Free Will, Moral Responsibility

Recent research suggests that romantic love may be literally addictive. Although the exact nature of the relationship between love and addiction has been described in inconsistent terms throughout the literature, we offer a framework that distinguishes between a narrow view and a broad view of love addiction. The narrow view counts only the most extreme, harmful forms of love or love-related behaviors as being potentially addictive in nature. The broad view, by contrast, counts even basic social attachment as being on a spectrum of addictive motivations, underwritten by similar neurochemical processes as more conventional addictions. We argue that on either understanding of love-as-addiction, treatment decisions should hinge on considerations of harm and well-being rather than on definitions of disease. Implications for the ethical use of anti-love biotechnology are considered.

This paper explores how philosophical inquiry and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) can mutually benefit from each other to produce new methodological and reflexive directions in neo-liberal policy research to examine the phenomenon of ‘What is (going on here)’. Through this we argue that augmenting linguistic analysis with philosophical perspectives develops and supports CDA scholarship more broadly by accommodating the shifting complexity of social problems of ideologically driven inequality that are inbuilt through, in our case, social policy texts. In discussing philosophical-methodological issues, the paper argues for the need to continually adapt CDA to the particular data so as to remain sensitive to and avoid hegemonic tendencies in analysis. Through adopting the principles of a working methodology, we discuss a micro-meso-macro CDA framework that draws on the analytical concepts of movement, metaphorical superfluidity, thematic condensation, and surrealism to conceive of a research approach capable of examining and comprehending evolving discourses of political economies. The most immediate benefit of this framework is its capacity to illustrate how forms of valuations perpetuated by and through policy discourse are the motivational locus of meaning making insofar as they strongly inform the moral underpinning the ideology of economic growth.

This paper examines the way the metaphor of diversity provides a moral basis for inequality in Singapore’s meritocratic education system. Based upon a collection of policy texts from 2002 to 2012, our analysis illustrates that the metaphor of diversity in policy texts provides ways for systemic discrimination within the education system and that this inequality is given legitimacy as necessary through various moral discourses. The paper employs a critical discourse analysis that draws upon the relationship between language analysis, the philosophical study of valuation, and political economy as a composite formulation of values to highlight the ways in which an argument for inequality permeates policy from within a frame of meritocracy, and to analyse how changes associated with new modes of value determination serve to legitimize inequality.

1. The article questions and challenges the official meritocratic principle of ‘equal opportunities’ (Wong, 2000) in Singapore's education system. Drawing on Foucault's and Nietzsche's philosophical perspectives, there is an explicit illustration through an in-depth analysis of how inequality is inbuilt in policy report/speech.

2. Discourse builds in/tangible structures in society and greatly determines the possibilities of the now. As such, I am also arguing that it would be more difficult to 'help' any 'community' if the structural discrimination which has been deeply embedded, is not made explicit through national policies, and by this I mean an explicit illustration through an in-depth policy analysis of how inequality is inbuilt in Singapore's education policies. It may be through this that discriminatory structures could be substantially challenged.

An initial analysis of the original 1979 policy on primary school streaming which I conducted illustrates how dichotomous (arbitrary) categorization of pupils, i.e. 'slow' and 'fast' learners legitimates and sustains increasing institutional/structural access (over the years terms like 'talents' have been employed in policy discourse), of who gets privileged knowledge access. Through this, I also ask then to what ends do forms of 'categorization' or conventional designation entail? By this, given that categorization legitimizes structural access, my question is, what is 'Malay/Muslim community' and how is this categorization necessary?

3. Even though the analysis in the article was based on Singapore's education system, it provides possible ways of understanding how inequality is continuously being inbuilt through policies on the basis of the ideology that economic growth is the (only) way forward. A way to critique this ideology is to expose its underlying assumptions. I believe the findings have much resonance with the widening inequality across many developed nations, as Singapore's policies have parallels with that of the U.K., U.S., and international organizations such as the World Bank.

4. Economically considered, the transliteration of meritocratic discourse into the metaphor of diversity pinpoints how the appeal of development for all necessarily also demands the advance of inequity for the sake of the whole, i.e. advancing the 'growth with inequity' principle.

