Conventional Deterrence

קובעי המדיניות בישראל הסתמכו על אסטרטגיה של הרתעה מצטברת במאבק בטרור, אולם ישראל נכשלה בעקביות בהרתעת חמאס, לא רק ב-7 באוקטובר אלא גם בשנים 2009-2008, 2012, 2014 ו-2021. הבחנה קריטית, שלעיתים קרובות מתעלמים ממנה, היא שאסטרטגיות הרתעה מצטברת בשילוב עם יכולות מניעה איתנות עלולות להוביל למלכודת התשה, המשמשת אסטרטגיית ניצחון עבור השחקנים החלשים במשוואה, ובסופו של דבר מובילה לכישלון ההרתעה במקום להצלחתה. מאמר זה מתבסס על לקחים ממקרים של הרתעה מוצלחת והרתעה כושלת ממחקר אורך של הסכסוך הערבי-ישראלי. ראשית, נטען כי במאבקי נחישות מאתגרים יצליחו השחקנים להימלט ממלכודת ההתשה אם יזנחו אסטרטגיה של הרתעה מצטברת לטובת תמרונים קרקעיים המכוונים לפגוע באופן שיטתי באסטרטגיות של ארגוני טרור, ובכך ישקמו את בעיית האמינות. שנית, מלחמות כאלה עלולות להוביל להתפשטות יתר ולמלחמות התשה נוספות, ולכן על הצד המתגונן לדעת מתי לעצור ולסגת, תוך שהוא מבטיח כי מאזן הלגיטימיות והנחישות נשמר לטובתו. טענת המאמר היא כי חמאס נותר בלתי מורתע לאורך כל הסכסוך, משום שישראל ראתה בהסתמכות על אסטרטגיות של הרתעה מצטברת ויכולת המניעה האיתנה שלה (כיפת ברזל) בחירה שהמחיר שלה נמוך יותר מזה של פתיחה במלחמה עם מרכיב של תמרון, שהייתה חיונית לפתרון בעיית האמינות של ישראל בנוגע לנכונותה לפעול.

La importancia estratégica de los aviones Super Etendard de la Armada Argentina para disuadir a la Corona Británica en su invasión a las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur desde el 3 de enero de 1833, llevada a cabo por la Armada Británica, el Capitán Onslow y su HMS CLIO.

India’s Operation Sindoor deployed 36 naval ships, including a Carrier Battle Group, establishing surveillance and de facto blockade along Pakistan’s coast. Following India’s new “any attack equals act of war” policy, the Navy is shifting from deterrence to compellence strategy, requiring faster response times and potentially earlier escalation in future Pakistan conflicts.

This study explores through the lens of neo-defensive realism whether a nucleararmed Iran could contribute to stability in the Middle East by deterring large-scale conflicts and reshaping regional power dynamics. Drawing on historical precedents and nuclear deterrence theory the research scrutinizes the potential for strategic balance while acknowledging the risks of escalation, arms races, and proxy warfare. Although, nuclearization imposes caution on Iran and its rivals. Yet, it also raises uncertainties regarding regional security and non-proliferation efforts. The findings highlight the paradox of nuclear deterrence-offering both the potential for stability and the danger of heightened tensions. Demanding the need for diplomatic strategies to navigate this evolving geopolitical landscape. This research offers Global South perspective rather than promoting nuclear proliferation.

Does violent retaliation of state and non-state actors to violent attacks lead to deterrence or, on the contrary, to counter-retaliation and an increase in violence? This paper studies this issue focusing on the Gaza-Israeli conflict between 2007 and 2014 using original security reports from the United Nations. The data include all Palestinian projectile launches (over 16,000) and Israeli airstrikes (over 8,800) during the period at issue down to the five-minute interval at which the action occurred. Our findings argue against the importance of cyclical counter-retaliation as driving this persistent conflict. First, this conflict is characterized by short-lived episodes of violence separated by quiet interludes. Violent episodes tend to last less than one day and are followed by three and a half days without attacks. Second, 61% of violent episodes include an initial attack that doesn't induce a retaliation, and among the ones that do, the median number of successive counter-retaliations is only 3. Third, violent episodes are not themselves cyclically related: 91% of violent episodes are initiated by Gazan militants attacks and 84.9% of violent episodes end with a Gazan militant attack. Finally, we find no evidence that episodes with counter-retaliations (i.e., cycles of violence) induce or deter subsequent violence. The median number of days without attacks after cycles of violence (3.1) is almost the same to the median number of days without attacks for all episodes (3.4). Moreover, the type of projectile launched by Gazan militants does not seem to be affected by Israeli retaliation or the lack thereof.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been accompanied by nuclear signalling since the beginning of the so-called “special military operation”. This signalling was meant to draw “red lines” for the West in this war, hinting that crossing them might have Russian nuclear escalation as a consequence.

