Theory of Argumentation

This article examines implicative argumentation in the political rhetoric of Ukrainian
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The publication aims to identify the types of implicative
argumentation found in the Ukrainian President’s speeches. The object of study includes
V. Zelenskyy’s international and domestic video addresses during the first months of the
full-scale Russian invasion in 2022. The subject is the types of implicative judgments within
the argumentative sections of his speeches. Implication is a logical operation that forms
a complex conditional judgment by combining two simple statements, where one acts as
the cause and the other as the effect. The traditional logical scheme for an implicative
judgment is “if..., then...”. The study identified two varieties of cause-and-effect judgments
in V. Zelenskyy’s rhetoric. In his argumentation, the Ukrainian President employs both
conditionally affirmative and conditionally negative implications. Conditionally affirmative
implication can follow the traditional «if..., then...» logical scheme. However, in some
cases, the President transforms it into situational variants such as: «faster..., faster...»,
«longer..., more...», «faster..., better...», «sooner..., more advantageous...». The same
pattern is observed with conditionally negative implications. The traditional ambivalent
scheme «if not..., then...» / «if..., then not...» can be transformed by V. Zelenskyy into
phrases like «better now..., than later...» and «if it were..., then not...». Notably, in some
of President Zelenskyy’s speeches, conditionally affirmative implication is combined with
conditionally negative implication. This demonstrates the orator’s use of a wide range of
implicative methods for constructing rhetorical argumentation

Nous visons, dans cet article, interroger les contenus d’enseignement- apprentissage de l’argumentation au secondaire qualifiant marocain pour en examiner la pertinence via les références théoriques et didactiques en vigueur. Cette étude, motivée par le constat des spécialistes, didacticiens et enseignants que la production argumentative pose des problèmes d’apprentissage considérables, est une étude exploratoire fondée sur une analyse de contenus. Elle vise à découvrir la présence/absence des composants structurels du discours argumentatif, proposés à des fins didactiques par la didacticienne du Français et spécialiste en didactique de l’argumentation Suzanne-Geneviève Chartrand, dans les orientations pédagogiques générales pour l’enseignement du français au secondaire qualifiant marocain. Les résultats ont révélé que les concepteurs de ces programmes mettent en avant une part considérable de ces composants alors qu’ils négligent d’autres dont l’importance est jugée primordiale.

Mots-clés : argumentation – composants structurels du discours argumentatif – contenus d’enseignement-apprentissage - orientations pédagogiques générales

Selon une thèse largement partagée, le droit et une pratique sociale et les contributions des participants sont complémentaires les unes des autres. Dans ces conditions, le raisonnement juridique consiste d'abord en une interprétation de ces pratiques et présuppose un point de vue interne de la part de celui qui souhaite en rendre compte. Le raisonnement juridique est ainsi conçu comme une argumentation pratique, subordonnée aux exigences de la rationalité car ceux qui participent à la pratique juridique sont contraints de donner des raisons à leur action et ces raisons tissent un réseau de contraintes. Très séduisante, cette thèse qui doit beaucoup à la critique des réalistes par Hart, n'en demeure pas moins justiciable de quelque critique. Keywords-Raisonnement juridique • Pratique sociale • Argumentation • Herméneutique • Hart • Dworkin • Interprétation • Valeurs • Point de vue interne • Très à la mode depuis les années 80, l'expression de « raisonnement juridique » (juristische ou encore juridische Argumentation, legal reasoning, razonamiento juridico, ragionamento giuridico) n'était-sauf erreur-que très rarement employée jusque dans les années soixante. Elle ne figure pas telle quelle chez les principaux auteurs tels que Hart, Kelsen ou Ross pour ne

L'histoire de la logique juridique... De quoi est-elle l'histoire et quand commence-t-elle? Question fort embarrassante. Car savonsnous ce qu'est la logique juridique et a partir de quand date-t-elle? Le terme «logique» a tant de sens! Et il y a bien des raisons pour songer que la dénomination «logique juridique» en posséde encoré davantage. Rien qu'á y penser il y a de quoi se décourager avant d'essayer de contenter les organisateurs du présent colloque qui nous ont demandé précisément un exposé sur l'histoire de la logique juridique. Laissons done cette interrogation démobilisante et venons en aux faits. En 1615 paraít Lógica iuridica de Schickhardus et avec elle fait son entrée, pour la premiére fois a notre connaissance, le terme «logique juridique» 1. Depuis, des auteurs de plus en plus nombreux le reprennent, parmi les plus proches de Schickhardus: Regnerus (1638), Leibniz (1667), Beier (1696) et Brunnemannus (1716), parmi les plus proches de nous: Piola (1895), Ehrlich (1918), García Máynez (1951), Klug (1951), Miró Quesada (1956) et Perelman (1976) 2. (Au XlXe s. et au XXe s. on recontre aussi les vocables

