Epistemological Foundationalism

Resumo: O geracionismo epistêmico sobre a memória tem ganhado cada vez mais apoio entre os epistemólogos. Em contraste com a visão preservacionista tradicional, a qual sustenta que a memória meramente preserva o status epistêmico das crenças, o geracionismo argumenta que a memória pode preservar e gerar status epistêmico. Este artigo oferece um novo argumento para tratar a memória como uma fonte epistêmica generativa. Ele apresenta um dilema para os preservacionistas epistêmicos e defende que o geracionismo fornece a solução. A ideia central é reconhecer a neutralidade epistêmica do conteúdo perceptual inconsciente e o papel da memória na geração de status epistêmico. O conteúdo que não é inicialmente mantido como uma crença permanece epistemicamente neutro, até que seja recuperado e convertido em uma crença, por meio de um processo de memória confiável.

According to Locke all our ideas come from two sources, sense experience and reflections. Sense experience gives us knowledge about the external world, while reflection gives us knowledge of our inner mental state. While the mind is passive in receiving ideas, it is active in combining them to form new ideas.

The seventeenth century witnesses the demise of two core doctrines in the theory of perception: naïve realism about color, sound, and other sensible qualities and the empirical theory, drawn from Alhacen and Roger Bacon, that underwrote it. Ejecting such sensible qualities from the mind-independent world at once makes for a cleaner ontology, since bodies can now be understood in purely geometrical terms, and spawns a variety of fascinating complications for the philosophy of perception. If sensible qualities are not part of the mind-independent world, just what are they, and what role, if any, do they play in our cognitive economy? We seemingly have to use color to visually experience objects. Do we do so by inferring size, shape, and motion from color? Or is it a purely automatic operation, accomplished by divine decree? This book traces the debate over perceptual experience in early modern France, covering such figures as Antoine Arnauld, Robert Desgabets, and Pierre-Sylvain Régis...

Kosmologiczna walentność o s o b liw o ś c i początkowej j e s t ra czej spraną niekwestionowaną i w sposób powszechny akcepto waną. Ma to m iejsce zarówno wśród kosmologów zajmujących s i ę s trukturą i ew o lu cją W szechświata, ja k i wśród fizy k ó w p o d ej mujących próby budowania t e o r i i u n ifik u ją c e j znane fiz y c e w spół czesnej o d d zia ły w a n ia 1 . J e s t bowiem o sobliw o ść początkowa za gadnieniem nie ty lk o samym p rze z s i ę in teresu jący m , jako p ro blem s t a l e ak tu a ln y , gdy i d z i e o odpowiedź na p ytan ie o ewolu c ję i s tru k tu rę W szechświata w je g o n a jw cz eśn iejszy ch etapach, a le j e s t ta k że problemem generującym, a nawet -można powie dzieć -stymulującym rozw ój nauk przy rod n iczy ch / i to n ie t y l ko k o sm o lo gii, a l e rów nież f i z y k i te o re ty c z n e j czy f i z y k i czą stek elem entarnych/. Generatywna r o l a tego szczególnego punktu -p ojaw iają cego s i ę w modelach k o sm ologii w spółczesn ej -p o le ga na tym, że to w łaśn ie j e j występowanie w praw ie w szystkich modelach re la ty w is ty c z n y c h b y ło powodem d la ró żn o rak ich prac teoretycznych zarówno na t e r e n ie samej k o sm o lo gii, ja k i na te re n ie f i z y k i . Przykładem tego ro d z a ju prac j e s t p o d ję c ie poszukiwań ro zw iązań niejednorodnych i n ieizotrop ow ych z a p r op ponowane p rzez A. E in s te in a , a kontynuowane p rzez G. Lemai-O t r e ' a czy s z c z e g ó ln ie p rze z grupę kosmologów ra d z ie c k ic h : 1. D. Landaua, E. M. L ifs z y c a , I . M. Chałatnikowa i W. Suda-kowa^. Efekty tych p ra c , mimo że n ie p rz y n io s ły spodziewane go r e z u l t a t u -w p o s t a c i ro z w ią z a n ia problemu o s o b liw o ś c itrudno j e s t d z i s i a j p rz e c e n ić . N ie w ą tp liw ie ona rów nież by ła powodem pow stania modelu kosmologicznego znanego pod nazwą "Mixm aster U n iv e r s e ", zaproponowanego przez Ch. W. IJisnera , a także modelu "The Steady State Theory" czy to w w e r s j i H. Bodniego i T. Gólda, czy F. Ilo y le 'a ^. J ej n ieusuw alności z m odeli kosm ologicznych opartych na OTW /Ogólnej T e o r i i

In Meditation I of Meditations on First Philosophy, René Descartes introduces the “evil genius” hypothesis—a thought experiment in which a supremely powerful and cunning deceiver systematically manipulates his perceptions and reasoning. Descartes does not suggest that such a being exists; rather, he uses it as a methodological tool to push doubt to its furthest limit. By doing so, he hopes to discard all uncertain beliefs and uncover a foundation for knowledge that is immune to even the most radical skepticism.

In this paper, I will argue that the evil genius argument plays a crucial role in Descartes’ project of epistemic foundationalism, despite significant criticisms regarding its coherence and philosophical usefulness. First, I will reconstruct Descartes’ argument and explain how it builds upon earlier stages of doubt, such as sensory deception and the dream argument. Next, I will analyze major criticisms of the evil genius hypothesis—especially concerns about the self-defeating nature of doubting reason and the overly demanding standard of certainty. Then, I will defend the usefulness of the evil genius device as a clarifying methodological step rather than a final skeptical stance. Finally, I will suggest that the enduring relevance of Descartes’ thought experiment lies in its capacity to engage with contemporary questions about trust, deception, and information in the digital age.

