Mental Representation

The standard formulation of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB) has outlived its usefulness. Though pedagogically convenient, JTB and its countless post-Gettier refinements reflect a fundamental misstep: treating knowledge as if it were a natural kind. This paper argues instead for the primacy of credencing: the act of proportioning belief to the degree of available evidence. Credencing provides the true epistemic primitive, whereas knowledge is a derivative, unstable linguistic construct-a coarse binary applied to a continuous evidential gradient. Its thresholds are context-bound, socially negotiated, and emotionally charged, reflecting pragmatic expediency and the human need for doxastic reassurance rather than epistemic fidelity. Philosophical energy has therefore been squandered on patching an inherently low-resolution concept, mistaking semantic compression for metaphysical depth. In place of this error, I propose a deflationary reorientation: credencing, articulated in explicit degrees of belief, should displace "knowledge" as the measure of epistemic evaluation. Knowledge-talk may retain utility in ordinary life, but its elevation to philosophical centrality is misguided. By recovering credencing as the first-order, semantically superior category, we free epistemology from the fruitless obsession with refining "knowledge" and restore its focus to the evidence-belief relation that genuinely tracks the world.

Objetivo -- Caracterizar los sentidos atribuidos al trabajo de un grupo de trabajadores pertenecientes a las generaciones “X” & “Y” de una empresa del sector de servicios de la ciudad de Medellín -- Marco de Referencias Conceptuales -- Se plantea el concepto de trabajo como fenómeno psicosocial y el concepto de sentido atribuido al trabajo, teniendo en cuenta las variables de sentido que son la representación, normas sociales, valoraciones, metas y preferencias en el trabajo, específicamente en el contexto de la descripción de generaciones y a lo que se propone como generación X y generación Y -- Método -- Estudio cualitativo- descriptivo, en el cual se realizaron entrevistas semiestructuradas a diez trabajadores de una empresa del sector de servicios de la ciudad de Medellín, quienes se encuentran entre las generaciones “X” & “Y” -- Resultados: Los resultados obtenidos permiten comprender que las generaciones tienen similitudes y diferencias en el sentido atribuido al trabajo, prin...

A questao que nos mobiliza nesse trabalho, reside em compreender como alunos do 5° ano aprendem Ciencias a partir de situacoes-problema (SP). Para isso, apostamos na realizacao de uma pesquisa participante. Os dados coletados foram gravados durante o desenvolvimento de duas SP selecionadas e desenvolvidas com criancas. Uma atividade abordava a questao dos nutrientes e outra aspectos de localizacao geografica. As SP permitiram visualizar que os alunos se mobilizam ao se depararem com um questionamento a ser desvendado e comecam a se questionar sobre o porque das coisas acontecerem de tal maneira. Desse modo, a utilizacao de SP sinalizam um caminho que pode vir a ser potencializado no Ensino de Ciencias.

This compilation of cutting-edge philosophical and scientific research comprises a survey of recent interdisciplinary research on cognitive systems, especially concerning knowing-how (part 1) and the role of mental representations in understanding the behavior of humans and animals (part 2). Representational systems provide their owners with useful information about their environment and are shaped by the special informational needs of the organism with respect to its environment. In part 1 on knowledge the volume focuses on recent debates concerning the status of knowing-how. Is knowing-how an irreducible kind of knowledge, or can it be explained in terms of propositional knowledge? In which way is the nature of knowing-how related to the discussions on representational theories of mind? -These are the questions that take center stage in the first part. In part 2, the authors address the long-standing dispute about the usefulness of the notion of representation in the study of behavior systems and offer a fresh perspective combining insights from philosophy, psychology and neurosciences.

Dans cet article. on suggère que les problèmes de sècuritéà fondement politique devraient aussi être analysés d'un point de vue psychologique. Puisque les individus évaluent le niveau de sécuritéà travers des processus cognitifs, les résultats sont subjectifs. Les représentations concernant la sécurité sont construites à partir d'une menace perçue dans l'environement, menace que l'individu craint d'avoir du mal à affronter. Deux études poursuivies en Israèl. où le problème de la sécurité est aigu. montrent à quel point les individus vivent différemment I'insécurité et indiquent que plusieurs facteurs influencent les représentations relatives à la sécurité. Ces données indiquent que des évènements réels, militaires, politiques, ou économiques. doivent être perçus pour devenir un aspect de la réalité personnelle: les énènements extérieurs sont compris et interprété subjectivement. Notre approche accorde une importance particulière à la psychologie politique dan...