Toda argumentación parte de un terreno común: creencias, lenguaje y supuestos compartidos que permiten evaluar cualquier razón. Como consecuencia, no se puede argumentar desde cero; sin esa base, los debates se bloquean. Por otro lado, las argumentaciones culminan en presunciones: expectativas razonables hacia el futuro o acciones derivadas de acuerdos alcanzados. Por ejemplo, presuponer la inocencia del acusado o actuar como si un enunciado fuese verdadero. Estos elementos marcan los límites y las potencialidades de la argumentación como práctica situada.

La reflexión se inicia con una premisa sencilla pero profunda: ante un conflicto de creencias, solo existen tres modos de actuación —la violencia explícita, la imposición de una autoridad externa o la argumentación— siendo esta última la opción menos violenta. El autor plantea que no todos los conflictos merecen o deben afrontarse y cita a Aristóteles: “no hay que discutir con todo el mundo” (Top. 164b), destacando que la argumentación surge cuando deseamos resolver un desacuerdo mediante el intercambio de razones, no mediante imposición o fuerza. También alerta sobre la potencial violencia interna en los debates: distorsionar argumentos, simplificar excesivamente, buscar victoria sin diálogo o impedir que el desacuerdo conduzca a mejores entendimientos. Finalmente, propone que las metas argumentativas no son uniformes: pueden perseguir la verdad, un acuerdo convivible o resolver un conflicto práctico, según el contexto.

La reflexión explora cómo los modelos extremos de razonamiento —ya sean fundamentalistas o relativistas absolutos— terminan deslegitimando la razón, provocando soledad y cinismo intelectual. A partir de Descartes, quien descartaba cualquier creencia susceptible de duda (en su búsqueda de certezas), se ilustra la caída de la razón en el solipsismo. Pensadores como Schelling sugirieron que esta “sofística del todo o nada” lleva a una melancolía existencial que mina la confianza racional. En contraste, a través de Carlos Pereda, se recupera la idea de una “razón enfática”, capaz de convivir con la incertidumbre, abierta al lenguaje figurado, la probabilidad y la historia conceptual. Esta visión reivindica una argumentación humana y situacional como nuevo paradigma racional.

La reflexión explora el propósito diverso que la argumentación desempeña en nuestra vida cotidiana. Identifica situaciones en las que argumentar resulta inútil o innecesario —como ante personas cerradas o en contextos de consenso— y destaca los cuatro factores que Ralph Johnson considera esenciales para fomentar la práctica argumentativa: intereses comunes, diversidad de puntos de vista, confianza en la racionalidad y apertura al cambio. A través de ejemplos de Luis Vega, Huberto Marraud y Carlos Pereda, se muestra que argumentamos para opinar, persuadir, justificar decisiones, orientar audiencias o anticipar desacuerdos.El texto concluye que la calidad de una argumentación depende de su función y contexto específico: no existe una fórmula universal para ser un buen argumento, sino que su valor se mide según lo que busca lograr.

La argumentación pública, esa que busca resolver conflictos derivados de creencias y deseos en contextos colectivos, no puede operar sin un marco orientador. En sociedades plurales, donde las creencias y deseos divergen, la violencia o la imposición no son opciones deseables. Este ensayo propone un modelo mínimo de argumentación pública que, sin pretender ser exhaustivo, establezca condiciones necesarias para que el debate sea válido y no derive en nuevas formas de violencia. Dicha propuesta se enfoca en evaluar al agente que argumenta, la argumentación misma, sus consecuencias y el contexto, con el fin último de alcanzar la coalescencia, es decir, una forma de acuerdo no violento que permita convivir en la diversidad.