This thesis deals with Conventional Deterrence and how to implement it correctly, thus needing to understand and collate its characteristics, modus operandi and what can affect it. To this end, the following research problem was established: how is Conventional Deterrence influenced by the Strategic Culture unique to each nation? We are working with the hypothesis that: a) Conventional Deterrence has a complex but developed framework of procedures and principles that must be analysed; b) each Strategic Culture is distinctive in that it includes the practices and processes of political-administrative resolution that are individualized in each nation. As such, the study of Strategic Culture makes it possible to identify these national specificities and make use of them with a view to better deterrence planning; and c) processes adopted or tolerated according to the coherence of the local Strategic Culture can result in solutions that are harmful to Conventional Deterrence, resulting in a nation being less guarded against external threats. The thesis argues that assessing the autochthonous
Strategic Culture makes it possible to seek solutions to improve the tools of
Conventional Deterrence (such as adopting an efficient Military Doctrine) and that understanding the allochthonous Strategic Culture helps to develop a Conventional Deterrence that is tailor-made to face the threats that arise (presenting itself as capable, credible and orchestrated in the face of hostile scrutiny). It is a panoramic thesis with the aim of offering a reflective contribution using historical analysis, and the approach method is hypothetical-deductive, with qualitative research involving data collection, including primary sources (such as official documents). There is a chapter dedicated to Neoclassical Realism (chosen as the theoretical basis), to the (still) inevitability of interstate conflicts and to the study of Grand Strategy and Military Doctrine as being, among other things, the channels for transmitting high-level political decisions and options for employing the military apparatus. Two chapters focus on a better understanding of Conventional Deterrence, especially from an academic and theoretical perspective. There is also a chapter on understanding Strategic Culture and
Defence Diplomacy, as well as a case study involving Brazil's Conventional Deterrence in relation to its Strategic Culture. The conclusion answers the research problem and confirms the validity of the hypotheses: that Strategic Culture intervenes in Conventional Deterrence because the political and military characteristics (positive and/or negative) that the former possesses (particular to each nation and group) effectively act on the latter's decision-making and implementation processes.

Europeans should recognize the responsibility for their own security including arms control, given not only renewed Russian belligerence but also other global trends undermining strategic stability. As the United States is likely to be even more focused on the Indo-Pacific region in the future, Europeans cannot afford to take a passive role or pursue multilateralism for the sake of multilateralism. Actively taking responsibility for their own security including arms control would mean Europeans learn to combine deterrence, competition, and engagement with nuclear-armed great powers. Such a combination would be particularly important for incentivizing Russia to engage with Europeans on arms control, and to find consensus within Europe to engage with Russia.

Presented by Antony Dabila States, like individuals, want not only life but honour, not only security but status. They often prefer danger in autonomy to peace under the protection of a stronger party. Are they 'irrational' ? Was the commander who sank with his ship irrational ? If he was, let us hope that humanity does not stop being irrational! 1 6