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Invited comment on David Pitt's The Quality of Thought. I argue that in view of Pitt's commitment to phenomenal intentionality, the thesis that thought content is determined by the qualitative character of thoughts, he should embrace unconscious qualitative character, positing it as the basis of the content of unconscious thoughts and other cognitive states. I criticise his attempt at an eliminativist theory of unconscious content.

The Unified Dynamic Model of Mind (UDMM) proposes a novel, mathematically grounded synthesis of predictive processing, active inference, embodied cognition, and cultural neuroscience. It conceptualizes the mind as a hierarchical, generative system that minimizes free energy through continuous prediction and action, thereby explaining not only perception and motor control but also emotion, intention, mental disorders, and sociocultural cognition. The model introduces two formal constructs-informational tension (IT), quantified as the Kullback-Leibler divergence between prior and posterior beliefs, and virtual attractors, representing dynamically stable cognitive states-to provide mechanistic, computationally tractable accounts of subjective experience and psychopathology. We critically evaluate the UDMM's theoretical coherence, mathematical rigor, and explanatory scope against established frameworks such as the Free Energy Principle, Integrated Information Theory (IIT), and Global Workspace Theory (GWT). While the UDMM offers a compelling unification of disparate domains-bridging neurobiology, psychology, and anthropology-it remains a framework rather than a fully validated theory, as its core parameters (e.g., IT threshold, global intention weight) lack empirical calibration. We conclude that the UDMM constitutes a paradigm-shifting heuristic that reframes consciousness as the phenomenological correlate of predictive inference under uncertainty, providing a fertile foundation for future empirical research in cognitive neuroscience, computational psychiatry, and artificial intelligence.

This thesis investigates Turkish-DIk,-AcAk and-mA constructions in the form of possessive phrases that exhibit nominal morphology, e.g. case marking.-DIk, which carries the non-prospective aspect, and its prospective aspectual variant-AcAk fall into the tense category because they allow A-bar movement and can constitute adjunct and complement clauses. Contrary to the current literature,-mA exhibits disjunctive distributions and diverse syntactic evidence in different embedding environments. It expresses the subjunctive mood when embedded under a subjunctive mood governor; otherwise, it marks VP nominalization. The mapping is manipulated by impoverishment and underspecification in the Distributed Morphology framework (Siddiqi, 2018). Likewise,-DIk and-mA embedded under mood governors (Farkas, 1992) are captured by a late insertion into the C-T complex resulting from T-C movement, contrary to Kural (1993), Kornfilt (2003, 2007), and Predolac (2017). To conclude, the nominal morphology operating on Turkish subordinate clauses differs from syntactic category transformations, e.g. gerunds.

Consciousness is both cybernetic and semantic. We use its cybernetic aspects to describe how our consciousness gives rise to voluntary and involuntary behaviour. We use its semantic aspects to describe how the brain/mind constructs a narrative framework which it uses to predict the near future of situations in which the subject is embedded.

In my Honours thesis, I constructed a two-level fractal model of the brain/mind based on a Turing Machine which is consistent with the known fact that lesions of the right cerebellar cortex produce Broca's like aphasia. That is, left cerebral lesions and right cerebellar lesions both interfere with the production of words. This is inconsistent with purely computational models of cognition, which rely on hierarchical data structures, in which high level data is abstract and low level data is concrete. Instead, my Honours findings seem to confirm the claim made by John Searle (Searle's Chinese Room) that cognition is necessarily semantic. I am responsible for the initial concept of the TDE-R (from Turing's original work), but Chat has constructed the comparison tables from ITS own understanding of my theory. It has understood my cybersemantic theory of cognition from other papers I have written (Dyer, 2025). I did not introduce my concept of cybersemantics, Chat itself considered this idea important enough to include in the analysis.

This study examined the links among adolescents’ representations of their relationships with parents, friends, and romantic partners. Sixty‐eight adolescents were interviewed three times to assess their working models for each of these types of relationships. Working models of friendships were related to working models of relationships with parents and romantic partners. Working models of relationships with parents and romantic partners were inconsistently related. A similar pattern of results was obtained for self‐report measures of relational styles for the three types of relationships. Perceived experiences were also related. Specifically, support in relationships with parents tended to be related to support in romantic relationships and friendships, but the latter two were unrelated. On the other hand, self and other controlling behaviors in friendships were related to corresponding behaviors in romantic relationships. Negative interactions in the three types of relationships al...

This essay explores the philosophical and linguistic dimensions of definition as both a conceptual and operational construct. Drawing on historical and contemporary theories—from logical positivism to pragmatism and naturalism—it investigates how meaning is assigned, negotiated, and transmitted. Particular attention is paid to the ontological status of definitions as functional structures that increase the probability of realisation. The argument is extended through the introduction of exograms—external memory traces—as essential vehicles for storing and communicating definitions. Through this lens, definition is reinterpreted not merely as a static linguistic form but as a dynamic, systemic artefact of cognition embedded in broader epistemic and cultural practices.

