Free Will, Moral Responsibility

This paper addresses the praiseworthiness dilemma posed by Taylor Cyr and Matthew Flummer, which questions whether faith, as a fulfillment of moral obligation, warrants moral praise. By examining two theological concerns—Semi-Pelagianism and the Praiseworthiness Worry—the paper explores the tension between human faith and divine grace. After analyzing three strategies proposed by Cyr and Flummer, I argue that while fulfilling obligations may demonstrate praiseworthy traits, it does not inherently render individuals praiseworthy. The proposed framework reconciles faith as moral duty with God's praiseworthiness, alleviating the issue of moral praise.

In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant denies K. L. Reinhold's definition of free will as the capacity to choose for or against the moral law. Kant notoriously calls the possibility of deviating from the moral law an incapacity, leading commentators to attribute to Kant the view that immoral action is not free. I argue that this claim instead pertains to the proper definition of free will. This reading elucidates the connection between Kant's commitment to free immoral action and his restriction of the concept of free will to pure reason's ability to be practical independently of sensible necessitation.

This paper investigates the relationship between Reinhold’s account of
free will and Kant’s account in the Religion. This relationship is important because Reinhold considered Kant’s treatment of free will in the Religion to confirm his own view that freedom consists in the capacity to choose for or against the moral law. I argue that despite their shared commitment to freedom as a necessary condition for imputation, these two thinkers have disparate conceptions of the ground for the exercise of free will. This difference indicates difficulties in their respective accounts.

In this paper, I consider the potential implications of the observation that epistemic judgment seems to be less emotional than moral judgment. I argue that regardless of whether emotions are necessary for blame, blaming emotions do play an important epistemic role in the moral domain. They allow us to grasp propositions about moral blameworthiness and thereby to appreciate their significance in a special way. Further, I argue that if we generally lack blaming emotions in the epistemic domain, then we are unable to grasp propositions about epistemic blameworthiness. As a result, regardless of one's theory of epistemic blame, there emerges a tension between the claims that we are epistemically blameworthy for our epistemic failings and the claim that we do not feel epistemic blaming emotions.

We propose a reformulation of gravitation and matter in which entropy S is the sole fundamental driver of physical phenomena. Matter, space, and gravity are emergent consequences of entropic expansion, with the gravitational constant G redefined as a local contingent parameter. This framework yields a falsifiable prediction: particle-space coupling may cause measurable violations of the equivalence principle. "Before light, before space, before time-there was only the will to unfold. That will is entropy.

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the biography and posthumous cult of Arsinoe III (c. 245–204 BC), Queen of Ptolemaic Egypt and sister-wife of Ptolemy IV. It revises the established image from ancient narratives of the queen as a passive victim of court intrigues, proving her significant influence on state affairs. A key event associated with her was participation in the Battle of Raphia (217 BC), where her presence and address to the troops bolstered their morale. Arsinoe III actively acted as a patron of the arts: her substantial donations and support for the Muses festival in Thespiae, alongside her contribution to completing the Temple of Homer in Alexandria, attested to her broad diplomatic influence. Her tragic death in 204 BC is interpreted as resulting from the struggle for the regency over the underage Ptolemy V. Particular focus is given to her unique posthumous cult. Established only in 199/198 BC, five years after her death, this cult featured a specific institution of priestesses serving for decades (unlike the annually rotated priestesses of other queens). It became one of the instruments for legitimizing Ptolemy V's power during crises. The cult's endurance, maintaining administrative functions even during revolts, demonstrates its importance to the dynasty as a mechanism for sacralizing power and connecting with elites.

In this essay I study the circumstances in which a person is responsible for acting on their delusions. Basic and general views of moral responsibility tend to allude to ideas about whether agents understand the consequences of their actions, and whether they have the capacity not to perform the specific actions in question. This area of study becomes more complex, however, when psychotic symptoms such as delusions become part of the conversation.

Schelling am Scheideweg der deutschen politischen Philosophie Der Name Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling steht selten an der Spitze von Diskussionen über die politische Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus. Die traditionelle Geschichtsschreibung hat diesen Platz Johann Gottlieb Fichte zugewiesen, mit seinem revolutionären Konzept des "absoluten Ichs" als Grundlage für Recht und Staat, sowie G. W. F. Hegel, dessen gipfelndes System in der Philosophie des Rechts die endgültige Synthese von Ethik, Moralität und Politik zu bieten scheint. Schelling wird seinerseits oft als "Naturphilosoph" oder "später Mystiker" wahrgenommen, dessen Interessen sich der Ästhetik und Theologie zuwandten und ihn von der praktischen Sphäre entfernten. Diese Wahrnehmung ist jedoch irreführend. Im Laufe seiner fruchtbaren Karriere war Schellings politisches Denken ein ständiges Anliegen, obwohl es nie in einer einzigen Abhandlung einheitlich dargestellt wurde. Vielmehr sind seine Ideen über den Staat, die Geschichte und die Freiheit eng mit den großen Veränderungen in seinem gesamten philosophischen System verflochten. Um Schelling als politischen Philosophen zu verstehen, ist es notwendig, die Entwicklung seines Denkens zu verfolgen, von seinem frühen Idealismus in Jena bis zu seiner späten Offenbarungsphilosophie in München. Der rote Faden ist sein unermüdlicher Versuch, über den bloßen Rationalismus der Aufklärung hinauszugehen, um die lebendige und organische Grundlage des Staates und der Freiheit zu finden. In diesem Sinne war Schelling nicht nur ein Kritiker des Liberalismus und des Kontraktualismus, sondern ein Denker, der es wagte, die Politik in einem breiteren Horizont zu verorten: dem der Ontologie, der Ästhetik und schließlich der Theologie. II. Die Anfänge: Der Staat als rationaler Mechanismus oder als lebendiger Organismus Die erste Phase von Schellings politischem Denken ist durch seine Beziehung und den späteren Bruch mit Fichte geprägt. In seinen frühesten Schriften, wie Über das Wesen der Philosophie als Wissenschaft (1795), teilt Schelling die Fichte'sche Prämisse, dass Recht und Staat die notwendigen Bedingungen für die Verwirklichung des absoluten "Ichs" sind. Das Gesetz ist in diesem Zusammenhang keine äußere Beschränkung, sondern die Manifestation der Selbstrechtssetzung der Vernunft. Doch schon in diesem Stadium unterscheidet sich Schelling durch eine grundlegende Unzufriedenheit mit dem Kontraktualismus der Aufklärung, insbesondere mit den Ideen von Kant und Rousseau.

