Intelligence Analysis

Non-verbal communication plays an important role in human communication. At the Delft University of Technology there is a project running on the automatic recognition of facial expressions. The developed system ISFER (Integrated System for Facial Expression Recognition) consists of modules suited for the analysis of a frontal view of the face. As the obtained results are still far from being perfect we present in this paper a new complementary approach based on a lateral view of the face. The underlying model is based on the silhouette of the facial profile with 10 characteristic points on specific places. The points are chosen so that using Matlab tool we can assess their locations as extreme points on the silhouette. From this information emotional facial expressions can be classified up to some degree using expert systems or neural networks. The new model and results of testing are reported in this paper.

Human Expression Recognition Clips Utilised Expert System [0] was designed to recognise facial expressions of the observed person in an automatic way. HERCULES forms a part of an Automated System for Non-verbal Communication [1] and represent the implementation of the facial expression analysis that the system performs. The theoretical formulation of facial expression recognition, whereupon inference engine of HERCULES is built, has been acquired from FACS [2]. HERCULES contains also a second inference ...

Complex event processing (CEP) is a computational intelligence technology capable of analyzing big data streams for event pattern recognition in real time. In particular, this technology is vastly useful for analyzing multicriteria conditions in a pattern, which will trigger alerts (complex events) upon their fulfillment. However, one of the main challenges to be faced by CEP is how to define the quantitative analysis to be performed in response to the produced complex events. In this paper, we propose the use of the MEdit4CEP-CPN model-driven tool as a solution for conducting such quantitative analysis of events of interest for an application domain, without requiring knowledge of any scientific programming language for implementing the pattern conditions. Precisely, MEdit4CEP-CPN facilitates domain experts to graphically model event patterns, transform them into a Prioritized Colored Petri Net (PCPN) model, modify its initial marking depending on the application scenario, and make...

This paper examines the evolutionary trajectory of Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) from its traditional origins to its current state enhanced by artificial intelligence technologies. Through systematic analysis of academic literature and empirical evidence, this study traces the development of OSINT methodologies, explores the integration of AI technologies including natural language processing, machine learning, and computer vision, and evaluates the implications for intelligence gathering in the digital age. The research reveals that AI integration has fundamentally transformed OSINT capabilities, enabling automated data collection, enhanced analytical precision, and real-time threat detection. However, this technological evolution also introduces significant challenges including privacy concerns, algorithmic bias, and ethical considerations. Critically, despite remarkable advances in AI sophistication, these systems remain vulnerable to collection and analytical errors that human cognition can readily detect, highlighting the persistent risk of false results and the irreplaceable value of human oversight in intelligence validation. The findings suggest that while AIpowered OSINT represents a paradigm shift from reactive to proactive intelligence gathering, successful implementation requires careful consideration of ethical frameworks, regulatory compliance, and human oversight mechanisms.

Jibia border is a major entry point for goods and people into Nigeria from Niger Republic. In recent years, the border has become increasingly lawless, with rise in smuggling, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities. This study aims to examine the nature and extent of border crimes committed at Jibia border, and to identify the factors that contribute to these crimes. The study used a purely qualitative approach, utilizing data from in-depth interviews with key informants. The in-depth interviews explored the causes of border crimes and the motivations of criminals, the challenges faced by law enforcement agencies, and the strategies that can be used to reduce border crimes. The study found out that cross-border crimes are a major problem at Jibia border, and that these crimes have a significant negative impact on the local community and Nigeria's national security at large. The study also identified a number of implications of cross-border crimes at Jibia International Border in Katsina State on Nigeria's national security which include proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), terrorism, insurgency and violent extremist activities, human/drug trafficking, distorted economy and a host of others. The findings of this study are expected to inform the development of policies and interventions to reduce border crime at Jibia border. The study is also expected to raise awareness of the problem of border crime and its impact on surrounding communities

A combination of public speculations and avalanche of media reportage are suggestive of fading culture of border security giving rise to evolving organized crimes along popular borders between Nigeria and Benin Republic. The study sought to establish veracity or otherwise of the claim with a view to signpost possible implications via security lens. Study adopted descriptive design and empirical evidence from analyzed data indicated faded culture of border security and affirmed six genres of organized crimes namely human trafficking, vehicle smuggling, smuggling of contraband goods, smuggling of small arms and light weapons, drug trafficking and migrant smuggling, perpetrated at varying degrees with contributory causes being border porosity, ignorance of the crimes, lucrativity of the crimes, poverty and unemployment. The nefarious practices were affirmed and noted to constitute a huge burden on the nation in different spheres, security sphere in particular. Thus, upgraded digitization of border security operations via incorporation of aerial surveillance, training on inter-agency collaboration, sensitization of border area dwellers, strategic recruitment of personnel and national rebirth advocacy to encourage legitimate dealings along the corridor to rebuild the culture of border security intelligence among border community dwellers and rekindle sense of patriotism in border security operatives were recommended

The use of deception to achieve advantage in conflict and competition is as old as civilisation.  But recent technological advances – particularly those relating to social media – have empowered deception-based stratagems to a historically unprecedented extent.  The employment of deception by malign actors has societal-level consequences, impacting upon the work of many professions.  But arguably the profession most impacted here is the intelligence analyst:  whose core role is to separate falsehood from truth and to advise accordingly.  It is therefore critical that intelligence analysts are appropriately prepared to recognise and counter deception in the contemporary era.

In this paper we investigate the increased significance of deception in the contemporary era, and how to build analyst capacity and resilience to address it.  The paper opens by describing the drivers that have increased the utility of deception in the contemporary era.  The paper then discusses the success mechanisms of deception arising from cognitive psychology.  The paper then uses three vignettes – drawn from the military, public health, and whole of nation security domains - to demonstrate the requirement for analysts to identify and counter deception.  The paper then concludes with a discussion of how to foster increased analyst capability and resilience to detect deception.

Open-source intelligence (OSINT) and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) analysts are drowning in data. Social media streams, news feeds, satellite imagery and sensor networks produce petabytes of information per day, far beyond what a single analyst or even a traditional AI pipeline can digest. Today's AI systems typically operate as single-perspective models, optimizing for a task without questioning their own reasoning. Such models may hallucinate facts or overlook ethical considerations, and no single model excels across all domains. Inspired by the MAGI supercomputer from Neon Genesis Evangelion, this paper proposes a three-persona AI system that "argues with itself" to produce more balanced intelligence products. Our system comprises an Optimist (Melchior) who proposes creative hypotheses, a Skeptic (Balthazar) who fact-checks and challenges those hypotheses, and a Synthesizer/Judge (Caspar) who integrates both viewpoints into a decision. We describe how this triad can handle OSINT tasks such as propaganda fact-checking and GEOINT tasks such as satellite image annotation. Implementation considerations favour open-source tools and multi-agent debate frameworks to reduce bias and improve transparency. We assess potential advantages-reduced hallucinations, explicit reasoning chains and better uncertainty quantification-and discuss challenges including coordination overhead and ensuring diverse knowledge bases. The paper concludes that a multi-agent "internal debate" architecture can enhance national security analysis, provided that rigorous evaluation and ethical frameworks are in place.