This paper defends a cognitive theory of those emotional reactions which motivate and constrain moral judgment. On this theory, moral emotions result from mental faculties specialized for automatically producing feelings of approval or disapproval in response to mental representations of various social situations and actions. These faculties are modules in Fodor's sense, since they are informationally encapsulated, specialized, and contain innate information about social situations. The paper also tries to shed light on which moral modules there are, which of these modules we share with non-human primates, and on the (pre-)history and development of this modular system from pre-humans through gatherer-hunters and on to modern (i.e. arablist) humans. The theory is not, however, meant to explain all moral reasoning. It is plausible that a non-modular intelligence at least sometimes play a role in conscious moral thought. However, even non-modular moral reasoning is initiated and ...

In his book Individuals P. F. Strawson writes that 'both the Cartesian and the no-ownership theorists are profoundly wrong in holding, as each must, that there are two uses of 'I', in one of which it denotes something which it does not denote in the other' (p. 98). I think, by contrast, that there is a defensible 'Cartesian materialist' sense, which Strawson need not reject, in which I (=df. the word 'I' or the concept I) can and does denote two different things, and which is nothing like the flawed Wittgensteinian distinction between the use of I 'as object' and the use of I 'as subject'. I don't argue directly for the 'two uses' view, however. Instead I do some preparatory work. First I criticize one bad (Wittgensteinian or 'Wittgensteinian') argument for the 'only one use of I' view. Then I offer a phenomenological description of our everyday experience of ourselves that leads to an attack on 'corporism'-the excessive focus on the body in present-day analytic philosophy of mind.

Intentionality is an essentially mental, essentially occurrent, and essentially experiential (conscious) phenomenon. Any attempt to characterize intentionality that detaches it from conscious experience faces two insuperable problems. First, it is obliged to concede that almost everything (if not everything) has intentionality -all the way down to subatomic particles. Second, it has the consequence that everything that has intentionality has far too much of it -perhaps an infinite amount. The key to a satisfactory and truly naturalistic theory of intentionality is (1) a realistic conception of naturalism and (2) a properly developed understanding of the phenomenon of cognitive experience.

Driving is a spatial behaviour that requires fast and accurate spatial coding in order to anticipate and respond appropriately to expected or stunner event. Convergent evidences from animal and human studies support that different reference frames can be used to code our surrounding environment. Although recent works argued in favor of the parallel encoding of space in both egocentric and allocentric coordinates and showed that humans enable to alternate between both these spatial knowledge, the flexibility of the cognitive system to switch between each other remains largely undocumented. The current study aimed to address this issue by investigating, among twenty eight healthy participants, the temporal cost linked to switch from one reference frame to another in memory. Experimental procedure consisted in two stages: (1) a first navigation phase in a virtual town during which participants had to learn the localization of several closed places that we generally encounter in a conventional city (e.g., shops, post office) and, (2) a spatial memory test involving egocentric or allocentric spatial knowledge about these closed places. The methodology of this memory test allowed to estimate the temporal cost needed to switch between egocentric and allocentric knowledge by comparing response times in two conditions: a 'repeat' condition in which the trials involve the same reference frame in memory as the previous trials with an 'alternate' condition in which the trials rely on different spatial memory as the previous trials. As expected, results showed that participants were faster on 'repeat' trials than on 'alternate' trials, revealing a strong temporal switch cost of 585 milliseconds (± 144.75). This limited flexibility of the cognitive system to switch between various spatial coding in memory could cause some insecurity problems in driving situation that requires very low reaction times.

The purpose of this article was to analyze the state of research on how children in inclusive preschools resolve peer conflicts. A systematic review of research results published in the scientific journal databases Scopus, Web of Science (WoS), Ebsco and Google Scholar between 2000 and 2024 was conducted using the PRISMA scheme. The results indicate that teacher intervention using a variety of strategies (6 papers) and programs to develop children's social skills (4 papers) is the main way to develop conflict resolution skills in preschool inclusive units. None of the studies analyzed describe ways for children with disabilities to resolve conflicts on their own. It can be concluded that teachers equipped with conflict resolution strategies can significantly influence preschool children's ability to resolve peer conflicts.

