negative liberty

This research article aims to (1) analyze the presence of the concepts of negative liberty and positive liberty within various provisions of the Gender Equality Act B. E. 2558 (2015), and (2) synthesize the research findings into policy recommendations for the amendment and improvement of the said Act. Methodologically, the research adopts a philosophical approach, utilises qualitative methods, and is grounded in documentary legal research. Both primary and secondary legal sources are employed, and discourse analysis is used as the principal analytical technique. The findings reveal that: (1) the Act promotes negative liberty, notably through protection from state interference, the safeguarding of private autonomy, and the provision of legal remedies in cases of discriminatory treatment; (2) the Act also advances positive liberty, including the empowerment of individuals to determine the course of their own lives, the provision of comprehensive redress mechanisms, and statesupported protective structures; and (3) twenty policy recommendations are proposed for the amendment of the Act in line with Berlin's framework. These recommendations focus on limiting state power, strengthening the legal mechanisms for the protection of rights, and enhancing the decision-making capacity of individuals.

Nudge advocates contend that nudges are liberty preserving, while government regulations are not. We interrogate that assumption by considering negative liberty in the forms suggested by the proponents of nudges. Specifically, we examine three ways of measuring negative liberty – liberty as freedom of choice, liberty as absence of coercion and liberty as absence of interference – applying the measures to a case study relevant to the nudge literature: regulations governing healthy food manufacture. We show that, depending on the liberty measure adopted and the estimated impact on producer and consumer behaviour, some regulations can be liberty reducing, while others are liberty preserving or liberty enhancing. When it comes to comparing nudges and more traditional policies aimed at increasing the health and welfare of citizens, there is no a priori negative liberty ground for preferring nudges.

En las sociedades liberales, admitimos por regla general el Principio de Libertad Procreativa que es coherente con el Principio del daño propuesto por Mill. Incluye varias libertades, como la de decidir cuándo, cuántas veces, con quién o si procrear. Por otra parte, defendemos también el Principio de Autonomía Parental, según el cual los padres tienen derecho a criar a sus hijos y a tomar las decisiones que les conciernen libres de intervención ajena. Habitualmente admitimos que sus límites son mayores que los de la libertad procreativa. La razón no puede ser más clara: hay un tercero involucrado, el niño, y según el Principio de Mill, la sociedad está legitimada para intervenir. Partiendo de que habitualmente la libertad procreativa y la autonomía parental se ha considerado por separado, y han sido defendidos sobre bases diferentes, en este trabajo me propongo defender que algunas ampliaciones propuestas de la libertad procreativa pertenecen en realidad al ámbito de la autonomía parental.

The History of Political Thought originated in, and partially remains an adjunct to the academic study of politics. As such it is not a mere subject matter or authentic tradition of speculation, but a secularising genealogy in some tension with an impulse to rigorous historicity. It provides an under-acknowledged context for the thinkers and concepts placed within it. The difficulties and consequent distortions are illustrated with reference to seventeenth-century discussions of liberty. It is argued that notions of negative liberty and Republican liberty as an ideological alternative are secularising genealogical projections that distort the character of seventeenth-century debate; but that republican liberty can be reformulated in more historically plausible terms as a special case of one of the entailments of contentious office-holding in and beyond a secularised conception of the political. Thomas Hobbes's conceptions of liberty provide a concluding illustration.

The definition of individual liberty as the absence of coercion or violence (threatened or actual) includes a circularity problem. A look at prominent representatives of classical liberalism and libertarianism (Hayek, Rothbard, Hoppe, Jasay) reveals that this is typical of classical liberals as well as of libertarians, though the latter avoid a confusion of power and freedom. However, the respective definitions of individual liberty analysed here rest on the assumption that coercion (or violence) presupposes the absence of the (voluntary) agreement of the coerced party. Thus they use the definiendum in a modified form (voluntariness) as part of the definiens in order to define the definiendum. The resulting circle can be avoided by looking at coercion and freedom (non-coercion) as representatives of the class of two-level decisions (meta-decision and object-decision) with different costs on the meta-level. While coercion means that the coerced party has to face or faces artificial costs in case of a negative meta-decision, non-coercion (freedom) does not. As a conclusion we define freedom as the absence of artificial interference in the private sphere of another person that would produce artificial costs for that person if she/he opted for a negative meta-decision.

