Causal Theory of Reference

Since it is a review, there is no place for an abstract. The author would like to thank the anonymous person who took the time to read and evaluate the book so neutrally, carefully, and positively.
It is helpful if you wish to decide whether or not to read the book "How do Proper Names Really Work? (De Gruyter 2023)

The paper makes a case for there being causation in the form of causal properties or causal structures in the domain of fundamental physics. That case is built in the first place on an interpretation of quantum theory in terms of state reductions so that there really are both entangled states and classical properties, GRW being the most elaborate physical proposal for such an interpretation. I then argue that the interpretation that goes back to Everett can also be read in a causal manner, the splitting of the world being conceivable as a causal process. Finally, I mention that the way in which general relativity theory conceives the metrical field opens up the way for a causal conception of the metrical properties as well.

This brief article responds to Steffen Koch's, 'Babbling stochastic parrots? A Kripkean argument for reference in large language models' (https://journals.ub.uni-koeln.de/index.php/phai/article/view/2325). Koch attempts by appealing to the causal theory of reference to show that when LLM's use (or seem to use) proper names, they refer to what those names standardly refer to in the language from which they were drawn; Koch then suggests ways to generalize the strategy beyond proper names to kind terms, both natural and social. We argue here that Koch's argumentative strategy is needlessly controversial and even if successful would be of limited scope. We offer instead a more direct argument for the conclusion that LLM's use language (rather than merely appearing to do so) because they meet the conditions required to perform rudimentary acts that Austin (1975) termed phatic acts. The argument applies to language generally, and implies that when so used, that language carries its usual linguistic meaning.

This paper proposes a theoretical architecture for synthetic phenomenal consciousness grounded in Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theory, enriched by embodied cognition, affective modeling, and neutral monism. Drawing from recent developments in deep learning, artificial life, and phenomenological philosophy, the architecture integrates sensorimotor feedback, affective valence, and self-referential meta-representations to approximate the structural and functional conditions of phenomenal consciousness. The paper argues that such a system, while non-biological, may instantiate minimal phenomenal states if HOT theory is interpreted functionally and extended to embodied artificial agents. The proposed Synthetic Phenomenal Consciousness Architecture (SPCA) is designed to meet the criteria for both access and phenomenal consciousness, offering a plausible framework for introspective reportability, selfmodeling, and affective salience. The implications of this model extend to artificial life, robotics, and the philosophy of mind, challenging the assumption that consciousness is inherently biological. The paper concludes by addressing common objections, including the simulation/instantiation distinction and the problem of qualia, and proposes a Phenomenal Turing Test as a heuristic for evaluating synthetic consciousness.

Two aims are at work in James Brown'sSmoke and Mirrors:to defend realism against some of its recent detractors, and to expound his own programmatic commitment to a Platonic form of realism. I am sympathetic to his first goal, and dubious about the second, so, as Brown himself predicts, I am enthusiastic about the critical part of the book but critical of his Platonic project. But I will begin this review with a hearty recommendation.Smoke and Mirrorsis clear, articulate, perceptive, occasionally provocative, and a healthy antidote to the sceptical pessimism about science that one encounters so often today.

Should the issue of the nature of reference, and more generally of the relation between our language and the world, take the form of a scientific theory? Or can it only result in the Quinean paradoxes of the indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference? In Truth and Words (2009), Gary Ebbs rejects the first option, while refusing Quine’s skepticism. This discussion aims to introduce this challenging work.

The original version of this paper in available in french  Revue de métaphysique et de morale, 2022/4, n°116

Nonclassical causal modeling was developed in order to explain violations of Bell inequalities while adhering to relativistic causal structure and faithfulness-that is, avoiding fine-tuned causal explanations. Recently, a no-go theorem that can be viewed as being stronger than Bell's theorem has been derived, based on extensions of the Wigner's friend thought experiment: the Local Friendliness (LF) no-go theorem. Here we show that the LF no-go theorem poses formidable challenges for the field of causal modeling, even when nonclassical and/or cyclic causal explanations are considered. We first recast the LF inequalities, one of the key elements of the LF no-go theorem, as special cases of monogamy relations stemming from a statistical marginal problem. We then further recast LF inequalities as causal compatibility inequalities stemming from a nonclassical causal marginal problem, for a causal structure implied by well-motivated causal-metaphysical assumptions. We find that the LF inequalities emerge from this causal structure even when one allows the latent causes of observed events to admit post-quantum descriptions, such as in a generalized probabilistic theory or in an even more exotic theory. We further prove that no nonclassical causal model can explain violations of LF inequalities without violating the No Fine-Tuning principle. Finally, we note that these obstacles cannot be overcome even if one appeals to cyclic causal models, and we discuss potential directions for further extensions of the causal modeling framework.