Much of recent philosophy of perception is oriented towards accounting for the phenomenal character of perception—what it is like to perceive—in a non‐mentalistic way—that is, without appealing to mental objects or mental qualities. In opposition to such views, I claim that the phenomenal character of perception of a red round object cannot be explained by or reduced to direct awareness of the object, its redness and roundness—or representation of such objects and qualities. Qualities of perception that are not captured by what one is directly aware of or by representational content are instances of what Gilbert Harman has called “mental paint” (Block, 1990; Harman, 1990). The claim of this paper is that empirical facts about attention point in the direction of mental paint. The argument starts with the claim (later modified) that when one moves one's attention around a scene while keeping one's eyes fixed, the phenomenology of perception can change in ways that do not refle...

The aim of our study was to investigate the impact of maternal exposure to family violence, maltreatment and related posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) on young children's mental representations of self and caregivers. Participant mothers (n=24) and children (n=25) were recruited from a referred sample when they were 4-7-years-old. Maternal report and child story-stem narratives were used. Mothers' experience of domestic violence and severity of violence-related PTSD symptoms robustly predicted more dysregulated aggression, attentional bias to danger and distress, as well as more avoidance of and withdrawal from conflicts presented in the children's story-stems. Less narrative coherence was also noted. Maternal experience and symptoms prior to their child's turning 4 adversely affected that child's mental representations from ages 4 to 7.

This paper discusses what I call the problem of evaluability for objectualism, namely the thesis that not all intentionality is propositional. The problem arises against the background of the standard understanding of the notion of representation, according to which the content of a mental state is its truth conditions. The problem of evaluability is the problem of explaining whether and how objectual representation can do away with propositions as a means of evaluating mental attitudes. The objectualist has two ways to reply to the problem of evaluability: either to hold that objectual content just is non-evaluable content; or that objectual content is evaluable, but not truth evaluable. I call the first absolute objectualism and the latter evaluative objectualism. I identify different challenges for each version and offer some reasons to support evaluative objectualism.

FR : En France, les politiques de l’autonomie vont devoir répondre à une hausse considérable des besoins d’accompagnement de la perte d’autonomie, dans un contexte où l’offre professionnelle de soins est en tension et où le nombre de proches aidants potentiels est amené à diminuer dans le futur. Dans ce contexte, le « virage domiciliaire » a été plaidé récemment, et vise à favoriser le vieillissement à domicile. L’objectif de l’article est d’analyser dans quelle mesure le virage domiciliaire répond aux attentes et préférences des personnes âgées et de leurs proches. Pour analyser les préférences des personnes âgées et des aidants, nous recourons à la méthode d’analyse de contenu, qui permet une analyse inductive des 36 entretiens conduits, à partir d’arbres thématiques. L’analyse de la disposition à se faire aider pour les personnes âgées et de la disposition à aider pour les aidants conduit à questionner la politique du maintien à domicile, dans laquelle on observe un écart entre les attentes respectives des familles et de l’État. Les entretiens montrent que le maintien à domicile repose en grande partie sur l’aide des proches (les enfants et conjoints), qui réalisent la quasi-totalité de l’aide administrative, de la coordination des professionnels, de la surveillance et du soutien à la vie sociale. Une partie de cette aide est « subie », faute d’une prise en charge professionnelle, ce qui peut conduire à des répercussions négatives de l’aide sur l’aidant et à des ruptures de l’aide. Pourtant, les personnes âgées sont unanimes quant à leur volonté de ne pas « trop peser » sur leurs proches, notamment leurs enfants, en cas de perte d’autonomie. Les entretiens mettent également en évidence les représentations négatives des EHPAD (Établissements d’hébergement pour personnes âgées dépendantes) par les personnes âgées et leurs proches, alors même que dans certaines situations (notamment d’isolement ou de forte dépendance avec des troubles cognitifs), l’EHPAD semble plus adapté et bénéfique que le domicile. Aujourd’hui, les ressources financières et familiales déterminent fortement la qualité de l’accompagnement de la perte d’autonomie.

Mots clés : Dépendance, proches aidants, soins de long terme, EHPAD, maintien à domicile, virage domiciliaire, préférences, méthode d’analyse de contenu thématique 

EN : In France, there is a growing need to support older people who are losing their independence due to the aging population. The supply of professional care is under pressure, and the number of potential family caregivers is set to decline. To promote aging at home, the « home shift » has been advocated recently. This article analyzes how the home shift meets the expectations and preferences of older people and their families. To analyze the preferences of older people and their carers, 36 interviews were conducted using the content analysis method. The interviews revealed that home care relies heavily on the care of relatives, who provide almost all the administrative assistance, coordination of professionals, supervision, and support for social life. However, some of this care is « taken over » because it is not provided by professionals, which can have a negative impact on the caregiver and lead to breaks in the care provided. The interviews also showed that older people are unanimous in their desire not to be a burden on their loved ones, especially their children, if they lose their independence. Furthermore, the negative perceptions that older adults and their families have of nursing homes were highlighted, even though in certain situations, nursing homes may be more appropriate and beneficial than living at home, such as isolation or high dependency with cognitive problems. Today, financial and family resources significantly impact the quality of support for people losing their independence. The analysis of older people’s willingness to seek care and caregivers’ desire to help leads us to question home care policy, where there is a discrepancy between the respective expectations of families and the state.