Jakiś czas tem u, gdy sam a byłam uczestniczką kursu języka włoskiego dla cudzoziemców, zetknęłam się po raz pierwszy z w ykorzystaniem opozycji znaczeniow ych w ćwiczeniach i tekstach leksykalnych. Zakres nie był wielki. O graniczał się do wyrazów przeciwstaw nych znaczeniow o, znanych z ulicy, bud yn ków , m etra . D otyczył napisów tego typu ja k : wejście : wyjście, wjazd : zjazd, w górę : w dół, pchnąć : pociągnąć. Pam iętam, że uderzyło m nie to ja k o nowość, pomogło mi skojarzyć słowa z ich znaczeniami i przyswoić je sobie najszybciej. N astępne w spomnienie związane jest ze słownikami. Praw ie wszystkie słowniki synonimów i wyrazów bliskoznacznych w ychodzące we Włoszech, a ukazuje się ich dużo, m ają tytuł: Synonimi e contrari. W Polsce do niedawna był jedyny Słownik wyrazów bliskoznacznych Skorupki, a relacje inne niż polisemia, homonim ia, synonimia, hiponim ia nie były nigdzie ukazyw ane. Zarys polskich prac lcksykograficznych na tem at synonimii przedstaw iłam w innym m iejscu1. Słow niki, w których uw zględniono by przeciw ieństwa w jakim kolw iek bąd ź zakresie, nie istnieją wcale. B adanie, a co za tym idzie i nauczanie słow nictwa, nie należy do nauk daw nych także i na świecie, za pierwszy słownik pojęciowy w epoce nowożytnej uchodzi Thesaurus R ogeta (1852)2, w którym sklasyfikow ano wyrazy i w yrażenia języka według znaczeń. Późniejsze jego odpow iedniki: niemiecki, francuski, hiszpański pochodzą już z wieku dwudziestego, ale jakkolwiek cenne, nie dają odpowiedzi, czy i o ile słownictw o poszczególnych języków jest uporządkow ane w sposób hierarchiczny i opozycyjny3.

René Descartes (1596-1650) is widely regarded as the father of modern philosophy. His noteworthy contributions extend to mathematics and physics. This entry focuses on his philosophical contributions in the theory of knowledge. Specifically, the focus is on the epistemological project of his famous work, Meditations on First Philosophy. Descartes circulated the Meditations to other philosophers for objections and comments. He responded with detailed replies that provide a rich source of further information about the original work. Indeed, six sets of objections and replies were published with the first edition of the Meditations (1641), and a seventh set was added with the second edition (1642).

Abstract
In this wide-ranging interview with José Maihub, world-renowned philosopher Susan Haack
reflects on her long, rich intellectual life.

Resumo
Nesta ampla entrevista com José Maihub, a renomada filósofa Susan Haack reflete sobre sua
longa e rica vida intelectual.

O presente artigo versa sobre a justificação de crenças religiosas, especialmente aquelas que são alegadas por sujeitos que dizem ter percebido Deus como sendo ou fazendo algo em relação a eles, essas crenças são geradas a partir da manifestação de Deus, e, por sua vez, são denominadas de crenças-M, que são as crenças alvo de justificação prima facie. Tese esta proposta por William Payne Alston em seu livro Perceiving Gog: the Epistemology of Religious Experience (1991). Em todo caso, nosso objetivo é compreender o que é estar consciente de Deus em termos epistêmicos necessariamente e a viabilidade de uma teoria da justificação que fundamente a crença religiosa. Avaliando, em última instância, se a proposta de Alston satisfaz os critérios para uma epistemologia da crença religiosa.

This paper offers a thorough appraisal of Peter David Klein's epistemological infinitism, emphasising his treatment of scepticism and the issue of infinite regress in epistemic justification. Klein, a prominent figure in contemporary epistemology, advocates for infinitism; a theory that argues justification is an unending process where each belief requires further reasons indefinitely. The study critically evaluates how Klein's defense of infinitism provides a distinctive response to the infinite regress problem, a core concern in scepticism. By contextualising Klein's theory within the broader framework of epistemology, the research explores its implications for ongoing debates on justification and scepticism. The methodology includes a thematic analysis of Klein's key philosophical contributions, coupled with a critical examination of competing justification theories such as foundationalism, coherentism, and contextualism. Employing a comparative approach, the study assesses Klein's infinitism alongside these rival theories by drawing on primary texts and relevant secondary literature. The paper is divided into five sections: an introduction to scepticism and epistemic justification, an analysis of Klein's infinite regress argument, an exploration of traditional solutions to the regress problem, criticisms of infinitism, and an appraisal of Klein's contributions. The findings reveal that, despite its innovative approach, Klein's infinitism encounters significant theoretical and practical challenges. The conclusion assesses whether infinitism can adequately address the regress problem and considers its relevance to realworld epistemic practices.

Antirreducionistas sustentam que crenças baseadas na compreensão (tanto da força quanto do conteúdo) de declarações 3 são justificadas não inferencialmente. Para reducionistas, por outro lado, compreensão como tal não é em si uma garantia para crença: crenças baseadas em compreensão são justificadas somente se inferencialmente sustentadas por outras crenças. Eu discuto o argumento de Elizabeth Fricker de que, mesmo que o antirreducionismo esteja correto em tese, sua relevância é enfraquecida pela presença de suporte inferencial de fundo; para adultos instruídos 4 , a justificação a partir de compreensão como tal não desempenha papel ativo e é substituída por autorização inferencial 5. Eu mostro que seu argumento suscita questões importantes. Suporte inferencial e não inferencial combinam para sobredeterminar a justificação de crenças baseadas em compreensão. © O uso do material da Oxford University Press (OUP) é restrito a Cognitio: Revista de Filosofia, v.15, n. 2, jul-dez 2014. O artigo original em língua inglesa pode ser acessado no site da revista The Philosophical Quarterly: http://pq.oxfordjournals.org/content/56/222/84. full.pdf+html. Agradecemos a Oxford University Press, detentora dos direitos de publicação do material original, pela permissão de uso concedida para fins desta publicação.