la verdad y la libertad son antes que nada derechos; se preguntan cómo podemos renegar de esos derechos, caer en error o perder la libertad. Es por ello que el racionalismo ha encontrado en la tradición adánica, planteando en principio la imagen de un Adán libre y racional, un tema que convenía particularmente a sus preocupaciones. En una perspectiva empirista, todo es invertido: lo asombroso es que los hombres lleguen a veces a comprender lo verdadero, a veces lleguen a comprenderse entre ellos, a veces a liberarse de lo que los encadena" Deleuze El artículo estudia el concepto de libertad de expresión de John Stuart Mill como es expuesto en su texto On Liberty. Sostiene la idea de que la libertad de expresión le permite a Mill resolver el problema de la libertad sin caer en explicaciones que supongan la libertad del individuo de modo esencialista. Así, la libertad de expresión debe analizarse como principio de una ética práctico-argumentativa, fundamentada en el individuo, en tensión con la opinión colectiva, relativa a un concepto de verdad en proceso. Estos cinco elementos constituyen la maquínica de la libertad de expresión que Mill propone. De este modo, la libertad de expresión es aquello que hay que proteger para efectivamente asegurar la libertad. Esto se logra por medio de una restricción de cualquier posible acción de la social en la expresión del individuo. La libertad, pues, es entendida como algo que hay que hacer, producir y no algo dado.

la verdad y la libertad son antes que nada derechos; se preguntan cómo podemos renegar de esos derechos, caer en error o perder la libertad. Es por ello que el racionalismo ha encontrado en la tradición adánica, planteando en principio la imagen de un Adán libre y racional, un tema que convenía particularmente a sus preocupaciones. En una perspectiva empirista, todo es invertido: lo asombroso es que los hombres lleguen a veces a comprender lo verdadero, a veces lleguen a comprenderse entre ellos, a veces a liberarse de lo que los encadena" Deleuze El artículo estudia el concepto de libertad de expresión de John Stuart Mill como es expuesto en su texto On Liberty. Sostiene la idea de que la libertad de expresión le permite a Mill resolver el problema de la libertad sin caer en explicaciones que supongan la libertad del individuo de modo esencialista. Así, la libertad de expresión debe analizarse como principio de una ética práctico-argumentativa, fundamentada en el individuo, en tensión con la opinión colectiva, relativa a un concepto de verdad en proceso. Estos cinco elementos constituyen la maquínica de la libertad de expresión que Mill propone. De este modo, la libertad de expresión es aquello que hay que proteger para efectivamente asegurar la libertad. Esto se logra por medio de una restricción de cualquier posible acción de la social en la expresión del individuo. La libertad, pues, es entendida como algo que hay que hacer, producir y no algo dado.

la verdad y la libertad son antes que nada derechos; se preguntan cómo podemos renegar de esos derechos, caer en error o perder la libertad. Es por ello que el racionalismo ha encontrado en la tradición adánica, planteando en principio la imagen de un Adán libre y racional, un tema que convenía particularmente a sus preocupaciones. En una perspectiva empirista, todo es invertido: lo asombroso es que los hombres lleguen a veces a comprender lo verdadero, a veces lleguen a comprenderse entre ellos, a veces a liberarse de lo que los encadena" Deleuze El artículo estudia el concepto de libertad de expresión de John Stuart Mill como es expuesto en su texto On Liberty. Sostiene la idea de que la libertad de expresión le permite a Mill resolver el problema de la libertad sin caer en explicaciones que supongan la libertad del individuo de modo esencialista. Así, la libertad de expresión debe analizarse como principio de una ética práctico-argumentativa, fundamentada en el individuo, en tensión con la opinión colectiva, relativa a un concepto de verdad en proceso. Estos cinco elementos constituyen la maquínica de la libertad de expresión que Mill propone. De este modo, la libertad de expresión es aquello que hay que proteger para efectivamente asegurar la libertad. Esto se logra por medio de una restricción de cualquier posible acción de la social en la expresión del individuo. La libertad, pues, es entendida como algo que hay que hacer, producir y no algo dado.