Within the unified framework of the Information-Causal Compression Field (ICCF), this paper establishes a complete causal chain that links the physical foundations of free will to the socio-psychological phenomenon of the causal echo chamber. We begin by redefining free will as the capacity of an Integrated Information Entity (IIE) to systematically select “high-action” (anti-entropic) paths, in opposition to the universe’s default “least-action” (entropic) tendency. On this basis, we argue that a universe capable of evolving life is itself the ultimate manifestation of the principle of least action, in an economic sense. Yet, the gift of free will confronts IIEs with two fundamental survival strategies: static stability and dynamic equilibrium. We then reveal the physical basis of conflict-seeking behavior, showing that polarization functions as a cognitive shortcut—a local least-action strategy—that bypasses the costly path of inner development. Ultimately, we demonstrate that the so-called causal echo chamber is not primarily an instrument of external manipulation, but a self-constructed cognitive prison, built by IIEs through the misuse of the very physical laws that make free will possible. This framework seeks to interpret human choice, conflict, and predicament within a unified physics grounded in first principles.

Quanto può dire su di me l’indagine dei fenomeni neurologici? Quanto rimane, dopo di ciò, del valore di me come essere umano? Queste domande sono risvolti della domanda centrale: quale rapporto c’è tra la fisiologia del mio cervello e la vita cosciente che sto vivendo? Alla sorgente della problematica, quindi lontano nella veduta, si trova un bivio che indirizza verso soluzioni contrapposte: c’è chi vuole che il mondo naturale esista indipendentemente dall’osservazione, dove non lo vedo e non lo conosco più, e c’è invece chi lo riconosce inestricabile dalla componente non meno inestricabile che chiamiamo osservatore. Mi dedico, in queste paginette, a mettere in luce quanto sia illogica e poi come sia impossibile la congettura di un mondo che sia oltre di noi. La formula del dialogo è adeguata all’intento di esprimermi nel modo più semplice e senza appellarmi subito ai modelli della filosofia e della fisica. Perciò, dopo una nota scolastica, propongo due dialoghi con uno scienziato. Nel primo dialogo contesto l’egemonia della neuroscienza, la leggenda che il cervello sia la causa della vita cosciente, negando che scommettere su natura e cervello fuori dall’osservazione sia doveroso per giustificare la dinamica e l’evoluzione della natura. Infine quello scienziato mi esorta a un secondo dialogo. Stavolta esamino un altro pretesto per legittimare il mondo esterno cioè l’obbligo di un riferimento per lo sguardo dei singoli spettatori. Un po’ annoiato, desideroso di risparmiare altra fatica all’ospite, sicuro che le sue dimostrazioni proliferano come accadeva una volta a favore di forestieri più nobili, mi congedo ricordando che nemmeno è concepibile un mondo che infrange l’unità dell’esperienza cosciente.

This paper aims at presenting a concise treatment of some key themes of my recent book Morality in a Technological World. Knowledge as Duty (Cambridge: Cambridge UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2007). In recent times, non-human beings, objects, and structures -for example computational tools and deviceshave acquired new moral worth and intrinsic values. Kantian tradition in ethics teaches that human beings do not have to be treated solely as "means", or as "things", that is in a merely instrumental way, but also have to be treated as "ends". I contend that human beings can be treated as "things" in the sense that they have to be "respected" as things are sometimes. People have to reclaim instrumental and moral values already dedicated to external things and objects. To the aim of reconfiguring human dignity in our technological world I introduce the concept of moral mediator, which takes advantage of some suggestions deriving from my previous research on epistemic mediators and on manipulative abduction. I also contend that through technology people can simplify and solve moral tasks when they are in presence of incomplete information and possess a diminished capacity to act morally. Moreover, many external things, usually inert from the moral point of view, can be transformed into what we call moral mediators. Hence, not all of the moral tools are inside the head, many of them are shared and distributed in "external" objects and structures which function as ethical devices. For example we can use external "tools", like computer or biotechnology, to reconfigure previously given social orders morally unsatisfactory. When my institution, the University of Pavia, was founded near Milan in 1361, women were viewed very differently from the way we see women today. Back then, a woman living in one of the centuries-old houses I pass each day on my way to work here in Pavia would not have been considered as "human" as men: seven hundred years ago, she would have essentially been property -first her father's then, later, her husband's, and she would probably have had little control over matters concerning her family or her own destiny. There is a very good chance that she would have been illiterate, as were most women and many men in medieval Europe, and she would certainly not have been permitted to attend the city's then-new university. In the fourteenth century, the centers of learning in northern Italy were among the most advanced in the world, yet even they considered women to be unworthy or incapable of being educated. Indeed, it took nearly 400 years for women to gain admission to the University of Pavia, and not until the eighteenth century was a degree awarded to a woman: Maria Pellegrini Amoretti, who was from a wealthy family, not surprisingly, took a law degree amid in 1777.