Quantitative researchers distinguish between causal and effect indicators. What are the analytic problems when both types of measures are present in a quantitative reasoned action analysis? To answer this question, the authors use data from a longitudinal study to estimate the association between two constructs central to reasoned action theory: behavioral beliefs and attitudes toward the behavior. The belief items are causal indicators that define a latent variable index while the attitude items are effect indicators that reflect the operation of a latent variable scale. The authors identify the issues when effect and causal indicators are present in a single analysis and conclude that both types of indicators can be incorporated into analyses of data based on the reasoned action approach.

In this paper, I propose a developmental explanation of the reliability of the intentional stance as an interpretive strategy, and by doing so counter an objection to Dennett's intentional stance theory (i.e. the 'If it isn't true, why does it work?' objection). Specifically, young children's use of the intentional stance enables them to learn from and thereby to become more similar to the adults in their culture. As a result, they themselves become increasingly intelligible to other people taking the intentional stance. Thus, the intentional stance and cultural learning constitute a feedback loop that (partially) explains the reliability of the intentional stance, and does so -contra Dennett's realist critics -without appealing to a realist interpretation of the descriptions speakers attach to intentional terms. However, I also suggest that this developmental perspective provides grist to the mill for a causal realist interpretation of the reference of intentional terms, insofar the causal interaction between intentional interpretations of behavior and cognitive development provides an anchor that links intentional terms to functional and/or neural processes. Importantly, causal (as opposed to descriptive) theories of reference make it possible to argue that intentional discourse can be referentially anchored to the causal machinery that produces behavior without generating true descriptions of it. I conclude by drawing out some consequences of the developmental perspective for the way in which we conceptualize the assumption of rationality that is at the core of the intentional stance theory.

The book can be read as a clear and opinionated introduction. In the first chapter of this book, traditional descriptivist theories of proper names, as developed by Frege, Russell, Strawson, and Searle, are reexamined and discussed. In the second chapter, Kripke's causal-historical view is presented, along with a critique of its limitations. The third chapter presents a refined form of cluster theory of proper names, which incorporates a meta-rule that enables regimenting the descriptions within the cluster, thereby making it possible to decide its applicability in any possible world, and thus rendering the proper name a rigid designator. In the fourth chapter, the necessary counterexamples suggested by Kripke and Donnellan, along with criticisms from Davit and Recanati, are examined and subjected to a critical analysis.  Chapter five deals with Frege's puzzle of identity. Finally, Chapter Six addresses indexicals and general terms. As a whole, the book offers a promising path to overcoming the stalemate between the old and new orthodoxy.

Este artigo tem por objetivo esclarecer os pontos relevantes no debate contemporâneo da distinção entre as ciências naturais e ciências humanas realizado por Charles Taylor e Thomas S. Kuhn. Inicialmente, procuramos elucidar relações entre a Antropologia Filosófica e o esforço de definição das denominadas Ciências da Natureza e Ciências do Espírito desenvolvidas na obra de Wilhelm Dilthey, base para Taylor em seu artigo Interpretation and the Sciences of Man. Assim, Kuhn discutirá o capítulo de Taylor em As ciências naturais e as ciências humanas que envolvem críticas sobre a natureza e objetivo das ciências incluindo a participação do sujeito, da comunidade científica e da hermenêutica estabelecida dentro do paradigma de tal área na constituição de sua interpretação. São feitos esclarecimentos de caráter filosófico e genealógico destas obras, bem como a análise sobre pontos convergentes e divergentes na distinção entre os tipos de ciências. Ao final, comentários críticos por parte de Hugh Lacey dos tópicos abordados no debate são implementados, em conjunto com interpretações de escritos tardios do próprio Kuhn, ampliando a discussão a partir de sua própria filosofia e dos valores epistêmicos presentes no empreendimento científico atual.

De par sa conception, une blockchain est "un grand livre ouvert et distribué capable d'enregistrer les transactions entre deux parties de manière efficace, vérifiable et permanente", généralement gérée par un réseau d'égal à égal adhérant à un protocole communication de nœud et validation de nouveaux blocs. Après l'enregistrement, les données de chaque bloc ne peuvent pas être modifiées de manière rétrospective sans modifier tous les blocs suivants, ce qui nécessite un consensus du réseau. La blockchain peut être considérée comme un système de conception sécurisé, distribué, avec une tolérance élevée aux erreurs. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.16651.3408

More often than not, recently popular structuralist interpretations of physical theories leave the central concept of a structure insufficiently precisified. The incipient causal sets approach to quantum gravity offers a paradigmatic case of a physical theory predestined to be interpreted in structuralist terms. It is shown how employing structuralism lends itself to a natural interpretation of the physical meaning of causal sets theory. Conversely, the conceptually exceptionally clear case of causal sets is used as a foil to illustrate how a mathematically informed rigorous conceptualization of structure serves to identify structures in physical theories. Furthermore, a number of technical issues infesting structuralist interpretations of physical theories such as difficulties with grounding the identity of the places of highly symmetrical physical structures in their relational profile and what may resolve these difficulties can be vividly illustrated with causal sets.