This work approaches the Book of Revelation through the lens of intelligence analysis, applying structured methods such as the intelligence cycle, symbolic language decoding, and comparative scriptural mapping. The study emphasizes the internal consistency of apocalyptic symbols (heaven, sea, abyss, woman, beast) across Revelation and other biblical texts, while situating them within historical phases of Christian society. Unlike traditional theological or geographical readings, this analysis treats Revelation as a coded political-prophetic document, demonstrating how signifiers shift meaning depending on narrative and covenantal context. The aim is not to provide dogmatic interpretation but to supply an analytical framework useful for scholars, students, and independent researchers interested in eschatology, symbolic systems, and interdisciplinary approaches between religion and intelligence studies.

The effectiveness of intelligence operations is directly related to the conduct of intelligence officers and depends on their moral attitudes and system of values. The specifics of intelligence operations may lead to moral dilemmas in the behaviour of the officers. The operating methods of intelligence institutions include both ethical tactical elements and those that run counter to the generally accepted ethical principles that could discredit democracy and the fundamental values that the state advocates. This article analyses the ethical problems that are encountered in the process of using HUMINT, an intelligence method. The authors employ theoretical analysis to construct an initial integral behaviour model of the intelligence officer based on the context of choices and operational implications that could encourage further scientific discussion of the subject.

The effectiveness of intelligence operations is directly related to the conduct of intelligence officers and depends on their moral attitudes and system of values. The specifics of intelligence operations may lead to moral dilemmas in the behaviour of the officers. The operating methods of intelligence institutions include both ethical tactical elements and those that run counter to the generally accepted ethical principles that could discredit democracy and the fundamental values that the state advocates. This article analyses the ethical problems that are encountered in the process of using HUMINT, an intelligence method. The authors employ theoretical analysis to construct an initial integral behaviour model of the intelligence officer based on the context of choices and operational implications that could encourage further scientific discussion of the subject.

MASINT combines physics, engineering, and advanced data analytics to provide actionable intelligence from unconventional sources. The integration of radar, infrared, seismic, and spectral technologies makes MASINT a powerful tool in both military and civilian contexts.
As global threats become more complex and concealed, MASINT’s ability to detect the undetectable makes it an essential element in national security and defense. Learn more in Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASIN) courses by Tonex.

A combination of public speculations and avalanche of media reportage are suggestive of fading culture of border security giving rise to evolving organized crimes along popular borders between Nigeria and Benin Republic. The study sought to establish veracity or otherwise of the claim with a view to signpost possible implications via security lens. Study adopted descriptive design and empirical evidence from analyzed data indicated faded culture of border security and affirmed six genres of organized crimes namely human trafficking, vehicle smuggling, smuggling of contraband goods, smuggling of small arms and light weapons, drug trafficking and migrant smuggling, perpetrated at varying degrees with contributory causes being border porosity, ignorance of the crimes, lucrativity of the crimes, poverty and unemployment. The nefarious practices were affirmed and noted to constitute a huge burden on the nation in different spheres, security sphere in particular. Thus, upgraded digitization of border security operations via incorporation of aerial surveillance, training on inter-agency collaboration, sensitization of border area dwellers, strategic recruitment of personnel and national rebirth advocacy to encourage legitimate dealings along the corridor to rebuild the culture of border security intelligence among border community dwellers and rekindle sense of patriotism in border security operatives were recommended

The focus of this study is to identify and reduce Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) in the cloud environment of Amazon Web Services (AWS). Popular security frameworks like MITRE ATT&CK, Cyber-Kill Chain and Pyramid of Pain were employed to improve effectiveness of forensic investigation in cloud environments. Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) using Cloud Trail log data were analyzed in order to discover the efficiency of these frameworks in attack patterns identification. Findings from the study reveals that logs are crucial for identifying attack trends such as lateral movement, exfiltration of data, escalation of privileges in order to help improve understanding and analysis of APT activities in AWS environment, and the integration of frameworks such as MITRE ATT & CK, Cyber-Kill Pains and Pyramid of Pain provides strategies that are proactive to quelling advanced cyber adversaries

This article discusses the significance of international borders in Europe and Northeast Asia during the Cold War (1945-1989) and after. Using the concept of "moral hazard," the article examines what happens when great powers frequently violate the borders of neighboring countries without suffering adverse repercussions. Norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity are viable only if large countries are willing to uphold them most of the time. The Soviet Union used or threatened to use military force against East European countries on numerous occasions (1953, 1956, 1968, 1980-1981) with impunity. After the USSR broke apart, the Russian Federation adopted a similarly domineering policy toward the former Soviet republics. Russian forces in Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Belarus, and Ukraine served as instruments of Moscow's hegemony in those countries. Until 2014, Western governments made little or no effort to deter or counter Russian military encroachments in neighboring states. By then, under the principle of moral hazard, leaders in the Kremlin had come to believe that they could act with a free hand in the former USSR.

Even as it passed its seventieth anniversary, the 1953 coup in Iran has remained a hotly debated political topic. This is true in the public spheres of Iran, which saw its last democratically elected prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq, overthrown in the coup, and in those of the United States and the United Kingdom, which helped stage the ouster. 1 There also has been an attempt at historical revisionism about the coup, usually by overemphasizing the domestic factors that led to the coup and placing less importance on the role of the CIA or questioning Mossadeq's democratic credentials. This revisionism has been robustly rebutted by the scholarly community, which has held to a general consensus on the basic narrative of the coup: that it overthrew a popular leader and that it took place with significant interventions from London and Washington. 2 The release of the final batch of US documents related to the coup in 2017 (following many years of undue delay) also bolstered evidence for this consensus. 3 But, although most public debates about the coup center on questions such as the constitutional process of Mosaddeq's dismissal or the relative weight given to domestic and international actors behind the coup, there is another historiographical question that has been subject to widely divergent perspectives in the field: the relationship of the coup to the Cold War. In other words, can the 1953 coup be considered a Cold War confrontation, or is this a misleading frame of reference? Both sides of this argument have often focused on the motivations of coup plotters (mostly those in Washington, DC, and London) and whether they are more readily explained by a genuine fear of the communist movement in Iran or whether this was a rhetorical smokescreen, masking the neocolonial drive for the control of Iran's resources. This tension is not limited to scholarship on Iran. Even as new global histories of the Cold War have grown in recent years, some have cautioned against the use of this framework for understanding politics in the Global South. Jeremi Suri, for instance, speaks of a "group of scholars" who have