In matters of twenty-first century public policy, age-old questions surrounding freedom of conscience and both personal and civic liberties remain in perennial tension with the necessary demands for civic conformity, custom, and consensus. These questions were also of critical importance in early eighteenth-century colonial America. In the first half of the eighteenth century, a hotbed of religious, intellectual, and cultural diversity was fomenting considerable conflict in Philadelphia, setting the stage for a vital debate over the nature and parameters of religious liberty and freedom of conscience in the colonies. Within this context of the eighteenth-century religious and cultural landscape of colonial Philadelphia, this article will examine a debate between Jonathan Dickinson and Benjamin Franklin whereby two distinctly different interpretations of religious liberty and freedom of conscience were established. Left to themselves, these two interpretations lead to sharply divergent trajectories. Nonetheless, by considering these two viewpoints in dialogue with one another, the Franklin-Dickinson pamphlet debate can serve as a useful tool for conceptualizing twenty-first century public policy issues related to freedom of conscience: policies that preserve the essential aspects of what constitutes each person's humanity while simultaneously respecting the broader exigencies for public order and responsible policy in the aggregate.

中文摘要：极权主义问题是二十世纪政治哲学的核心问题。在伯林的思想脉络中，二十世纪极权主义的思想根源是一元主义和积极自由。从一元主义的角度而言，经验问题和规范问题构成了哲学一元主义的理论基础，哲学一元主义则衍生了政治一元主义，而政治一元主义乌托邦为二十世纪的极权主义实践准备了完美无缺的理想图景。从积极自由的角度而言，积极自由可以分为原初的积极自由和扭曲的积极自由，扭曲的积极自由又可分为个体积极自由和集体积极自由，而集体积极自由为二十世纪的极权主义实践奠定了貌似合理的正当性基础。因此，二十世纪的极权主义是政治一元主义和集体积极自由共同作用的结果。

In this article we address the relevance of J.S. Mill's political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics. In contrast to some readings of Mill, we reject the view that in the formulation of public policies liberties of all kinds enjoy an equal presumption in their favor. We argue that Mill also rejects this view and discuss the distinction that Mill makes between three kinds of liberty interests: interests that are immune from state interference; interests that enjoy a presumption in favor of liberty; and interests that enjoy no such presumption. We argue that what is of focal importance for Mill in protecting liberty is captured by the essential role that the value of self-determination plays in human well-being. Finally, we make the case for the plausibility of a more complex and nuanced Millian framework for public health ethics that would modify how the balancing of some liberties and public health interests should proceed by taking the thumb off the liberty end of the scale. Mill's arguments and the legacy of liberalism support certain forms of state interference with marketplace liberties for the sake of public health objectives without any presumption in favor of liberty.

Isaiah Berlin's account of freedom is more useful for feminists than is generally recognized, especially when seen in the context of his value pluralism. Focusing on the work of Nancy Hirschmann and Sharon Krause, I argue, first, that Berlin's concept of negative liberty can be used to resist patriarchy when his notion of the 'conditions' of negative liberty is taken into account. Second, positive liberty is also useful to feminists, but Berlin does not, as some feminist (and other) writers suppose, simply reject positive liberty; on the contrary, he sees it as a fundamental human value of great importance. Third, Berlin's value pluralism makes a crucial contribution. It explains why he distinguishes negative liberty from its conditions and why he does not reject positive liberty as a value. It also explains how feminists can see the value in both negative and positive liberty without trying, paradoxically, to fit them both into a single concept. Further, my liberal-pluralist extension of Berlin's pluralism locates all these insights within a complex but coherent political outlook which provides a sympathetic resource for feminism.

Through publically agreed laws that correspond to a common set of public restrictions, the ‘people as a sovereign body’ serves to protect against violations of individual liberty and despotic power. Where no such common body exists, individuals are deprived of this protection. In such cases, individuals must obey without liberty, while those in power command under a state of license. Neoliberal theorists maintain that any common personality, with its corresponding set of public and arbitrary positive and negative restrictions on liberty, undermines individual liberty. Neoliberal theory only allows for private restrictions on liberty. Against these neoliberal assumptions, we argue that rejecting public restrictions on liberty does not promote individual liberty. To the contrary, it creates conditions in which free individuals become servile and political inequality becomes entrenched, where citizens are divided into those who obey and those who command. Tracing the consequences of ne...

This article offers an analysis of the polemic between neorepublicanism and Isaiah Berlin on the concept of liberty. Neorepublican theory argues that Berlin's concept of liberty allows arbitrary power to emerge, and that the characteristically negative association between intervention and liberty in his argument should be dispelled. This article points out that the concept of liberty in Berlin does not preclude intervention to prevent oppression. One theme present in Berlin's argument is that interference by Law is an instrument that assures the exercise of both negative and positive liberty. Taking as its point of departure the ideas of negative liberty and positive liberty, the article argues that, on the basis of Berlin's work, these notions are facets of a broader concept that involves primarily the freedom to choose among alternatives. It highlights the fact that the two lines of thought converge in seeing the exercise of freedom as subject to no ultimate ends.