Suppose that you just ate a meal. Having satisfied your hunger, you find yourself craving a beer and realize that there is no beer left in the fridge. You know that the corner store has a good selection of beers, so you walk to the store to get some. At the same time that you finish your meal, your cat finishes eating. Being in the habit of cleaning himself after eating, he looks for a comfortable place and gets to work cleaning his face. Both you and your cat are exercising agency. In your case, you do so when you take a walk to the store to get some beer. In the case of your cat, he exercises agency when he looks for a place to groom and sets to grooming himself. It is clear that even if what you two are doing can be done in automatic mode there is a difference between the walking and the grooming on the one hand, and the process of digesting your respective meals on the other. And yet in all these cases you and your cat are always doing something. In this respect, the walking, the grooming, and the digesting, are cases of agency. In the case of walking and grooming, you and your cat exhibit intentional agency; and in the case of digesting you each exhibit a very modest species of (quasi-) agency. This generous understanding of agency is controversial, to say the least. Some action theorists will reject the idea that non-human animals like cats can be true agents while some other action theorists will take the further step of insisting that in cases like digestion there is simply no agency at all since no one is really doing anything. In this essay we reject such an exceptionalist view of agency and argue in favor of a gradualist understanding of agency that accepts that non-human animals like cats are agents, and goal-oriented processes like digestion involve some species of agency. We endorse a bottom-up approach to understanding agency and argue that, contrary to a widely accepted view about agency, being an agent is not an all-or-nothing A. Buckareff et al. (eds.

The traditional debate over theories of reference of natural kind terms faces a serious dilemma. On the one hand, although direct reference theory, or the causal–historical analysis of reference to natural kinds, is still highly influential in the philosophy of language, there is a notorious “qua” problem: direct reference theory cannot uniquely determine the referents of natural kind terms. On the other hand, the standard descriptivism does not accommodate our externalist intuition. We propose temporal externalist descriptivism, where relevant future theorists determine references by past speakers. This position makes the externalist intuition about reference compatible with descriptivism about natural kind terms by ensuring the possibility of mistakes in the past and present practice. It also provides a defense of the controversial claim of temporal externalism based on a descriptivist analysis of reference. While causal–historical analysis focuses on inheritance through history, a reference has both a past and a future. In this sense, reference to natural kinds is essentially a provisional phenomenon.

This paper uses the notion of Natural Kinds to defend the “scientific” character of Marxian economics as a discipline. Drawing from Saul Kripke and other natural kind theorists, a criterion will be supplied that is at once logical, modal, semantic, ontological, and empirical. This would represent an encapsulation of the intuitive standards around which different economic theories compete, representing a theory indistinct
target that all scientific claims of economics aim to hit. We will demonstrate this using the case example of the work of Marx. This procedure could be repeated with any contending economic theory, giving us a theory-neutral condition for evaluating the “scientific” status of economic claims. Three results follow: (a) we get a logical framework for defining the validity-space of claims that would make up “economics;” (b) we get a tool for comparing varying economic claims or theories against one another, a tool that could be used with many others; and (c) we will see how counter to some theorists, economics does in fact represent a Natural Kind.

Causal composition allows people to generate new causal relations by combining existing causal knowledge. We introduce a new computational model of such reasoning, the force theory, which holds that people compose causal relations by simulating the processes that join forces in the world, and compare this theory with the mental model theory and the causal model theory , which explain causal composition on the basis of mental models and structural equations, respectively. In one experiment, the force theory was uniquely able to account for people's ability to compose causal relationships from complex animations of real-world events. In three additional experiments, the force theory did as well as or better than the other two theories in explaining the causal compositions people generated from linguistically presented causal relations. Implications for causal learning and the hierarchical structure of causal knowledge are discussed.