's two main prewar works were entitled La Sociologie allemande contemporaine and La Philosophie critique de l'histoire. From these two works, the young doctoral student at the École normale supérieure retained throughout his career two essential teachings which helped him to approach international problems in an original way. The first, drawn from the work of Max Weber, is the centrality of the political in human affairs and the need to understand the world in terms of power relations, both within and outside political units. The second is the Hegelian (and Marxist) idea of the gradual emergence of the meaning of history, which nobody wanted as it is, but which emerges from the confrontation and conflict between different perspectives on the world. As expressed in a paraphrase of Marx Aron was fond of, "men make their own history, but do not know the history they make". Rather than the centrality of economics, Aron used this dialectical tool to replace the Marxist class struggle vision with that borrowed from Weber, yet without ignoring economic interests in his analysis. These are the most salient methodological principles of a reflection that he himself linked to "historical sociology", a tradition born in Germany in the wake of Weber's writings and which Aron had analyzed at length in his first work on German-language sociology. For him, it is a tradition that makes it possible to encompass the entire field of the human sciences and to neglect none of the dimensions relevant to the analysis of the complex phenomena they deal with. Rejecting any reductionism to economics, as in Marx's case, as well as to politics or psychology, this approach remained throughout Aron's intellectual journey his special way of approaching major political problems, both internal and external. 2 This original perspective, received during his intellectual training, pushed Aron to adopt a point of view that is both inclusive and politically focused on international relations and, more particularly, on the emerging nuclear dialectic in the post-Hiroshima era. While postwar strategists quickly integrated the existence of atomic weapons into their studies, usually to underline its radically new character at the strategic and operational levels, Aron was more circumspect and insisted from his first analyses, as early as 1945, on 1 Early English translations were published in book form under the title On War : Atomic Weaopns and

Аннотация. Статья посвящена проблеме использования в научном обороте термина конфликты низкой интенсивности . Это понятие появилось в поствьетнамскую эру в риторике американских политиков и военных в качестве эвфемизма для вооруженных противостояний с партизанским движением или повстанцами. В январе 1986 г. госсекретарь Дж. Шульц назвал данный тип конфликтов важнейшим вызовом, с которым США будут сталкиваться как минимум до конца XX века. Понятие конфликт низкой интенсивности используется и в американских официальных документах, в частности в полевом уставе сухопутных войск США. В то же время ученые, занимавшиеся данной проблематикой, отмечали размытость и туманность данного термина. В статье предпринята попытка описать спектр мнений различных отечественных и зарубежных исследователей по вопросу об определении термина конфликты низкой интенсивности , в том числе авторов коллективной монографии Института США и Канады РАН Конфликты низкой интенсивности в американской военнополитическо...

Ofer Fridman holds the degrees of BA (Military History and Security Studies) from Hebrew University, MA (Counter-Terror and Homeland Security) from Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya and PhD (Political Science, supervised by Prof. Beatrice Heuser) from University of Reading. He is a Sessional Lecture at the University of Reading and was a Visiting Research Fellow and Visiting Lecturer at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in 2014. Ofer joined the War Studies Department at King's to conduct a research project that focuses on the politicisation of'Hybrid Warfare'. During his visit of Moscow to conduct a quantitative research of Russian military research publications "MGIMO Review of International Relations" took the following interview from him.

How do battlefield outcomes convert to strategic deterrence stability? Does the use of traditional tools of conventional deterrence, tools such as punishment, denial, or cumulative deterrence, lead to strategically successful deterrence outcomes against states and non-state actors, or does such an outcome depend on battlefield victory? And, if the latter, under what circumstances? Policy makers and scholars interested in how conventional deterrence works against states and non-state actors (NSAs) cannot provide a reassuring answer. Israeli policy makers have long been puzzled

Long-range missile proliferation is becoming a key facet of defense modernization and expansion in the Indo-Pacific region, with the People’s Republic of China leading in the acquisition of long-range ballistic, cruise and post-ballistic missiles. Advances in technology and precision capability allow long-range missiles to coerce target small countries who don’t have the means to retaliate or have relied on masses of manpower for defense. At the same token these missiles can work for small states in providing credible deterrence with less cost in manpower. The EPB also provides some recommendations relevant to the DND and AFP to consider, both to exploit the power of these weapons and to defend against them.