Throughout his writings, John Milton addressed the idea of genuine liberty or freedom over against the self-indulgence that he sometimes called license, a selfindulgence that inevitably leads to tyranny from within and from without. Indeed, Milton's understanding of license inevitably includes the idea of abusing freedom to pursue some sort of fleshly indulgence, whereas his concept of genuine liberty focuses on the freedom for the moral person to live a virtuous life and pursue virtuous goals under the strictures of his own conscience in spite of the temptations and roadblocks offered by intemperate persons, stifling custom, or an interfering state. Significantly, Milton's explicitly Christian ideal of genuine liberty emphasizes the need for virtuous self-government to characterize the truly free individual. Although Milton does not always employ the specific terms liberty or license, these concepts as well as the ideal of self-government can consistently be seen, implicitly or explicitly, with remarkable consistency throughout his four and a half decades of published writings. Liberty, License, and Virtuous Self-Government in John Milton's Writings of public Liberty, but of licentiousness"); and Livy, who in his History of Rome criticized corrupt young aristocrats who "preferred their own freedom from all restraints to the general liberty." 8 But for Milton, the distinction between liberty and license is first and foremost a theological matter, for true liberty comes from Christ giving believers freedom from sin and its attendant licentious indulgence. Such liberty, once gained, frees the believer to live according to a mature, selfregulating Christian conscience. Milton articulates this explicitly in De Doctrina Christiana (On Christian Doctrine), his posthumously discovered theological treatise, 9 where he states:

Relationships in liberal theory between liberty and economic well-being are empirical propositions: (a) economic conditions can reach a level so low as to make the effective establishment of liberty impossible; (b) the marginal value of economic gain diminishes with respect to the value of liberty as economic conditions improve; and (c) the priority standing of liberty requires the development of social forms and conditions necessary for the establishment of liberty. Empirical data, however, do not support these assumptions. A more complex relationship between liberty and economic well-being is suggested, where (a) liberty is needed as a first condition to increase economic well-being, and (b) the very distinction between political values like liberty and economic values is jeopardized. A fusion of politics and economics may be required to account for these relationships, a point re-emphasizing the sensitivity of normative theory to empirical evidence.

In this article we address the relevance of J.S. Mill's political philosophy for a framework of public health ethics. In contrast to some readings of Mill, we reject the view that in the formulation of public policies liberties of all kinds enjoy an equal presumption in their favor. We argue that Mill also rejects this view and discuss the distinction that Mill makes between three kinds of liberty interests: interests that are immune from state interference; interests that enjoy a presumption in favor of liberty; and interests that enjoy no such presumption. We argue that what is of focal importance for Mill in protecting liberty is captured by the essential role that the value of self-determination plays in human well-being. Finally, we make the case for the plausibility of a more complex and nuanced Millian framework for public health ethics that would modify how the balancing of some liberties and public health interests should proceed by taking the thumb off the liberty end of the scale. Mill's arguments and the legacy of liberalism support certain forms of state interference with marketplace liberties for the sake of public health objectives without any presumption in favor of liberty.

Page 1. Negative and Positive Liberty* George Crowder University College, Oxford The distinction between ... the work. ' Letter to Lind, 27-28 March, 1 April 1776, in Correspondence of Jeremy Bentham, (London, 1968), vol. I, p. 310. See ...

Through publically agreed laws that correspond to a common set of public restrictions, the ‘people as a sovereign body’ serves to protect against violations of individual liberty and despotic power. Where no such common body exists, individuals are deprived of this protection. In such cases, individuals must obey without liberty, while those in power command under a state of license. Neoliberal theorists maintain that any common personality, with its corresponding set of public and arbitrary positive and negative restrictions on liberty, undermines individual liberty. Neoliberal theory only allows for private restrictions on liberty. Against these neoliberal assumptions, we argue that rejecting public restrictions on liberty does not promote individual liberty. To the contrary, it creates conditions in which free individuals become servile and political inequality becomes entrenched, where citizens are divided into those who obey and those who command. Tracing the consequences of ne...