5. The analysis highlights that value judgments are continually at work in the policy discourse and that despite the strong discourse of meritocracy that the Singapore education system promotes, it is argued that it is in the interests of the Singapore people that 'talents' should get privileged access to knowledge as it is through this that more 'opportunities' for the rest of the population are created. The findings demonstrate that although the underlying assumptions of this 'logic' that has been constructed in policies are unsubstantiated, the logic is continuously legitimated through forms of e/valuations.



This article has been featured in websites such as: http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/04/150428105815.htm
http://www.eurasiareview.com/28042015-what-is-value-of-inequality-within-singapores-education-system/

This paper presents detailed methods for constructing a flexible philosophical–analytical model through which to apply the analytic principles of CDA for the interpretation of metaphors across policy texts. Drawing on a theoretical framing from Foucault and the augmentation of Nietzsche’s views on valuation, we sketch a framework for examining ways in which evaluative semantic categories can be linked to sociological theories in order to bring out their relevance for the purpose of critical discourse analysis. This multi-level research framework draws upon a relationship between language analysis, the philosophical study of valuation, and political economy as a composite formulation of values through which neo-liberalism is discursively entwined and progressed through a system of principles of e/valuation.

In an attempt to start rectifying a lamentable disparity in scholarship, we evince fruitful points of similarity and difference in the ideas of Simone de Beauvoir and Ayn Rand, paying particular attention to their views on long-term projects. Endorsing what might be called an “Ethic of Resolve,” Rand praises those who undertake sustained goal-directed actions such as careers. Beauvoir, however, endorses an “Ethic of Ambiguity” that makes her more skeptical about the prospects of carrying out lifelong projects without deluding oneself. Our study teases apart the strengths and drawbacks of these views.

In this essay, I will explore Jonathan Edwards’ theodicy and his response to those who criticized his doctrine of freedom of the will. Critics claim that Edwards’ doctrine of freedom of the will makes God the author of sin. Edwards argued that God was not the author of sin, but that he sought good even in the fall of humanity. He offers ten different arguments which I will examine chronologically over the course of this paper. He provides arguments in relation to patristic theology, medieval theology, and Reformed theology. I will expound on the historical background of his argumentation. My conclusion is that Edwards’ theodicy regarding the fall is well grounded in Christian tradition and offers a sound theological view for this issue.

Purpose -This paper aims to examine how to further embed CSR thinking and practice into corporations, particularly in emerging markets, by reviewing and drawing similarities between key issues faced by all senior managers, namely ethics, leadership, personal responsibility and trust.

ABSTRACT: This paper serves two purposes: (i) it can be used by students as an introduction to chapters 1-5 of book iii of the NE; (ii) it suggests an answer to the unresolved question what overall objective this section of the NE has. The paper focuses primarily on Aristotle’s theory of what makes us responsible for our actions and character. After some preliminary observations about praise, blame and responsibility (Section 2), it sets out in detail how all the key notions of NE iii 1-5 are interrelated (Sections 3-9). The setting-out of these interconnections makes it then possible to provide a comprehensive interpretation of the purpose of the passage. Its primary purpose is to explain how agents are responsible for their actions not just insofar as they are actions of this kind or that, but also insofar as they are noble or base: agents are responsible for their actions qua noble or base, because, typically via choice, their character dispositions are a causal factor of those actions (Section 10). The paper illustrates the different ways in which agents can be causes of their actions by means of Aristotle’s four basic types of agents (Section 11). A secondary purpose of NE iii 1-5 is to explain how agents can be held responsible for consequences of their actions (Section 12), in particular for their character dispositions insofar as these are noble or base, i.e. virtues or vices (Section 13). These two goals are not the only ones Aristotle pursues in the passage. But they are the ones Aristotle himself indicates in its first sentence and summarizes in its last paragraph; and the ones that give the passage a systematic unity. The paper also briefly consider the issues of freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice and free-will in the contexts in which they occur (i.e. in the final paragraphs of Sections 6, 7, 12, 13).