This issue of Ethics in Progress is grounded in the conviction that engaging with Hegel today remains a meaningful endeavor 1. Exploring whether Hegel's thought and its extraordinarily rich conceptual framework continue to provide tools for navigating the complexities of the contemporary world requires a delicate balance: drawing on Hegel's profound insights while safeguarding the integrity of their originality and specificity, rather than anachronistically adapting ideas that, in certain respects, inevitably bear the imprint of their historical context. Instead, the objective is to breathe new life into the concept, demonstrating how Hegel's philosophy can serve as a dynamic framework for addressing

Let's build a rigorous, postdoctoral-level overview of Latin-named logical fallacies. I'll provide: • 0 1 F 4 D C Latin term • 0 1 F 9 E 0 English translation • 0 1 F 4 A C Example sentence using the fallacy • 0 1 F 9 E 8 Refutation of the fallacy 0 1 F 5 0 D Fallacies in Latin with Translation, Example, and Refutation

Abstract
In an era where geopolitical crises, ecological collapse, and mass violence unfold in real time, the global public remains transfixed by celebrity scandals and algorithm-curated distractions. This essay interrogates the cultural phenomenon of infotainment as a mechanism of moral anesthesia. Through a multidisciplinary lens—drawing from media theory, political philosophy, and digital sociology—it argues that the convergence of spectacle, legal voyeurism, and algorithmic manipulation has eroded public empathy and civic engagement. Using case studies ranging from the commodification of parricide in Buenos Aires to the performative legal dramas of Argentinian celebrities, the essay explores how attention economies reward distraction over discernment. It further examines the psychological and political implications of this shift, particularly in the context of rising authoritarianism, global conflict, and the normalization of atrocity. The analysis culminates in a meditation on catharsis without closure, asking whether rhetorical disruption can still awaken a numbed collective conscience—or whether we are already too far gone.

🎯 Abstract
I contend that cinema, when wielded with brutal honesty and poetic irony, becomes a scalpel that dissects the illusions of power, the trauma of loss, and the paradox of redemption. This video essay explores four cinematic moments—each a visual and emotional rupture—through the lens of fallacy and counter fallacy. From the Californian fires in System of a Down’s “Lonely Day” to the raw grief of La Stanza del Figlio, the visceral chaos of Amores Perros. Moreover, the haunting mercy in The Power of the Dog, I assert that these images challenge the myth of control, expose the fragility of masculinity, and ultimately argue that healing is not the opposite of violence, but its most radical inversion.

Abstract
In an era where geopolitical crises, ecological collapse, and mass violence unfold in real time, the global public remains transfixed by celebrity scandals and algorithm-curated distractions. This essay interrogates the cultural phenomenon of infotainment as a mechanism of moral anesthesia. Through a multidisciplinary lens—drawing from media theory, political philosophy, and digital sociology—it argues that the convergence of spectacle, legal voyeurism, and algorithmic manipulation has eroded public empathy and civic engagement. Using case studies ranging from the commodification of parricide in Buenos Aires to the performative legal dramas of Argentinian celebrities, the essay explores how attention economies reward distraction over discernment. It further examines the psychological and political implications of this shift, particularly in the context of rising authoritarianism, global conflict, and the normalization of atrocity. The analysis culminates in a meditation on catharsis without closure, asking whether rhetorical disruption can still awaken a numbed collective conscience—or whether we are already too far gone.

Merleau-Ponty wrote prolifically throughout his life on psychology, aesthetics, and politics, on pedagogy, physics, and painting. Between his appointment to the Université de Lyon in 1945 and his sudden death in Paris in 1961-a copy of Descartes' Dioptrique on the desk in front of him-the survey of courses he taught is dizzying in scope. For all its promise, however, the interdisciplinary nature of Merleau-Ponty's work, and the abruptness of its end, raises the question of how these projects connect. The question is encouraged by Merleau-Ponty's own notes, which indicate that the book he was working on at the time of his death was meant to return to problems left "insoluble" in Phenomenology of Perception (VI 200). Did he hope for this work to supersede the Phenomenology? to correct for its false start? to press on in the same direction? That his career would be punctuated by this kind of ambiguity is fitting. Merleau-Ponty is, as de Waehlhens noted, a "philosoph[er] of the ambiguous" (SB xviii). We emerge from his first major text, The Structure of Behavior, having undermined, rather than clarified, productive oppositions between stimulus and response, cause and effect, form and content, and Phenomenology of Perception blurs the boundaries that separate conscious subjects from the world of objects that cannot think or perceive. "Eye and Mind," Merleau-Ponty's last complete philosophical work, seamlessly weaves Cartesian vision science and the metaphysics of painting. From an interpretive standpoint, moreover, it would go against the spirit of Merleau-Ponty's work to resolve these ambiguities: Though he does not name it until the 1950s, Merleau-Ponty strives to resist what he calls "bad dialectic"-that is, any dialectical argument that culminates in a "final synthesis" (VI 143). In this sense, he