Liberalism thus views the concept of freedom as a fundamental element of its intellectual foundation and without access to and defense of freedom, there is no meaning for the existence and survival of liberals. Due to the wide range of views of liberalism and the differences of opinion of liberal thinkers and different trends, attitudes and views on different freedoms, for example some of the thinkers believe in the interference of the state power in personal freedoms with the goal of creating social justice and economic justice and so on..., such as the thinkers of the Social liberal trend in the thought of liberalism, But some other thinkers believe in the protection of individual freedoms from interfering of the power of the state, and reject any form of interference in freedom, such as thinkers of the Libertarians trend in the thought of liberalism, including (Friedrich A. von Hayek). These two views of liberalism are expressed in terms of freedom, as: positive freedom (when the...

Liberalism thus views the concept of freedom as a fundamental element of its intellectual foundation and without access to and defense of freedom, there is no meaning for the existence and survival of liberals. Due to the wide range of views of liberalism and the differences of opinion of liberal thinkers and different trends, attitudes and views on different freedoms, for example some of the thinkers believe in the interference of the state power in personal freedoms with the goal of creating social justice and economic justice and so on..., such as the thinkers of the Social liberal trend in the thought of liberalism, But some other thinkers believe in the protection of individual freedoms from interfering of the power of the state, and reject any form of interference in freedom, such as thinkers of the Libertarians trend in the thought of liberalism, including (Friedrich A. von Hayek). These two views of liberalism are expressed in terms of freedom, as: positive freedom (when the...

RESUMEN. En este artículo se quiere mostrar que hay un tercer concepto de libertad aparte de los dos descritos por Isaiah Berlin. Para llevar a cabo su propósito el autor realiza una reconstrucción histórica del concepto hobbesiano de libertad y del concepto de libertad al que éste se opuso. Se concluye señalando que, aunque el concepto de libertad como no interferencia pudo se un ideal valioso en el mundo occidental de la posguerra, hay otros conceptos de libertad que son igualmente valiosos en relación a la concepción que tengamos del carácter normativo de la naturaleza humana.

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Hobbes and Republican Liberty he offers a dazzling comparison of two rival theories about the nature of human liberty. The first originated in classical antiquity, and lay at the heart of the Roman republican tradition of public life. It flowered in the city-republics of Renaissance Italy, and has been central to much recent discussion of republicanism among contemporary political theorists. Thomas Hobbes was the most formidable enemy of this pattern of thought, and his attempt to discredit it constitutes a truly epochal moment in the history of Anglophone political thought. Professor Skinner shows how Hobbes's successive efforts to grapple with the question of human liberty were deeply affected by the claims put forward by the radical and parliamentarian writers in the course of the English civil wars, and by Hobbes's sense of the urgent need to counter them in the name of peace. Skinner approaches Hobbes's political theory not simply as a general system of ideas but as a polemical intervention in the conflicts of his time, and he shows that Leviathan, the greatest work of political philosophy ever written in English, reflects a substantial change in the character of Hobbes's moral thought, responding very specifically to the political needs of the moment. As Professor Skinner says, seething polemics always underlie the deceptively smooth surface of Hobbes's argument. Hobbes and Republican Liberty is an extended essay that develops several of the themes announced by Quentin Skinner in his famous inaugural lecture on Liberty before Liberalism of 1998. Cogent, engaged, accessible and indeed exhilarating, this new book will appeal to readers of history, politics and philosophy at all levels, and provides an excellent introduction to the work of one of the most celebrated thinkers of our time.

This paper examines John Stuart Mill's discussion of economic liberty and individual liberty, and his view of the relationship between the two. It explores how, and how effectively, Mill developed his arguments about the two liberties; reveals the lineages of thought from which they derived; and considers how his arguments were altered by political economists not long after his death. It is argued that the distinction Mill drew between the two liberties provided him with a framework of concepts which legitimised significant government intervention in economic matters without restricting individual liberty.

Berlin argues that Green's positive freedom, at odds with his liberalism, justifies an oppressive society. Berlin's argument proceeds in three steps. The first embraces a shift from negative freedom to rational self-mastery, which is underpinned by a metaphysics of a split self. Then it is claimed that positive freedom is realizable only in a certain kind of society which, thirdly, it is argued, is oppressive. Green takes the first two steps but they d o not commit him to the totalitarian conclusion, not least because he grounds positive freedom in a view of a unitary self and his society does not leave empty the institutional framework which makes possible the realization of freedom. Green's society is not oppressive in the name of freedom, but rather enabling in the name of freedom.