According to an intuition highly popular in Western world, beliefs, including religious beliefs, must be supported by sufficient evidence in order to be held in a rational (or justified) way (evidentialism). Plantinga formulates his own view about the rationality of religious beliefs, which he considers as opposite to the traditional view. The central thesis of his position is that religious beliefs are perfectly rational when believed in the basic way, that is without any evidence or argument and even without the use of natural reason at all. According to Plantinga people could have acquired their religious beliefs via extraordinary cognitive faculty, which he calls, after Calvin, sensus divinitatis. In this paper I ask a question whether Plantinga successfully rejects traditional intuition about the need of natural reason for religious beliefs. For this purpose, I first refer to Plantinga's understanding of the traditional concept of the rationality of religious beliefs. I then summarize Plantinga's views on the third condition of knowledge and his account of the rationality of religious beliefs.

Artykuł podejmuje próbę scharakteryzowania filozofii ponowoczesnej oraz zadaje pytanie, czy możliwe jest twórcze wykorzystanie jej refleksji przez teologię chrześcijańską. Odpowiedź zależy od tego, jakie elementy postmodernizmu są akcentowane. Jeśli na pierwszy plan wysuwa się dekonstrukcję, to dialog teologii z postmodernizmem jest niemożliwy. Jeśli zaś wyakcentuje się krytykę filozofii nowożytnej, to przykłady korzystania z dorobku myślicieli postmodernistycznych znaleźć można w teologii postliberalnej. Dla przedstawicieli tej ostatniej szczególnie ważne jest odrzucenie przez postmodernizm zasady epistemologicznego fundamentalizmu. W artykule omawiana także propozycja polskiego autora, którego zalicza się do nurtu teologii postliberalnej, Pawła Grada

Este artigo discute as diferentes concepções sobre as estruturas conceituais hierárquicas como a arbor porphyriana e o papel que a negação desempenha na sua constituição. Na concepção clássica a negação é considerada fundamental na medida em que define a relação de exclusão conceitual. Mostrar-se-á, por outro lado, que em algumas concepções contemporâneas alternativas a negação não é considerada central posto que segundo elas as estruturas conceituais não são construídas por relações de exclusão.

2.4.2 Acesso privilegiado e autoridade da perspectivade primeira pessoa 2.4.3 Externalismo e Inner Sense CAPÍTULO 3 AGRADECIMENTOS Agradeço à minha mãe, Virgínia, e à minha esposa, Anna, por tanta dedicação e suporte tornando meu caminho possível. O presente livro, Além da Autoconsciência Proposicional, pretende questionar a necessidade de uma estrutura conceitual, articulada por proposições, para explicar a autoconsciência. O ponto de partida dessa investigação se encontra em dois ensaios, da área da Filosofia da Mente, de Fred Dretske: Simple Seeing (1979), e Conscious Experience (1993). No primeiro, o autor articula uma visão de experiência consciente e não epistêmica que apareceu primeiro em Seeing and Knowing (1969), embora ainda não exatamente nos mesmos termos 1 . Em Seeing and Knowing, Dretske, com foco epistemológico na área da Filosofia da Percepção, pretendia mostrar como estados perceptivos levam a estados epistêmicos, ou seja, como ver leva a saber. Entretanto, para isso, o autor definiu uma forma de visão não cognitiva, não epistêmica, que seria mais tarde designada por "simples ver". Ideias próximas eram desenvolvidas por outras vias, por autores diferentes a partir da segunda metade do século XX. Em 1957, Roderick Chisholm faz uma distinção entre os conceitos de "visão proposicional" e visão "não proposicional". Em 1963, G. J. Warnock contrasta as percepções "seeing that White`s Bishop is dangerously exposed" com "seeing White`s dangerously exposed bishop". Em 1966, J. F. Soltis isola uma forma de simple seeing que não possui implicações com respeito à verdade ou à falsidade das crenças que o observador tenha adquirido. Em 1969 e em 1981, Dretske propõe sua própria versão desses assuntos dentro da Filosofia da Percepção e da Filosofia das Ciências Cognitivas. A etiqueta utilizada por ele na época era a de "nonepistemic seeing" 2 . Pode-se, ainda, relacionar outros autores que trabalharam nessa perspectiva, mas foi Evans (1982) quem primeiro introduziu de maneira explícita a expressão "conteúdo não conceitual", tornando-se uma referência básica para a abordagem desse assunto. A ideia de conteúdo não conceitual, no trabalho de 1982, insere-se dentro de um objetivo maior que era o de mostrar o papel que as conexões informacionais desempenham em tornar possíveis identificações demonstrativas e outros tipos de identificações. No segundo ensaio, Conscious Experience (1993), os mesmos princípios são articulados em uma tentativa de descrever a experiência consciente ela mesma. Dretske propõe uma distinção que deve explicar um dos princípios CAPÍTULO 1 DEPENDÊNCIA LÓGICA E INDEPENDÊNCIA LÓGICA O objetivo a que aqui me proponho é usar o conceito de Dependência Lógica, proposto por Dretske (1969), para estabelecer um critério fundamental para discernir: Estados perceptivos (formas específicas de estados mentais); Estados conceituais (crenças). Um tipo de relação pode ser utilizado para caracterizar essa distinção: a dependência que um estado pode ou não ter em relação a crenças (todo tipo de crenças) sobre o conteúdo do próprio estado. O primeiro passo consiste em delinear esse tipo de relação de dependência entre estados com conteúdo conceitual para, posteriormente, isolar uma habilidade fundamental de percepção que sirva como base para explicar habilidades cognitivas mais complexas. Essa relação pode ser compreendida como a expressão de um traço geral de uma das principais categorias de estados mentais: as crenças, e pode ser evidenciada na descrição de determinadas atitudes voltadas a esse tipo de conteúdo, o conteúdo conceitual. O que foi apresentado até aqui serve para demarcar o tipo de estrutura característica de conceitos e atitudes proposicionais, o que possibilita estabelecer outra forma de conteúdo, independentemente do modo então delineado. O estabelecido fornece os fundamentos de um critério negativo que confere um contraste de conceitos, crenças e atitudes proposicionais com a percepção enquanto um gênero particular. O foco passa a ser, então, especificar um tipo de estado ou atividade que interrompa a conexão estabelecida pela Dependência Lógica, ou seja, que funcione de forma autônoma em relação às crenças que o indivíduo tenha sobre aquilo que é percebido, isto é, sobre o conteúdo da percepção ela mesma. Portanto, o intuito é estabelecer a negação dessa dependência e mostrar que a suscetibilidade que um estado pode exibir em relação às crenças que o indivíduo possua, ou não possua, é irrelevante para aquilo que se percebe em um nível específico de percepção e consciência. Desse modo, pode-se isolar uma capacidade visual (perceptual) de uma série de outras habilidades cognitivas como conhecer, reconhecer, classificar, categorizar, implicar, inferir, antecipar, interpretar, fazer analogias, saber, saber que 5 se vê, saber que se percebe, saber que se sabe, entender, discorrer, descrever, solucionar o problema etc. O isolamento dessa capacidade visual primitiva deve conferir maior clareza sobre o modo como a percepção contribui para a aquisição de crenças e, mais especificamente, de conhecimento sobre aquilo que se vê. Além disso, o isolamento dessa capacidade deve contribuir para revelar a natureza da consciência e da autoconsciência (a última, de um modo relacionado) 6 . A expressão Dependência Lógica, no contexto que aqui proponho, representa um aspecto de uma série de situações que englobam casos como ver que, ver como, ver onde, ver quem, ver o que, entre outras. De acordo com Dretske (1969, p. 13, 25, 75) tais situações estão relacionadas à ideia de conteúdo conceitual (epistêmico). De modo geral, o intuito do conceito de Dependência Lógica é nos colocar em uma posição de estabelecer um contraste entre um estado com conteúdo proposicional e um estado sem esse tipo de conteúdo. Esse contraste pode mostrar que tipo de relação decorre de qual forma de estado mental e, em sua forma negativa, que tipo de relação não pode haver se um estado é classificado como tendo o conteúdo zero de crenças (conteúdo não epistêmico, não conceitual, desprovido de toda e qualquer forma de crença). Nesse sentido, o significado da expressão Dependência Lógica envolve uma série de mecanismos cognitivos: conhecer, reconhecer, classificar, categorizar, implicar, inferir, antecipar, interpretar, fazer analogias, saber, saber que se vê, saber que se percebe, saber que se sabe, acreditar estar vendo, entender, discorrer, descrever, solucionar o problema etc. 7 . O motivo de abranger toda essa variedade de habilidades é o fato de que todas elas implicam, de algum modo, a existência de determinada crença, ou conjunto de crenças. Elas implicam a posse e aplicação de conceitos e de um tipo de estrutura que lhes é peculiar: a de uma atitude proposicional (ver seção 1.2, a seguir) 8 . Isto significa