Is the non-therapeutic circumcision of infant males morally permissible? The most recent major developments in this long-simmering debate were (a) the 2012 release of a policy statement and technical report on circumcision by the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), and (b) the decision of a German court that ritual circumcision is an unconstitutional form of bodily injury. In this editorial I address the AAP's claims as well as evaluate religious motivations more specifically. I suggest that the AAP's "health benefits" arguments are weak, and that religious circumcision is in tension with post-Enlightenment ethical and legal norms--the root of much of the current controversy. I conclude by asking how this tension might begin to be resolved.

Il problema del libero arbitrio è tornato recentemente sulla scena filosofica grazie all'apporto di studi ed esperimenti neuroscientifici sulla volontà. Nel presente lavoro vengono trattati alcuni aspetti del problema del libero arbitrio e della volontà cosciente tra filosofia e scienza cognitiva.
Innanzitutto si definiscono le condizioni di un'azione libera (possibilità alternative e autodeterminazione) e si considera il rapporto fra libertà e determinismo illustrando pregi e difetti delle posizioni più rappresentate: le teorie della famiglia libertaria, il compatibilismo, lo scetticismo. Questa indagine conduce ad una conclusione scettica per cui il libero arbitrio risulta incoerente sia con una concezione deterministica che con una concezione indeterministica della realtà.
Viene discusso poi il rapporto fra aspetti fenomenici (soggettivi) della libertà e descrizione neuroscientifica: nello specifico viene indagato il rapporto fra decisione di compiere un'azione motoria e preparazione dell'azione a livello corticale. Alcuni recenti esperimenti presi in esame (sulla scia di quelli condotti da Benjamin Libet) mostrano che la consapevolezza cosciente della decisione di agire compare “in ritardo” rispetto all'attivazione corticale preparatoria al movimento. Grazie a questo ritardo sembra possibile prevedere in anticipo il momento in cui il soggetto agisce e l'esito della decisione. A ciò segue un'analisi di alcuni stati psicopatologici rilevanti (come la depersonalizzazione) in cui il senso dell'agency è compromesso.
Alla luce di tutto ciò viene illustrata l'ipotesi (sostenuta da D. Wegner e D. Dennett) che la volontà non rivesta un ruolo causale nel determinare le azioni, ma sia una sensazione frutto di un'autoattribuzione a posteriori del soggetto stesso: sarebbe dunque il prodotto di un'inferenza a posteriori rispetto ai correlati neuronali delle decisioni ed un meccanismo di attribuzione i cui deficit provocano una perdita del senso dell'agency.
Nelle conclusioni vengono delineate le teorie più recenti sulla volontà cosciente in relazione al rapporto fra filosofia della mente, neuroscienze, fenomenologia e psicologia.

The goal of the book is to present the latest research on the new challenges of data technologies. It will offer an overview of the social, ethical and legal problems posed by group profiling, big data and predictive analysis and of the different approaches and methods that can be used to address them. In doing so, it will help the reader to gain a better grasp of the ethical and legal conundrums posed by group profiling. The volume first maps the current and emerging uses of new data technologies and clarifies the promises and dangers of group profiling in real life situations. It then balances this with an analysis of how far the current legal paradigm grants group rights to privacy and data protection, and discusses possible routes to addressing these problems. Finally, an afterword gathers the conclusions reached by the different authors and discuss future perspectives on regulating new data technologies.

The aim of the present study was to investigate how basic moral sensitivity in bullying, moral disengagement in bullying and defender self-efficacy were related to different bystander behaviors in bullying. Therefore, we examined pathways that linked students' basic moral sensitivity, moral disengagement, and defender self-efficacy to different bystander behaviors in bullying situations. Three hundred and forty-seven teenagers completed a bullying survey. Findings indicated that compared with boys, girls expressed higher basic moral sensitivity in bullying, lower defender self-efficacy and moral disengagement in bullying. Results from the SEM showed that basic moral sensitivity in bullying was negatively related to pro-bully behavior and positively related to outsider and defender behavior, mediated by moral disengagement in bullying, which in turn was positively related to pro-bully behavior and negatively related to outsider and defender behavior. What differed in the relations between outsider and defender behaviors was the degree of defender self-efficacy.