Current work on multi-agent systems at King’s College London is extensive, though largely based in two research groups within the Department of Informatics: the Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) thematic group and the Reasoning & Planning (RAP) thematic group. DAI combines AI expertise with political and economic theories and data, to explore social and technological contexts of interacting intelligent entities. It develops computational models for analysing social, political and economic phenomena to improve the effectiveness and fairness of policies and regulations, and combines intelligent agent systems, software engineering, norms, trust and reputation, agent-based simulation, communication and provenance of data, knowledge engineering, crowd computing and semantic technologies, and algorithmic game theory and computational social choice, to address problems arising in autonomous systems, financial markets, privacy and security, urban living and health. RAP conducts rese...

This dissertation critiques the ideological architecture of contemporary progressivism—commonly labeled as the “woke agenda”—through the lenses of geopolitics, education, digital ethics, climate orthodoxy, and decolonial cultural narratives. By juxtaposing rhetorical analysis with geological realism, this work interrogates the monopolization of moral discourse by Western institutions and the climate-industrial complex. Argentina serves as a focal point, not merely as a nation in crisis, but as a cultural crucible where imported ideologies, technological dependency, and postcolonial entanglements collide.
Through critical examination of President Javier Milei’s paradoxical governance—libertarian anti-woke rhetoric accompanied by geopolitical dependencies—the study reveals contradictions in both global and national expressions of sovereignty. It highlights how AI, mobile technology, and social networks are ethically compromised by the extractive violence of Coltan mining, often invisible to the hyper-connected classroom. Drawing from Baudrillard, Galeano, and post-Marxist thought, this work proposes a manifesto of intellectual resistance rooted in localized dignity, analog introspection, and intercontinental solidarity.


Today, I intend to counter-argument-ing the woke agenda and the  term woke originated in African American Vernacular English (AAVE) in the early 20th century. It originally meant being “awake” or alert to racial injustice and social inequality. Over time, it expanded to include awareness of broader issues like sexism, LGBTQ+ rights, and environmental justice.

Questo libro è composto di 650 pagine in cui sono descritte 123 fallacie descritte in modo dettagliato. Ho inserito 1500 esempi. 1200 confutazioni. 500 strategie. E' un libro sconvolgente, impegnativo, scomodo e difficile da praticare. Riguarda la nostra debole capacità di ragionare correttamente. È un libro sconvolgente, perché, quando ci rendiamo conto di quanto siano numerose le fallacie quotidiane in cui siamo immersi e, soprattutto, quando ci rendiamo conto che possiamo fare poco per difenderci, ci assale l'amarezza, lo sconforto e, qualche volta, il disgusto.

Czy polityka w Polsce jest rozumna, sprawiedliwa i skuteczna? Ta książka to fascynująca próba odpowiedzi na to pytanie – nie przez pryzmat teorii, lecz głosu obywateli. Autorka redefiniuje pojęcie racjonalności, wskazując, że nie może być ona częściowa ani pozbawiona wartości. Opierając się na badaniach opinii publicznej, analizuje, jak Polacy postrzegają politykę i czy ich zdaniem spełnia ona warunki racjonalności. To pozycja nie tylko dla politologów i socjologów, ale dla każdego, kto czuje, że coś w polityce „nie gra” – i szuka naukowo uzasadnionej, a zarazem zrozumiałej odpowiedzi dlaczego

Српскословенски превод Паламиних Аподиктичких слова сачињен је око 1360. године. Његов аутограф, који је сачуван у Зборнику 88 рукописне колекције Манастира Високи Дечани, садржи велики број схолија, које представљају важно помагало за праћење процеса преношења основног текста. Овај је рад усредсређен на две од схолија које разоткривају философску потку Паламине (теолошке) аргументације-у првом реду, аристотеловску. Након основних информација о значају српскословенског текста Аподиктичких слова, оне су дате у изворнику и преводу на савремени српски језик, а пропраћене су и одговарајућим коментарима.