Keywords: Dependency, family carers, long-term care, nursing home, home care, preferences, thematic content analysis method

single function objects: Notebooks, calculators, abacuses, maps, and so on demonstrate a fairly straightforward way of extending the mind and its capabilities. They, if you like, hold information "off line" which the mind can access as required. All of the information and procedures held in such simple devices could, at a stretch, be held by the mind, in the Brain. This extension is more questionable in the case of computational devices like mobile phones or laptops, Using these is more akin to a collaboration with another autonomous device rather than the phone being a simple extension of the mind. This difference is likely to be extended further as AI technology is increasingly incorporated into phones and similar devices.

What follows assumes that a complex nonlinear networked dynamical system affords a more plausible representation of brain functionality than does computation. Detailed analysis of the neuron shows basic incompatibilities with a computational model.

This exploratory investigation sought to gain a better understanding of the mental representations of attachment in maltreated adolescents, and how, if at all, unresolved attachment representations are related to cognitive processes in this population. Measures of cognitive functioning, attachment state of mind and parent ratings on attention were obtained from 38 adolescents with a history of maltreatment. Results showed that maltreated adolescents with unresolved states of mind in regard to attachment scored significantly lower on measures of cognitive processes of attention, working memory and cognitive efficiency, even when intelligence was controlled for in the analyses. Theoretical considerations, implications for future research and clinical implications are discussed.

Resumen. El estudio del pensamiento moderno, permitió entender cómo, partir de Descartes y fundamentalmente con Kant, se sustituye el primado del ser, y comienza el apogeo del sujeto y la autoconciencia, cuyo alcance afecta al estatuto de la ciencia misma. En este contexto Freud da cuenta del estatuto científico del psicoanálisis y aspira a inscribir al mismo en las ciencias naturales. Planteamos que su interlocutor es Kant, y como éste, el vienes busca consolidar el estatuto del fenómeno, de tal modo que permita la existencia del objeto científico. Analizamos cómo nuestra época mantiene coordenadas distintas. El auge del capitalismo, la globalización, el avance de la técnica y del mercado, el imperio de la mercancía, etc., entre otros aspectos que conviven en la cultura actual. Al respecto se constató diferencias respecto a la clínica freudiana, con la práctica actual. Actualmente, las llamadas patologías actuales de borde o narcisistas, no encuentra explicación suficiente en las formalizaciones freudianas, lo que al modo de anomalías, han forzado a nuevas conceptualizaciones. Se postuló que la pulsión es el concepto central que persiste como modelo explicativo, a razón de ser la ontología de la teoría. Por lo cual si bien las manifestaciones clínicas varían, la ontología de la teoría persiste.

Modeling the cognitive processes of learners is fundamental to build educational software that are autonomous and that can provide highly tailored assistance during learning . For this purpose, many student models have been developed. However to the best of the authors' knowledge there is no model for the evaluation and teaching of spatial reasoning. This paper describes how a knowledge representation model for modeling cognitive processes of learners is applied to represent the knowledge handled in a complex and demanding task, the manipulation of the robotic arm CanadarmII, and more specifically, how a training software for CanadarmII manipulations can benefit from the model to evaluate spatial mental representations and provide customized assistance.

In the first part of this paper I present some basic presuppositions that in my view define metaphysical realism, whose negation leads to idealism. Aquinas' explicit realism is based on his epistemological thesis on the intentionality of cognitive representations. If this thesis is called into question, with the admission that "omne apparens est verum", Aquinas, following Aristotle (Book IV of the Metaphysics), argues in favor of what can be called radical realism, according to which idealism is self-contradictory. By internal consistency, adherence to any of the idealist theses, even partial, leads to radical idealism, which concludes in nihilism. This thesis is rigorously expounded by E. Gilson. Realism, however, does not diminish the value of intellectual knowledge. On the contrary, intelligent beings are higher than non-intelligent beings, and the reality of the physical world, as argued in the fifth way, demands Divine Intelligence.

