans span both the physical and digital world. Seen as a whole, the Virternity project is an encompassing idea, its aims and goals are by no means small in intention or in scope. What is or is not achievable may not be answered in this book but certainly, this is an attempt to address the challenges that lie ahead with reference to current developments and similar endeavours that are already in existence. What the reader may elicit from this book is the potential of the ideas that the Virternity project has expressed and that much of what is proposed is certainly possible or may be in the future.

В результате получается предложение [Я люблю путешествовать по разным странам мира, во время путешествия нахожу случайные новые знакомства и стараюсь перевести их в дружеские, а][какое у тебя жильё в котором ты сейчас проживаешь][, интересуюсь потому что искал партнёров для совместного проживания во время путешествия.] и логический смысл его середины не изменён. 25.1 3 Имя к кому обращаются или идентификационные данные не указаны, далее я добавляю к предложению первого варианта вопроса вступление Тему [Слышал, что ты очень часто находишься в разъездах по различным странам мира и у меня к тебе вопрос] и также добавляю конец предложения Рему [и насколько оно удобное, комфортабельное.] В результате получается предложение [Слышал, что ты очень часто находишься в разъездах по различным странам мира и у меня к тебе вопрос][какое у тебя жильё в котором ты сейчас проживаешь][и насколько оно удобное, комфортабельное.] и логический смысл его середины не изменён.

On reconnaît généralement la science-fiction cyberpunk et postcyberpunk à sa particularité de mettre en scène des objets techniques plus évolués que ceux que nous utilisons au quotidien. Ces objets sont à la fois défamiliarisants et familiers. L'étrangeté instaurée par les mondes (post)cyberpunks repose en partie sur une mise à distance de notre présent dans le but de nous le faire éprouver. Elle repose également sur l'exploration du devenir de nos propres objets techniques. Formant un laboratoire de possibles, la science-fiction concourt à l'élaboration de nouvelles séries technologiques dans les diégèses. Toutefois, nous aurions tort de les cantonner à de simples fantaisies. Ces technologies fictionnelles s'inscrivent en effet dans une dialectique propre : si la science-fiction se réapproprie et narrativise les objets techniques existants, elle nourrit en retour des liens étroits avec la science appliquée à l'industrie (les technosciences). La science-fiction forme en réalité un moteur de l'innovation technologique. Cette dialectique invite à prendre au sérieux le « terrain socio-anthropologique » que constitue la science-fiction et les objets que celle-ci met en scène. Par ailleurs, qu'il soit virtuel ou actuel, tout objet technologique peut s'observer suivant les dynamiques relationnelles qu'il entretient avec les autres objets. Les études intermédiales n'appréhendent pas les objets comme des dispositifs autonomes pour lesquels il faut penser a posteriori les dynamiques, mais partent du principe que ce sont les relations qui informent les objets. Selon cette approche, une technologie comporte en elle des structures sémiotiques qui ne lui sont pas exclusives et réarticule des mémoires, des conflictualités, des matérialités, des questions, des concepts et des rapports de force liés à des objets plus anciens. Les technologies imaginées dans la science-fiction ne semblent pas échapper à ce nœud de relations. En s'appuyant sur ce cadre théorique, cette thèse s'intéresse à un ensemble de technologies qui émerge dans la science-fiction audiovisuelle au sortir de la Guerre froide. Ces technologies, que nous appelons technologies de « mémoire totale », permettent aux personnages de gérer de façon inédite leur mémoire personnelle. Du dispositif de lifelogging implanté dans le cerveau au phénomène du mind uploading (« téléversement de l'esprit »), la science-fiction imagine et problématise le devenir de la mémoire humaine. Ainsi, l'étude entreprise ici consiste, d'une part, à comprendre d'où provient l'idée d'une mémoire totale, et d'autre part, à analyser les enjeux et les conséquences des technologies de mémoire totale sur la mémoire, les individus et les univers fictionnels. À terme, ce projet de thèse vise à réfléchir avec la science-fiction aux limites de l'innovation technologique à l'heure où, d'un côté, l'idéologie transhumaniste prend de plus en plus d'ampleur et, de l'autre, les projets technoscientifiques s'inspirent ouvertement des fantaisies technologiques issues de la science-fiction. En explorant les technologies de « mémoire totale », cette étude développe une critique de l'idéologie transhumaniste et de son projet d'amplification corporelle radicale (human enhancement) au sein duquel la mémoire tient un rôle clé.