This paper presents a novel agent-based individuals from different communities of interest framework as a decision aid tool for intelligence analysis. represented by agents. This technology extends net-centric information processing and abstraction as well as fusion and multi-source Owing to their flexibility and dynamic nature, intelligent integration strategies. Our information agents traverse and agents are widely used as an interface between users and the mediate disparate ontologies in different formats providing a Internet applications. For example, Bollacker utilized an foundation for semantic interoperability. The presented agent that assists the user in searching for scientific system provides knowledge discovery by accessing a large literatures [3], Ackerman developed I-DIAG agent system number of information sources in a particular domain and to refine group collective discussions to be more condensed organizing them into a network of information agents. Each and strong knowledge [1], and Lieberman employed an agent provides expertise on a specific topic by drawing on agent for helping users browse the Internet by retrieving relevant information from other information agents in relevant documents according to users' browsing activities related knowledge domains. Unique advantages include net- [13]. Other attempts such as an information agent called centric scalability, principled information assurance, as well SurfAgent to automatically recommend relevant documents as ground breaking knowledge discovery in service of to users based on their profiles [18], or an agent-based intelligence analysis. brokering facilitation between users and various information resources utilize agents to assist users in retrieving

Organisations nowadays devote many resources in maintaining a robust security posture against emerging cyber-threats. This typically requires rapid response against newly identified or shared threat information so that appropriate countermeasures are immediately deployed to eliminate these threats or reduce the associated risks. For many shared indicators, like malicious IPs or URLs, such a response might only require minor modifications to the configuration of security appliances. Self-Healing systems are the mechanism that allows a system to discover any misconfigurations and apply the necessary corrections in an automated or semiautomated manner. This paper proposes such a mechanism that can be deployed within large organisations that either do not have the resources to devote in security and therefore automation is one of their main priorities, or they outsource their infrastructure's protection. The use of such a mechanism can relax the increased need for human resources and can also reduce response times in confronting emerging threats. The architecture and the details of a reference implementation for local public administrations is also provided. a

Threat intelligence sharing has become a cornerstone of cooperative and collaborative cybersecurity. Sources providing such data have become more widespread in recent years, ranging from public entities (driven by legislatorial changes) to commercial companies and open communities that provide threat intelligence in order to help organisations and individuals to better understand and assess the cyber threat landscape putting their systems at risk. Tool support to automatically process this information is emerging concurrently. It has been observed that the quality of information received by the sources varies significantly and that in order to assess the quality of a threat intelligence source it is not sufficient to only consider qualitative indications of the source itself, but it is necessary to monitor the data provided by the source continuously to be able to draw conclusions about the quality of information provided by a source. In this paper, we propose a methodology for evaluating cyber threat information sources based on quantitative parameters. The methodology aims to facilitate trust establishment to threat intelligence sources, based on a weighted evaluation method that allows each entity to adapt it to its own needs and priorities. The approach facilitates automated tools utilising threat intelligence, since information to be considered can be prioritised based on which source is trusted the most at the time the intelligence arrives.

The emerging risk of cybercrimes has compelled the organisations to shift their cyber defence strategy from reactive to proactive. In this paper, we have analysed various cyber threat intelligence models used by organizations with respect to their potential features, their methods of countermeasures, language specification of the threat indicators, whether they are open source or closed source, owning organization, acceptance parameters of security requirements and capability to measure the efficacy of cyber threat intelligence feeds. In addition to this, the paper also proposes a cyber-threat intelligence framework which overcome the problems found in existing models and frameworks. The proposed framework consists of three layers. Layer 1 consists of input layer data incoming from online and offline sources. Layer 2 preprocesses, classifies and filters the received data from layer 1. Layer 3, provides a detailed report using Elastic search-Logstash-Kibana (ELK) stack. The implementation result shows that the proposed model detects new generation malware effectively and fulfils all the security requirements as proposed in SANS Tools and Standards for Cyber Threat Intelligence Projects.

This paper explores the Iran-Israel conflict not as an isolated regional event, but as a programmable conflict within a global algorithmic framework. It introduces the concept of strategic blowback, where controlled crises escape their intended scripts, resulting in long-term instability. Through case studies (Afghanistan, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Palestine), the paper argues that political engineering via AI, proxies, and sanctions often miscalculates human memory, trauma, and rebellion. It also identifies counter-cases such as Turkey and South Africa that show partial resistance to algorithmic governance.

The basic role of the state is to satisfy the primary human need, namely the need for security. To this end, it uses a number of instruments of a diverse nature, and counterintelligence is one of them. The scope of counterintelligence services has gradually expanded over time and currently includes not only counteracting hostile intelligence (sometimes also allied intelligence) but also combating organized crime (especially international), preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism (including cyberterrorism), controlling economic turnover in the field of dual-use technologies, combating individuals and groups seeking to overthrow the prevailing political order by force, combating extremism, cryptology, securing government communications, and finally protecting one's own intelligence operations. Counterintelligence is a kind of alter ego of intelligence, it is, as it were, the other side of the same coin. Adding the prefix kontr makes the basic word its opposite. Counterintelligence, unlike intelligence, which is supposed to obtain necessary information, protects it and ensures its safety. It is worth remembering, however, that counterintelligence is not only a defensive
form of action, there is also offensive counterintelligence. Its aim, is to control the actions of the opponent, to manipulate them and influence them, to obtain information about the modus operandi the opponent, his contacts, interests, goals, state of knowledge. Therefore, counterintelligence should be referred to collecting information and taking actions to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or contract killings. Modern counterintelligence services face a number of new challenges, which are primarily related to the development of new ICT technologies, social media, and systems based on artificial intelligence, including machine espionage. They can be used to disrupt the
electoral process, cause social unrest or even revolution (color revolutions), spread disinformation through fake news or using deep technology fake. Since modern societies are information societies, they
are highly susceptible to information attacks aimed at persuading them to behave in a specific way, e.g. to vote for a specific candidate or protest against the policy of a given government. Modern information techniques allow for the manipulation of images and sounds, and thus enable the publication of false information, processed, manipulated to achieve a specific goal of information warfare. An example here is the deepfake technology, which, through ultra-realistic video materials, can change the perception of a given person in the public consciousness and influence the outcome of elections. Based on the above comments, it can be stated that today's counterintelligence, in addition to traditional challenges related
to the protection and protection of its own systems and information resources, as well as an active form of counteracting espionage, must keep up with the development of new ICT technologies, social media,
and systems based on artificial intelligence. Petrification in this area may lead to a decrease in its effectiveness, and consequently also to inefficiency and serious perturbations in the sphere of security.