This study explores the enduring theological and apologetic debate between Calvinism and Arminianism, focusing on the tension between divine sovereignty and human freedom. Tracing historical roots from Augustine through the Reformation to modern evangelical contexts, the paper highlights how both systems construct coherent theological frameworks while facing significant apologetic challenges. Calvinism emphasizes God's unconditional sovereignty but is critiqued for potentially undermining divine justice and implicating God in evil. Arminianism stresses universal grace and human responsibility, yet raises concerns about divine efficacy and the assurance of salvation. The analysis integrates biblical exegesis, philosophical reasoning, pastoral application, and contemporary critiques, including atheist objections and global Christian perspectives. Ultimately, the study argues that both traditions contribute valuable insights but remain limited by human attempts to fully comprehend the divine mystery. Apologetic engagement requires humility, balance, and openness to constructive dialogue across traditions, including alternative models such as Molinism and Barthian Christocentrism.

В статье рассматривается развитие системы общественно-политических взглядов деятеля "буддийского социализма" Японии Утияма Гудо (1874-1911). Уделяется внимание анализу содержания его теоретических работ, соотношению и развитию буддийских и социалистических элементов в системе взглядов Утияма. Цель данной статьи заключается в более детальном рассмотрении Утияма Гудо как мыслителя и общественного деятеля. Основной источниковой базой исследования выступили три основные теоретические работы Утияма Гудо: "Анархо-коммунистическая революция: в память о заключении" (1908), "Об отрицании морали" (1908), "Повседневное пробуждение" (1911). Для начального периода творчества Утияма было характерно смешение буддийской догматики Махаяны с гуманистическим представлением самого Утияма о справедливом устройстве общества. В более поздних работах Утияма, попав под влияние ранних социалистов и анархистов, все чаще просматривалось материалистическое понимание общественных институтов. Идеализм Утияма тогда проявлялся не в апелляции к буддизму школы Сото Дзэн и эгалитаризму Махаяны, а в гиперболизации роли "вредных идей", консервирующих отношения эксплуатации. Второй момент, который отражает эклектику Утияма, заключается в представлении им возможных путей реализации общественного переустройства. Революционный пафос и призывы к борьбе с правительством были либо лишены конкретного содержания, либо сводились к выбиванию у господствующих классов более сносных условий жизни и труда для крестьян и рабочих. Делается вывод о том, что система общественных взглядов Утияма Гудо носила крайне эклектичный характер.

The article examines the development of the system of socio-political views of the figure of "Buddhist socialism" of Japan Uchiyama Gudo (1874-1911). Attention is paid to the analysis of the content of his theoretical works, the relationship and development of Buddhist and socialist elements in the system of views of Uchiyama. The purpose of this article is to consider Uchiyama Gudo in more detail as a thinker and public figure. The main source base of the study were three main theoretical works of Uchiyama Gudo: "Anarcho-Communist Revolution: In Memory of Imprisonment" (1908), "On the Denial of Morality" (1908), "Everyday Awakening" (1911). The initial period of Uchiyama's work was characterized by a mixture of Mahayana Buddhist dogmatics with Uchiyama's own humanistic idea of ​​a just social structure. In Uchiyama's later works, having fallen under the influence of early socialists and anarchists, a materialistic understanding of social institutions was increasingly visible. Uchiyama's idealism was then manifested not in an appeal to Soto Zen Buddhism and Mahayana egalitarianism, but in an exaggeration of the role of "harmful ideas" that preserve exploitative relations. The second point that reflects Uchiyama's eclecticism is his presentation of possible ways to implement social reorganization. Revolutionary pathos and calls to fight the government were either devoid of specific content or were reduced to knocking out more tolerable living and working conditions for peasants and workers from the ruling classes. It is concluded that Uchiyama Gudo's system of social views was extremely eclectic.

How should we understand the relationship between theological and philosophical approaches to understanding free will? Are they, and should they remain, entirely distinct, having no bearing on one another whatsoever? Do they conflict with one another, forcing us to choose between two? Do they complement, constrain, or illuminate one another? Do philosophy and theology ultimately converge on a singular and consistent view of human and divine freedom? Philosophers and theologians have been puzzling over such questions for centuries. More recently, there has been a resurgence of interest among analytic theologians, that is to say, those analytic philosophers and systematic and historical theologians who explore theological questions using the tools of contemporary analytic philosophy. Aku Visala and Olli-Pekka Vainio's Theological Perspectives on Free Will: Compatibility, Christology, and Community is an excellent contribution to this ongoing discussion. The volume offers eleven new essays, plus an introduction by the editors, each of which pushes the relevant debates forward in new directions. Given the breadth of topics that it covers, the volume also serves as a helpful overview of the debate for anyone wishing to get up to speed on these issues. In what follows, I will first provide a summary of each of the essays included in the volume. I will then offer some critical reflections on the volume as a whole as well as several of the specific issues discussed therein. The volume is divided into three parts. The first part features essays that discuss the compatibility of theological and philosophical perspectives on free will. The second part features essays that discuss various social aspects of human freedom and their relevance for philosophical and theological perspectives on free will. The third part features essays that discuss Christ's freedom. The first two essays are companion pieces. In his "Why Christians Should (Still) Be Compatibilists", Jesse Couenhoven presents a cumulative theological case for compatibilism. He argues that compatibilism makes the most sense of God's freedom in light of his essential moral perfection, the freedom of the blessed in heaven, Christ's incarnate freedom, and human agency in light of the transformative nature of grace. Compatibilism, says Couenhoven, is also no worse off than libertarianism with respect to the problem of evil and the problem of hell. In his "Weighing Compatibilism and Libertarianism in Analytic Theology", Kevin Timpe responds directly to the Couenhoven piece. He argues that the various considerations concerning human and divine freedom presented by Couenhoven give the Christian no reason to prefer compatibilism over libertarianism. And because the most plausible way of reconciling compatibilism with the problem of evil and the problem of hell is to accept strong universalism (a view rejected by the majority of voices in the history of Christian thought on the topic), there is a cumulative case to be made, instead, that Christians should be libertarians. If human beings are completely lacking in any kind of free will, this would seem to undermine much of what we care about personally, socially, legally, politically, and theologically. It would seem that we could no longer hold anyone morally responsible for any of his or her actions. It would make inappropriate any kind of censure, condemnation, or punishment of any individual, regardless of the severity of his or her wrongdoing. In "Can an Unfree Person Have a 'Deep Self'?", Leigh Vicens argues that even if it were true that