This article (re-)introduces Risālat al-Bayān al-aẓhar, a short and by all appearances unfinished treatise by the Coptic scholar al-Rashīd Abū ’l-Khayr Ibn al-Ṭayyib (d. after 1270), to exemplify the pivotal role played by the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī during the ‘Renaissance’ of Copto-Arabic literature in the 13th and 14th centuries. Rāzī’s œuvre left its mark on both content and form of systematic religious thought in Eastern Christianity. Whilst the Risāla is available in a partial edition since 1938, it has never been studied so far. As we shall see, Ibn al-Ṭayyib’s critique of Rāzī’s deterministic concept of human agency as outlined in the Muḥaṣṣal came in an attempt to counteract what he perceived as a detrimental effect of the mounting popularity which Rāzī’s works enjoyed among contemporaneous Christian readers. The critique is based on a rich patchwork of sources that is characteristic of 13th century Copto-Arabic encyclopaedism.

In this thesis, our general aim is to describe the general organization of moral cognition, i.e. the set of psychological mechanisms involved in the formation of moral judgments. More precisely, we claim that, to achieve a full understanding of our moral psychology, we need to distinguish between three different kinds of moral judgments : moral judgments about what happens (good or bad), moral judgments about agents’ dispositions (praiseworthy or blameworthy) and judgments about agents’ responsibility for a given event. For each kind of moral judgment, we describe the underlying mechanism, and the way it interacts with the others. Finally, we draw some conclusions for moral psychology and philosophy.

In a much-publicized paper, Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) reported evidence that feelings of moral cleanliness are grounded in feelings of physical cleanliness: a threat to people’s moral purity leads them to seek, literally, to cleanse themselves. In an attempt to replicate and build upon these findings, we conducted a pilot study in which we unexpectedly failed to replicate the original results from the second study of Zhong and Liljenquist’s report. To investigate the source of this issue, we conducted a series of direct replications of Study 2 as reported in Zhong and Liljenquist (2006). We used the authors’ original materials and methods; we investigated samples that were more representative of the general population than in the original experiments; we investigated samples from different countries and cultures; and we substantially increased the power of our statistical tests. Nevertheless, we still failed to replicate Zhong and Liljenquist’s initial reported findings. Our research suggests that more work is needed to clarify the scope and robustness of the original results.

ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that the ‘discovery’ of the problem of causal determinism and freedom of decision in Greek philosophy is the result of a combination and mix-up of Aristotelian and Stoic thought in later antiquity; more precisely, a (mis-)interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of deliberate choice and action in the light of Stoic theory of determinism and moral responsibility. The (con-)fusion originates with the beginnings of Aristotle scholarship, at the latest in the early 2nd century AD. It undergoes several developments, absorbing Epictetan, Middle-Platonist, and Peripatetic ideas; and it leads eventually to a concept of freedom of decision and an exposition of the ‘free-will problem’ in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Fate and in the Mantissa ascribed to him.

The notion of a free will is a notion we have inherited from antiquity. It was first in antiquity that one came to think of human beings as having a free will. But, as with so many other notions we have inherited from antiquity, … we have to ask ourselves whether the notion of a free will has not outlived its usefulness, has not become a burden rather than of any real help in understanding ourselves and what we do." 1 I

Originally submitted: May, 2017. Last edited and expanded: November - December, 2024. In this research thesis we will discover that Augustine’s opinion that concupiscence was an evil, hereditary stain of original sin was not in line with the agreed-upon tradition of the earliest of Church fathers but there are strong arguments for believing that this opinion was based on non-Christian or spurious sources, the most probable direct source being the “Ambrosiaster” document. On this shaky foundation of the inheritance of concupiscence, Augustine built the idea of the massa damnata. It was a novel doctrine, since it was incompatible with the earlier Orthodox tradition. Augustine's claim that this denial of limbo and the positive damnation of unbaptized infants was part of the Catholic tradition, was a novelty to the Church universal. It was unsupported by early sources. This leads me to conclude that Augustine’s threefold philosophical structure of concupiscence, massa damnata and the positive damnation of unbaptized infants was not in accordance with “the faith which was once for all delivered to the saints” (Jude 1:3b, NKJV). The lack of orthodox evidence supporting an idea of genetically inheriting sin substantially weakens the basis as proffered by Augustine.