Phishing campaigns are becoming more sophisticated, using encrypted communication platforms like telegram to coordinate their activities and store stolen information. This paper introduces a structured and scalable framework that supports cyber threat intelligence (CTI) efforts in monitoring malicious telegram channels linked to phishing activity.The framework is based on a combination of machine learning and human expertise, and it leverages a large dataset of telegram messages and their corresponding labels to train and evaluate the performance of the model. The methodology involves four interconnected stages: extracting hidden artifacts from phishing code, gaining unauthorized access to private telegram groups, analyzing collected data automatically, and implementing counterintelligence measures to prevent detection. Initial findings validate the framework's ability to detect indicators of compromise (IoCs) and visualize the attacker's infrastructure. Additional functionalities like integration with threat intelligence platforms and artificial intelligence-based data enrichment enhance the framework's versatility and usefulness. This method improves proactive communication monitoring, providing a secure and flexible solution for tracking adversarial communication channels.

The relationship between border securitisation and enhanced national security has garnered significant interest from scholars and analysts. Although scholars have examined various themes in border security, the majority concentrate on urban and semi-urban border regions, resulting in a significant gap in the study of remote border security. This study evaluates the characteristics of crime in rural border communities of Nigeria, along with the challenges and opportunities presented by the Buhari administration's approach to the securitisation of land borders. This research is grounded in securitisation theory and employs a qualitative methodology, utilising key informant telephone interviews supplemented by secondary sources. This study categorises rural border criminality into three distinct levels: Independent Marketers Gang (IMG), Retail Criminal Gang (RCG), and Service Providers Gang (SPG). The identified challenges encompass the porosity of Nigerian land borders, inefficient and centralised policing strategies, insufficient familiarity and sociolinguistic skills among security personnel, corruption among border security agents, strong sociocultural ties that obscure border distinctions, social alienation and underdevelopment of border communities, exploitation of ECOWAS and AfCFTA frameworks by criminals, and inadequate support from neighbouring countries such as Benin. The study advocates for Nigeria to implement a decentralised, community-oriented policing strategy tailored to the specific dynamics of each border region, encouraging local involvement in security initiatives. It also suggests the recruitment and deployment of security personnel with comprehensive knowledge of the local geography, languages, and cultural practices, alongside the provision of ongoing specialised training for border security agents, emphasising surveillance technology, cultural intelligence, and counter-smuggling techniques.

By submitting this thesis electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification.

What is ‘profiling leaders at a distance’ and why is it so important?
Greater understanding of a world leader’s decision-making process and leadership style can be obtained by the systematic examination of their background, words, and behavior. Renshon (2008) explains that many scholars have used the early work of Alexander L. George to “systematize the case study method in international relations analysis and place it on solid epistemological, conceptual, and empirical ground” (471). There are several approaches that can be used when developing the profile of a world leader. These include the psychobiography, operational code analysis, trait analysis, motive imagery, integrative complexity, self-monitoring, cognitive mapping, and authoritarian personality analysis. Systematic analysis methods have been used by analysts and decision-makers for several decades in an effort to increase the understanding regarding the influence of a world leader’s personality and nature on his/her political behavior.
The method of profiling analysis chosen for a specific project should suit the type of information sought.

Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, the Air Education and Training Command, the Air University, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited.

With UN peace operations involved in increasingly volatile and dangerous situations, there appears to be growing acceptance among member states that UN missions need greater capacity to generate intelligence, both to protect themselves and to fulfill their mandates more effectively. This policy paper strives to unpack the concept of intelligence in UN peace operations by explaining its needs and requirements, existing structures, and limitations and to clearly define the concept of intelligence within the limits of the UN’s fundamental principles and its multilateral and transparent nature. It aims to clarify and demystify the debate on intelligence in UN peace operations and to propose a specific UN approach. In order to reform and strengthen its analytical capacities and capabilities in peace operations, this paper proposes that the UN: - Develops a definition of intelligence different from the traditional military definition, which focuses on serving the national interest and ope...

Debido a las características particulares del mundo en el que nos encontramos se hacen especialmente importantes los análisis de inteligencia. En el presente trabajo se discute cómo funciona la mente humana en los análisis de inteligencia, centrando el objetivo en la incertidumbre, las valoraciones de la prueba, los juicios bajo presión y las limitaciones de tiempo, analizando cómo la estructura de nuestra maquinaria mental influye y constriñe los análisis de inteligencia. Nos ocuparemos del funcionamiento de la mente humana, y qué limitaciones encuentra centrándonos en cómo estas características cognitivas afectan a los analistas de inteligencia, cuando no se basan en hechos sesgados; además del impacto que el tiempo y la presión tienen en la exactitud de los resultados.     Due to the particular characteristics of the world in which we find ourselves, intelligence analysis becomes especially important. This paper discusses how the human mind works in intelligence analysis, focusin...

Risk Analysis and Crisis Management was designed in response to the acute need to strengthen the capacities for analysis and strategic intervention in the face of crisis situations, while contributing to the improvement of the human resource within the institutions with responsibilities in the field of public order and national security. Developed as part of an international cooperation initiative coordinated by INTERPOL, with the support of the Romanian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the course is primarily aimed at personnel in the intelligence analysis and decision-making support structures but is also relevant for operational personnel involved in the direct
management of critical events.

Gathering and analyzing information is something that police intelligence units are thought to do in relative isolation. The collection and analysis of intelligence has traditionally been the purview of well-insulated investigators and analysts who belong to specialized police divisions focusing on organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism. But intelligence work in the United States and many other democracies has been significantly transformed in recent years. It has become more collaborative, melding the police with an array of other actors. The confluence of three separate developments has driven this process. First, the rise of evidence-based approaches to law enforcement and crime prevention has placed a premium on creating dialogue among a heterogeneous mix of experts. Second, the police have increasingly come to value cooperation and intelligence inputs from a wider range of local and international sources, prompting efforts by intelligence analysts to make greater use of security partnerships. And third, law enforcement increasingly understands the need to build trust and enhance legitimacy in local communities. Trust and legitimacy encourage local leaders to report suspicious behavior, identify crime patterns, and predict riots and other threats to public order. Over the past several decades, accordingly, police have changed the ways they make sense of the world by including a mix of outsiders in their process of acquiring and assessing information. Successive waves of reforms have introduced community policing, problem-oriented policing, and intelligence-led policing into the day-to-day practices of law enforcement agencies in the English-speaking world and, increasingly, elsewhere. Many of these initiatives embrace what we call the 'partnership paradigm', in which law enforcement works with outsiders to analyze intelligence

Over the years, Intelligence has been a crucial part in Psychological practices.Basic operational definition behind construct of Intelligence proposed by Wechsler (1944), was to act purposefully (Plan and control behaviors) and thinking rationally (organize and direct behavior). This operational definition was afterwards incorporated in measures for intelligence but as these measures were first aligned with academics, a major part of basic definition got overlooked. Previously Intelligence was divided in two major components that are Crystalized and Fluid Intelligence but resent Literary Reaproach was intended to enlighten the basic purpose of Intelligence measures and to highlight the overlooked components of Intelligence.These components are then further aligned with behavioral interpretations of Executive functions.It is proposed that alliance of Fluid Intelligence with Executive Functioning can bring pronounced change in clinical practices and change the bookish views of Intelli...