The article proposes a social network analysis of the main European capitalisms and its correspondence with an index of economic freedom. The analysis relates to two kinds of economic liberties taken from the concept of freedom formulated by Isaiah Berlin. While the first kind of freedom (negative freedom) depends on the external system (e.g. the constraints on the firm defined by the regulations), the second refers to the internal obligations within the business system itself that prevent the free exercise of business (positive freedom): specifically, the social network, in which the company is embedded. After an operationalization of the two concepts of freedom, the analysis of a comprehensive database allows us to explore the relationship between the two kinds of freedom.

Much of the liberal tradition in political thought has shared Isaiah Berlin's fears about all positive concepts of liberty. Indeed these fears seem justified in relation to Marx and Hegel. However, the danger of a tyrannical paternalism derives not from the concept of positive freedom itself but from the reification of the self associated with rationalism. Spinoza's monism and his notion of individual conatus make any rationalist reification of the self implausible. Consequently his account of positive freedom enriches rather than undermines the commitment to negative liberty, whilst also helping to explain his ability to reconcile liberal toleration with the strikingly Hobbesian premisses of his political philosophy.

This paper inspects the form of freedom that exists in Dubai to make people living in the city happy and satisfied. I ponder Berlin's two notions of negative and positive freedom to see whether these notions can truly categorically exclude one another in the definition of freedom, and if so, which one applies in Dubai. I base my research on the assumption that the aim of every political/economic system is to make people happy and that the way to people's happiness is through the satisfaction of their desires of survival and well-being. The results I succumb to show that Berlin's two notions of freedom are intricately related on many levels: both partisans of positive and negative freedom seem to disregard the fact that, the subjectivity suggested by negative freedom does not exclude the presence of an objective element in negative freedom and, consequently the objectivity suggested by positive freedom does not exclude the presence of a subjective element in it. The categorically dualistic conception of freedom suggested by Berlin would thus be incomplete and the necessity of freedom would dwell in a form of a dialectic synthesis between negative and positive freedom, that which I call Dialectic Freedom. This is the form of freedom that prevails in Dubai.

Myślenie w żywiole wolności. Józefa Tischnera wizja wolności jako determinanty liberalnej demokracji Wieloaspektowość idei wolności, którą można rozpatrywać zarówno w kontekście metafi zycznym, jak i politycznym, jednoznacznie dowodzi swojej złożoności. Trudno polemizować ze stanowiskiem, iż: "Podejmowanie pytania, czym jest wolność, wydaje się przedsięwzięciem beznadziejnym. Natychmiast bowiem odwieczne sprzeczności i antynomie, które jakby tylko czyhały na tę chwilę, wpędzają nasz umysł w rozmaite dylematy, wskutek czego uchwycenie istoty wolności lub jej przeciwieństwa staje się równie niemożliwe, jak zrozumienie kwadratury koła" 1. Perturbacje defi nicyjne pojęcia wolności są niewątpliwe. Wręcz rodzi się pytanie: jak konstruktywnie odnieść się do poglądów sławnych poprzedników, których trudno nawet wymieniać, by nie zostać posądzonym o subiektywną wybiórczość. Dodatkowo problem potęguje fakt, iż, jak stwierdził Jacek Kloczkowski: "Niewiele idei odgrywa tak znaczącą rolę w polskiej tradycji intelektualnej jak wolność" 2. Również Józef Tischner wpisywał się w tę tradycję, twierdząc: "Gdy

la verdad y la libertad son antes que nada derechos; se preguntan cómo podemos renegar de esos derechos, caer en error o perder la libertad. Es por ello que el racionalismo ha encontrado en la tradición adánica, planteando en principio la imagen de un Adán libre y racional, un tema que convenía particularmente a sus preocupaciones. En una perspectiva empirista, todo es invertido: lo asombroso es que los hombres lleguen a veces a comprender lo verdadero, a veces lleguen a comprenderse entre ellos, a veces a liberarse de lo que los encadena" Deleuze

This article offers an analysis of the polemic between neorepublicanism and Isaiah Berlin on the concept of liberty. Neorepublican theory argues that Berlin's concept of liberty allows arbitrary power to emerge, and that the characteristically negative association between intervention and liberty in his argument should be dispelled. This article points out that the concept of liberty in Berlin does not preclude intervention to prevent oppression. One theme present in Berlin's argument is that interference by Law is an instrument that assures the exercise of both negative and positive liberty. Taking as its point of departure the ideas of negative liberty and positive liberty, the article argues that, on the basis of Berlin's work, these notions are facets of a broader concept that involves primarily the freedom to choose among alternatives. It highlights the fact that the two lines of thought converge in seeing the exercise of freedom as subject to no ultimate ends.