We argue that the fragility of contemporary marriages—and the corresponding high rates of divorce—can be explained (in large part) by a three-part mismatch: between our relationship values, our evolved psycho-biological natures, and our modern social, physical, and technological environment. “Love drugs” could help address this mismatch by boosting our psycho-biologies while keeping our values and our environment intact. While individual couples should be free to use pharmacological interventions to sustain and improve their romantic connection, we suggest that they may have an obligation to do so as well, in certain cases. Specifically, we argue that couples with offspring may have a special responsibility to enhance their relationships for the sake of their children. We outline an evolutionarily-informed research program for identifying promising biomedical enhancements of love and commitment.

"Argument (extrait)

[...] Ce mémoire ne procède donc pas à l’analyse exhaustive de la totalité de l’œuvre gidienne, dans toute la variété d’aspects qu’elle présente (bien qu’une telle analyse soit implicite) ; nous ne nous lancerons pas, non plus, dans des analyses extensives tenant au côté esthétique de l’œuvre gidienne, car ce serait visiblement hors sujet, sauf prou certains cas où le style contribue sensiblement à l’idée; car ce qui nous préoccupe ici, est le coté extra-esthétique de l’œuvre de Gide, c'est-à-dire sa philosophie des valeurs. Nous essayerons d’en trouver le principe d’unité concernant la morale, les attitudes [...] immoralistes envisagées, les particularités de la vision immoraliste gidienne qui en ressortent et les modalités d’expression littéraire du système axiologique gidien – aspects de si grand intérêt, d’ailleurs, pour une réception correcte de Gide.
Nous avons structuré notre mémoire en trois grandes parties : la première traitera de l’immoralisme gidien d’une perspective culturelle intégrative, afin de le décrire comme point culminant d’une évolution naturelle (et nécessaire) de la culture (ceci, en contrepoint des théories le qualifiant de dérogation destructive) ; la deuxième section analysera sa genèse et ses manifestations internes, par une approche dissociative qui tentera de trouver et d’expliciter le spécifique de l’immoralisme de Gide, en le traitant dans son déterminisme intime, d’un côté, et en comparaison avec ses influences majeures, de l’autre ; la troisième partie est une démarche appliquée, qui suivra l’immoralisme Gidien à l’œuvre : ses topoï littéraires et leur fonctionnement. À ces trois grandes parties correspondent, évidemment, les trois chapitres du mémoire : le premier, André Gide et la filiation immoraliste ; le deuxième, Le Devenir immoraliste de la conscience gidienne : désagrégation ou délivrance ? et respectivement le troisième, L’immoralisme gidien à l’œuvre : les topoï immoralistes et la nouvelle axiologie. [...]"

"The modal ontology of Dionysius is structured as an alethic modal logic containing the axioms K + D + CD. The three-stage hierarchies together with the negation of the being (through the evil) as the fourth accessible state form the full logical square (being = possibility, well-being = perfection = necessity, illumination = internal negation of being, non-being = impossibility = external negation of being). The evil has no existence at all because it is a logical connective (external negation of being).
This logic has much in common but also much at odds with Leibniz's and his Spanish Jesuit predecessors' *deontic* logic of the "moral necessity" imposed on the divine Providence. Both have, however, the unique accessibility relation (in Kripke frames). In Dionysius, no deontic logic could be imposed on God, but the deontic logic for humans who try to be saved (= deified), that is the logic of ascetics (different from the deontic logic of Church law) has shift reflexive accessibility relation.
The main differences between Leibniz and Spanish Jesuits, on the one side, and Dionysius and the Eastern patristics, on the other side, result from their different theological attitutdes. The West did not know the Eastern doctrine of deification, and, moreover, these Western thinkers were Augustinians who deliberately tried to avoid what they called "Semi-Pelagianism" but what, in fact, was the normative teaching of the Eastern Fathers on the free will."