Cohesion policy is one of the solutions to overcome the current crisis because the efficient use of its financial instruments determines the strengthening of the competitiveness of the European economy, the acceleration of economic growth and employment growth. The transposition of the economic and social cohesion in the territorial level is not new, but the economic development of the regions highlights that the gaps within states have widened over time. In this paper, we propose to evaluate the efficiency with which the European funds in Romania have been used so far by using a matrix for assessing regional competitiveness.

A multilayer hierarchical structure for an intelligent analysis system is described in this paper. Four levels (patients', measurement, Web-based, and interpreting) are used to collect massive amounts from clinical information and analyze it with both traditional and artificial intelligent methods. To support this, a novel fuzzy pain demand (FPD) index derived from the interval of each bolus of patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) is designed and documented in a large-scale clinical survey. The FPD index is modeled according to a fuzzy modeling algorithm to interpret the self-titration of the drug delivery. A total of 255 patients receiving intravenous PCA using morphine (1 mg/ml) tested this index by offline analysis from this system. We found the FPD index modeled from a fuzzy modeling algorithm to interpret the self-titration of the drug delivery can show the patients' dynamic demand and past efforts to overcome the postoperative pain. Moreover, it could become an online system to monitor patients' demand or intent to treat their pain so these factors could be entered into a patient's chart along with temperature, blood pressure, pulse, and respiration rates when medical practitioners check the patients. Index Terms-Fuzzy modeling algorithm, fuzzy pain demand (FPD) index, intelligent analysis system, intent to treat, multilayer hierarchical structure, patient-controlled analgesia (PCA). T HE need for a reliable and valid tool to measure pain is essential for any clinical practice or trial associated with pain treatment. However, the subjective feeling of pain is extremely hard to quantify [1]- . The current patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) method provides the patient with a pain-driven button that activates a pump to administer a bolus dose of analgesic at a fixed time interval (i.e., lockout time). And, the most commonly used measures of pain intensity, including visual analog scales (VASs), numerical rating scales Manuscript

Most exhaustive NDT techniques require large capital equipment, are difficult to apply to complex geometric structures and, above all, are time-consuming to use and some take a considerable time to complete. As a solution to the problems associated with NDT applications, there is a need to establish an intelligent analysis system that supports a portable testing environment, which allows various types of inputs and provides sufficient data regarding damage severity in the tested structure. Approach: This research investigated possible fast NDT systems and algorithms and provides a novel approach that allows engineers and researchers to pinpoint defects in real time. The system was based on incident signals on a composite surface being detected and analyzed. Any damage in the composite causes a change in the detected signal. The proposed technique is suitable for high volume monitoring and inspection of safety critical components non-destructively. It unified through conversion the extracted information from irrelevant background using the developed Classification Algorithm with the ability to correlate obtained data to level of damage and it is effect on the structure overall performance. Results: The feasibility of using time measurements to establish the integrity of RIM composites using a handheld, low frequency, electronic tapping device has been studied. The relationship between damage and component thickness had also been established. Conclusion: A mathematical model describing the composite time response and its relation to both level of damage and tensile strength was presented. An excellent agreement between the model and the testing data was observed. Also the credibility of the measuring device and its promising future as a cheap on line NDT testing instrument was proved.

Strategic Foreword: This essay will analyze and discuss the known asymmetric methods of warfare as deployed by Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah in contemporary Israel-Palestine conflicts. This abstract is an attempt to depict, in particular, the narrative, ideological, and political methods employed by Palestine's most well-known modern terrorist organization. This version of "The Crypto-Antisemitic methodology of Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah" will serve as the basis for further research, and future expansions. What is written is not made for consumption of audience that are not privy to narrative, ideological, and coercive forms of warfare. It is not a "propaganda piece for Zionism", it is a strategic hypothesis and analysis concerning the nature of HAMAS' Jihadist nature. 1 Capas de Hamas, hũa-Psychological Warfare and Ethical Erosion Crypto-antisemitism, as previously discussed, is defined as "crypto-antisemitism is a hidden variant of antisemitism that takes the masks of-whatever means is most socially acceptable for that particular environment. Antisemitism and crypto-antisemitism are both intersectional, but crypto-antisemitism is hard to prove, "coincidental' or purposefully enraging for Jewish people to provoke a socially damaging Jewish response." Naturally, the evolution of such doctrine can be applied in military strategy. Evidence of HAMAS occupying civilian infrastructure and militarizing explicitly civilian zones such as schools, hospitals, and houses of non-combatants is so widespread that all one must do to find such acts is perform a quick search. This is intentional and a combination of various aspects of warfare. The first aspect of the crypto-antisemitic methodology of HAMAS' asymmetrical warfare is psychological. The method of exposing Israeli soldiers to difficult situations, wherein the lives of comrades must be valued over the lives of others, is immense, but this may very well be, in some regard, intentional. In such warfare, where civilians are constantly at risk, soldiers are exposed continuously to moral and ethical crises, which

This article analyzes the role of intelligence in the intricate fight against international terrorism at the beginning of the 21st century. First, it considers the main trends of terrorism in the decade of the 1990s, what were the changes in the mode of action by the various organizations and how the intelligence services dealt with these challenges. Then it evaluates the threats lying ahead in the future years and the technological and socio-economical developments influencing them, including the threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. Finally, it analyzes the implications of the September 11 attacks from the operational and intelligence point of view. The work of intelligence against terrorism in the 21st century will be an arduous task, which will require a close look at new social and technological developments, an objective analysis of the new trends and threats, as well as much vision. Intelligence is essential in countering terrorism, in diminishing its tactical effects and strategic importance. The US Congress Report of the National Commission on Terrorism stressed that "good intelligence is the best weapon against international terrorism." But without a comprehensive, intelligent and firm policy of all the governments and political leaders involved, terrorism will continue to present a real threat to future generations.

Sensemaking has been described as a process involving information structuring. However, there are few detailed accounts of how this manifests in practice, particularly in relation to the creation and use of external representations such as data visualisations, and how such structuring aids sensemaking. To explore these questions in depth, we present an interview study of police crime analysts from which a model of their analysis process is developed. We describe the model focusing on the notion of 'think-steps', which for the analysts acted as a primary structuring concept. We describe how 'think-steps' propagate throughout the analysis process captured in the model. For the analysts, 'think-steps' are extensible templates that decompose a case into elements, provide a way of storing and visually structuring data, support generation of requests for information, focus research, simulate a case, and shape reporting. We reflect on the implications that our findi...

Sense-making plays an important role in Intelligence Analysis, but can be difficult to study in situ. Thus, it is common to use training exercises to study this phenomenon. In this paper, an exercise was undertaken by Military Intelligence personnel. The behaviour of groups of analysts is considered in terms the Data / Frame Model of Sense-making. The paper illustrates how Intelligence Analysis need not follow a linear process but often involves parallel and overlapping explorations of data, with multiple frames that might be minimal and sketchy. The use of representations, such as link diagrams, provides a means of externalizing frames and it is suggested that this shifts reasoning from deductive reasoning to abductive reasoning as the exercise progresses.