En las sociedades liberales, admitimos por regla general el Principio de Libertad Procreativa que es coherente con el Principio del daño propuesto por Mill. Incluye varias libertades, como la de decidir cuándo, cuántas veces, con quién o si procrear. Por otra parte, defendemos también el Principio de Autonomía Parental, según el cual los padres tienen derecho a criar a sus hijos y a tomar las decisiones que les conciernen libres de intervención ajena. Habitualmente admitimos que sus límites son mayores que los de la libertad procreativa. La razón no puede ser más clara: hay un tercero involucrado, el niño, y según el Principio de Mill, la sociedad está legitimada para intervenir. Partiendo de que habitualmente la libertad procreativa y la autonomía parental se ha considerado por separado, y han sido defendidos sobre bases diferentes, en este trabajo me propongo defender que algunas ampliaciones propuestas de la libertad procreativa pertenecen en realidad al ámbito de la autonomía parental.

Globalization is a motor that exports Western ideologies such as liberal democracy, capitalism to Africa, and other parts of the world. Hence, the situation in Africa since the post-colonial era demonstrates a discontent for liberal democracy and its economic option of capitalism. Thus, in this paper, we show that the discontent in Western individualistic ontology is in conflict with traditional African communalistic ontology, and therefore, it is detrimentally hunting the practice of liberal democracy in post-colonial Africa.

Much of the liberal tradition in political thought has shared Isaiah Berlin's fears about all positive concepts of liberty. Indeed these fears seem justified in relation to Marx and Hegel. However, the danger of a tyrannical paternalism derives not from the concept of positive freedom itself but from the reification of the self associated with rationalism. Spinoza's monism and his notion of individual conatus make any rationalist reification of the self implausible. Consequently his account of positive freedom enriches rather than undermines the commitment to negative liberty, whilst also helping to explain his ability to reconcile liberal toleration with the strikingly Hobbesian premisses of his political philosophy.

Liberalism thus views the concept of freedom as a fundamental element of its intellectual foundation and without access to and defense of freedom, there is no meaning for the existence and survival of liberals. Due to the wide range of views of liberalism and the differences of opinion of liberal thinkers and different trends, attitudes and views on different freedoms, for example some of the thinkers believe in the interference of the state power in personal freedoms with the goal of creating social justice and economic justice and so on..., such as the thinkers of the Social liberal trend in the thought of liberalism, But some other thinkers believe in the protection of individual freedoms from interfering of the power of the state, and reject any form of interference in freedom, such as thinkers of the Libertarians trend in the thought of liberalism, including (Friedrich A. von Hayek). These two views of liberalism are expressed in terms of freedom, as: positive freedom (when the...

Resumo Pretendemos mostrar que a crítica comunitarista de Taylor à concepção liberal de liberdade (negativa) propõe uma nova forma de ver a liberdade da vontade (chamada de positiva). As teorias da liberdade negativa simplesmente se baseiam num conceito de oportunidade (opportunity-concept). Esse conceito não envolve a capacidade de realização, uma vez que se aplica à liberdade (negativa) como ausência de obstáculos, que se explicita como o poder de fazer isto ou aquilo sem se deparar com impedimentos externos, de ordem física ou legal, para o exercício desta ou daquela ação possível. A questão torna-se mais complexa com o conceito de realização (exercise-concept), mediante o qual a liberdade implica, essencialmente, autodeterminação e controle sobre a pessoa do agente e da sua ação e, portanto, possui um valor intrínseco de realização e não simplesmente instrumental. Sem abandonar a importância do valor liberal da liberdade do indivíduo, Taylor propõe uma nova forma de ver essa liberdade: ela não reside no exercício de opções indiferenciadas, mas no exercício efetivo de capacidades, mediante a satisfação de certos desejos qualifi cados como autênticos. Somos livres apenas se nós fazemos aquilo que realmente queremos, a partir de nossos verdadeiros desejos, não viciados por obstáculos internos, em particular pela não autenticidade de alguns deles.

Mill's Liberty Principle aims to protect 'social' freedom, which is traditionally understood as negative freedom. I argue that Mill's conception of social freedom does not comfortably fit even a moralized conception of negative freedom, and that individuality, an ideal fundamental to On Liberty, is a robustly positive type of freedom. This raises the question of whether protecting social freedom involves an egalitarian, progressive (in the contemporary sense) state that ambitiously strives to create the social conditions of individuality. I consider the case for an affirmative answer to that question, then argue that the ideal of individuality itself blocks interventions that some contemporary egalitarian, progressive liberals consider at least consistent with the Liberty Principle. These include autonomy-enhancing paternalism, and outright prohibition of as opposed to time, place, and manner regulation of the expression of some opinions that adversely affect protected minorities. Though not libertarian, the Liberty Principle is not an expression of this type of egalitarian liberalism, as evidenced inter alia by Mill's emphatic rejection of state control of education, and his categorical case against prohibiting the expression of even the most extreme and insidious opinions.