The proposal for adoption of the 5g mobile phones together with its underlying technologies is reviewed and the real agenda behind its introduction has been explicated. It is elucidated that the reason for the inception of the 5g technology has nothing to do with our "Good Samaritan's" Corporatocracy to award humanity with a new level of convenience and comfort that may be backed up by good or new advanced technology in light of progress. In contrast, the real agenda behind its introduction, in the long run, has everything to do with transforming our solar organic consciousness in favor of a cybernetic-transhumanist society, in conformance with protecting the negative alien's interest to further subjugate us to 'unconsciousness enslavement.' This way, humanity can be more directly 'controlled' to conform to a model of a hive-like society much like Star Trek's so-called "Borg Collective" to suit the parasitic-vampiric needs of the negative aliens. And, this is why it is being proposed that there should be smart cells at localized control towers installed on every lamp post or building in the urban areas to interface with what is now portrayed as "ultrafast" 5g mobile users who would benefit from its redundant features of "high efficiency data transfer" and "small latency," and more congruent with the need of a machine-like transhumanist-cybernetic collective as opposed to solar consciousness beings whose organic health-environment would be gravely endangered by inception of the EMF radiation produced and propagated everywhere by such a technology. Introduction • Telecommunications companies hope to debut the first commercial 5G networks in the early 2020s. • And, the new masterminds of this artificial technology promise a package under the disguise of "ultrafast 5G service," with the primary attractive and sexy feature of "ultralow latency," and "record-breaking speeds and high efficiency data transfer," which is to be commonly utilized by humanity in the next five years. • Companies and industry groups contend that 5G will handle far more traffic at much higher speeds than the base stations that make up today's cellular networks. • 5g promises to be based on brand-new technologies. • To understand how 5G will differ from today's 4G networks, it is helpful to review 5 newly proposed technologies classified under "millimeter waves," "small cells," "massive MIMO," "full duplex," and "beamforming," and consider exactly what each will signify for human wireless users. • And, besides the 5G technology, future smartphone users, VR gamers, and autonomous cars are to be equipped with a wireless network that can be used on an everyday basis. • So, let us start by reviewing some basic background on 5G technology.

The progressing cyborgization of the human body reaches its completion point when the entire body can be replaced by uploading individual minds to a less vulnerable and limited substrate, thus achieving \digital immortality" for the uploaded self. The paper questions the philosophical assumptions that are being made when mind-uploading is thought a realistic possibility. I will argue that we have little reason to suppose that an exact functional copy of the brain will actually produce similar phenomenological e®ects (if any at all), and even less reason to believe that the uploaded mind, even if similar, will be the same self as the one on whose brain it was modeled.

Many researchers have argued that humanity will create artificial general intelligence (AGI) within the next twenty to one hundred years. It has been suggested that AGI may pose a catastrophic risk to humanity. After summarizing the arguments for why AGI may pose such a risk, we survey the field’s proposed responses to AGI risk. We consider societal proposals, proposals for external constraints on AGI behaviors, and proposals for creating AGIs that are safe due to their internal design.

Background: While modern humans seek ways to extend life expectancy, the necessity of advanced bioengineering tools for the production of effective human enhancement applications appears as compelling as ever. Objective: The technological future of Homo sapiens has been scheduled within a quantum environment and advanced physical interventions are imperative to occur in the anatomy of modern humans, including genetic improvement and human cloning. New terminologies and latest projects such as genome editing, mind uploading and tissue engineering applications for the growth of new organs are issues of discussion in this paper. Methods: Several advanced biotechnological methods are presented in this paper, including the 14-days rule, the 2045 Initiative project and the CRISPR technique and their social and ethical implications are discussed. Results: The exponential aging of the population results in rapidly increasing demands for next-generation drugs and innovative pharmaceutical products that target individualized genetic treatment, resulting in the emergence of controversial ethical and social implications in the forthcoming post-Homo sapiens Era. Conclusion: The next-generation ethics must be clarified, an interdisciplinary debate should be initiated, and all the different perspectives must be recorded and evaluated to adopt the most efficient practices for controversial topics like the potential digital immortality.