The question of freedom is recurrent in the theory of habitus. In this paper I propose that the notion of freedom is an essential and necessary component for the coherence of the analyses which mobilize habitus both in terms of their theoretical articulation and in terms of their grounding in empirical reality. This argument can seem surprising considering that the theory of habitus has often been accused of being deterministic. Yet I show that, from an epistemological point of view, habitus theory is not deterministic. Bourdieu’s treatment of this concept implies at least three principles that exclude determinism: (1) the production of an infinite number of behaviors from a limited number of principles, (2) permanent mutation, and (3) the intensive and extensive limits of sociological understanding. After identifying and describing these principles, I show the reason for their incompatibility with a deterministic perspective and consider their implications for the corresponding model of action. I illustrate this analysis by a discussion of Loïc Wacquant’s carnal sociology of the pugilistic universe which reveals why it is essential to understand and explain the relation between habitus and freedom.

The manuscript seeks to inquire into poststructuralist theorizing of the contexts and conditions of the subject’s continuous emergence and focuses on the importance of subject formation with regard to ethical theories on responsibility by reading Butler and her authors. Rather than reading Butler as a theorist of gender and sexuality in a narrow sense -- as has been the prevalent way of engaging her work in the existing literature to this day -- this work strives to understand and demonstrate the pertinence of Butler’s thinking for critical theory and philosophy as these are concerned with ethics and with the question of the subject as more broadly construed. I argue that response and responsibility are crucial modes of subject formation. The trajectory of my dissertation -- inquiring into Butler’s readings of Hegel, Nietzsche, Althusser, Levinas, Freud, Foucault, and Kierkegaard -- draws out the implications of what it means to theorize subject formation. Approaching the question of the subject through the question of its emergence offers important avenues to unearth how at their very core subject formation and the enterprise to give an account thereof are ethical questions and have decisive bearings on what kind of ethical theorizing will subsequently become available. Main issues in the manuscript are the precariousness of life, the role of others, desire and the unattainability of satisfaction, the implication and dispossession by social norms that always precede and exceed us, and the primacy of others and their addressing us, which means that responding and responsibility are crucial modalities of subject formation.

According to some people, diverse findings in the cognitive and neurosciences suggest that free will is an illusion: We experience ourselves as agents, but in fact our brains decide, initiate, and judge before ‘we’ do (Soon, Brass, Heinze and Haynes 2008; Libet and Gleason 1983). Others have replied that the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘our brains’ makes no sense (e.g., Dennett 2003)  or that scientists misperceive the conceptual relations that hold between free will and responsibility (Roskies 2006). Many others regard the neuro-scientific findings as irrelevant to their views on free will. They do not believe that determinist processes are incompatible with free will to begin with, hence, do not understand why deterministic processes in our brain would be (see Sie and Wouters 2008, 2010). That latter response should be understood against the background of the philosophical free will discussion. In philosophy, free will is tradionally approached as a metaphysical problem, one that needs to be dealt with in order to discuss the legitimacy of our practices of responsibility. The emergence of our moral practices is seen as a result of the assumption that we possess free will (or some capacity associated with it) and the main question discussed is whether that assumption is compatible with determinism.  In this chapter we want to steer clear from this 'metaphysical' discussion.
The question we are interested in in this chapter, is whether the above mentioned scientific findings are relevant to our use of the concept of free will when that concept is approached from a different angle. We call this different angle the 'pragmatic sentimentalist'-approach to free will (hereafter the PS-approach).  This approach can be traced back to Peter F. Strawson’s influential essay “Freedom and Resentment”(Strawson 1962).  Contrary to the metaphysical approach, the PS-approach does not understand free will as a concept that somehow precedes our moral practices. Rather it is assumed that everyday talk of free will naturally arises in a practice that is characterized by certain reactive attitudes that we take towards one another. This is why it is called 'sentimentalist.' In this approach, the practical purposes of the concept of free will are put central stage. This is why it is called 'pragmatist.'