The threat of the use of nuclear weapons by the aggressor is a significant factor in the ongoing war. Also in future, the Ukrainian government (any leadership) will be interested in its own nuclear weapons at least as long as Russia is ruled by an ill-predictable authoritarian regime. Nuclear arms could be helpful for Ukraine both for deterrence and to increase the attractiveness of the country as a military ally. However, due to many economic, political, and legal factors discussed in the paper, the likelihood of development of Ukraine's own nuclear arsenal should be considered as extremely low. The unlikely scenario, in which Ukraine could nevertheless develop such weapons, would require such a significant improvement of political and economic institutions, that the risk for third countries from the new nuclear actor will remain minimal. Abstrakt Hrozba použití jaderných zbraní ze strany agresora je významným faktorem probíhající války. Také v budoucnu bude mít ukrajinská vláda (pod jakýmkoli vedením) zájem na vlastních jaderných zbraních, přinejmenším dokud bude v Rusku vládnout špatně předvídatelný autoritářský režim. Jaderné zbraně by mohly být pro Ukrajinu užitečné jak pro odstrašení, tak pro zvýšení atraktivity země jako vojenského spojence. Vzhledem k mnoha ekonomickým, politickým a právním faktorům, o nichž se v článku hovoří, je však pravděpodobnost vývoje vlastního jaderného arzenálu na Ukrajině třeba považovat za extrémně nízkou. Nepravděpodobný scénář, kdy by Ukrajina přesto mohla takové zbraně vyvinout, by vyžadoval výrazné zdokonalení politických a ekonomických institucí, riziko pro třetí země ze strany nového jaderného aktéra tak zůstává minimální.

he relationships between the United States and its allies in the Middle East are, for the most part, founded on national security considerations. As a result, trends that might affect the readiness and capabilities of the U.S. armed forces or Washington's ability to use force effectively have potentially far-reaching implications for America's allies in the region. Three developments in recent y are of particular concern here. First is the growing gap between civilian and military elites in the United States, resulting in heightened civil-military tensions and flaws in the national security decisionmaking process.

Notwithstanding the flurry of bilateral visits, conclusion of several agreements and the flow of Japanese investments on an unprecedented scale to Israel in recent years, Israel-Japan relations remain largely confined to the economic sphere. The relationship is determined largely by the Japanese side, based on cold calculation of the assets and liabilities that it brings to Japan. Despite the recent change in the economic and geopolitical situation in the Middle East, Japanese policy is still aimed at finding a comfortable balance between the risks that relations with Israel entail in terms of Japan’s energy supply from the Gulf states and the political and economic advantages that the relationship may bring.

Poland's strategic situation is pre-determined by the use of depth and includes the Baltic countries, Belarus, and Kaliningrad in a broader sense. • The HOMAR acquisitions ensure the possibility of active projection and distribution of military power over a wider geographic region. The preemptive nature of MRL capabilities will form a vital part of a broader strategy of deterrence by denial. • These capabilities will have the ability to suppress the Russian SAM advantage in Kaliningrad and suppress the Russian A2AD bubbles in Kaliningrad and Belarus. • Rocket artillery (MRL) will be an essential part of the concept of layered enemy destruction at a tactical, operational, and strategic level and will create its own version of A2/AD capability.

In spite of absence of war declaration or any conclusive evidence of the attacker, some scholars refer the cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007 as the first cyber-war and Estonia accused Russia that was behind it. No doubt that our increasing reliance on the networked systems is creating a high security risk through the cyber domain on the states (critical infrastructure, military), industry (economy, companies) and individuals (privacy, safety) that interconnected globally in cyberspace. To make it worse than nuclear or conventional weapons, cyber weapons are easy to access, inexpensive, difficult to track and identified and evolving much faster than its laws and legal policies nationally and internationally. In this paper, I will try to identify the conceptual and technical challenges between Conventional Deterrence (nuclear and conventional weapons) and Cyber Deterrence (cyber weapons offensive/defensive) and showing limited cyber deterrence effectiveness comparing to the conventional deterrence. Despite its huge anticipated impact on the future of cyber weapons/wars, this short essay will not examine the influence of artificial intelligence and internet of things on the future of cyber weapons/wars.