In a small undergraduate class at Harvard in 1967, Saul Kripke presented a revolutionary non-descriptivist view of the reference determination of proper names. 1 A later version of these lectures was delivered at Princeton in 1970, published as the paper "Naming and Necessity" (1972), and finally published as the book Naming and Necessity (1980). In these works, Kripke is careful to claim that he is not presenting a theory of reference but rather "a better picture-a picture which, if more details were to be filled in, might be refined so as to give more exact conditions for reference to take place" (1980: 94). In a recent paper, Andrea Bianchi claims that "forty years later, we do not possess a fully blown theory built on this picture" (2011: 264). I found Bianchi's claim both surprising and disappointing, for I thought that I had proposed just such a theory. Kripke's Harvard lectures inspired my first attempt in a dissertation, "The Semantics of Proper Names: A Causal Theory" (1972). A more polished short version of the theory was published in "Singular Terms" (1974) and a more polished long version, in Designation (1981a). So, what is Bianchi's problem? He thinks that what I proposed does not count as a theory of reference for proper names because it does not have the form of a biconditional along the lines of: "proper name a refers to x iff aRx." And Bianchi insists that a theory must have that form. Now I did offer a biconditional of the sort that Bianchi wants in my initial development of a causal theory in Designation, before considering the problems of confused reference and reference change. But Bianchi is right that I did not present the final theory, which takes account of those problems, as a biconditional. My focus 1 About half those attending were graduate students. My notes of these lectures are available on the website of the Saul Kripke Center at <http://kripkecenter.commons.gc.cuny.edu/resources/ unpublishedworks/fall-1967/>.

adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this book are included in the book's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the book's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

Beginning with the separation of science and religion, this paper explores AI focused new religious movements and spotlights on how they aim to identify or create divinity with AI, then resulting in a positive sense of reverence and awe. This is achieved through a (re)enchantment of the world, which can be referred to as 4.0, or perhaps 5.0. This new frontier shows a closer connection between mankind and machines, with a stronger link with AI technologies. The essay discusses the historical relationship between religion and science – which has a long chronicle of closeness and adhesion – but also some turning points that have marked the later separation of them. At certain moments in history, science and religion diverged on their own paths: one of the most significant of them was the publication of Darwin's 'On the Origin of Species' in 1859. This fracture is what these movements aim to awesomely heal with a future vision where science, religion, and humanity are intertwined and part of a greater whole that transcends human beings.

Unlike the relativity theory it seeks to replace, causal set theory has been interpreted to leave space for a substantive, though perhaps 'localized', form of 'becoming'. The possibility of fundamental becoming is nourished by the fact that the analogue of Stein's theorem from special relativity does not hold in causal set theory. Despite this, we find that in many ways, the debate concerning becoming parallels the well-rehearsed lines it follows in the domain of relativity. We present, however, some new twists and challenges. In particular, we show that a novel and exotic notion of becoming is compatible with causal sets. In contrast to the 'localized' becoming considered compatible with the dynamics of causal set theory by its advocates, our novel kind of becoming, while not answering to the typical A-theoretic demands, is 'global' and objective.

This paper is made up of responses to the papers in this volume. Part I is concerned with the philosophy of linguistics, particularly with the linguistic conception of grammars and the psychological reality of language. Part II is concerned with the theory of reference for proper names, including issues of reference borrowing, grounding, the qua-problem, and causal descriptivism. Part III is concerned with the theory of meaning, particularly the matters of direct reference, the contingent a priori, rigidity for kind terms, narrow meaning, and the use theory. Part IV is concerned with methodology, particularly with "putting metaphysics first", the role of intuitions, and the contribution of experimental semantics. Part IV tackles two issues in metaphysics: the definition of scientific realism and biological essentialism. Keywords (separated by "-") Philosophy of linguistics-Theory of reference-Theory of meaning-Intuitions-Experimental semantics-Scientific realism-Biological essentialism 371

We begin this brief rejoinder by thanking all the authors who took time to provide comments on our work, which appeared recently in this journal (Aguirre-Urreta, . All commentaries appear to suggest that causal indicators cannot be used for measurement but differ in how strongly this conclusion is stated; commentaries challenging our work and its conclusions are notably absent. In what follows we outline some common themes across the commentaries, provide some thoughts on these themes, and outline areas we believe need further research. Whether a concept can be measured by observing items representing its causes is an important question in the causal indicator literature. This issue is addressed directly in the commentaries by and . Cadogan and Lee (2016) note that "measurement is about quantifying the properties of objects" (p. 162), which very closely mirrors our own views on the topic. The issue at hand is whether the procedures advocated in the causal indicator literature, as it currently stands (more on this later), allow us to "quantify the properties of objects." This is not currently the case. In particular, Cadogan and Lee (2016) outline the conditions that would need to be satisfied for a causal indicator model to provide information on the variance of the latent variable of interest; a researcher would need (a) to know the identity of all causes, (b) to know the form and magnitude of the paths relating each of those causes to the latent variable, and (c) to have directly observed data on the variances and covariances of those causes. While most articles on causal indicators do not explicitly explain whether it is the causal indicators (i.e. observed data) or the attribute that the causal indicator represents that acts as a cause, we argue that only this second interpretation of the literature is plausible. This interpretation necessitates adding a fourth item to the list: that the causal indicators are free from measurement error-that is, that all the variance in the causal indicators is relevant variance for the purpose of explaining the latent variable of interest. It is clear that researchers typically do not have access to all the necessary information and thus, in practice, it would be difficult to argue that causal indicators can measure the latent variable of interest. Moreover, though maybe not evident at first sight, if researchers were to be able to satisfy all those conditions, then we would no longer be talking about causal indicators but rather composite indicators (cf. Bollen & Bauldry, 2011) since having knowledge of all possible causes of the latent variable (and the relevant magnitudes of the paths, etc.) there would be no need for a disturbance term and the variable would not be latent but a composite of its observed causes. The nature of the disturbance term is, we believe, one of the unresolved issues in this literature (see below for more on this). From a similar perspective on whether the reflective and causal approaches can be considered to be alternative measurement schemas, Markus (2016) noted that our arguments and results provide an important