Do Descartes, Locke, and Hume have an internalist or externalist view of epistemic justification? Internalism is, roughly, the view that a belief that p is justified by a mental state, such as the awareness of evidence. By contrast, externalism is, roughly, the view that a belief that p is justified by facts about the belief-forming process, such as the reliability of the belief-forming process. I argue that they all think that the awareness of evidence is required for justification, but none of them think that the awareness of evidence alone is sufficient for justification. Similarly, I argue that they all think that reliability of the belief-forming process is required for justification, but none of them think reliability alone is sufficient for justification. So, neither a fully internalist position nor a fully externalist position adequately captures their views of justification; rather, both the supporting evidence and the reliability of the belief-forming process explain why we should hold those beliefs, and hence explain why those beliefs are justified. Thus, they each have a partly internalist, partly externalist view of justification.

Unspeakable Conversations, an essay written by the late Harriet McBryde Johnson, contains Johnson's extremely personal and candid reflections on her interactions with Peter Singer, an Australian moral philosopher and Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University.  She disagrees strongly with Peter Singer's views on selective infanticide of disabled infants, though she struggles to defend her own view because as an atheist she can see that Singer's views are reasonable.  In this essay, I defend Johnson's view against that of Singer by showing how Singer is able to be both reasonable and wrong at the same time.

Neste artigo eu ofereço uma nova abordagem para resolução do problema do regresso epistêmico. Tal problema pode ser considerado um dos mais tradicionais problemas em epistemologia, que nos segue desde a Antiguidade. As teses tradicionais que tentam responder a esse problema tem dificuldades ainda não respondidas satisfatoriamente, fato que, inicialmente, serve de motivação para a procura de uma nova resposta. Primeiramente, apresento o problema do regresso epistêmico e as respostas tradicionais oferecidas à sua resolução. Como veremos, todas elas apresentam problemas sérios que comprometem a plausibilidade das mesmas, a saber: (i) não respondem adequadamente quando é apropriado interromper o regresso, e (ii) não especificam ou determinam o grau de justificação requerido para o conhecimento. Em seguida, argumentarei em favor da tese que chamarei de "Contextualismo Justificacionista", mostrando que ela consegue responder adequadamente a (i) e (ii). Palavras-chave: Regresso epistêmico. Contextualismo. Justificação. Conhecimento. Estrutura das razões.

Today we find philosophical naturalists and Christian theists both expressing an interest in virtue epistemology, while starting out from vastly different assumptions. What can be done to increase fruitful dialogue among these divergent groups of virtue-theoretic thinkers? The primary aim of this paper is to uncover more substantial common ground for dialogue by wielding a double-edged critique of certain assumptions shared by `scientific' and `theistic' externalisms, assumptions that undermine proper attention to epistemic agency and responsibility. I employ a responsibilist virtue epistemology to this end, utilizing it most extensively in critique of Alvin Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief (2000). Epistemological externalism presages, I also argue, a new demarcation problem, but a secondary aim of the paper is to suggest reasons to think that `responsibilist externalism,' especially as glossed in virtue-theoretic terms, provides its proponents with the ability to adequately address this problem as we find it represented in a potent thought-experiment developed by Barry Stroud.