Netzah Yisrael Lo Yeshaker (NILI), a clandestine pro-British spying organization, is founded in Ottoman Turkish-ruled Palestine by Aharon Aaronsohn, his brother Alexander Aaronsohn, his sister Sarah Aaronsohn, Avshalom Feinberg, and the Belkind brothers. 1917 February: The first contact is made between the Netzah Yisrael Lo Yeshaker (NILI) center at Atlit and British intelligence in Cairo. The connection is maintained by sea for several months and the British receive useful information from the group. September: The Turks catch a carrier pigeon sent from Atlit to Egypt, furnishing clear proof of espionage within the Jewish population. One of the group, Na'aman Belkind, is captured by the Turks. 1 October: NILI is uncovered by the Turkish police; Turkish soldiers surround its members in Zikhron Ya'akov and arrest many people, including Sarah Aaronsohn. 5 October: Sarah Aaronsohn attempts suicide after four days of torture: she shoots and mortally wounds herself, dying on 9 October. 1919 May: Aharon Aaronsohn is killed in an air accident; Netzah Yisrael Lo Yeshaker (NILI) finally breaks up. 1920 The Haganah underground militia is officially established. 1936 Ezra Danin, together with Ephraim Dekel and Emmanuel Wilensky, lays the foundations of the Arab Department in the Haganah. 1939 The Mossad Le'Aliyah Beth is created to organize illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine. 1940 June: Shaul Avigur, in a memorandum to the Haganah command, proposes establishing a joint countrywide information service. September: Avigur's proposal goes into effect, and the Information Service (Sheruth Yedioth, or Shai), the Haganah's intelligence arm, is officially established. 1941 The Palmah underground militia creates the Syrian Platoon, commanded by Yisrael Ben-Yehuda and Yehoshua (Josh) Palmon, who have made a major specialist contribution to Shai; members of the platoon speak Arabic and operate in Syria. 1942 Due to World War II, the Mossad Le'Aliyah Beth activities are wholly suspended for the duration of the war. 1943 The Palmah sets up the Arab Platoon, a unit of combat and intelligence officers disguised as Arabs for covert missions. It is known by its codename Shahar. 1944 The Palmah sets up the German Platoon, consisting of Germanspeaking Palestinian Jews, commanded by Shimon Avidan. They are parachuted into Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe to encourage resistance and collect intelligence. The Mossad Le'Aliyah Beth activities are resumed when Palestinian Jews learn the full extent of the "Final Solution." 1945 Yolande Harmer is recruited in Egypt to the Political Department of the Jewish Agency during a visit to Egypt by the department's head, Moshe Sharett; posing as a journalist, she is considered one of the best spies in Egypt. July: Briha (Escape), an organization for the illegal immigration movement of Jews to Palestine from postwar Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe, begins activities. 1946 In Hadera, Palmah's Arab Platoon organizes courses on intelligence, as a result of cooperation between Zerubaval Vermal (Arbel), nicknamed Chifab, later a founder of combat intelligence in Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and Yehoshua Flomin. Participants are taught Arabic and hear lectures to gain an acquaintance with the Arabs. 1948 14 May: The State of Israel is declared. 15 May: Israel becomes an independent state. 7 June: Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, after consulting with Shai's acting director Reuven Shiloah, resolves to establish three intelligence organizations instead of Shai: Military Intelligence (MI), attached to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) General Staff; a domestic secret service, later known as the Israeli Security Agency (ISA); and a foreign intelligence service. The first two are initially subordinate to the IDF; the foreign intelligence service is intended to be subordinate to the minister of defense until the end of Israel's War of Independence. 29 June: Meir Tobianski is executed by firing squad after xx • CHRONOLOGY a field court-martial conducted by Shai members and presided over by Isser Be'eri. The charge is treason, based on circumstantial evidence. Tobianski is later cleared of espionage charges. 30 June: Shai is formally dismantled. Heker 2, an ultrasecret unit, is set up in the Political Department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Its missions are sabotage and propaganda behind enemy lines. Chaim Herzog is appointed director of Military Intelligence (DMI), holding this position until 1950. MI is assigned the responsibility for combat intelligence, operations security and counterespionage, listening, and censorship. July: The listening unit moves into the Tsahalon building in Jaffa. 22 July: Changes are made in the structure of the operations section of the IDF and intelligence. Functions formerly belonging to Shai are to merge into the Military Intelligence Service, under the IDF Operations Branch. The new body is to encompass the combat intelligence, censorship, and operations sections and will be headed by Be'eri. The head of the combat intelligence section is to be Binyamin Gibli. 30 July: MI is created under the IDF General Staff branch. Eventually this service is to become the Department of Intelligence. 1 August: Under Order 48/25, the Intelligence Service comes into force. 20 August: The first regulations of the Intelligence Service, drawn up by Herzog and Be'eri, are approved. 22 September: Yigael Yadin, head of Operations Branch, publishes a document defining the division of authority between MI and the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry. October: The offices of the Shai, headed by Be'eri, are transferred to the Green House in Jaffa. 1949 24 March: The original order of Intelligence Service is canceled, replaced by a new order prepared by Herzog; the Department of Intelligence in the General Staff is divided into branches called Military Intelligence Service (IS) with a number appended. April: A supreme committee for intelligence work is formed and chaired by Shiloah; later it is titled the Committee of Directors of the Intelligence Services, known by the Hebrew acronym VARASH. On the establishment of this committee, the Magic Carpet operation for secret airlifting of Yemeni Jews to Israel begins; by its end in September 1950 it will have brought some 45,000 out of 46,000 Yemeni Jews to Israel. 2 May: Ya'acov Buqa'i, disguised as an Arab en route to Syria on a spying mission, is caught by the Jordanian authorities. July: Shiloah proposes the creation of a central institution to enhance coordination and cooperation among CHRONOLOGY • xxi the intelligence services. 3 August: Buqa'i is tried and hanged in Amman. October: Isser Be'eri is tried for his part in the execution of Meir Tobianski. The court decides to discharge Be'eri from the military service. 13 December: Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion authorizes establishment of the "Institute [mossad] for Co-ordination" to oversee the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry and to coordinate internal security and military intelligence bodies. This is the birth date of the Mossad, then attached to the Foreign Ministry. Reuven Shiloah is appointed the Mossad's first director. 1950 The Ezra and Nehemia Operation is launched, whereby almost all Iraqi Jews are brought to Israel, first via Cyprus then directly; the operation continues until early 1952. April: Binyamin Gibli is made director of Military Intelligence (DMI) with promotion to colonel. He mainly develops apparatus for intelligence gathering. July: Yehoshafat Harkabi is appointed Gibli's deputy and boosts intelligence analysis. 1951 Ben-Gurion authorizes the final reorganization of the Mossad, making it an independent, centralized authority, capable of handling all overseas intelligence tasks. According to the proposal, which in the end does not materialize, the Mossad is supposed to be called the "Authority." It is meant to include representatives of the other two services, MI and the domestic security service. The Mossad then departs from the Foreign Ministry and reports directly to the prime minister, thus becoming part of the Prime Minister's Office. Major Max Binnet is assigned to an espionage mission in Egypt. March: Creation of Nativ, an intelligence organization responsible for Israel's connection with the Jews of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and for immigration to Israel from those countries. 1 April: The so-called Spies' Revolt erupts, sparked by the transfer of intelligence functions from the Foreign Ministry to the Mossad; the revolt is led by Asher Ben-Natan. May: In Egypt, Major Avraham Dar recruits young Jews for an espionage network. 1952 Avraham (Avri) El-Ad is recruited by MI's Unit 131 to command the Jewish espionage network in Egypt; later he betrays its members. 20 September: Shiloah resigns from the Mossad directorship, and Isser Harel, until then director of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), is appointed to the post. Izi Doroth replaces Harel as the ISA director. 1953 Amos Manor is appointed Israeli Security Agency (ISA) director. December: Official title of Military Intelligence (MI) is changed from xxii • CHRONOLOGY the Department of Intelligence to Directorate of Intelligence in the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), raising its status in the IDF hierarchy. 1954 2 July: Members of a Jewish espionage network in Egypt begin the Susannah Operation by planting small firebombs in several mailboxes in Alexandria. A series of sabotage acts, directed primarily against Western embassies and other institutions, is planned, attempting to prevent the British evacuation from Egypt. 14 July: In its second action, the network in Egypt firebombs the American libraries in Cairo and Alexandria. 23 July: After the third action of the network in Egypt, its members are caught. 26 July: First publication on the capture of the Susannah network in the Arabic press. Toward the end of the month, a furor erupts in Israel as to who gave the order to set up...