PREFACE This briefing provides the results of a quick-response study performed by the Institute for Defense Analyses for the Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning under task "New Approaches to Meet Emerging Long-Term Threats." The briefing is presented in two volumes: an unclassified main briefing, and a classified second volume of technical appendices. The study was motivated by concern that with the end of the cold war, challenges to U.S. security may be changing in ways that current U.S. military capabilities are ill-suited to meet-and that the nature of the defense planning problem may be changing in ways that the existing PPBS system is ill-suited to meet. In particular, the combination of slower modernization rates (which means longer-term implications for current program decisions) and a rapidly changing threat environment have made longer range planning both more important and more difficult. Given this, IDA developed an analytical approach for g conducting longer term planning under such conditions, and provided a "proof of principle" for that approach via a series of illustrative analyses. 3 The resulting approach begins by projecting a set of new military-operational challenges created by new forms of conflict or emerging strategies for aggression. These projected challenges are then compared with the capabilities of programmed forces, and shortcomings, or "critical mission areas" are identified. Options for improving capabilities in these critical mission areas are then developed and assessed, and implications for 3 programmed forces are derived. Perhaps the most significant finding of the study is the utility of a "critical mission" approach to long range planning. Centering the analysis on a set of critical military missions (as opposed to, e.g., technological or geo-political projections) insulates the 3 analysis to a degree from the uncertainties associated with changing international political alignments; helps focus attention on the policy problem to be solved; facilitates cross-3 system and cross-service analysis; makes it easier to integrate the unusually wide range of disciplinary perspectives required to evaluate the unusually diverse range of analytical issues raised by long range planning; and facilitates the integration of technological and doctrinal change into operational concepts for the use of new systems. In addition, although not intended to provide definitive programmatic recommendations, the analyses I 'ii. I conducted to demonstrate the approach suggested a number of possible avenues for improving long term military capabilities. These include survivability enhancerments for dismounted personnel; development of armed, unmanned, airborne recce systems; nonlethal incapacitation technologies; command disablement for PGMs; foliage penetrating radar; and agent defeat systems for biological and chemical weapons. 3 The work benefited from the contributions of many individuals. In addition to the authors and principal contributors listed on the cover, Mr. Theophilos Gemelas provided valuable assistance in compiling literature relevant to future threats; Ms. Erika Tildon provided essential graphics and clerical support; Ms. Eileen Doherty edited the document; and Ms. Barbara Varvaglione provided timely and efficient production assistance. The briefing was reviewed by Mr. Michael Donley, Dr. Phillip Gould, and Dr. David Sparrow of the IDA staff. * Develop a framework of essential analytical tasks i Conduct illustrative analyses to see whether completion of tasks yields useful insights £ • Provide "proof of principle"-not definitive answers 3 Slide ES-i: Purpose This briefing summarizes the findings of a quick-response IDA study of new approaches to planning for emerging long-term threats. The study was motivated by concern that, with the end of the cold war, challenges to U.S. security may be changing in ways that current U.S. military capabilities are ill-suited to meet-and that the nature of the defense planning problem may be changing in ways that the existing PPBS system is ill-suited to meet.

BACKGROUND: The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was founded in 1998 to integrate and focus the capabilities of the Department of Defense (DoD) that address the weapons of mass destruction threat. To assist the Agency in its primary mission, the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO) develops and maintains an evolving analytical vision of necessary and sufficient capabilities to protect United States and Allied forces and citizens from WMD attack. ASCO is also charged by DoD and by the U.S. Government generally to identify gaps in these capabilities and initiate programs to fill them. It also provides supprt to the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee (TRAC), and its Panels, with timely, high quality research. ASCO ANALYTICAL SUPPORT: The Institute for Defense Analyses has provided analytical support to DTRA since the latter's inception through a series of projects on chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons issues. This work was performed for DTRA under contract DASW01 98 C 0067, Task DC-6-2118.

Проведенный анализ подходов к явлению гибридных войн свидетельствует о том, что применяемые сегодня технологии оказывают воздействие на мировоззрение граждан. Это выводит гибридные конфликты на иной уровень, заставляя говорить о применении новых технологий, ориентированных, прежде всего, на социокультурную сферу. В статье выдвигается гипотеза о том, что гибридные войны имеют три вектора социокультурного влияния, воздействуя на культурную идентичность, чувство патриотизма и сопричастности судьбе государства, а также духовные и материальные ценности народа.