Neka znanja o mehanizmima delovanja i očekivanim uticajima pojedinih potencijalnih zagađujućih supstanci (npr. arsena i bora) postoje već dugo, ali ima i još uvek malo proučenih, posebno onih vezanih za litijum u životnoj sredini. Aktuelizacija eksploatacije litijuma u svetskim razmerama ipak je poslednjih par decenija dovela do istraživanja i dala rezultate koje su autori pokušali da predstave ovom publikacijom. S obzirom na očekivane negativne efekte rada rudnika jadarita i ekstrakcije litijuma i bora, šira javnost ima pravo da bude upoznata sa svim tim jer je znanje o rizicima koji postoje ključno za opredeljivanje prilikom odlučivanja o budućoj sopstvenoj dobrobiti.

"Massa Critica-
Strettamente legato al discorso del risveglio di coscienza è il concetto della“massa critica”. Ora non tutti sanno di preciso cosa significa,come terminologia in fisica nucleare viene definita : “la massa critica di un materiale fissile che indica la quantità necessaria affinché questo materiale abbia una reazione nucleare a catena che possa auto - sostenersi in maniera autonoma. Una soglia quantitativa minima oltre la quale si ottiene un mutamento qualitativo”, quindi una soglia quantitativa minima anche di una massa piccola, che oltre la quale per uno o due fattori aggiuntivi può ottenersi un mutamento qualitativo in percentuali estremamente maggiori.
Effetto Maharishi -
Quando si sviluppò questo concetto nel quotidiano, nel sociale? Quando si cominciò a parlare di “Effetto Maharishi” (Maharishi era un grande maestro indiano meditatore) studiato scientificamente da un istituto, il “Maharishi International University “ nel Massachusetts in USA .
L’assunto di partenza era che se una persona pratica regolarmente una qualche forma di meditazione, si produce una sorta di armonizzazione nel suo stato mentale ed emozionale che si ripercuote positivamente non solo sulle situazioni che risultano più calme e meno violente ma che addirittura può raggiungere una quota di almeno l’1% della popolazione di un’intera città che pratica la meditazione per cui gli effetti positivi si diffonderanno anche sul restante 99% che non medita. Incredibile! Basterebbe che l’1% della popolazione di una città praticasse la meditazione costantemente magari in orari precisi, effondendo un intento preciso, che potrebbe “accadere che il restante 99% della popolazione che non medita ottiene lo stesso risultato, rilevando un sensibile abbassamento dei tassi di criminalità e di violenza”.
Il termine “massa critica” è quindi una piccola percentuale ma costante di persone che possono generare un cambiamento nella rimanente parte del mondo, nella rimanente popolazione, nel rimanente spazio sub-atomico della materia. Questi esperimenti condotti fin dagli inizi degli anni ’70 portano ad un’indagine che definisce la cosiddetta “coerenza cerebrale”, cioè quando il cervello entra in “coerenza”, anche a distanza. Uno studio molto interessante fu condotto, intorno al 2005-2007 in Italia, in provincia di Lucca, dal Villaggio Globale, un’organizzazione che fa capo ad alcuni ricercatori del mondo dei “ Creativi culturali”. A questo esperimento parteciparono oltre un milione di persone in tutto il mondo, sempre sulla base dell’effetto Maharishi, e qui si evidenziò una relazione statisticamente significativa tra la “coerenza cerebrale” di due gruppi di persone che meditavano a 200 km di distanza l’uno dall’altro.
Questi due gruppi, durante la meditazione, venivano monitorati attraverso degli elettroencefalografi e l’analisi indicò un aumento di coerenza a livello cerebrale tra tutti gli individui: è come se i loro cervelli si fossero sincronizzati a distanza. Cosa voleva significare? Che lo stato generale di consapevolezza di ciascun singolo influenzava quello di tutti, di ben due gruppi che tra l’altro meditavano a km di distanza l’uno dall’altro! Un grande esperimento che andò a determinare un flusso di coscienza che si cominciò a chiamare il “paradigma olistico” della spiritualità della Nuova Era."

Nel XXI secolo il futuro dell’umanità appare sempre più un enigma minaccioso; il riscaldamento climatico, i postumi della pandemia globale, la terza guerra mondiale che, sempre di più, sta mettendo insieme i suoi pezzi, le crisi economiche e gli scenari globali instabili, costringono intere parti del mondo verso la miseria, la persecuzione e la fuga da stragi indiscriminate; allo stesso tempo, il progresso scientifico e tecnologico promette di rispondere a tali emergenze. Ma alla luce di quali principi si può convergere verso soluzioni condivise in società sempre più plurali e polarizzate, tali per cui, spesso, non si condivide nemmeno la diagnosi di ciò che sta accadendo? Per provare a rispondere a tale complesso interrogativo, si propone una rilettura dell’opera di Jonas Das Prinzip Verantwortung, nel quarantacinquesimo anniversario di pubblicazione.