Netzah Yisrael Lo Yeshaker (NILI), a clandestine pro-British spying organization, is founded in Ottoman Turkish-ruled Palestine by Aharon Aaronsohn, his brother Alexander Aaronsohn, his sister Sarah Aaronsohn, Avshalom Feinberg, and the Belkind brothers. 1917 February: The first contact is made between the Netzah Yisrael Lo Yeshaker (NILI) center at Atlit and British intelligence in Cairo. The connection is maintained by sea for several months and the British receive useful information from the group. September: The Turks catch a carrier pigeon sent from Atlit to Egypt, furnishing clear proof of espionage within the Jewish population. One of the group, Na'aman Belkind, is captured by the Turks. 1 October: NILI is uncovered by the Turkish police; Turkish soldiers surround its members in Zikhron Ya'akov and arrest many people, including Sarah Aaronsohn. 5 October: Sarah Aaronsohn attempts suicide after four days of torture: she shoots and mortally wounds herself, dying on 9 October. 1919 May: Aharon Aaronsohn is killed in an air accident; Netzah Yisrael Lo Yeshaker (NILI) finally breaks up. 1920 The Haganah underground militia is officially established. 1936 Ezra Danin, together with Ephraim Dekel and Emmanuel Wilensky, lays the foundations of the Arab Department in the Haganah. 1939 The Mossad Le'Aliyah Beth is created to organize illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine. 1940 June: Shaul Avigur, in a memorandum to the Haganah command, proposes establishing a joint countrywide information service. September: Avigur's proposal goes into effect, and the Information Service (Sheruth Yedioth, or Shai), the Haganah's intelligence arm, is officially established. 1941 The Palmah underground militia creates the Syrian Platoon, commanded by Yisrael Ben-Yehuda and Yehoshua (Josh) Palmon, who have made a major specialist contribution to Shai; members of the platoon speak Arabic and operate in Syria. 1942 Due to World War II, the Mossad Le'Aliyah Beth activities are wholly suspended for the duration of the war. 1943 The Palmah sets up the Arab Platoon, a unit of combat and intelligence officers disguised as Arabs for covert missions. It is known by its codename Shahar. 1944 The Palmah sets up the German Platoon, consisting of Germanspeaking Palestinian Jews, commanded by Shimon Avidan. They are parachuted into Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe to encourage resistance and collect intelligence. The Mossad Le'Aliyah Beth activities are resumed when Palestinian Jews learn the full extent of the "Final Solution." 1945 Yolande Harmer is recruited in Egypt to the Political Department of the Jewish Agency during a visit to Egypt by the department's head, Moshe Sharett; posing as a journalist, she is considered one of the best spies in Egypt. July: Briha (Escape), an organization for the illegal immigration movement of Jews to Palestine from postwar Soviet-occupied Eastern Europe, begins activities. 1946 In Hadera, Palmah's Arab Platoon organizes courses on intelligence, as a result of cooperation between Zerubaval Vermal (Arbel), nicknamed Chifab, later a founder of combat intelligence in Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and Yehoshua Flomin. Participants are taught Arabic and hear lectures to gain an acquaintance with the Arabs. 1948 14 May: The State of Israel is declared. 15 May: Israel becomes an independent state. 7 June: Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, after consulting with Shai's acting director Reuven Shiloah, resolves to establish three intelligence organizations instead of Shai: Military Intelligence (MI), attached to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) General Staff; a domestic secret service, later known as the Israeli Security Agency (ISA); and a foreign intelligence service. The first two are initially subordinate to the IDF; the foreign intelligence service is intended to be subordinate to the minister of defense until the end of Israel's War of Independence. 29 June: Meir Tobianski is executed by firing squad after xx • CHRONOLOGY a field court-martial conducted by Shai members and presided over by Isser Be'eri. The charge is treason, based on circumstantial evidence. Tobianski is later cleared of espionage charges. 30 June: Shai is formally dismantled. Heker 2, an ultrasecret unit, is set up in the Political Department of the Israeli Foreign Ministry. Its missions are sabotage and propaganda behind enemy lines. Chaim Herzog is appointed director of Military Intelligence (DMI), holding this position until 1950. MI is assigned the responsibility for combat intelligence, operations security and counterespionage, listening, and censorship. July: The listening unit moves into the Tsahalon building in Jaffa. 22 July: Changes are made in the structure of the operations section of the IDF and intelligence. Functions formerly belonging to Shai are to merge into the Military Intelligence Service, under the IDF Operations Branch. The new body is to encompass the combat intelligence, censorship, and operations sections and will be headed by Be'eri. The head of the combat intelligence section is to be Binyamin Gibli. 30 July: MI is created under the IDF General Staff branch. Eventually this service is to become the Department of Intelligence. 1 August: Under Order 48/25, the Intelligence Service comes into force. 20 August: The first regulations of the Intelligence Service, drawn up by Herzog and Be'eri, are approved. 22 September: Yigael Yadin, head of Operations Branch, publishes a document defining the division of authority between MI and the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry. October: The offices of the Shai, headed by Be'eri, are transferred to the Green House in Jaffa. 1949 24 March: The original order of Intelligence Service is canceled, replaced by a new order prepared by Herzog; the Department of Intelligence in the General Staff is divided into branches called Military Intelligence Service (IS) with a number appended. April: A supreme committee for intelligence work is formed and chaired by Shiloah; later it is titled the Committee of Directors of the Intelligence Services, known by the Hebrew acronym VARASH. On the establishment of this committee, the Magic Carpet operation for secret airlifting of Yemeni Jews to Israel begins; by its end in September 1950 it will have brought some 45,000 out of 46,000 Yemeni Jews to Israel. 2 May: Ya'acov Buqa'i, disguised as an Arab en route to Syria on a spying mission, is caught by the Jordanian authorities. July: Shiloah proposes the creation of a central institution to enhance coordination and cooperation among CHRONOLOGY • xxi the intelligence services. 3 August: Buqa'i is tried and hanged in Amman. October: Isser Be'eri is tried for his part in the execution of Meir Tobianski. The court decides to discharge Be'eri from the military service. 13 December: Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion authorizes establishment of the "Institute [mossad] for Co-ordination" to oversee the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry and to coordinate internal security and military intelligence bodies. This is the birth date of the Mossad, then attached to the Foreign Ministry. Reuven Shiloah is appointed the Mossad's first director. 1950 The Ezra and Nehemia Operation is launched, whereby almost all Iraqi Jews are brought to Israel, first via Cyprus then directly; the operation continues until early 1952. April: Binyamin Gibli is made director of Military Intelligence (DMI) with promotion to colonel. He mainly develops apparatus for intelligence gathering. July: Yehoshafat Harkabi is appointed Gibli's deputy and boosts intelligence analysis. 1951 Ben-Gurion authorizes the final reorganization of the Mossad, making it an independent, centralized authority, capable of handling all overseas intelligence tasks. According to the proposal, which in the end does not materialize, the Mossad is supposed to be called the "Authority." It is meant to include representatives of the other two services, MI and the domestic security service. The Mossad then departs from the Foreign Ministry and reports directly to the prime minister, thus becoming part of the Prime Minister's Office. Major Max Binnet is assigned to an espionage mission in Egypt. March: Creation of Nativ, an intelligence organization responsible for Israel's connection with the Jews of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and for immigration to Israel from those countries. 1 April: The so-called Spies' Revolt erupts, sparked by the transfer of intelligence functions from the Foreign Ministry to the Mossad; the revolt is led by Asher Ben-Natan. May: In Egypt, Major Avraham Dar recruits young Jews for an espionage network. 1952 Avraham (Avri) El-Ad is recruited by MI's Unit 131 to command the Jewish espionage network in Egypt; later he betrays its members. 20 September: Shiloah resigns from the Mossad directorship, and Isser Harel, until then director of the Israeli Security Agency (ISA), is appointed to the post. Izi Doroth replaces Harel as the ISA director. 1953 Amos Manor is appointed Israeli Security Agency (ISA) director. December: Official title of Military Intelligence (MI) is changed from xxii • CHRONOLOGY the Department of Intelligence to Directorate of Intelligence in the General Staff of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), raising its status in the IDF hierarchy. 1954 2 July: Members of a Jewish espionage network in Egypt begin the Susannah Operation by planting small firebombs in several mailboxes in Alexandria. A series of sabotage acts, directed primarily against Western embassies and other institutions, is planned, attempting to prevent the British evacuation from Egypt. 14 July: In its second action, the network in Egypt firebombs the American libraries in Cairo and Alexandria. 23 July: After the third action of the network in Egypt, its members are caught. 26 July: First publication on the capture of the Susannah network in the Arabic press. Toward the end of the month, a furor erupts in Israel as to who gave the order to set up...