O presente artigo, produzido pelo método lógico-dedutivo, procura compreender a liberdade política, por meio da análise do "Corpo Político" de Thomas Hobbes. Confirma-se o relevante papel atemporal da filosofia política hobbesiana, considerando que o medo é resultado da igualdade dos homens vivendo em estado de natureza, e que a liberdade política nasce com a criação do Estado (soberania), consequência do contrato social, sendo o seu objetivo garantir a manutenção (segurança) e o bem-estar dos homens no estado civil. A análise foi feita a partir de sua teoria de soberania, na qual se constata uma preocupação com a liberdade dos cidadãos e não apenas com o poder absoluto.

Resumo Pretendemos mostrar que a crítica comunitarista de Taylor à concepção liberal de liberdade (negativa) propõe uma nova forma de ver a liberdade da vontade (chamada de positiva). As teorias da liberdade negativa simplesmente se baseiam num conceito de oportunidade (opportunity-concept). Esse conceito não envolve a capacidade de realização, uma vez que se aplica à liberdade (negativa) como ausência de obstáculos, que se explicita como o poder de fazer isto ou aquilo sem se deparar com impedimentos externos, de ordem física ou legal, para o exercício desta ou daquela ação possível. A questão torna-se mais complexa com o conceito de realização (exercise-concept), mediante o qual a liberdade implica, essencialmente, autodeterminação e controle sobre a pessoa do agente e da sua ação e, portanto, possui um valor intrínseco de realização e não simplesmente instrumental. Sem abandonar a importância do valor liberal da liberdade do indivíduo, Taylor propõe uma nova forma de ver essa liberdade: ela não reside no exercício de opções indiferenciadas, mas no exercício efetivo de capacidades, mediante a satisfação de certos desejos qualifi cados como autênticos. Somos livres apenas se nós fazemos aquilo que realmente queremos, a partir de nossos verdadeiros desejos, não viciados por obstáculos internos, em particular pela não autenticidade de alguns deles.

In theoretical considerations on democracy freedom is sometimes understood in unconditional and conditional terms. This general distinction underlies I. Berlin's concept of negative and positive freedom, and E. Fromm's concept of 'freedom from' and 'freedom to'. The authors of this paper introduce the concept of extrinsic and intrinsic sense of freedom which is meant to be psychological representation of the philosophical distinction on unconditional and conditional freedom, respectively. An extrinsic freedom results from a lack of external restrictions/barriers, whereas intrinsic freedom is based on the belief that being free means compatibility between one's own actions and preferred values, life goals or worldview. Based on nationwide survey data, the authors show that both forms of freedom are embedded in entirely different basic human values and moral intuitions. Further, it is shown that intrinsic freedom negatively predicts liberal orientation and ...

la verdad y la libertad son antes que nada derechos; se preguntan cómo podemos renegar de esos derechos, caer en error o perder la libertad. Es por ello que el racionalismo ha encontrado en la tradición adánica, planteando en principio la imagen de un Adán libre y racional, un tema que convenía particularmente a sus preocupaciones. En una perspectiva empirista, todo es invertido: lo asombroso es que los hombres lleguen a veces a comprender lo verdadero, a veces lleguen a comprenderse entre ellos, a veces a liberarse de lo que los encadena" Deleuze

Interpretive constitutional debate over the last few decades has centered on two apparently linked questions: whether the Constitution can be given a determinate meaning, and whether the institution of judicial review can be justified within the basic assumptions of liberalism. Two groups of scholars have generated answers to these questions. The constitutional faithful argue that meaning can indeed be determinately affixed to constitutional clauses, by reference to the plain meaning of the document, the original intent of the drafters, evolving political and moral norms of the community, or the best political or moral philosophical theory available and that, because of that determinacy, judicial review can indeed be brought within the rubric of liberalism. Taking issue with the constitutional faithful is a group who might be called constitutional sceptics. Scholars in this group see, in every constitutional phrase or doctrine, the possibility of multiple interpretations, and in the...