Exploramos algunas explicaciones del mutuo y común desinterés por el vínculo entre argumentación y ciencia en las disciplinas que estudian estas prácticas. En el estado del arte de la teoría de la argumentación, identificamos y criticamos el supuesto de que el desacuerdo es una condición necesaria para la argumentación, o que esta se propone resolver desacuerdos o diferencias de opinión. Examinamos y cualificamos la suposición ampliamente extendida en la filosofía de la ciencia de que la argumentación científica es la mera exteriorización del razonamiento, que puede evaluarse racionalmente al margen del proceso, los participantes y el contexto en que ocurre. Frente a estas concepciones, caracterizamos a la argumentación como una práctica constitutivamente epistémica, como una forma de indagación. Esto permite comenzar a cerrar la brecha entre argumentación y ciencia, abonando a nuestra comprensión de ambas prácticas.

La palabra históricamente ha promovido el odio y la intolerancia en Colombia, también silencia, calla y excluye. El lenguaje ofensivo es violencia, del hp a la muerte, en ocasiones, es un paso. El Presidente se equivoca al normalizar el insulto soterradamente.

The Rhetorical Art Festival for Primary School Students entitled "I Think… I Express Myself… I Communicate…" has been organized since 2018 by the Hellenic Institute of Rhetorical and Communication Studies (H.I.R.C.S.), in collaboration with the Cultural Affairs Coordinators of the Primary Education Directorates of Attica and the teachers of the participating schools. It is addressed to students of the 4th, 5th, and 6th grades of public and private schools, who take part in rhetorical games such as expressive reading in front of an audience, impromptu speaking, and argumentation games, within the framework of the educational program "Rhetorical Art Games at School: I Think… I Express Myself… I Communicate…". Since its inception, the Festival has been held annually, hosting 1,354 students. This study presents a thematic analysis of the responses from one hundred and eighteen (118) teachers to an evaluation questionnaire regarding the benefits students gained from their participation. The findings highlight significant benefits, such as the development of oral and communication skills, improvement in public speaking, enhancement of selfconfidence, and the social-emotional growth of participants.

L'objectif de cette contribution est de montrer que le concept juridique de fait a une double dimension, technique et épistémologique, qu'il est difficile d'unifier. Au plan technique, on observe l'existence d'une véritable qualification juridique de fait qui s'illustre par le régime probatoire et l'appréciation souveraine des juges du fond. Au plan épistémologique, on constate que le fait est toujours moins formalisé que ce qu'on désigne par « le droit » bien que cette opposition soit plus un continuum qu'une distinction aux bords nets. Ses fonctions s'illustrent alors tant par son rôle argumentatif que strictement épistémologique, c'est-à-dire en tant que « cas ».

Intuitively, the disagreement is related to subjectivity. The aim of this paper is to show that the possibility of determining objective reasons explains the objectivity of the law despite of the disagreement. However, there are factors of resistance to the objectification of the reasons which explain the persistence of the disagreement.

Légitimité douteuse de la fiction en droit -Critiquer la nature et les fonctions des fictions revient à apprécier la légitimité du procédé. En effet, que sont les fictions et à quoi servent-elles ? Sont-elles un élément de technique juridique parmi d'autres ou bien une aberration à éliminer dans l'interprétation et la création du droit ? Pour trancher l'alternative et appuyer la légitimité des fictions, on a principalement recours à deux arguments. D'une part, on avance que les fictions ont toujours existé depuis le droit romain, voire avant 2 . De la validation du testament du captif réputé libre à en passant par la subrogation réelle, les immeubles par destination, le mariage putatif ou la représentation, les exemples de fiction ne manquent pas 3 . De là, il est facile d'en légitimer l'usage tant il est demeuré constant dans les siècles passés. D'autre part, on fait souvent remarquer que les fictions seraient utiles pour préserver l'ordre social 4 . En attesterait l'idée que « nul n'est censé ignorer la loi » ou que « l'enfant conçu est réputé né chaque fois qu'il y va de son intérêt ». Les fictions seraient même utiles comme expédient à travers la rétroactivité ou les clauses réputées non écrites. Aussi, il faudrait traiter les fictions comme un élément de technique juridique 5 parmi d'autres car elles jouent un rôle particulier. Pourtant, l'analyse de la nature des fictions devrait conduire à être moins enthousiaste. Elles sont aussi présentées comme une technique de déformation volontaire des catégories juridiques 6 qui procède par affirmation du faux 7 , le procédé devrait ainsi éveiller plus de suspicion. Ainsi, la présente étude se propose d'établir que le procédé de la fiction, pour séduisant qu'il soit, est illégitime car dangereux et inutile. Les fictions ouvrent à coup sûr la voie à de faux problèmes dans l'interprétation. Elles sont même un refus de penser car elles peuvent toujours être remplacées par un procédé non fictionnel 8 . La possibilité de se dispenser des fictions s'explique en réalité par leur nature propre qui emprunte à la fois à l'analogie et l'exception 9 , voire la présomption 10 , si ce n'est au mythe 11 . La fiction viole les règles 1 . L'auteur tient à remercier particulièrement Hélène Thomas pour sa relecture et ses remarques toujours éclairantes. 2 G. Boyer, « Sur quelques emplois de la fiction dans l'ancien droit oriental »,