In Free Will's Value: Criminal Justice, Pride, and Love, John Lemos defends the importance of libertarian free will for moral responsibility, criminal justice, and meaningful relationships. Lemos argues that libertarianism is a superior theory of free will compared to compatibilism and that it offers a foundation for criminal justice that better aligns with our moral intuitions than what the free will skeptics have offered so far. I critically examine Lemos' arguments against compatibilism, in particular his rejection of compatibilism due to its apparent inability to respond adequately to the manipulation argument, and his own version of libertarianism, the 'indeterministic weightings' (IW) view. In considering Lemos' treatment of the manipulation argument, I suggest a way that a compatibilist could object to Lemos' dismissal of both hard-and soft-line replies. In considering the IW view, I focus on Lemos' response to the luck problem and highlight the problematic role of indeterminacy in self-forming actions, which are supposed to be the ultimate foundation of moral responsibility.

This paper challenges the claim that causal determinism invalidates moral responsibility. I argue that, although individuals are undoubtedly shaped and influenced by their experiences, they retain the capacity to interpret, evaluate, and respond to those experiences in diverse and reflective ways. Such capacity thus renders the determinist’s claim that “one is determined by past experiences, psychological and physiological traits” false and introduces a meaningful form of agency that grounds moral responsibility. In what follows, I articulate the determinist argument and offer a multi-layered objection to it, drawing from both philosophical and psychological insights. I then anticipate possible replies from the determinist and demonstrate how these replies fail to undermine the core of my position.

Recent approaches to the study of happiness often base their research on Aristotle's ethics, particularly his Nicomachean Ethics, a seminal work on the concept of the highest good, or happiness, which remains central to contemporary society. Many investigations emphasize living a virtuous life by following the principle of the Golden Mean. This research focuses on Aristotle's concept of deliberation, examining its significance in achieving a happy life. We explored the definitions and interpretations of Aristotle's two types of virtues-moral and intellectual-through recent scholarship to better categorize and define deliberation. Our findings suggest that deliberation precedes the actions required to live in accordance with virtue, indicating its central role in attaining happiness. Further psychological and philosophical research, building on this conclusion, could confirm the importance of deliberation and contribute to broader studies in the field.

Courtroom discourse, which is in the field of Forensic Linguistics, presents the analysis on legal language used in the courtroom settings . It mainly focuses on the legal language as object, process and instrument ; and the legal language in enabling and reporting contexts . In the paper, I present an overview of some critical issues concerning with the studies of courtroom language. By taking a case study of a Chinese criminal trial, I exemplify some language aspects used in the courtroom to shed light on the nature of the courtroom discourse -the primary speaking roles of a judge in directing, ruling and instructing. Further, I explore the distribution of information in the judge's speech realized by the tone groups.

Dieser Essayband enthält eine Kurzfassung des Buches "Die Erschaffung der Realität" und ergänzt sie um weitere Perspektiven: "Allgegenwärtiges Bewusstsein und Freier Wille" beschreibt ausführlich eine neue Lösung für das Problem der Entscheidungsfreiheit. "Spirituelle Erlebnisse - eine Frage der Beweisbarkeit?" zeigt an diesem Beispiel, wie wir unsere Realität stabilisieren. "Das Selbst, die Leere und das Gewahrsein" erklärt, warum unser Selbst mehr und nicht weniger ist als wir glauben. "Dynamische Existenz" legt mit geschärften Argumenten dar, wie unvermeidliche Individualität und gemeinsame Realität zusammenpassen. Außerdem: "Individualität und das physikalische Paradigma", "Laws of Form: Warum Spencer-Brown etwas daneben liegt", "Radikaler Konstruktivismus - ein Hohlkörper?"

This paper is about Kant's doctrine of virtue and its applicability in the context of environmental ethics and sustainable development. The analysis starts with the concept of the categorical imperative and the importance of moral action based on reason and individual responsibility. This approach will be compared with philosophers of the Frankfurt School of Critical thought, through the imperative of responsibility contributing to shaping a contemporary ethical framework that integrates virtue, sustainability and intergenerational responsibility in the need for a new ethical paradigm. Environmental ethics and sustainability in the context of virtue and moral law, are based in an ethic that supports the preservation of environment and the sustainable use of natural resources. Changing the ethical paradigm is an essential process to face today's environmental challenges and requires a redefinition of the virtues and values that guide moral action, making them suitable for the environmental context. In conclusion, this paper highlights the importance of environmental ethics in facing global development challenges and the need for a philosophical approach that integrates with everyday practices to protect the planet.

The purpose of this essay is to explore the section of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit [PS] 3 which deals with the problem of Self-Consciousness. I am particularly interested in this section of the Phenomenology because it bears on the question of empathy, or how we can know the subjective, experiential state of another person. Unfortunately, Hegel's philosophy, or metaphysics, is extremely complex, and his writing is notorious for its difficulty both in the original German and in English translations. The main feature of Hegel's thinking is his tendency to formulate issues in terms of dialectical moments. Once he establishes a position on an issue, he is driven to put forward the negative of the position, then to establish a new higher order position which attempts to unite the original view and the negative side. This process often makes it difficult to determine what, if any, Hegel's final conclusion or position is on a particular issue. Hegel's philosophy carries with it the core assumption of the Spirit (Geist) that is Ultimate, Absolute, and Eternal Being. Although the German term Geist can be translated as Mind, in common with many scholars of Hegel, I prefer the translation of it as Spirit because Hegel's notion of Spirit expresses far more than what is commonly meant by Mind. Spirit has a number of qualities including: 1) subjectivity,

Many of our practices presuppose moral responsibility. Arguably, agents can only be morally responsible if they are able to act other than they do. Compatibilists and incompatibilists traditionally disagree about whether determinism precludes the ability to do otherwise, often reaching an impasse because they endorse different readings of 'able to do otherwise'. I argue that the correct reading of 'able to do otherwise' depends on the purposes of our responsibility-entailing practices. Practices serving different purposes may warrant different readings. Consequently, there may be no single independently ascertainable definition of freedom to do otherwise that justifies our responsibilityentailing practices wholesale.