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan for Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the most difficult to solve from all existing "frozen" conflicts. The knot of many problems interweaves historical burden and modern reality, occupied territories, military successes and defeats, tens of thousands killed, the fate of over one million refugees and forced evicted citizens, and a combination of Rivalry, interests and ambitions of the big international players. Almost 30 years since the beginning of the conflict and a quarter of a century of attempts for its peaceful and sustainable regulation by the OSCE Minsk Group, there is still no any progress towards its resolution. This article gives an overview of the options available to the conflict and the reasons for the lack of a solution acceptable to both parties. It also presents the current state of the conflict regulation processes and the positions of the States involved in the conflict. It is recalled the famous maxim that success in politics depends on achieving a balance between the interests of equally "unhappy" countries. The authors share their expert point of view on the need for compromises and acceptable concessions from Armenia and Azerbaijan, the role of Russia, the USA and France, as co-chairmen of the Minsk Group, as well as and active involvement of the wider international community for a peaceful, equitable and legal resolution of the conflict. The publication forecasts the future status of the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The focus is on the new aspects in the politics of Baku and Yerevan after the last big escalation of April 2016. The current policy of the major countries involved in the conflict are clarified. Opportunities for sustainable conflict resolution are presented.

This paper assesses the validity of narrow deterrence theory between a State and a Non-State actor in the context of the Israel and Gaza conflict. We build the most comprehensive data set on this conflict between 2007 and 2014 using original security reports from the United Nations, which capture over 16,000 Palestinian projectile launches and over 8,800 Israeli airstrikes, recorded with precise timing. We show that this conflict is characterized by short-lived episodes of violence separated by quiet interludes. Episodes tend to last less than one day and are followed by 3.5 days of calm, on average. Most episodes have no retaliation and consist only of provocations that go unanswered. Moreover, counterretaliation does not induce subsequent episodes. We find that Israeli retaliation strongly correlates with Gazans' initial number of attacks and type of rockets fired. Yet, rather than provoking an immediate increase in violence or de-escalation, retaliation seems to have no short-term effect. These findings support the concept of narrow deterrence and weigh heavily against the argument that retaliation perpetuates this conflict.

This paper examines the extent to which deterrence has motivated the acquisition of nuclear armament by North Korea and Pakistan. Nation-states involve in the acquisition of nuclear weapons to deter other nation-states with the notion that a nuclear attack by one would receive an overwhelming nuclear counterattack such that both the defender and attacker would be annihilated. This scenario has created a security dilemma and nation-states are grasping with fears. Both North Korea and Pakistan were involved in the acquisition of nuclear weapons because of adversaries that have constituted major threats based on ideological and religious differences. The paper adopted the neo-realism theory as its theoretical framework of analysis. The paper relied on a qualitative method of data gathering technique. It unravels that both North Korea and Pakistan's adversaries have motivated them to acquire more nuclear weapons. Therefore, the paper concludes that North Korea and Pakistan could enjoy peaceful coexistence with neigbhours if they have enough deterrence.

This paper examines the extent to which deterrence has motivated the acquisition of nuclear armament by North Korea and Pakistan. Nation-states involve in the acquisition of nuclear weapons to deter other nation-states with the notion that a nuclear attack by one would receive an overwhelming nuclear counterattack such that both the defender and attacker would be annihilated. This scenario has created a security dilemma and nation-states are grasping with fears. Both North Korea and Pakistan were involved in the acquisition of nuclear weapons because of adversaries that have constituted major threats based on ideological and religious differences. The paper adopted the neo-realism theory as its theoretical framework of analysis. The paper relied on a qualitative method of data gathering technique. It unravels that both North Korea and Pakistan's adversaries have motivated them to acquire more nuclear weapons. Therefore, the paper concludes that North Korea and Pakistan could enjoy peaceful coexistence with neigbhours if they have enough deterrence.

Iran has pursued nuclear weapons for over four decades. The basic reasons for this quest have remained unchanged in the face of the most crippling sanctions. Almost three and a half years after Trump’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Pact (JCPOA), Tehran officially announced that it has enriched uranium up to 60%, very close to the 90% suitable for nuclear weapons. Iran is highly likely to be the world’s next nuclear state. A nuclear-armed Iran will be emboldened to accelerate its aggressive activities in the region and act against its neighbors with little fear of retribution. Moreover, Iran’s network of proxies would adopt a more confrontational approach towards Israel. Besides, Iran’s politics of threat can have serious socioeconomic consequences for Israel.Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons could arguably set off a cascade effect, encouraging other major regional powers to move in the same direction. The West, particularly the United States, would seek to offset this risk by ...