Disclaimer: DIN provides consulting in the sphere of digital immortality. You can use this theory and protocol for free. DIN may help by providing advice to implement the protocol, but do not take any legal responsibility for your actions according the protocol. Abstract. Future superintelligent AI will be able to reconstruct a model of the personality of a person who lived in the past based on informational traces. This could be regarded as some form of immortality if this AI also solves the problem of personal identity in a copy-friendly way. A person who is currently alive could invest now in passive self-recording and active self-description to facilitate such reconstruction. In this article, we analyze informational-theoretical relationships between the human mind, its traces, and its future model; based on this analysis, we suggest the instruments to most cost-effectively collect quality data about a person for future resurrection. These guidelines form a "digital immortality protocol". Digital immortality is plan C for achieving immortality, after plan A, life extension, and plan B, cryonics.

The combination of superintelligence and massive computational power will make it possible for computers in the future to create and sustain virtual environments of a size and complexity that is way beyond anything we are currently capable of devising. Will it be possible — or desirable — to 'upload' ourselves into these virtual worlds? David Chalmers has interesting things to say on this issue; I will be suggesting a slightly different take on it. The existence of these virtual worlds leads to another question: might it not be possible—or even probable—that we ourselves are among their (virtual) inhabitants? This issue has been discussed fairly widely in recent years. I will be proposing some relevant (and hopefully, useful) distinctions and offering some reflections on it.

The article seeks to analyze the apocalyptic and eschatological dimensions of mind uploading that is, transferring of mind and consciousness from a biological to a computational substrate as described in Neal Stephenson's novel Fall; or, Dodge in Hell (2019) primarily from a Christian religious perspective. The first section will deal with the implications of uploading of mind and consciousness to a nonbiological digital substrate, the second will look into the idea of the soul in a digital world and see how it relates to the traditional Christian and also non-Christian concepts soul, afterlife and immortality; and lastly, the third section will depict how the idea of digital reincarnation of God has been employed in the novel and in what ways it differs from or conforms to the traditional picture of a Judeo-Christian deity.

Transhumanism is a philosophical system that proposes the use of advanced technologies directly in the human body to modify and improve its biological condition. That is the core idea of transhumanism and it can be adopted by various ideological systems in different ways. It will depend on their ethical approach and what they define as "improvement". In this article we will quickly review the difference between transhumanist philosophy, Transhumanism and Transhumanisms.

If we uploaded our minds into cyberspace, would we be immortal?! "Upload" our Sapiens' minds into… something?! Mind is noumenon, mind is a nature, a quid, an essence, a character. "Upload" our characters into… something?! Nature/quid/unity/soul/essence/character is about nonlocality. We, patterns, structures, cosmic order (whether positivistic science likes it or not) were metaphysically determined. Our Cosmos was metaphysically determined. We did not choose the order that determines us. With some zigzagging sisyphic effort we come to know some things, at least those things that we need to know in order to be able to survive.

The idea of mind-uploading shows that, in the philosophical sense, we are still deeply embedded in Cartesian dualisms and Newtonian mechanical ways of thinking. Moreover, this idea tends to neglect the complexities of our material existence, i.e. our embodied reality, no matter how obsolete or imperfect, or unable to cope with exponential technological advancements they may be. The emergence of seemingly omnipotent cyberspace inspired the idea that once we are disembodied and transformed into pure data, we could become one with the Machine-God and attain digital immortality. After discussing the key the issues of the mind-uploading thesis, interconnectedness rather than opposition of mind and matter will be introduced as it is comprehended in the philosophy of Taoism and embedded in the etymology of the Chinese character Tao. The desire to leave the ‘meat’ behind based on Cartesian body-mind split will be criticized through the concept of embodied consciousness. In order for the mind or any other immaterial phenomena to be uploaded into a machine, it first has to be measured, pragmatically proven and materialized. This shows a discrepancy between our mechanical hardware / the inert matter and dynamical wetware / living bodies. The chapter will attempt to provide a platform for more inclusive, anti-essentialist ways of thinking and debating the complex and intimate relations with our machines rooted in materiality and the potential of these relations to shape possible posthuman futures.

Observations by Lucretius and Seneca suggest that "life after death" is the necessary mode of all life. Since it is possible to pop into existence from death (non-existence) once, the question naturally arises: Can one pop into existence again after living and dying once? Some arguments against this possibility are examined and shown to lack a solid foundation.