An essay written for an epistemology class for the MA in Philosophy program of Biola University. 

I examine Laurence BonJour's conception of Indirect Representational Realism and note some critical problems for his views, thus opening up the possibility for a form of direct realism.

The subject of this paper is the concept of 'demonstrative concept', which has been introduced in philosophy by John McDowell in Mind and World. The analysis presented in the article has a reconstructive and a critical character. Its reconstructive drive may be viewed as required by the concise mode the philosopher adopted to present his theoretical innovation and comprehends an effort to make clear: (i) what is the difference between the temporal conditions necessary (a) to give conceptual status to the color shade we have before our eyes and (b) to our possession of ordinary concepts; (ii) the sui generis character of the universality proper to demonstrative concepts and the uniformity of their relations to what they are concepts of; (iii) the equivalence of their semantical regime to that which is proper to concepts of measurement standards; (iv) the very singular function performed by memory in the constitution and possession of demonstrative concepts. Now, the critical character of the paper firstly lies in the remark that there is a kind of inconsequence in the way McDowell conceives the employment of those concepts, namely in his refusal to admit that even though it is natural to say 'I see the shade in my mind's eye', it would be a mistake to think that when we recognize a color shade as being the same as the one we have seen before there is an inner comparison of it with the retained sample. The second of the paper critical points is the warning that, considering the complex constitution process of demonstrative concepts and its exacting semantic, it seems impossible to take them as coextensive to our human experience of colors.

This article offers an analysis and defense of the solution proposed by Spinoza to the “Cartesian circle” problem. Taking into consideration Spinoza’s sound analysis of the epistemic conditions of an authentic doubt, it will try to show, against the interpreters who maintain that Spinoza’s most explicit and consistent solution fails, that his solution offers a perfectly coherent account of the self-justification of the objective value of reason. I will also briefly indicate the intimate connection existing between Spinoza’s solution to the “Cartesian circle” problem and his conception of truth as its own standard

In his essay Avoiding the Myth of the Given (AMG), McDowell gives a new characterization both of the content of perceptual experience and of the way in which it enables a subject to know. This new characterization has been charged to give rise to a "pluralism anxiety". The goal of this paper is to explore in detail possible problems linked with the pluralism that arise from McDowell's change of mind about the content of perceptual experience, and to evaluate whether McDowell has conceptual resources to avoid them. The structure of the paper will be the following: first we will reconstruct in detail McDowell's revised view on perceptual experience as it is presented in AMG; then, we will reconstruct arguments in support of the claim that McDowell's revised position could give rise to a pluralism anxiety; finally yet importantly we will discuss whether it is possible to offer an interpretation of McDowell's position which offers a way out of such difficulties.

The distinction between prima facie and what is sometimes called 'ultima facie' justification in epistemology is familiar. Yet I believe that its importance is generally under-appreciated. This distinction is extremely useful in making clear the demarcations between competing epistemological theories. I begin this paper by discussing the primary motivation for recognizing this distinction, and then enumerate the ways that it sheds light on the foundationalist/coherentist, internalist/externalist, and naturalism debates in contemporary epistemology. 2. Marking the Distinction The primary reason to make the distinction between prima and ultima facie justification is to make a place for epistemic defeasibility. The need for an account of defeasibility arises from the recognition that there are two rather different ways of having unjustified beliefs. One's belief might be unjustified because one bases one's belief on either bad reasons or no reasons. Let me briefly describe three cases that will serve as paradigms in the discussion that follows: Case 1: Chuck believes that Mary doesn't like chicken because they were once at a restaurant together and Mary ordered lamb when she could have had chicken. Case 2: Alice looks across the quad (in good light) and sees in the distance a person she takes to be her colleague Ed. She comes to believe that she sees Ed. However, Alice also (justifiably) believes that Ed is in France and will not return to the U.S. for another six months. THE PRIMA/ULTIMA FACIE JUSTIFICATION DISTINCTION IN EPISTEMOLOGY 551

The Philosophy is from the time of Antiquity, to the birth of the Middle Ages Philosophy, both traces things in different approaches, thus the Ancient Philosophy trace back the Origin of Everything in Existence. Therefore the Modern philosophy deals with the world of today whereby eveything has improved from the old period.

In particular, the more complete exposition of the diagonal reconstruction shows that, besides its textual advantages, it has the philosophical virtue of capturing the independent anti-materialist intuitions of T. Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Philosophical Review 83, 4 (1974): 435-50, and others that have nothing to do with Descartes, just as we might expect-along the lines of K. Gunderson, "Asymmetries and Mind-Body Perplexities," Minnesotta Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. M. Radner and S. Winokur (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970) 4.

Herman Philipse argues that Christian belief cannot be warranted in Alvin Plantinga's sense. More specifically, he thinks it is impossible for intellectually responsible and modern believers to hold their religious beliefs in the manner of properly basic beliefs, not on the basis of explicit evidence or arguments. In this paper, we consider his objections to Plantinga's work and argue that they all fail.

The article begins with the question concerning the relation between the so called definition of knowledge (E. Gettier) and the epistemic relation but its main part aims at showing what are the most important constituents of this relation (constituents of the idea of knowledge in general). Fundamental for the possibility of epistemic relation is the presence of some kind of conscious subject. In this context critical remarks are considered concerning contemporary naturalistic approaches to the idea of knowledge where the possibility of wholly unconscious cognition (knowledge) has been seriously taken into account (e.g. robots capable of adaptive behavior in some environment). The second essential element of epistemic relation is the existence of some object (content), which conscious subject must be capable to grasp. The extent of the concept of object (content) cannot be limited to the realm of physical things because epistemic relation also allows for the presence of abstract obje...