В статье конфликт в Донбассе рассматривается в контексте эволюции войны. Концепция и практика тринитарной войны была разрушена атомным оружием, национально-освободительным движением, появлением транснациональных террористических сетей и, как ни странно, запретом агрессии международными конвенциями. Войны стали неконвенциональными; большинство из них приобрело характер войн по доверенности, конфликтов низкой интенсивности. Конфликт на Донбассе стал продуктом международных противоречий, результатом геополитической борьбы; население – главная страдающая сторона. Оно воспринимает цепь событий с весны 2014 г. как катаст рофу, которой никто не ждал. С точки зрения населения, конфликт превратился в коммерческое предприятие элит.

This paper examines the idea of creating an American-led extended deterrence regime in the Middle East to address potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles. It does not focus on how to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed power. Instead it addresses how the U.S. Government can act to deter Iran in a future setting where it already possesses these weapons and is trying to employ them to geopolitical advantage. Developing a coherent strategy can lessen the risk that the United States will be surprised, compelled to improvise, and unable to lead effectively in the Middle East and elsewhere. Even as the Administration employs diplomacy, sanctions, and multilateral cooperation to derail Iran from the nuclear path, it should also develop a clear sense of how it will react if, as is possible, Iran emerges as a nuclear power, led by a radical government with a menacing foreign policy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently stated that Iran should consider the consequences of a U.S. "defense umbrella over the region." This paper explores many of the issues related to such an umbrella. Key questions arise regarding an extended deterrence regime. What Iranian threats would this regime try to deter? Who would it protect, and how would it protect them? How much deterrence is possible, and how much is enough? What shape would a deterrence regime take, how would it operate, and would it be effective? What options are available? This paper addresses these and related questions. Its intent is to illuminate issues and options, not to advocate any single approach.

Another major conclusion of this study is that although nuclear weapons could have destabilizing consequences in certain situations, on net they have reinforced national security and regional stability in Asia. It is possible to argue that fledgling and small nuclear arsenals would be more vulnerable to preventive attacks; that the related strategic compulsion for early use may lead to early launch postures and crisis situations; that limited war under nuclear conditions to alter or restore the political status quo can intensify tensions and carry the risk of escalation to major war; that inadequate command, control, and safety measures could result in accidents; and that nuclear facilities and material may be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These are legitimate concerns, but thus far nuclear weapons have not undermined national security and regional stability in Asia. Instead, they have ameliorated national security concerns, strengthened the status quo, increased deterrence domin...

Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) are engaged in an extended discourse over the future direction of U.S. defense strategy and military force structure. In the past, these discussions have focused almost exclusively on questions related to U.S. conventional military forces, with discussions about nuclear weapons held in separate fora. However, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) examined both nuclear and conventional forces, a first in the QDR's history. This indicates that analysts both inside and outside government are beginning to review and assess the potential deterrent and operational relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons. 1 Examples of this "extended discourse" include the QDR process, the House Armed Services Committee's "Congressional Defense Review," DOD's Annual Report on China, implementation of a variety of measures designed to "transform" the military services, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and Overseas basing and realignment processes, and annual Congressional oversight of DOD's budget.

Ofer Fridman holds the degrees of BA (Military History and Security Studies) from Hebrew University, MA (Counter-Terror and Homeland Security) from Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya and PhD (Political Science, supervised by Prof. Beatrice Heuser) from University of Reading. He is a Sessional Lecture at the University of Reading and was a Visiting Research Fellow and Visiting Lecturer at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in 2014. Ofer joined the War Studies Department at King's to conduct a research project that focuses on the politicisation of'Hybrid Warfare'. During his visit of Moscow to conduct a quantitative research of Russian military research publications "MGIMO Review of International Relations" took the following interview from him.

When do coercive tools, like air power and economic sanctions, work? Robert Pape argues that coercive strategies that depend upon the punishment of civilians-whether they are executed by strategic bombing or economic sanctions-do not work and will never work. He argues that only denial/interdiction strategies-those that disrupt the enemy's military strategy-will be able to coerce states. This review essay examines the majority of Pape's writings to see if he successfully defends his dismissal of punishment strategies, and provides policymakers with a theory of coercion. Upon close examination, there are two flaws with Pape's work: (1) he holds punishment strategies to a higher standard of success than denial strategies; and (2) he confuses effectiveness with utility.