Sheila Jasanoff and other STS researchers refer to a "sociotechnical imaginary" as "collectively held and performed visions of desirable futures…animated by shared understandings of forms of social life and social order attainable through, and supportive of,

Background: While modern humans seek ways to extend life expectancy, the necessity of advanced bioengineering tools for the production of effective human enhancement applications appears as compelling as ever. Objective: The technological future of Homo sapiens has been scheduled within a quantum environment and advanced physical interventions are imperative to occur in the anatomy of modern humans, including genetic improvement and human cloning. New terminologies and latest projects such as genome editing, mind uploading and tissue engineering applications for the growth of new organs are issues of discussion in this paper. Methods: Several advanced biotechnological methods are presented in this paper, including the 14-days rule, the 2045 Initiative project and the CRISPR technique and their social and ethical implications are discussed. Results: The exponential aging of the population results in rapidly increasing demands for next-generation drugs and innovative pharmaceutical pr...

Οι ραγδαίες εξελίξεις στον χώρο της βιονικής τεχνολογίας φαίνεται να επηρεάζουν όλο και περισσότερο την αντίληψή μας σχετικά με τον ορισμό του σύγχρονου ανθρώπου και των βιολογικών περιορισμών του. Στο πλαίσιο της τεχνολογικής έκστασης του 20ού και του 21ου αιώνα, τα σενάρια επιστημονικής φαντασίας που περιγράφουν την ένωση ανθρώπου  μηχανής και της ψηφιοποίησης της ανθρώπινης συνείδησης φαντάζουν πλέον πραγματοποιήσιμα. Στο παρόν άρθρο, θα επιχειρή σω να αντιπαραθέσω τις σύ γχρονες μετα- ουμανιστικές θεωρίες που υποστηρίζουν την εγκυρότητα της παραπάνω υπόθεσης με τις κυρίαρχες αντιλήψεις στον χώρο της νεότερης φιλοσοφίας σχετικά με τον εαυτό και την ανθρώπινη συνείδηση. Στην συνέχεια, θα εξετασθεί η ιδέα του ασώματου υποκειμένου μέσα από το πρίσμα της μεταστρουκτουραλιστικής σχετικοποίησης του εαυτού και της μεταμο-ντέρνας άρσης των ουσιοκρατικών ορισμών του ανθρώπου. Τέλος, θα αναδειχθεί η βαθύτερη σχέση ανάμεσα στον δι-ανθρωπισμό (transhumanism) και την ύστερη νεωτερικότητα, στο πλαίσιο της οποίας ανιχνεύονται ταυτόχρονα η ηθική θεμελίωση του μεταουμανιστικού ιδεώδους και η οντολογική κριτική του.

2 глава. Объяснение реализации сегмента Искусственной Семантической нейронной сети Семантического интеллекта, выделяемой из науки Нейроинформатика (Информатика) для примера и объяснения работы технологии с использованием Семантической сети программной платформы электронного компьютера программно, семантической сети аппаратной платформы электронного компьютера программно. И далее искусственной нейронной сети аппаратной платформы электронного компьютера программно, искусственной нейронной сети аппаратной платформы электронного компьютера аппаратно, Семантической сети программной платформы телекоммуникационной сети программно, Семантической сети аппаратной платформы телекоммуникационной сети программно, Искусственной нейронной сети программной платформы телекоммуникационной сети программно. И далее искусственной нейронной сети аппаратной платформы телекоммуникационной сети программно, Искусственной нейронной сети аппаратной платформы телекоммуникационной сети аппаратно, Телекоммуникационной сети сетевой топологии Звезда программно, Телекоммуникационной сети сетевой топологии Звезда аппаратно на Жёстком магнитном диске и на магниторезистивной памяти для запуска Семантической сети Семантического интеллекта Загрузки сознания программно.

El materialismo de la Edad Moderna nos describe al hombre como una máquina, comparable a un complejo artilugio mecánico. Cabe entonces imaginar que una máquina no-biológica pueda constituir un ser pensante como lo son los seres humanos, e incluso cabría pensar en la posibilidad de codificación de una mente humana real para su posterior trasvase a un sustrato artificial. Considero que estas últimas posiciones son más propias de la cultura friki o de amantes de la ciencia ficción que de una cultura humanista seria. En cualquier caso, una cosa parece clara: la simulación por ordenador de cualquier tipo de materia no es la materia misma. Una simulación por ordenador de una estrella no emite luz ni calor, y del mismo modo tampoco ofrece calor humano (en términos materiales) ni voluntad de vivir una máquina que hipotéticamente pueda contener toda la información sobre el ser humano y simular sus respuestas.