This methodological principle presumes that semantic intuitions be uniformly shared among speakers and across actual and possible cases. Machery et al. (2004), Machery, Olivola, and de Blanc (2009) questioned the truth of this presumption. First, they noted that philosophers have exclusively relied on their own intuitions, i.e., theoreticians' intuitions. Second, by means of an empir

Teoriile descriptiviste au încercat să elimine anumite contradicții logice dacă numele erau considerate descrieri definite. Kripke a respins valabilitatea acestor teoriile descriptiviste argumentând că nu este nevoie de o descriere unică a identității, se pot utiliza descrieri identificatoare chiar dacă referința nu a fost identificată corect, și o descriere (spre deosebire de un nume) nu poate funcționa ca indicator rigid. Ulterior, teoriile descriptiviste au extins această idee a descrierii definite la un set de descrieri sau o medie ponderată a acestor descrieri.

alereferintei-pentru-nume-proprii/ Since the 1960s, Kripke has been a central figure in several fields related to mathematical logic, language philosophy, mathematical philosophy, metaphysics, epistemology and set theory. He had influential and original contributions to logic, especially modal logic, and analytical philosophy, with a semantics of modal logic involving possible worlds, now called Kripke semantics. (Fodor 2004) He developed the argument that necessity is a "metaphysical" notion, which must be separated from the a priori epistemic notion, and that there are necessary truths that are a posteriori truths, such as "this water is H 2 O". In Naming and Necessity, Kripke proposed a causal theory of reference, according to which a name refers to an object by virtue of a causal connection with the object, mediated by the communities of speakers. He also states that the proper names, unlike most descriptions, are rigid designations (the brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

alereferintei-pentru-nume-proprii/ Gareth Evans, in The Causal Theory of Names, states that the causal theory of reference needs to be expanded to include what he calls multiple "bases". After the initial baptism, the use of the name in the presence of the person can, under the right circumstances, be considered as reinforcing the name in its referent. For those who are in direct contact with the person, the reference for the expression of the name is solved by means of a causal chain that includes people who knew him during the "baptism", or by indexing the person to the name at the time of communication. The causal chain can continue through a series of referential uses of the name throughout the person's life. If confusion occurs, the referent switching of a name may occur. (Evans and Altham 1973) According to Evans, causal theory in its initial variant allows that no matter how distant or obscure the causal link between the use of a proper name and the object originally referred to, the

In the third edition of DISCOVERING BIBLICAL EQUALITY, Ronald Pierce and Erin Heim argue that the divine names Father and Mother are both metaphorical forms of predication. This essay critiques their argument by offering a classical account of theological language after the manner of Augustine, Aquinas, Petrus Van Mastricht, and others. I argue that Father, as a divinely revealed name, is not metaphorical predication but is proper predication.

În principiu, orice nod din cadrul unei rețele blockchain poate propune adăugarea de informații noi în blockchain. Pentru a valida dacă această adăugare de informații (de exemplu o înregistrare de tranzacție) este legitimă, nodurile trebuie să ajungă la o formă de acord. Aici intră în joc un „mecanism de consens”. Pe scurt, un mecanism de consens este o metodă de validare specifică (criptografică) predefinită care asigură o secvențiere corectă a tranzacțiilor pe blockchain. În cazul criptomonedelor, o astfel de secvențiere este necesară pentru a aborda problema „dublei cheltuieli” (adică problema că același instrument de plată sau activ poate fi transferat de mai multe ori dacă transferurile nu sunt înregistrate și controlate centralizat.