The problem of automatically recognizing a user's operational context, the implications of its shifting properties, and reacting in a dynamic manner is at the core of mission intelligence and decision making. Environments such as the OZONE Widget Framework 1 provide the foundation for capturing the objectives, actions and activities of the mission analyst and decision maker. By utilizing a "context container" that envelops an OZONE Application, we hypothesize that action and intent can be used to characterize user context with respect to operational modality (strategic, tactical, opportunistic, or random). As the analyst moves from one operational modality to another, we propose that information visualization techniques should adapt and present data and analysis pertinent to the new modality and to the trend of the shift. As a system captures the analyst's actions and decisions in response to the new visualizations, the context container has an opportunity to assess the analyst's perception of the information value, risk, uncertainty, prioritization, projection and insight with respect to the current context stage. This paper will describe a conceptual architecture for an adaptive work environment for inferring user behavior and interaction within the OZONE framework, in order to provide the decision-maker with context relevant information.

The motivation process is based on the motivational system that encompasses many generic causal variables (primary/secondary, internal/external, intrinsic/extrinsic, qualitative/ quantitative, measurable/non-measurable, etc.). Given their possible clustering, we develop an outline of a model of employee motivation to reveal clear differences between motivation, satisfaction before triggering, involvement, performance and satisfaction (fulfillment). In this context, we try to find as many answers to these questions: What are the components of the direct and continuous motivational system's impact on work? Will a motivated employee always get maximum performance? Is satisfaction always perceived by all the motivated employees? Will the motivated, satisfied and engaged at work employees always have superior performance? From our point of view, the answers to the last three questions are actually some disclaimers: there are no elements of motivation, which alone have a direct and continuous impact on performance (even though most managers consider that a motivated staff keeps the company competitive); there is no guarantee that all motivated employees always perceive satisfaction; it is not guaranteed that motivated, satisfied and committed employees will always get superior performance. In this article we will try to argue these points of view.

The motivation process is based on the motivational system that encompasses many generic causal variables (primary/secondary, internal/external, intrinsic/extrinsic, qualitative/ quantitative, measurable/non-measurable, etc.). Given their possible clustering, we develop an outline of a model of employee motivation to reveal clear differences between motivation, satisfaction before triggering, involvement, performance and satisfaction (fulfillment). In this context, we try to find as many answers to these questions: What are the components of the direct and continuous motivational system's impact on work? Will a motivated employee always get maximum performance? Is satisfaction always perceived by all the motivated employees? Will the motivated, satisfied and engaged at work employees always have superior performance? From our point of view, the answers to the last three questions are actually some disclaimers: there are no elements of motivation, which alone have a direct and continuous impact on performance (even though most managers consider that a motivated staff keeps the company competitive); there is no guarantee that all motivated employees always perceive satisfaction; it is not guaranteed that motivated, satisfied and committed employees will always get superior performance. In this article we will try to argue these points of view.