In this conceptual analysis contribution to the special issue on radical embodied cognition, we discuss how embodied cognition can exist with and without representations. We explore this concept through the lens of judgment and decision-making in sports (JDMS). Embodied cognition has featured in many investigations of human behavior, but no single approach has emerged. Indeed, the very definitions of the concepts "embodiment" and "cognition" lack consensus, and consequently the degree of "radicalism" is not universally defined, either. In this paper, we address JDMS not from a rigid theoretical perspective but from two embodied cognition approaches: one that assumes there is mediation between the athlete and the environment through mental representation, and another that assumes direct contact between the athlete and the environment and thus no need for mental representation. Importantly, our aim was not to arrive at a theoretical consensus or set up a competition between approaches but rather to provide a legitimate scientific discussion about how to explain empirical results in JDMS from contrasting perspectives within embodied cognition. For this, we first outline the definitions and constructs of embodied cognition in JDMS. Second, we detail the theory underlying the mental representation and direct contact approaches. Third, we comment on two published research papers on JDMS, one selected by each of us: (1) Correia et al. ( ) and ( ) Pizzera (2012). Fourth, following the interpretation of the empirical findings of these papers, we present a discussion on the commonalities and divergences of these two perspectives and the consequences of using one or the other approach in the study of JDMS.

T he proposition that the mental lexicon is a ‘dual route’ system, advanced by Pinker and others to account for regular and irregular morphology, overlooks the important fact that morphological regularity correlates inversely with phonological regularity â€" ‘regular’ past-tense beeped being phonologically irregular (exceptional syllable), while ‘irregular’ past-tense kept is phonologically just regular.

Many people agree that dolphins are sentient beings, but few would claim to know what being a dolphin is like. From a psychological perspective, a dolphin's experiences are a function of its mental capacities, especially those processes that relate to memories, percepts, thoughts, and emotions. This paper reviews what is currently known about dolphins' cognitive abilities, focusing on how they perceive and remember events. Experiments with captive dolphins show that they can flexibly access memories of past events and construct sophisticated representations of the world and themselves. How dolphins act and what they remember about their actions impacts what they perceive, which in turn guides their thoughts and decisions. Many of the actions and events that shape a dolphin's experience are internally generated and monitored. Knowing how dolphins perceive temporal patterns, objects, emotions, actions, agents, scenes, messages, and motivations can help clarify what dolphins' thoughts, memories, and experiences are like. Only by giving dolphins a way to show what they know, or can learn, can we hope to understand what goes on inside their heads.

Many people agree that dolphins are sentient beings, but few would claim to know what being a dolphin is like. From a psychological perspective, a dolphin's experiences are a function of its mental capacities, especially those processes that relate to memories, percepts, thoughts, and emotions. This paper reviews what is currently known about dolphins' cognitive abilities, focusing on how they perceive and remember events. Experiments with captive dolphins show that they can flexibly access memories of past events and construct sophisticated representations of the world and themselves. How dolphins act and what they remember about their actions impacts what they perceive, which in turn guides their thoughts and decisions. Many of the actions and events that shape a dolphin's experience are internally generated and monitored. Knowing how dolphins perceive temporal patterns, objects, emotions, actions, agents, scenes, messages, and motivations can help clarify what dolphins' thoughts, memories, and experiences are like. Only by giving dolphins a way to show what they know, or can learn, can we hope to understand what goes on inside their heads.

One of the main positions in the contemporary debate on joint attention is John Campbell's relationalist account. This account has been welcomed as extremely promising in some strands of philosophy and cognitive science, but it has recently been subject to renewed criticism. In this paper, I take a sympathetic approach toward Campbell's relationalism and I provide support for it by means of a naturalistic theory of the individuation of joint-attentional states. I start from examining some recent objections raised against Campbell's account. I suggest that, although these objections do not undermine the account, they point to questions that current relationalism leaves unanswered. Specifically, current relationalism does not provide an explanation of the psychological processes through which a jointattentional experience is individuated, i.e., assembled and experienced, in such a way that it can constitute an immediate justification for a coordinated action. I propose that such an explanation can be found in a phenomenologicalinteractionist approach to shared intentionality.

According to the traditional conception of the mind, semantical content is perhaps the most important feature distinguishing mental from non-mental systems. And this traditional conception has been incorporated into the foundations of contemporary scientific approaches to the mind, insofar as the notion of 'mental representation' is adopted as a primary theoretical device. Symbolic representations are posited as the internal structures that carry the information utilized by intelligent systems, and they also comprise the formal elements over which cognitive computations are performed. But a fundamental tension is built into the picture -to the extent that symbolic 'representations' are formal elements of computation, their alleged content is completely gratuitous. I argue that the computational paradigm is thematically inconsistent with the search for content or its supposed 'vehicles'. Instead, the concern of computational models of cognition should be with the processing structures that yield the right kinds of input/output profiles, and with how these structures can be implemented in the brain.