IT & C, Volumul 2, Numărul 2, Martie 2023, pp. 26-32
ISSN 2821 - 8469, ISSN – L 2821 – 8469, DOI: 10.58679/IT78749

Force dynamics is an approach to knowledge representation that aims to describe how notions of force, resistance, and tendency enter into the representation of certain kinds of words and concepts. As a theory of causation, it specifies how the concept of CAUSE may be grounded in people's representations of force and spatial relations. In this chapter, we review theories of force dynamics that have recently emerged in the linguistic, psychological, and philosophical literatures. In discussing these theories we show how a force dynamic approach to causation is able to account for many of the key phenomena in causal cognition, including the representation of individual causal events, the encoding of causal relations in language, the encoding of causal chains, and causation by omission. Recent accounts of force dynamics have shown how this perspective can be instantiated in computational terms, which not only helps clarify the force dynamic approach to various phenomena, but also helps explain how the units of cognition hypothesized in this approach may be grounded in people's perceptual experience. In addition to reviewing the strengths of this approach, the chapter identifies lines of inquiry for possible future research.

In some of his writings, Kuhn criticized Putnam’s causal theory of reference for natural kind terms put forward in his classic paper “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” claiming that Putnam’s theory cannot explain the reference changes of natural kind terms. After looking into Kuhn’s objections to Putnam’s reference theory, some of the main features of Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis and some traits of Putnam’s later version of his theory, we will argue, on the one hand, that Putnam’s later reference theory contains some components that enhance the explanation of the reference change of natural kind terms, and on the other hand, that Kuhn’s and Putnam’s views on reference do no differ that much, especially in virtue ofcertain similarities between Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis and Putnam’s thesis of conceptual relativity.

O objetivo desse trabalho é expor criticamente os argumentos externalistas de Putnam e conjuntamente, por contraste, desenvolver uma explicação descritivista neo-fregeana e basicamente internalista do significado do conceito de água, capaz de melhor responder aos problemas por ele levantados.

I shall endeavor to show that every physical theory since Newton explains without drawing attention to causes-that, in other words, physical theories as physical theories aspire to explain under an ideal quite distinct from that of causal explanation. If I am right, then even if sometimes the explanations achieved by a physical theory are not in violation of the standard of causal explanation, this is purely an accident. For physical theories, as I will show, do not, as such, aim at accommodating the goals or aspirations of causal explanation. This will serve as the founding insight for a new theory of explanation, which will itself serve as the cornerstone of a new theory of scientific method.

At the Sandy Hook interfaith prayer vigil, a Lutheran pastor prayed: "Lord God we call you by many names: Elohim Adonai, Great Spirit, Higher Power, Divine One. But however we address you, you are always Father and Mother to us all." 1 Naturally this event received a great deal of attention because of issues it raised related to American civic religion and religious syncretism. However, what should also attract our attention is the manner in which this prayer summarizes all that has been said previously about God/the Divine Power in the words, "you are always Father and Mother to us all." The prayer makes clear that whatever we may say about God, God is both Father and Mother. The statement is remarkable because in the present setting of our culture it is so unremarkable. It illustrates how language like this has become commonplace among many who claim to bear the name Christian. Although Jesus Christ taught his followers to address God as "Father" in the Lord's Prayer, during the last forty years, feminism has vigorously raised the charge that this term can no longer effectively serve Christians as the exclusive reference to the first person of the Trinity. Instead, it has maintained that feminine names and terms of

TOWARD A CAUSAL THEORY OF LINGUISTIC REPRESENTATION' DENNIS W. STAMPE 1 CAUSAL theories have recently been in vogue. We have causal theories, or intimations of causal theories, of knowledge and memory, of belief, of evidence, of proper and common names, and of reference. If all or several of these various phenomena should turn out to have causal analyses, it will be no mere coincidence. Only their having something in common would make it so. And all these phenomena apparently do have in common the fact that they involve a relation to an "object," of one kind or another. It is, after all, this relation, this "involvement of an object," that we are tempted to understand as some kind of causal relation. Further, the entities that share this property of involving an object, may be conceived as sharing a common nature, for in each case, that which stands in that relation may b e conceived as being a representation, or a psychological state of representational character, their various "objects" being what they variously represent. If this is so, the thought suggests itself that the truth underlying our attraction to causal theories is that representation is an essentially causal phenomenon. In what follows, I develop this thought, sketching the outlines of a causal theory of representation in general. 2. Where Russell held that we may make a judgment or supposition only about things with which we are acquainted, or as h e also put it, things that are presented to US,^ I shall suggest that we can make a judgment or supposition about such things as are represented to us, or of which we can form a representation, but only of such things. It may be that an object is represented to us only uia representations of representations of representations. The thing may then be at an indefinitely distant remove from our representation of it, and we may b e far from being immediately acquainted with it. But if, even at such a remove, it is represented to us, no matter how wildly inaccurate our representations of it may be, then the thing may figure as an object of our psychological states, and of our linguistic expressions of those states. A thing's being somehow represented