Asla, M. 2018. "Yo, mi cerebro y mi otro yo (digital): muerte e inmortalidad humanas en el horizonte de la transferencia mental", Investigación y Ciencia: Edición Española de Scientific American. Número monográfico, Humanos: por qué somos una especie tan singular. (506) 90-91 Noviembre. Versión online

5 Глава. Алгоритмы языка программирования SLIMD Semantic Logical Intelligence magnetic domains и правила науки Лингвистика используемые для реализации технологии Загрузки Сознания программно Mind Uploading Whole Brain Emulation. Алгоритм актуального членения предложения Topic-Comment языка программирования SLIMD Semantic Logical Intelligence magnetic domains, по которому возможно осуществлять Загрузку Сознания Mind Uploading Whole Brain Emulation программно из памяти межнейрональных связей нервной системы нервной сети человека способом составления в результате размышлений множественного количества Семантических сетей семантического интеллекта или Нейронных сетей нейронного интеллекта имеет некоторые отличительные особенности, которые и хотелось бы объяснить. Сознание и мышление человека, обученного одному или множеству различных языков естественной разговорной речи складывается и формируется в результате жизнедеятельности и восприятия окружающего бытия. В биологической нервной системе нервной сети человека распределение потоков информации получаемых и воспринимаемых через зрительную, слуховую и осязательную системы происходит по межнейрональным взаимосвязям вероятно хаотически, учитывая химические реакции с химическим балансом, как в организме, так и в нервной системе нервной сети, и их отличия, происходящие в определённые моменты жизнедеятельности человеческого организма. Таким образом, запоминание и распределение информации, поступающей на языках естественной разговорной речи или поступающей изображениями в нервную систему нервную сеть через органы зрения, слуха и осязания происходит хаотически с некоторыми упорядоченностями, например при многократных повторениях или заучиваниях информации наизусть, и накапливается там, в огромных хаотических объёмах с некоторым процентом упорядоченности уникальными идентификаторами пространства имён. Например, уникальные идентификаторы пространств имён могут

В данном случае не описывается как, а описывается Например 0000000000000 [фрагмент кода] на русском языке естественной разговорной речи для того, чтобы можно было понять алгоритм загрузки сознания программно языками естественной разговорной речи. Далее осуществить загрузку сознания программно из своего головного мозга изначально на бумажные носители с дальнейшим переписыванием в NVRAM non volatile random access memory, SDRAM память, на HDD жёсткий магнитный диск или в MRAM магниторезистивную память.

The idea of mind uploading shows that in the philosophical sense, we are still deeply embedded in Cartesian dualisms and Newtonian mechanical ways of thinking. Moreover, this idea neglects our material existence, i.e. our embodied reality, no matter how obsolete or imperfect or unable to cope with exponential technological advancements it may be. In this paper I will attempt to step out of Eurocentric and anthropocentric thought in two ways. Firstly, by introducing the Chinese philosophical concept of Tao - through the etymology of the written character Tao I will comparatively analyze it with the concept of the Machine-God. Secondly, the desire to leave the meat behind emerging from the body-mind split will be criticized through the concept of embodied consciousness. In order for a mind or any other immaterial phenomena to be uploaded into a machine, it first has to be measured, pragmatically proven and materialized. This shows the discrepancy between our mechanical hardware / the inert matter and dynamical wetware / living bodies. The paper will be an attempt to provide a platform for more inclusive, anti-essentialist ways of thinking and debating the complex and intimate relations with our machines and their potential to shape possible posthuman futures.