Mental variables are central to symbolic accounts of cognition. Conversely, according to the pattern associator hypothesis, variables are obsolete. We examine the representation of variables by investigating the Obligatory Contour Principle (OCP, McCarthy, 1986) in Hebrew. The OCP constrains gemination in Hebrew roots. Gemination is well formed at the root's end (e.g., SMM), but not in its beginning (e.g., SSM). Roots and geminates, however, are variables; hence, according to the pattern associator view, the OCP is unrepresentable. Three experiments demonstrate that speakers are sensitive to the presence of root gemination and constrain its location. In forming words from novel biconsonantal roots, speakers prefer to reduplicate the root's final over its initial radical, and they rate such outputs as more acceptable. The avoidance or rejection of root-initial gemination is independent of its position in the word and is inexplicable by the statistical frequency of root tokens. Our results suggest that linguistic representations specify variables. Speakers' competence, however, is governed by violable constraints.

El análisis del conocimiento práctico en filosofía adquirió un lugar central en el debate filosófico a partir de la publicación de “El concepto de lo mental” (1949) de Gilbert Ryle. En esta obra, Ryle introdujo la distinción entre saber-que y saber-cómo, sentando así las bases para una epistemología del saber-cómo. Actualmente, este debate distingue dos enfoques: el intelectualismo, que vincula el saber-cómo al saber proposicional para justificar su carácter epistémico, y el anti-intelectualismo, que resalta su dimensión práctica como una forma directa de interactuar con el mundo. Estas perspectivas han influido en campos como la psicología, la sociología de la ciencia y la inteligencia artificial, destacando el carácter complejo y multifacético del saber-cómo.

Las recientes investigaciones en lingüística dentro de las que se destacan las adelantadas por Meyer, Fairclough & Wodak y Van Dijk, han coincidido en que mediante las prácticas discursivas se ejerce poder, dado que, quien emite un discurso busca, ante todo, persuadir a los receptores, a través de creencias, actitudes, valores y un sinnúmero de saberes tomados de su entorno y la cultura. La relación discurso-poder está dada por el control "sutil" que se ejerce sobre las mentes de un grupo determinado, a partir del lenguaje. En palabras de Jäger, mediante los discursos es posible "inducir comportamientos y generar (otros) discursos. De este modo, contribuyen a la estructuración de las relaciones de poder en una sociedad". Este artículo pretende explicar, a partir del ACD, cómo dicha relación se manifiesta a través de algunas estrategias discursivas, tales como el uso de determinadas estructuras semánticas sintácticas, marcadores discursivos y fenómenos de polifonía, entre otras, las cuales son utilizadas en los discursos políticos y ayudan a evidenciar marcas lingüísticas de poder.

A common criticism, which Duns Scotus's doctrine on divine ideas has received, is the supposed contradiction that it maintains when stating, on the one hand, that we find the origin of its intelligibility in the divine essence and, on the other hand, that it is given in the divine intellect by 'producing' their esse intelligibile. In the present paper we seek to argue that this putative second position does not indicate the origin of intelligibility of divine ideas, instead with the expression producit lapidem in esse intelligibili, Duns Scotus refers to the intellection of the thing in its specificity, that is, insofar as it differs from the divine essence, in other words, the grasp that the intellect makes of the possible concrete essences that it can create.

This research explored the mental representation of media and digital literacy
(MDL) in 242 Mexican high school students through a definitional task based
on the natural semantic networks technique. The participants defined ten
target concepts related to MDL, using verbs, nouns, and adjectives as definers,
and then they rated each definer with a scale from 1 to 10. The smaller the
number, the lower the quality of the definer to conceptualize the target, while
the higher the rating, the higher the quality of the definer to define it. The
participants showed a beginner level in MDL despite their daily navigation
through the media space and using some digital devices. These results suggest
that simple exposure to information and media technologies does not
guarantee the knowledge necessary to use them appropriately and with critical
thinking, which points out the need to promote MDL programs in this
population, which will empower students to use media and digital tools, with
repercussions awareness that its use entails in their academic and social
environment.

RESUMO O presente ensaio busca refletir e apresentar a Represontologia (a ciência das representações) e os Estudos Representacionais (área que abarca as pesquisas produzidas sob a perspectiva da representação enquanto ferramenta de pesquisa). O nosso objetivo é comparar histórico, métodos e reflexão, traçando semelhanças e diferenças entre essas duas práticas de pesquisa. O texto se encerra refletindo sobre os trabalhos publicados na primeira edição da Revista Colirium e sobre as monografias que aplicam a represontologia, com o fito de traçar um primeiro desenvolvimento do campo.