En su autobiografía, Collingwood ilustra lo que él llama “la lógica de pregunta y respuesta” con varios ejemplos, uno de los cuales es su solución a la pregunta sobre el propósito de la muralla que los romanos construyeron aproximadamente entre las actuales Inglaterra y Escocia desde la época de Adriano. El propósito de este trabajo es presentar una traducción comentada del artículo de Collingwood en donde expone dicha solución. Analizando cuidadosamente su argumentación, es posible mostrar cómo funciona la lógica de pregunta y respuesta en detalle. Dado el lugar que las obras de Collingwood ocupan en el currículum de los estudiantes de historia en este país, esta forma de explicar la lógica de pregunta y respuesta parece ser la más idónea para que dichos estudiantes accedan a un poderoso instrumento heurístico y hermenéutico, tanto para comprender mejor las argumentaciones de los historiadores como para construir mejor las propias.

The aim of the article is to answer the question of whether the theory of recognition can be applied to research on the human-technology relationship and, if so, to what extent. The article assumes that the theory of recognition is a normative theory, and therefore, its moral consequences can certainly be applied to human persons. To use this theory for studying the relationship between humans and technology, shifts in the theory are necessary. These shifts have been reduced to the concept of solidarity with technological artifacts (especially with robots). However, the article constructs an argument that the concepts of vulnerability and resistance may be helpful in justifying the development of recognition in the relationship between humans and technology. The model of recognition discussed in this case is not, however, a model based on mutual relations but rather on unilateral recognition, which is introduced into the theory through the concept of adequate regard.

RESUMEN: Este trabajo presenta un esbozo de una teoría del texto argumentativo lo más explícita posible. Tras formular los principios de esa teoría, se exponen algunos elementos de la "lógica de pregunta y respuesta" de R. G. Collingwood para servir de intermediario entre aquellos principios y su aplicación a textos argumentativos concretos. Para ilustrar dicha aplicación se ha elegido un texto breve, pero argumentativamente completo, tomado de un libro reciente del físico Frank Wilczek. Finalmente, se discuten tres preguntas que suscita la teoría: (a) qué clase de teoría es la expuesta y cuál es el lugar que ocupa en relación con las teorías de la argumentación al uso; (b) cuál es el nivel de detalle apropiado para el análisis de textos argumentativos; (c) hasta dónde puede considerarse útil una teoría de este tipo, especialmente de cara a los textos argumentativos de la esfera "técnica" (Goodnight 1982), usuales tanto en la academia como en los círculos profesionales. PALABRAS CLAVE: texto argumentativo, esferas de la argumentación, lógica de pregunta y respuesta, conocimiento de fondo, escritura académica ABSTRACT: This paper presents a sketch of a theory of the argumentative text, trying to be as explicit as possible. After formulating the principles of that theory, it offers some elements of R. G. Collingwood's "logic of question and answer" for the purpose of building a bridge from abstract theory to concrete application. To illustrate such an application, a brief albeit argumentatively complete text is taken from a recent book by the American physicist Frank Wilczek. Finally, three questions arising from the theory: (a) what kind of theory it is and what relation it has to current theories of argumentation; (b) what the level of analysis appropriate to argumentative texts is; (c) to what extent can such a theory be deemed useful, especially with regard to argumentative texts in the technical sphere (Goodnight 1982), that are usual both in academia and in professional circles.