Em “O Mito do Conhecimento”, Laurence BonJour defende a tese de que a concepção “falibilista” de conhecimento, assumida de modo preponderante pelos epistemólogos na era pós-Gettier, “está errada”, pois tal concepção “fraca” de conhecimento proporciona pouca satisfação da perspectiva filosófica e é inexistente no âmbito do senso comum, constituindo tão-somente um “mito filosófico”.

In particular, the more complete exposition of the diagonal reconstruction shows that, besides its textual advantages, it has the philosophical virtue of capturing the independent anti-materialist intuitions of T. Nagel, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Philosophical Review 83, 4 (1974): 435-50, and others that have nothing to do with Descartes, just as we might expect-along the lines of K. Gunderson, "Asymmetries and Mind-Body Perplexities," Minnesotta Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ed. M. Radner and S. Winokur (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970) 4.

En el presente ensayo examinaré las nociones de falsedad de actos cognoscitivos no judicativos que se encuentran en Suárez y en Descartes. Ademas, presentaré y defenderé una interpretación  de la noción cartesiana de la falsedad material de las ideas, y arguiré que ésta es significativamente distinta de, y más fuerte que, las dos nociones suarecianas de falsedad no judicativa. En particular, sostendré que, mientras que la falsedad de un acto no judicativo en Suárez no implica que ese acto represente erróneamente a su objeto, la falsedad material de Descartes sí lo implica. Arguiré tambien que Descartes necesita esa noción más fuerte de falsedad no judicativa a fin de poder construir una crítica efectiva a ciertas nociones y conceptos --algunos de proveniencia escolástica-- que él considera radicalmente inaceptables.

STRUCTURES OF JUSTIFICATION: PART III. CONTEXTUALISM This paper is the last part of a series of three articles concerning the structure of justification. The author discusses contextualism regarding the structure of justification in the versions put forward by David Annis and Michael Williams. Williams explicitly contrasts his view with both foundationalist and coherentist theories. He gives a novel and valuable account of the system of beliefs and the structure of justification. Still, one can have doubts as to its normative dimension, i.e. as to whether it correctly shows what the structure of justification should be like from the epistemic point of view.

In response to Pascal's famous wager argument for adopting Christian belief, Denis Diderot noted that ‘An Imam could just as well reason this way’. In this article, I will show how Diderot's observation about Pascal's argument can legitimately be made about Alvin Plantinga's Reformed Epistemology (RE) and its use in defending the rationality of Christian belief. Plantinga's RE can, with some minor adjustments, easily be adopted by Muslims. I shall argue that an Islamic analogue of Plantinga's Christian RE presents an undercutting rationality defeater for Christian belief for those reflective Christians who adopt Plantinga-style religious epistemology. I call this defeater the ‘Diderot Objection’ to Plantinga's RE. As part of my discussion, I will consider how Plantinga attempts to respond to this sort of objection and will show why his response runs into difficulties.

Abilitism is an approach to the metaphysics of concepts, according to which each concept consists of a managing cognitive ability coordinating other abilities (cognitive and non-cognitive) and a set of subordinate abilities associated with this managing ability. As I argue here, if we accept the abilitist approach, we can efficiently solve such puzzles in the metaphysics of concepts as the partial possession problem, the concept pluralism problem, etc. However, there are some possible objections to abilitism, concerning the abilitist explanation of compositional properties of concepts, knowledge-that, an extension/intension of concepts, and the idea that concepts are constituents of thought. However, as I demonstrate here, they can be answered.

This article examines some of the most important metaphors and analogies that epistemologists have used to discuss the structure and validity of knowledge. After reviewing foundational, coherentist, and other metaphors for knowledge, we discuss the metaphilosophical significance of the prevalence of such metaphors. We argue that they support a view of philosophy as akin to science rather than poetry or rhetoric.

O fundacionismo epistêmico enfrenta uma grave objeção em relação às crenças básicas que se colocam como fundamento da justificação e do conhecimento: o conhecido problema de Sellars. Aqui, tenta-se caracterizar o problema proposto por Sellars e apresentar algumas respostas que parecem bastante plausíveis, a partir de um entendimento da experiência sensorial e da própria natureza da percepção, que permite contornar o problema e defender uma versão de fundacionismo moderado.

According to foundationalism, some beliefs are justified but do not depend for their justification on any other beliefs. According to access internalism, a subject is justified in believing some proposition only if that subject is aware of or has access to some reason to think that the proposition is true or probable. In this paper I discusses a fundamental challenge to internalist foundationalism often referred to as the Sellarsian dilemma. I consider three attempts to respond to the dilemma-phenomenal conservatism, BonJour's classical foundationalism, and Fumerton's classical foundationalism. I argue that, of these three, only the last seems to avoid getting impaled on one or the other horn of the dilemma. I end by responding to some concerns with Fumerton's account. According to foundationalism, some empirical beliefs are noninferentially justified or foundational: they are justified but do not depend for their justification on any other empirical beliefs. According to access internalism (simply "internalism" in what follows), a subject is justified in believing some proposition only if that subject is aware of or has access to some reason to think that the proposition is true or probable. 1 The internalist foundationalist is confronted with the formidable task of providing an account of foundational belief that satisfies this internalist requirement. In this paper we will take a careful look at a famous dilemma for internalist foundationalism that is often referred to as the Sellarsian dilemma. 2 Its proponents apparently intend the dilemma to be a clearly fatal or decisive argument, or at least one for which there seems to be no clear response that is not vulnerable to a dilemma of essentially the same form, so that we might as well give up trying. 3 I consider three attempts to respond to the Sellarsian dilemma-1 According to mentalism or internal state internalism, justification is essentially a function of, or supervenes on, the subject's mental states, and in this sense it is "internal" or "inside" the subject. I will be concerned here with access internalism or awareness internalism, and will say nothing about mentalism.