No capítulo X de A Estrutura das Revoluções Científicas (1962) de Thomas Kuhn o conceito de paradigma figura como elemento filosófico central na tensão que se estabelece entre o âmbito perceptivo/cognitivo versus o âmbito ontológico do "problema da mudança de mundo". No presente artigo, apresento alguns desdobramentos do conceito de paradigma com o objetivo de indicar dois sentidos principais para o termo subjacentes às formulações kuhnianas no capítulo X e que são desenvolvidos na obra tardia do autor, a saber: (1) o 'paradigma' como exemplar, apresentado em "Postscript-1969" (1970) e "Seconds thoughts on paradigms" (1977); e (2) o 'paradigma' como léxico, apresentado principalmente, em, "Metaphor in science" (1979), "Commensurability, comparability, communicability" (1983), "Possible worlds in history of science" (1989), "The road since Structure" (1990) e "Afterwords" (1993). Através do conceito de exemplar, explicito a função cognitiva que os paradigmas exercem nos membros das comunidades científicas: a singularidade dos exemplares reside não apenas no fato de eles serem exemplos-padrão para os membros de uma comunidade, mas em serem expressão de um processo cognitivo mais geral que já está pressuposto no desenvolvimento da atividade científica. Através do conceito de léxico, explicito a função constitutiva dos paradigmas como princípios a priori, porém dinâmicos e relativizados, como condições de possibilidade para a experiência do conhecimento, sendo, em particular, determinantes na experiência do sujeito no âmbito científico. Nesse sentido, a articulação teórica proposta nesse artigo evidencia que a análise do empreendimento científico na Estrutura considera processos cognitivos e ontológicos do sujeito epistêmico expressos por meio do conceito de paradigma. No entanto, essa compreensão é obscurecida diante do emprego polissêmico e impreciso do termo no decorrer de toda a obra e que se apresenta de modo particularmente conflitante no capítulo X.

In Chapter X of Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), the paradigm concept is the central philosophical element between the tension between perceptive/cognitive versus ontological dimensions of “the world change problem.” In this essay, I present some developments of the paradigm concept in Kuhn's work, intending to indicate two senses of the concept that can assist comprehension of chapter X: (1) the 'paradigm' like exemplar, presented in "Postscript – 1969" (1970) and "Seconds thoughts on paradigms" (1977) and (2) the paradigm like lexicon, presented in "Metaphor in science" (1979), "Commensurability, comparability, communicability" (1983), "Possible worlds in history of science" (1989), "The road since Structure" (1990), and "Afterwords." I explain the cognitive function paradigms play in members of the scientific community through the concept of exemplar. The exemplars are not just examples of patterns but expressions of a more general cognitive process assumed in the development of the scientific activity. Through the lexicon concept, I explain the constitutive function of paradigms as a priori principles, however dynamic and relativized, as conditions of possibility for the experience of knowledge, being, in particular, determinant in the subject's experience in the scientific field. In this sense, the theoretical articulation proposed in this article shows that the analysis of the scientific enterprise in the Structure considers cognitive and ontological processes of the epistemic subject expressed through the concept of paradigm. However, this understanding is obscured by the polysemic and imprecise use of the term throughout the work, which is presented in a particularly conflicting way in Chapter X.

The article sheds new light on sensory elements in legal cases concerning misleading food labelling. It presents the findings of a qualitative review of 821 cases on misleading food labelling registered in 2002-2007 by the Danish food authorities. The cases show that sensory tends to be backgrounded by other arguments more easily verbalized. A taxonomy of the sensory dimensions of the cases is set up and different sensory aspects are analyzed in order to establish to what the extent and how sensory variables can be integrated into experimental setups for testing the misleading potential of food naming and labelling solutions with a view to promoting ''fair speak" principles for in-store food-to-consumer communication. The study is part of the cross-disciplinary research project ''Spin or fair speak-when foods talk" which aims at providing new knowledge, tools, and experimental evidence for self-regulation, public control, and innovation in food naming and labelling.

Teoriile descriptiviste au încercat să elimine anumite contradicții logice dacă numele erau considerate descrieri definite. Kripke a respins valabilitatea acestor teoriile descriptiviste argumentând că nu este nevoie de o descriere unică a identității, se pot utiliza descrieri identificatoare chiar dacă referința nu a fost identificată corect, și o descriere (spre deosebire de un nume) nu poate funcționa ca indicator rigid. Ulterior, teoriile descriptiviste au extins această idee a descrierii definite la un set de descrieri sau o medie ponderată a acestor descrieri.