Малюченко Д. А. «Весна» на Балтике. Аресты командного состава Балтфлота в 1931 г. и их последствия // Клио. 2025. №5. С. 178-182.

К безусловным достижениям отечественной историографии политических репрессий в СССР в 1930-е гг. относятся и определение правового механизма осуществления репрессивного давления, и определение методов репрессивной практики, и выявление корпуса персональных данных сотрудников советских спецслужб, являвшихся исполнителями политического террора. Несмотря на накопление большого массива данных, позволяющих детально изучить не только наиболее крупные, но даже следственные дела по контрреволюционным организациям на местном уровне, исследовательский интерес к отдельным сюжетам продолжает оставаться крайне выборочным. В полной мере это относится к самому знаковому в истории Красной армии начала 1930-х гг. следственному делу «Весна», начавшемуся на территории Украинской ССР и постепенно приобретшего всесоюзный масштаб. Историков спецслужб объединяет мнение о том, что основной удар арестами 1930-1931 гг. был нанесен по военным специалистам, бывшим царским офицерам, служившим в рядах Красной армии и флота. И даже учитывая имеющиеся оценки суммарного количества арестованных командиров, не до конца понятны масштабы арестов в пределах того или иного военного округа или флота. В центре нашего внимания -советский военно-морской флот на Балтийском море, командный состав которого также подвергся чисткам в рамках дела «Весна». В данной статье приводятся выявленные в архивные данные о масштабах арестов в ряде флотских соединений, вызванных ими перемещениях командного состава и последствиях изъятий командиров для процесса боевой подготовки флота на протяжение нескольких учебных кампаний.

The undoubted achievements of the domestic historiography of political repressions in the USSR in the 1930s include the definition of the legal mechanism for implementing repressive pressure, the definition of the methods of repressive practice, and the identification of a corpus of personal data of employees of the Soviet special services who were the executors of political terror. Despite the accumulation of a large array of data that allows for a detailed study of not only the largest, but even investigative cases on counterrevolutionary organizations at the local level, research interest in individual stories continues to be extremely selective. This fully applies to the most significant investigative case in the history of the Red Army in the early 1930s, the "Vesna" case, which began on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR and gradually acquired an all-Union scale. Historians of the special services are united by the opinion that the main blow of the arrests of 1930-1931 was dealt to military specialists, former tsarist officers who served in the ranks of the Red Army and Navy. And even taking into account the available estimates of the total number of arrested commanders, the scale of arrests within a given military district or fleet is not fully understood. Our focus is on the Soviet Baltic Navy, whose command staff was also purged as part of the "Vesna" affair. This article presents archival data on the scale of arrests in a number of naval units, the resulting movement of command staff, and the consequences of the removal of commanders for the navy's combat training process over several training campaigns.

Psihodinamske teorije razvoja uglavnom se baziraju na ranom razvoju i uticaju ranog razvoja na kasnije obrasce ponašanja čoveka. Jedna od osam ključnih emocionalnih kompetencija na kojoj se zasniva psihoterapijski rad u Integrativnoj Psihodinamskoj Psihoterapiji je celovitost objekta, pojam-kompetencija koji je uvela Melanija Klajn (Klein, 1940). Klajn je opisala najranije faze razvoja celovitosti objekta, i neke manifestacije defekta ove sposobnosti kod odraslih osoba. Smatramo da je vredno daljih istraživanja praćenje razvojnih faza ove sposobnosti u kasnijim životnim razdobljima. Jedno od takvih istraživanja dolazi od autora čiji je referentni okvir teorija ego razvoja Džejn Levinger (Loevinger, 1970). U ovom radu daćemo sažeti prikaz ove teorije i povezati je sa nalazima Melanije Klajn i doprinosima Ferberna, Kohuta kako bismo pokazali moguću skicu celoživotnog razvoja celovitosti objekta, odnosa
prema polarnostima i put razvoja ka mudrosti. Otkrića o razvoju Ega koja dolaze iz drugih istraživačkih oblasti, van psihotarapijskih iskustava, mogu biti od velike koristi kao dopuna naših znanja o psihološkom razvoju i pomoću nam da bolje razumemo faze razvoja, a time i onoga što razvojni psiholog Vigotski (1993) naziva "zonom narednog razvoja". Kada znamo
kuda idemo, i koje su "stanice" na tom putu, bolje ćemo pomoći one koje tim putem usmeravamo ka razvoju.
U ovom radu prikazali smo pogled na razvoj ega kroz optiku razvoja odnosa prema suprotnostima koje su dale Šarma i Kuk-Grojter (2011) jer odslikava iz jednog drugog ugla i načina posmatranja sposobnost za celovito doživljavanje objekta koju je opisala Melanja Klajn na ranim uzrastima. Stiče se utisak kao da sa njome počinje i završava razvoj, da se on kreće od spajanja, preko razdvajanja, do ponovnog spajanja na drugom nivou.
Ključne reči: celovitost objekta; polarnosti; integracija; razvoj ega;