Modern Philosophy started off on the ground of the collapse of the medieval synthesis of Thomas Aquinas. Rene Descartes, the French searcher for an indubitable foundation of knowledge, started off the project of rebuilding epistemology on an unshakable foundation. His meditations consists for us, his epistemic edifice. We sought here, to examine the tenability of his efforts, without prejudice to his helps.

Recent trends in Biblical hermeneutics have tended towards social-scientific approaches, namely those sympathetic to standpoint epistemology. These epistemological approaches privilege certain socially situated persons as having better epistemic access to Biblical interpretation. Standpoint epistemology entails epistemological relativism and thus, is incompatible with historic Christian Biblical interpretation. Since standpoint epistemology at its root is a critique of Foundationalism, in this paper I will offer an apologetic for the continued use of foundationalism as epistemic justification in Biblical hermeneutics. Additionally, I call for the development of robust categories of epistemic privilege when evaluating a Biblical hermeneutic.

In this article we intend to present Alvin Plantinga's epistemology by showing the way in which its central concepts: the Reidian foundationalism, the partial critique of evidentialism, warrant, proper function, reliability and externalismare logically interrelated. A section of this article is reserved to the critiques of his account of warrant brought by Peter Klein and Richard Feldman and to the way in which Plantinga answered them, by developing the concepts of cognitive maxi-and mini-environment. In the end we will see the way in which Plantinga's epistemology relates to both modernism and postmodernism.

The motive which impels me to present this Treatise to you is so reasonable, and when you shall learn its design, I am confident that you also will consider that there is ground so valid for your taking it under your protection, that I can in no way better recommend it to you than by briefly stating the end which I proposed to myself in it.[ L][ F] 2. I have always been of the opinion that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be determined by help of Philosophy rather than of Theology; for although to us, the faithful, it be sufficient to hold as matters of faith, that the human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it yet assuredly seems impossible ever to persuade infidels of the reality of any religion, or almost even any moral virtue, unless, first of all, those two things be proved to them by natural reason. And since in this life there are frequently greater rewards held out to vice than to virtue, few would prefer the right to the useful, if they were restrained neither by the fear of God nor the expectation of another life; and although it is quite true that the existence of God is to be believed since it is taught in the sacred Scriptures, and that, on the other hand, the sacred Scriptures are to be believed because they come from God (for since faith is a gift of God, the same Being who bestows grace to enable us to believe other things, can likewise impart of it to enable us to believe his own existence), nevertheless, this cannot be submitted to infidels, who would consider that the reasoning proceeded in a circle. And, indeed, I have observed that you, with all the other theologians, not only affirmed the sufficiency of natural reason for the proof of the existence of God, but also, that it may be inferred from sacred Scripture, that the knowledge of God is much clearer than of many created things, and that it is really so easy of acquisition as to leave those who do not possess it blameworthy. This is manifest from these words of the Book of Wisdom, chap. xiii., where it is said, Howbeit they are not to be excused; for if their understanding was so great that they could discern the world and the creatures, why did they not rather find out the Lord thereof? And in Romans, chap. i., it is said that they are without excuse; and again, in the same place, by these words, That which may be known of God is manifest in them-we seem to be admonished that all which can be known of God may be made manifest by reasons obtained from no other source than the inspection of our own minds. I have, therefore, thought that it would not be unbecoming in me to inquire how and by what way, without going out of ourselves, God may be more easily and certainly known than the things of the world.[ L][ F] As you begin this reading of Descartes' Meditations, you should think about the role of reason and faith. Consider how you might reply to the following questions:  Why does Descartes dedicate his Meditations to the faculty of sacred theology?  What are the two issues that Descartes focuses on in the Meditations?  How does he understand the relative roles of reason and faith in his project? What are the problems entailed in relying solely on faith? 3. And as regards the Soul, although many have judged that its nature could not be easily discovered, and some have even ventured to say that human reason led to the conclusion that it perished with the body, and that the contrary opinion could be held through faith alone; nevertheless, since the Lateran Council, held under Leo X. (in session viii.), condemns these, and expressly enjoins Christian philosophers to refute their arguments, and establish the truth according to their ability, I have ventured to attempt it in this work.[ L][ F] 4. Moreover, I am aware that most of the irreligious deny the existence of God, and the distinctness of the human soul from the body, for no other reason than because these points, as they allege, have never as yet been demonstrated. Now, although I am by no means of their opinion, but, on the contrary, hold that almost all the proofs which have been adduced on these questions by great men, possess, when rightly understood, the force of demonstrations, and that it is next to impossible to discover new, yet there is, I apprehend, no more useful service to be performed in Philosophy, than if some one were, once for all, carefully to seek out the best of these reasons, and expound them so accurately and clearly that, for the future, it might be manifest to all that they are real demonstrations. And finally, since many persons were greatly desirous of this, who knew that I had cultivated a certain Method of resolving all kinds of difficulties in the sciences, which is not indeed new (there being nothing older than truth), but of which they were aware I had made successful use in other instances, I judged it to be my duty to make trial of it also on the present matter.[ L][ F] it, than in denying what is true. In philosophy, on the other hand, where it is believed that all is doubtful, few sincerely give themselves to the search after truth, and by far the greater number seek the reputation of bold thinkers by audaciously impugning such truths as are of the greatest moment.[ L][ F] 6. Hence it is that, whatever force my reasonings may possess, yet because they belong to philosophy, I do not expect they will have much effect on the minds of men, unless you extend to them your patronage and approval. But since your Faculty is held in so great esteem by all, and since the name of SORBONNE is of such authority, that not only in matters of faith, but even also in what regards human philosophy, has the judgment of no other society, after the Sacred Councils, received so great deference, it being the universal conviction that it is impossible elsewhere to find greater perspicacity and solidity, or greater wisdom and integrity in giving judgment, I doubt not,if you but condescend to pay so much regard to this Treatise as to be willing, in the first place, to correct it (for mindful not only of my humanity, but chiefly also of my ignorance, I do not affirm that it is free from errors); in the second place, to supply what is wanting in it, to perfect what is incomplete, and to give more ample illustration where it is demanded, or at least to indicate these defects to myself that I may endeavour to remedy them; and, finally, when the reasonings contained in it, by which the existence of God and the distinction of the human soul from the body are established, shall have been brought to such degree of perspicuity as to be esteemed exact demonstrations, of which I am assured they admit, if you condescend to accord them the authority of your approbation, and render a public testimony of their truth and certainty, I doubt not, I say, but that henceforward all the errors which have ever been entertained on these questions will very soon be effaced from the minds of men. For truth itself will readily lead the remainder of the ingenious and the learned to subscribe to your judgment; and your authority will cause the atheists, who are in general sciolists rather than ingenious or learned, to lay aside the spirit of contradiction, and lead them, perhaps, to do battle in their own persons for reasonings which they find considered demonstrations by all men of genius, lest they should seem not to understand them; and, finally, the rest of mankind will readily trust to so many testimonies, and there will no longer be any one who will venture to doubt either the existence of God or the real distinction of mind and body. It is for you, in your singular wisdom, to judge of the importance of the establishment of such beliefs, [who are cognisant of the disorders which doubt of these truths produces].* But it would not here become me to commend at greater length the cause of God and of religion to you, who have always proved the strongest support of the Catholic Church. [ L][ F] Notice how Descartes moves back and forth between referring to the soul and referring to the mind. Consider that while Descartes is dedicating his work to a religious authority (the faculty of theology), he is attempting to put philosophy on a foundation that does not require religious authority. In her essay "The Politics of Anti-Foundationalism," Naomi Scheman notes Descartes' dilemma and its connection to religious authority: "The epistemic framework he inherited and in which he was taught was coming undone. That framework traced epistemic warrant up to divine origins and ran justification down through culturally authorized channels. The challenge to it meant that authority and power-religious, political, and economic-were no longer stably invested in hierarchies that existed independently of the individuals who happened to people them. But with increasing democratization came the threats of religious schism, political anarchy, economic chaos, and skepticism. If everyone could think for himself, what guarantee was there that what different people came up with would be sufficiently congruent to sustain social order, a working economy, or anything that could count as shared knowledge about the world? Descartes' project, which has been the dominant project of modern philosophy, was to provide grounds for assurance that such congruence was possible and to develop a method for ensuring that it would be realized."