CUNOAȘTEREA ȘTIINȚIFICĂ, Volumul 2, Numărul 2, Iunie 2023, pp. 119-122
ISSN 2821 – 8086, ISSN – L 2821 – 8086, DOI: 10.58679/CS90935

1. Specify knowledge about the system to be studied using a causal model. Represent background knowledge about the system to be studied. A causal model describes the set of possible data-generating processes for this system. 2. Specify the observed data and their link to the causal model. Specify what variables have been or will be measured, and how these variables are generated by the system described by the causal model. 3. Specify a target causal quantity. Translate the scientific question into a formal causal quantity (defined as some parameter of the distribution of counterfactual random variables), following the process in Figure 3. 4. Assess identifiability. Assess whether it is possible to represent the target causal quantity as a parameter of the observed data distribution (estimand), and, if not, what further assumptions would allow one to do so. 5. State the statistical estimation problem. Specify the estimand and statistical model. If knowledge is sufficient to identify the causal effect of interest, commit to the corresponding estimand. If not, but one still wishes to proceed, choose an estimand that under minimal additional assumptions would equal or approximate the causal effect of interest. 6. Estimate. Estimate the target parameter of the observed data distribution, respecting the statistical model. 7. Interpret. Select among a hierarchy of interpretations, ranging from purely statistical to approximating a hypothetical randomized trial. FIGURE 1. A general roadmap for approaching causal questions.

Sensations of acting and control have been neglected in theory of action. I argue that they form the core of action and are integral and indispensible parts of our actions, participating as they do in feedback loops consisting of our intentions in acting, the bodily movements required for acting and the sensations of acting. These feedback loops underlie all activities in which we engage when we act and generate our control over our movements. The events required for action according to the causal theory, or Searle's theory, do not add up to agency. I find the agent at work, her engagement in her action, in her sensation of acting. It is often thought that bodily movements are either mere events or actions. I suggest that there is a third possibility: that they are activities which are not actions. Activities, whether they are actions or not, differ from mere events in that they are controlled from within the brain. They are actions only if this control forms agent control, that is, control in which the conscious mind, the agents' intentions in acting and her sensations of acting, participates. Internally wayward actions are characterized by the fact that the person involved does not have a sensation of action and therefore does not control her movements. In the absence of such a sensation she does not act.

Last but not least, je remercie de tout mon coeur ma compagne, Geneviève Dupraz, sans qui cette thèse n'aurait tout bonnement jamais pu voir le jour, puisque par un heureux concours de circonstances qui ne se produit qu'une seule fois dans le cours d'une vie, elle m'a offert la possibilité de me mettre en disponibilité et de me consacrer à temps plein à ces recherches. Geneviève aura été, au quotidien, l'indéfectible interlocutrice et soutien et supporté stoïquement mes sautes d'humeurs et mes horaires folkloriques. Cette thèse lui est tout naturellement dédiée. Le terme objet sera constamment employé dans son sens le plus large pour tout ce sur quoi peut porter une proposition. Nous comptons donc parmi les objets non seulement les choses, mais aussi les propriétés et les rapports, les classes et les relations, les états et les processus, tout ce qui est réel comme ce qui est fictif. 4

Last but not least, je remercie de tout mon coeur ma compagne, Geneviève Dupraz, sans qui cette thèse n'aurait tout bonnement jamais pu voir le jour, puisque par un heureux concours de circonstances qui ne se produit qu'une seule fois dans le cours d'une vie, elle m'a offert la possibilité de me mettre en disponibilité et de me consacrer à temps plein à ces recherches. Geneviève aura été, au quotidien, l'indéfectible interlocutrice et soutien et supporté stoïquement mes sautes d'humeurs et mes horaires folkloriques. Cette thèse lui est tout naturellement dédiée. Le terme objet sera constamment employé dans son sens le plus large pour tout ce sur quoi peut porter une proposition. Nous comptons donc parmi les objets non seulement les choses, mais aussi les propriétés et les rapports, les classes et les relations, les états et les processus, tout ce qui est réel comme ce qui est fictif. 4

1 For example, see Cartwright (2007); Cartwright and Efstathiou (2009); Cartwright and Hardie (2012). 2 From now on, references to 'interventionism' and 'the interventionist theory' should be understood as referring specifically to the Woodwardian version of this theory.

In some of his writings, Kuhn criticized Putnam’s causal theory of reference for natural kind terms put forward in his classic paper “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” claiming that Putnam’s theory cannot explain the reference changes of natural kind terms. After looking into Kuhn’s objections to Putnam’s reference theory, some of the main features of Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis and some traits of Putnam’s later version of his theory, we will argue, on the one hand, that Putnam’s later reference theory contains some components that enhance the explanation of the reference change of natural kind terms, and on the other hand, that Kuhn’s and Putnam’s views on reference do no differ that much, especially in virtue ofcertain similarities between Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis and Putnam’s thesis of conceptual relativity.