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Philosophy
Epistemology

20 Dynamics and the Perception of Causal Events

Profile image of Phillip WolffPhillip Wolff

2008, Oxford University Press eBooks

Abstract
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The paper introduces a novel epistemological theory of causation, focusing on how individuals mentally represent causal relationships that extend beyond mere observable phenomena. It contrasts conventional views of causation as linked only to visible events with the proposition that invisible causal elements can be inferred through lawful connections to observable properties. The discussion of Hume's influence and the shortcomings of existing psychological theories of causation underlines the need for a deeper understanding of how causal inferencing operates in human cognition.

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