Nie trzeba chyba podkreślać, że czasownik "widzieć" należy do potocznego, nietechnicznego języka, którym posługujemy się na co dzień. Okazuje się jednak, że nawet jego zwyczajne, codzienne użycie prowokuje do zadawania istotnych filozoficznie pytań i konstruowania niełatwych do rozwikłania zagadek poznawczych. Zadaniem, które sobie w tym artykule stawiam jest rozpoznanie sposobów, w jakich używane jest to wyrażenie i wprowadzenie takich uzupełniających rozgraniczeń pojęciowych, które pomogą w zagadek tych rozwiązaniu. Zacznijmy od przedstawienia trudności, o których mowa. Wyobraźmy sobie, że przysłuchujemy się takiej oto wymianie słów: A: Widziałem tu wczoraj czerwony kubek. B: Nie mogłeś widzieć czerwonego kubka, bo takiego nie mam. A: Chyba lepiej wiem, co widziałem-co najwyżej to było złudzenie. Który z uczestników tego dialogu ma rację? Można powiedzieć, że spór dotyczy tu tego, czyj opis percepcji powinniśmy uznać za uprzywilejowany-podmiotu percepcji, czy też osoby trzeciej (która dysponuje na przykład jakimiś dodatkowymi informacjami). Będę argumentował za tym, że najwygodniej uznać, że mamy tu do czynienia po prostu z dwoma znaczeniami wyrażenia "widzieć"obiektywnym (którym posługuje się rozmówca B) i subiektywnym (którym posługuje się rozmówca A). Jednakże, zanim do wyraźnego rozgraniczenia tych znaczeń przejdziemy, wskażę kilka innych jeszcze kłopotliwych przykładów użycia wyrażenia "widzieć". Najlepiej rozpoznanymi zjawiskami, które prowadzą do nieporozumień w rodzaju tego, z dialogu powyżej są halucynacje i iluzje. Czy ulegający halucynacji człowiek, który wypowiada zdanie "widzę czarnego psa" wypowiada po prostu zdanie fałszywe, czy też dwuznaczne (bo w pewnym sensie słowa "widzieć" rzeczonego psa widzi)? Czy typ halucynacji, której człowiek ten ulega ma wpływ na warunki prawdziwości tego zdania? Na przykład-czy sytuacja będzie odmienna w przypadku halucynacji typowej i halucynacji przeżywanej przy zamkniętych oczach? A co z dość podobną (przynajmniej na pierwszy rzut oka) sytuacją snu-czy mówiąc, że widziałem psa we śnie, posługuję się wyrażeniem "widzieć" w sposób istotnie odmienny od tego, z którym mieliśmy do czynienia w przypadku halucynacji-być może jest to już użycie metaforyczne? brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

Todas as teorias fundacionistas assumem que algumas crenças justificadas são básicas porque sua justificação não se deve ao fato de terem sido inferidas de outras crenças justificadas, interrompendo assim o regresso epistêmico. A versão internalista do fundacionismo sustenta que uma crença só pode ser justificada quando o fator justificador está cognitivamente disponível ao sujeito que crê com base nele. Tendo em vista esta dupla exigência – dar por encerrado o regresso epistêmico em crenças que são justificadas de modo não inferencial, e assegurar a consciência do item que contribui para a justificação de tais crenças básicas epistemicamente independentes – alguns críticos levantaram objeções contra o fundacionismo internalista. Neste artigo me ocupo de uma dessas objeções, tendo em vista especificamente a teoria proposta por Laurence BonJour: o dilema apresentado por Michael Bergmann.