Many theorists working on the origins of language now argue that language is a cultural evolutionary outgrowth of the human capacity for Gricean communication. However, basically no attention has been paid by these theorists to the naturalistic standing of Grice's model of communication. The worry is that Grice's model is couched in folk psychological terms (e.g. the beliefs, desires, and intentions of agents), as opposed to neuroscientific or even cognitive psychological ones, and the question of how to locate folk psychological states and their properties within a scientific-naturalistic worldview has proven to be among the most recalcitrant in the whole of philosophy of mind and psychology. This chapter attempts to settle the theoretical debt incurred by much contemporary theorising on the origins of language by sketching how Gricean communication can be naturalised using Dennett's intentional stance theory of folk psychology. This includes a (brief) treatment of the relationship between speaker meaning and the meaning of public language items, including those we use to make explicit judgments about other agents' – and our own – mental states. The chapter concludes by flagging an important challenge to the naturalisation pathway outlined here. This challenge concerns the possibility of residual intentional or representational properties at the level of subpersonal cognitive mechanisms. I will distinguish three possible lines of response without signing on to a particular one at this time.

This paper presents the results of an experiment which investigated elementary school children's conceptual knowledge about the earth. First-, 3rd-, and 5thgrade children were asked a series of questions about the shape of the earth. Children's responses to these questions revealed considerable apparent inconsistency. For example, many children said that the earth is round but also stated that it has an end or edge from which people could fall. A great deal of this apparent inconsistency could be explained by assuming that the children used, in a consistent fashion, a mental model of the earth other than the spherical earth model. Five alternative mental models of the earth were identified: the rectangular earth, the disc earth, the dual earth, the hollow sphere, and the flattened sphere. It is argued that these models are constrained by certain presuppositions which children form based on interpretations of their everyday experience. Some of these models (the rectangular earth and the disc earth) seem to be initial models children construct before they are exposed to the culturally accepted information that the earth is a sphere. In the process of knowledge acquisition, children appear to modify their initial models to make them more consistent with the culturally accepted model by gradually reinterpreting their presuppositions. Synthetic models (such as the hollow sphere and the flattened sphere) are generated by children

Maintaining an accurate mental representation of the current environment is crucial to detecting change in that environment and ensuring behavioral coherence. Past experience with interactions between objects, such as collisions, has been shown to influence the perception of object interactions. To assess whether mental representations of object interactions derived from experience influence the maintenance of a mental model of the current stimulus environment, we presented physically plausible and implausible collision events while recording brain electrical activity. The parietal P300 response to 'oddball' events was found to be modulated by the physical plausibility of the stimuli, suggesting that past experience of object interactions can influence working memory processes involved in monitoring ongoing changes to the environment.

Based on the mathematics of nonlinear Dynamical System Theory, neurocognition can be analyzed by convergent fluid and transient neurodynamics in abstract n-dimensional system phase spaces in the form of nonlinear vector fields, vector streams or vector flows (the so-called "vectorial form"). This processual or dynamical perspective on cognition, including the dynamical binding mechanisms in cognitive neuroarchitectures, has the advantage of a more accurately modeling of the transient cognitive processes. Thus, neurocognition can be considered as being organized by integrative synchronization mechanisms which best explain the liquid flow of neurocognitive information orchestrated in a network of positive and/or negative feedback loops in the subcortical and cortical areas. The human neurocognitive system can be regarded as a nonlinear, dynamical and open nonequilibrium system. This new fluid or liquid perspective in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience can be regarded as a contribution towards bridging the gap between the discrete, abstract symbolic description of propositions in the mind, and their continuous, numerical implementation in self-organizing neural networks modelling the neural information processing in the human brain.

Based on the mathematics of nonlinear Dynamical System Theory, neurocognition can be analyzed by convergent fluid and transient neurodynamics in abstract n-dimensional system phase spaces in the form of nonlinear vector fields, vector streams or vector flows (the so-called "vectorial form"). This processual or dynamical perspective on cognition, including the dynamical binding mechanisms in cognitive neuroarchitectures, has the advantage of a more accurately modeling of the transient cognitive processes. Thus, neurocognition can be considered as being organized by integrative synchronization mechanisms which best explain the liquid flow of neurocognitive information orchestrated in a network of positive and/or negative feedback loops in the subcortical and cortical areas. The human neurocognitive system can be regarded as a nonlinear, dynamical and open nonequilibrium system. This new fluid or liquid perspective in cognitive science and cognitive neuroscience can be regarded as a contribution towards bridging the gap between the discrete, abstract symbolic description of propositions in the mind, and their continuous, numerical implementation in self-organizing neural networks modelling the neural information processing in the human brain.