The article approaches the interpretation of the principle of karma as suggested in a sideline in Watsuji Tetsurō’s early reading of the philosophy of Dōgen: Karma is the historic, conditioned origin of how our being is enacted at every single instant, of which each individual is the constantly renewed product. In a sense, any sentient existence in the world is thus karmic because it has a history. The consequences of the problem thus posed are explored in the context of the question of subjectivity, causality, and free will, reformulated here as the problem of “genuine choice,” the position where different inputs, such as desires, moral codes, and duties, prompt a person to choose between contradictory courses of action. The results of this analysis are then used to develop a rationalistic reading of one of Dōgen’s key terms, shinjin datsuraku (“casting off the bodymind”), building on Tsujiguchi Yūichirō’s recent work, as the refusal of a person to succumb to her primary karmic determination or to follow the most readily available course of action that her biological, social, and mental structures propose to her.

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The soul, duly prepared by exhortation to the study of true philosophy, finds herself in gradually advancing to the greater from the less. It should be noted that the one-paragraph reference to Olympiodorus herein (p. 9), while perfectly congruous with the exposition, is strictly impossible as he was in fact much posterior in historical time to Iamblichus. This editorial interpolation was mistakenly left in the final draft years before it was subsequently uploaded, an error for which the editor apologizes. No reader has ever noticed or objected to this mistake, and so we are not going to correct it now. Undoubtedly, neither Iamblichus nor Olympiodorus would object in spirit, for they were not mere philologists, and both of them are quoted correctly herein. They are in fact spiritual brothers and work together in this presentation for the true benefit of souls. It is like the friendly table talk between Callimachus (d. 240 B.C.) and Heraclitus portrayed in a beautiful and philosophically accurate woodcut published in 'The Dial' just before it ceased publication about a century ago--it could never have happened but it should have and (at least in the mind of Callimachus) did indeed occur, or so the artist surmised.

ABSTRACT: This is a short companion piece to my ‘Found in Translation – Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics III.5 1113b7-8 and its Reception’ in which I examine in close textual analysis the philosophical question whether these two lines from the Nicomachean Ethics provide any evidence that Aristotle discussed free choice – as is not infrequently assumed. The result is that they do not, and that the claim that they do tends to be based on a mistranslation of the Greek. (There is some inevitable overlap with Part 1 of the 'Found in Translation' paper.)

ABSTRACT: 1. This paper argues that Epicurus had a notion of moral responsibility based on the agent’s causal responsibility, as opposed to the agent’s ability to act or choose otherwise; that Epicurus considered it a necessary condition for praising or blaming an agent for an action, that it was the agent and not something else that brought the action about. Thus, the central question of moral responsibility was whether the agent was the, or a, cause of the action, or whether the agent was forced to act by something else. Actions could be attributed to agents because it is in their actions that the agents, qua moral beings, manifest themselves. 2. As a result, the question of moral development becomes all important. The paper collects and discusses the evidence for Epicurus views on moral development, i.e. (i) on how humans become moral beings and (ii) on how humans can become morally better. It becomes clear that Epicurus envisaged a complex web of hereditary and environmental factors to shape the moral aspect of a human being. 3. In line with Epicurus’ theory of moral responsibility and moral development, Epicurus ethics does not have the function of developing or justifying a moral system that allows for the effective allocation of praise and blame. Rather, for him the function of ethics – and in fact of the whole of philosophy – is to give everyone a chance to morally improve.

For David Hodgson, human beings must be free—in some sense adequate to ground personal responsibility—and it becomes the work of his book to demonstrate how. The premises he starts with, however, simply do not lead to the conclusion he would like us to draw. Or they do not without smuggling in a trainload of assumptions all along the way. Hence, although the project sets out with great promise, the reader is left with little more than a sort of “free-will-of-the-gaps.”