В публикации предпринята попытка отразить одну из причин у траты в лияния Временного правительства на войска Северного фронта, что способствовало успеху Октябрьского вооруженного восстания. Частично, это было связано с деятельностью революционных организаций, ставших радикальными в своей риторике и деятельности. На основании материалов периодической печати, делопроизводственных документов, приказов и прочих исторических источников автором предпринята попытка рассмотреть влияние Областного комитета Финляндии на русские вооруженные силы в ходе революционного процесса. Областной комитет армии, флота и рабочих Финляндии являлся русской революционной организацией, активно претендовавшей на власть в Великом княжестве Финляндском. Для воплощения властных амбиций Облфинком и его представители активно опирались на органы солдатского самоуправления, пытаясь таким образом, получить контроль над войсками 42-армейского корпуса и вооруженными силами, подчиненными командующему Балтийским флотом. Влияние ОКФ сводилось к двум составляющим: помощь солдатам в хозяйстве и поддержка их политических требований. Это привело к конфронтации с властью в лице Временного правительства и постепенной утрате последним контроля над войсками Северного фронта в Финляндии.

The doctrine of free will and its relationship to divine sovereignty has generated centuries of theological debate. This thesis presents a comprehensive, academically balanced examination of both affirmations: that of human free will and that of divine sovereign predestination. The study traces the biblical foundations, theological constructions, philosophical arguments, and historical developments of both positions, incorporating perspectives from Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Arminius, Molina, Edwards, and modern scholars.

Limited Atonement, often referred to as "Particular Redemption" or "Definite Atonement," is one of the five points of Calvinism, encapsulated in the acronym TULIP (Total Depravity, Unconditional Election, Limited Atonement, Irresistible Grace, Perseverance of the Saints). It asserts that Christ's atonement on the cross was specifically intended for the elect—those whom God has sovereignly chosen for salvation rather than for all humanity indiscriminately. This doctrine is rooted in a particular interpretation of biblical texts and reflects the Calvinist emphasis on God’s sovereignty in salvation.

In recent philosophy of religion, there has been an increasing interest shown in the analysis of theological doctrines. This thesis takes up that approach with regard to Jonathan Edwards' metaphysics of sin. The objective is to ascertain whether or not the metaphysics that underpin Edwards' theological commitment to a strong doctrine of human depravity forms a coherent whole. The dissertation deals with this in terms of Edwards' doctrine of the fall, the question of the authorship of sin, his doctrine of imputation, his use of a doctrine of temporal parts and his espousal of occasionalism. From this analysis it is clear that Edwards' commitment to occasionalism proves problematic to his understanding of temporal persistence and human action. Moreover, when coupled with his compatibility thesis, this occasionalism undermines his attempted exculpation of the Deity on the question of the authorship of sin. Thus, the metaphysics underpinning Edwards' doctrine of sin do not yield a coherent whole. Nevertheless, Edwards' thinking raises interesting and fruitful philosophical insights into the theological problems raised. For instance, if divested of its occasionalistic garb, his theory of imputation, taken as part of a perdurantist ontology, could provide a novel solution to this traditional theological problem. In a similar way, if his doctrine of the fall were to be separated out from his occasionalism, it provides an internally coherent account of how Adam fell. So, although my conclusions regarding Edwards' hamartiology are largely negative, there is reason to believe that Edwards' legacy to contemporary philosophical theologians is a positive and potentially fi-uitful one. Not only does he raise the level of debate about harnartiological problems. He also shows that it is possible to make real advances on the particularly thorny problems associated with a traditional hamartiology, by utilizing the methods and tools of philosophical analysis. It goes without saying that in this kind of project there are a considerable number of people and institutions who have provided help and support along the way. I have tried to ensure that all those who have made a contribution to this thesis are mentioned below. However, I take full responsibility for any omissions. Regarding institutions and granting bodies, my thanks go to the following: The staff and fellows of the Whitefield Institute for providing me with the funds and fonun to express earlier drafts of chapters of this thesis; the governors, Headmaster, staff and students of the Royal Grammar School, Guildford, who also funded the first part of this work; and the support of the congregation, Elders and Trustees of Chertsey Street Baptist Church, Guildford. Mention should also be made of the staff of the Evangelical Library, Dr.

Our freedom to influence and be influenced, coupled with freedom from coercion, makes us moral agents. We cannot choose our personal characteristics, family values, or national culture, but we can come to awareness of them and choose our response to them. Jesus, for example, could have joined those who hated Samaritans or he could have joined those who loved across religious difference. He chose the latter. He could have devoted his genius and charisma to personal enrichment, but instead devoted it to the exploited. Like Jesus, within our personhood and context, we can choose. We can emphasize self or community, power or service, fear or love, greed or generosity.

This article offers a critical response to Richard Swinburne's "The Free Will of a Sinless Incarnate God". Swinburne addresses an apparent contradiction in traditional Christology: how Christ can possess a human nature, including genuine free will, while being necessarily sinless. After reviewing Swinburne's proposed solution-that Christ was predetermined not to sin but still experienced genuine temptation-I develop an objection based on Kane's libertarian theory of free will. I argue that genuine human freedom necessarily involves Self-Forming Actions where alternative possibilities, including the possibility to sin, are genuinely available. Since Christ, on Swinburne's account, lacks this capacity, he cannot possess genuine human freedom and thus lacks an essential component of human nature. I propose the Dispositional Incarnation Model as the most robust solution to this dilemma, as it allows Christ to possess genuine libertarian freedom at the occurrent level of his human experience while securing his sinlessness through his divine nature dispositionally exemplified. This, rather than the solution proposed by Swinburne, provides the conceptual basis for one affirming the traditional Chalcedonian claim that Christ is "perfect in humanity" and "like us in all respects except for sin".