Una de las controversias generadas con la hipótesis de la transferencia mental gira en torno a la relación autocomprensión-identidad. Si un sujeto puede reducirse a patrones de información, y la tecnología es capaz de preservar y transferir dichos patrones, entonces la idea de la unicidad del individuo se torna problemática. Puesto que sería posible crear múltiples copias de la misma persona, ¿qué clase de titularidad ontológica gozarían dichas copias? Son muchas y variadas las respuestas que podemos encontrar en los debates bioéticos contemporáneos, sin embargo, éstas no suelen tener en consideración los criterios estéticos de la transferencia mental. En esta comunicación conecto dichos criterios con los argumentos éticos a través del análisis de Klara y el Sol, novela publicada en 2021 por el premio Nobel de literatura Kazuo Ishiguro. En primer lugar, muestro cómo el autor prosigue en esta obra su reflexión sobre el modo en que los avances tecnológicos afectan las vivencias de intimidad y los espacios intersubjetivos más estrechos (asunto que ya inició en Nunca me abandones, 2005). Argumento, en segundo lugar, que esta reflexión está conectada con una interpretación trascendente de la memoria, idea que acompaña gran número de obras del autor. En tercer lugar, destaco la importancia que, en Klara y el Sol, cobran las percepciones morales. Sobre esta cuestión defiendo que las descripciones que hace Ishiguro de este tipo de intuiciones no solo explica el curso de los acontecimientos de la novela, sino que son también clave para entender, por un lado, la propuesta narrativista de la identidad sugerida en las últimas páginas de la novela y, por el otro, el peculiar uso estilístico del lenguaje empleado. Finalmente, conecto el tratamiento que el autor concede a las percepciones morales con las propuestas formuladas por Aldous Huxley e Iris Murdoch sobre la relación entre la ética y la literatura. En la conclusión final de este trabajo propongo que esta relación fundada en las percepciones morales tiene gran relevancia teórica y práctica en el desarrollo y difusión de la bioética contemporánea.

Семантического нейроэмулятора искусственного интеллекта] технологии Загрузки сознания аппаратно c использованием специализированного нейроинтерфейса под управлением OS Windows. 2 1 глава. Объяснение реализации Сегмента Лингвистической сети, выделяемой из науки Лингвистика языком программирования SLIMD цветовой модели NCS WSYRGB для примера и объяснения работы уже не гипотетической, а технически возможно реализуемой технологии Загрузки Сознания человека WBE Whole Brain Emulation программно и объяснения работы алгоритма Актуального членения предложения программно на языках естественной разговорной речи. Загрузка сознания осуществляется с памяти межнейрональных связей биологического мозга, обученного языкам естественной разговорной речи любого человека при порядке чтения слева направо и называется Семантической сетью Семантического Интеллекта.

ABSTRACT: In general, what was normal behavior then, is not accepted now. What is accepted now, will not be accepted in the future. The main idea is that what we do online and offline, will be recorded: online will be recorded in the cloud and what is offline (our private life), is stored in our brains long-term-memory cortex. In the future, when we will choose to live in an online/digital cloud, the online + biological brain memory we will be uploaded bulk on our online digital profile; our new life on the Matrix or whatever server digital life will be named. We will pass from material representation to digital representation, a smart HI-AI image of us. (Human Intelligence-Artificial Intelligence). Digital life will be complex! I don't know if the upload will be successful and if your mind and consciousness will work together well in the new Wide Digital Playground (WDP). But technology will evolve to a precise and perfect point procedure. We will pass from material representation to digital representation, a smart HI-AI image of us, the new HYBRID Human Intelligence-Artificial Intelligence.

I survey four categories of factors that might give a digital mind, such as an upload or an articial general intelligence, an advantage over humans. Hardware advantages include greater serial speeds and greater parallel speeds. Self-improvement advantages include improvement of algorithms, design of new mental modules, and modication of motivational system. Co-operative advantages include copyability, perfect co-operation, improved communication, and transfer of skills. Human handicaps include computational limitations and faulty heuristics, human-centric biases, and socially motivated cognition. The shape of hardware growth curves, as well as the ease of modifying minds, are found to have a major impact on how quickly a digital mind may take advantage of these factors.

Mind uploading speculation and debate often concludes that a procedure described as gradual in-place replacement preserves personal identity while a procedure described as destructive scan-and-copy produces some other identity in the target substrate such that personal identity is lost along with the biological brain. This paper demonstrates a chain of reasoning that establishes metaphysical equivalence between these two methods in terms of preserving personal identity.

Trans-humanism is a current of thinking that propagates the creation of technologies which serve to overcome human biological limitations. However, trans-humanists want to create not only technologies that make it possible to improve the man, but also to fully liberate their mind from the body. Their desire is to move the human mind to a machine and lead to the creation of super intelligence. What is more, it was revealed in the article that trans-humanists also propagate the elimination of traditional education. They believe that technologies which liberate from the body and increase intelligence are more effective than education.