There is a concern that causal determinism might render free-will impossible. I compare some different perspectives, namely Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Libertarianism, and Hard Determinism, and conclude that Hard Determinism is correct—we lack free-will. To further bolster the case, I consider the work of Libet, who has found neuropsychological evidence that our brains non-consciously cause our actions, prior to our being aware of it. Thus we are also not choosing consciously. I then consider Dennett’s work on the role of the conscious self. I defend his model—of a fragmented self—which could not cause our actions. Finally I argue that many things that free-will purportedly provides, eg., justification for the penal system and reactive attitudes, can be reconstructed without free-will. I then end with some speculations about why people still want free-will.

La question des rapports entre le destin comme force cosmique, la providence divine, et le libre arbitre individuel figure parmi les plus tenaces dans la pensée et la religion gréco-romaines, au moins à partir de la période hellénistique 1 . Les positions des anciennes écoles philosophiques sur cette question sont nuancées; qui plus est, elles changent selon l'époque et le point de vue des philosophes individuels concernés. Néanmoins, si on en reste au niveau grossièrement simplificateur des doxographies anciennes, on peut dire que les Épicuréens nient la providence et acceptent le déterminisme, tout en essayant de sauvegarder la liberté et la responsabilité humaines par leur doctrine du climamen. Pour les stoïciens, les choses extérieures sont gouvernées par le destin (heimarmenê), envisagé comme une chaîne infinie, éternelle et incontournable de causes et d'effets, mais le choix moral est laissé à l'initiative

Hannah Arendt’s concept of the banality of evil is sometimes read as ‘letting off’ Eichmann, by portraying him as a moral idiot who was unable to think for himself. While I ultimately reject such readings of Arendt, I do reach a similar conclusion, via a different route, by arguing that Arendt’s account of the ‘nobody’ does undermine the grounds for ascribing responsibility to Eichmann. Thankfully, though, this unfortunate conclusion can be avoided by revising the concept of the banality of evil.

We begin in section I by considering two different routes to free will skepticism. The first denies the causal efficacy of the types of willing required for free will and receives its contemporary impetus from pioneering work in neuroscience by Benjamin Libet, Daniel Wegner, and John-Dylan Haynes. The second, which is more common in the philosophical literature, does not deny the causal efficacy of the will but instead claims that whether this causal efficacy is deterministic or indeterministic, it does not achieve the level of control to count as free will by the standards of the historical debate. We argue that while there are compelling objections to the first route—e.g., Al Mele (2009), Eddy Nahmias (2002, 2011), and Neil Levy (2005)—the second route to free will skepticism remains intact. In section II we argue that free will skepticism allows for a workable morality, and, rather than negatively impacting our personal relationships and meaning in life, may well improve our well-being and our relationships to others since it would tend to eradicate an often destructive form of moral anger. In section III we argue that free will skepticism allows for adequate ways of responding to criminal behavior—in particular, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alternation of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justified and sufficient for good social policy. We present and defend our own preferred model for dealing with dangerous criminals, an incapacitation account built on the right to self-protection analogous to the justification for quarantine (see Pereboom 2001, 2013, 2014a; Caruso 2016), and we respond to recent objections to it by Michael Corrado and John Lemos.

Purpose–The purpose of this paper is to introduce practitioners to the appropriate use of measures of unethical behaviour, evaluate the use of integrity-related assessments for use in personnel selection, and determine the validity of the moral competency index (MCI) instrument using standard validation procedures. Design/methodology/approach–Content, construct, convergent and discriminant approaches are applied to establish the relative validity of the assessment tool.

Fundamental beliefs about free will and moral responsibility are often thought to shape our ability to have healthy relationships with others and ourselves. Emotional reactions have also been shown to have an important and pervasive impact on judgments and behaviors. Recent research suggests that emotional reactions play a prominent role in judgments about free will, influencing judgments about determinism’s relation to free will and moral responsibility.
However, the extent to which affect influences these judgments is unclear. We conducted a metaanalysis to estimate the impact of affect. Our meta-analysis indicates that beliefs in free will are largely robust to emotional reactions.