Current compatibilism concerning free will is divided in two major camps, defining freedom either (a) as a state of harmony or a process of formation between distinct levels of human desires, or (b) as an agent's access and responsiveness to reasons. Referring to modern as well as classical sources, I argue that the split between these approaches may go along with divergent metaphysical interpretations of their shared compatibilist commitment. Most importantly, while "desire theories" are apt to comply with the basic claim that human behaviour can be both causal and free, "reason theories" are capable of fulfilling the stricter requirement that free agency be not only causal, but also free. Given that the latter formula demands some noncausal element being involved in free will, I investigate under which conditions reasons can figure as such noncausal entities, and discuss how attractive the ensuing version of reason compatibilism is.

The question of free will’s existence has long occupied philosophy; here, however, I will set that metaphysical debate aside and examine the effects of believing in free will on people’s lives and institutions. In this essay, I ask: What are the practical and ethical consequences of holding beliefs about free will? We consider three levels of belief: (1) Personal belief in one’s own free will, (2) Interpersonal belief in other people’s free will, and (3) Institutional/societal reliance on free will. In each context, belief in free will may bring both advantages and costs. The aim is to weigh empirical and philosophical evidence on these outcomes. I emphasise that this inquiry is not about whether free will objectively exists; instead, I am assuming that people do or do not believe in free will, and I am asking whether that belief is beneficial or harmful through the three levels. By examining psychological research on free-will beliefs and behaviour, drawing on philosophical analyses of responsibility and attitudes, and considering the legal, political, and environmental implications, the aim is to provide clarity on the various dilemmas surrounding free will beliefs.

Are free will and moral responsibility possible in a world where choices are the inevitable consequences of past causes governed by physical law? Both libertarian and hard incompatibilist theories suggest not. By contrast, this paper develops an account of freedom as selfgovernment, motivated by the need to address key challenges: the need for a broad understanding of free will beyond the limitation of liability, the charge that it proceeds by equivocation, the problem of the lawful causal origins of choice, the recognition of degrees of freedom and moral responsibility, and the risk of conformist functionalism. The framework of freedom as self-government integrates five key ideas. One, it recognizes a wider realm of autonomy for which freedom is relevant, anchored in non-domination. It holds that it is identified by the cognitive and practical role it has in liberation movements against domination, which aims to protect and secure wide capacities for choice. Two, it does not proceed by equivocation, but rather is grounded in a robust compatibilist tradition of thinking about free will from Plato onwards, present in both common and expert circles today. Three, it acknowledges that relative to all causes governed by physical law, no person has free will and moral responsibility. However, drawing from the model of the physical relativity of motion, it argues that the frame of reference of freedom as self-government is also valid, that relative to it people can be free, and that this frame of reference is the more relevant to adopt. Four, the view presented also suggests that in contrast to libertarian and hard incompatibilist doctrines, it can parsimoniously acknowledge degrees of freedom and proportional responsibility. And five, the present view suggests that the functionalist methodological component of freedom as self-government does not have to lead to conformity with de facto evil, if coupled with moral realism.

Call the form of personal control necessary for agents to be morally responsible in the basic desert sense moral freedom. 2 Skepticism about our possessing moral freedom (or about our being "morally free," as I will sometimes say) appears to be on the rise. My aim in this paper is to respond to this skepticism and to contribute to efforts to resist its supposed growth. In fact, my aim is to offer a bipartisan response to it; one that can be appreciated and embraced by both incompatibilists and compatibilists. That's the good news, as they say. The bad news-at least I will not be surprised if it initially appears to be bad news-is that those who join the program will need to make their peace with the philosophical propriety of having faith. This is because my goal is to bring this attitude (back) into the free will debate. More specifically, I will be attempting to respond to free will skepticism by appealing to faith.

Building on the Stoic notion of self-regulation, we explore philosophical conceptualizations in relation to empirical evidence from psychology and cognitive neuroscience. We challenge the mainstream account that dismisses the possibility of free will based on contemporary scientic ndings. Instead, we argue that these ndings actually support and rene the Stoic view of free will, particularly in terms of diachronic self-regulation through second-order willed actions over time. Contrary to classical interpretations of Libet-type experiments-which are often cited to refute free will-we contend that such evidence undermines the notion that we are passive recipients of spontaneous desires. Rather, we possess the capacity to regulate our actions proactively by cultivating and exercising deliberate, voluntary intentions. Freedom, in this sense, arises from a meta-cognitive ability or hierarchical, second-order will that can causally inuence or override rst-order desires or impulsive habits. In essence, our choices are not entirely predetermined by our upbringing or external circumstances; they emerge from our capacity to reect upon and respond to those inuences. Through this process, the self becomes a self-determined free agent.

This short paper argues for the view that Paul in Romans 7:9–11 is referencing Adam in Eden — it follows that Paul himself understands that Satan’s deception about the tree of knowledge caused Adam’s death and such was not a punishment from God.

This publication is devoted to a critical analysis of the article by G.M. Ippolitov and T.V. Filatov, recently published in the journal Klio: “Once more about history as a science. Reflections – invitation to discussion”. The author believes that this article does not provide solid evidence of the full value of history as a scientific discipline and completely unsatisfactorily resolves (or rather, does not resolve at all) the question of the subject of science in general and history in particular. The author offers his interpretation of this concept with specific examples and evidence. Similarly, the functions, methods and categories of science are considered, with a projection on history. It is concluded that the latter is a full-fledged scientific discipline, although its data are widely used by unscrupulous scientists for various falsifications and manipulations.