This chapter was commissioned for the recent volume dedicated to Collingwood in the series "Interpreting (author)" published by Cambridge University Press. It has two features lacking in the secondary literature on Collingwood's 'logic of question and answer': (1) it expounds the core of that logic in the shape of six criteria or commandments followed by anyone pursuing a serious inquiry; (2) it illustrates that core with examples, both taken from Collingwood himself; (3) it tries to re-unite in one text all the references pertinent to the logic of question and answer contained in Collingwood's oeuvre. In addition, this chapter lists all outstanding questions beyond the core discussed and proposes that the logic of question and answer can most fruitfully be understood and developed withing the framework of contemporary argumentation theory.

Este artículo va dirigido principalmente a los historiadores mexicanos e hispanoamericanos que han leído a Collingwood y no terminan de entender lo que este filósofo, que fue también historiador y arqueólogo profesional (algo raro entre filósofos de la historia) quiere decirles. Esta tarea requiere en primer lugar explicar en qué consiste la lógica de pregunta y respuesta (o lógica de cuestión y respuesta) en la que Collingwood insistió en su autobiografía. Pero en lugar de discutir esto en abstracto, como es usual en la abundante literatura secundaria sobre el tema, aquí expongo la lógica de Collingwood al hilo de una traducción y análisis del ejemplo más notable que el autor menciona: su descubrimiento del propósito de la muralla que Adriano comenzó a construir en la isla de Gran Bretaña. Como este texto de Collingwood historiador fue publicado hace casi un siglo y en una obscura revista de historia regional, sirva este artículo también para rescatarlo del olvido.

During Kant’s time, the fusion of mathematics and empirical research – pioneered by figures like Newton – was reshaping how conclusions about nature were drawn. Kant had to grapple with the question of how such validation depends on the logical frameworks and rationality standards used to structure scientific demonstrations. With the fading reliance on metaphysical principles to establish such standards, this article positions Kant’s theory of synthesis as a pivotal response to these philosophical challenges, foreshadowing theses on how representational systems model and structure phenomena. A substantial part of Kant’s strategy involved reconciling the inferential and representational dimensions of knowledge. The article will show how Kant’s transcendental logic, Fodor’s Language of Thought, and Husserl’s formal ontologies collectively address the specification of non-extensional content by bridging conceptual mediators, representational structures, and grounded genus-species relationships. We then argue that without linking the formal specification of intensional cognitive processes to a normative theory of higher-order contents, and a theory of science and epistemology, the program remains incomplete. In chapter three, we delve into the debate with naturalist reductions of intentionality (Dennett) and with phenomenological and Hegelian perspectives, emphasizing normative, reflective, and intersubjective frameworks that shape cognition and its alignment with scientific paradigms and cultural norms. We conclude that Kant’s thesis of a priori syntheses anchors problematic representations within possible experience, offering a dynamic framework for scientific self-consciousness and judgment certainty, bringing forth phenomenological data conditioned by a normative ceiling.

El propósito de este artículo es explorar cómo el discurso argumentativo promueve la comprensión que tienen niños de 8 a 10 años de edad sobre las variables que son inherentes al fenómeno físico de rebotar. Desde una perspectiva social, se reconoce que la interacción entre pares les permite a los niños y niñas contrastar las creencias ajenas con sus propias ideas y llegar a acuerdos que contengan cláusulas de validez para todos los participantes en la situación. A través de un análisis discursivo se muestra cómo el discurso argumentativo genera un conocimiento que más que compartido, reconoce la convergencia de diferentes estilos de pensamiento y construye nuevas formas de pensar los fenómenos físicos.

En su resumen el autor señala como objetivo de su artículo el ofrecer una explicación de la legitimidad de ciertos argumentos ad hominem acudiendo a la epistemología de las virtudes. Rivera-Novoa (2022) destaca como su tesis central la afirmación de que hay argumentos ad hominem que son aceptables si se conciben como argumentos inductivos cuya fuerza está determinada por una apelación justa a los vicios epistémicos del interlocutor. Si bien estimo que el tema es de gran interés y considero valiosas las distinciones que el autor hace; es precisamente esta caracterización de los mencionados argumentos “como inductivos” la que impugno en esta nota debido a sus consecuencias absurdas. Completaré mi crítica con una apelación a la inferencia plausible como marco adecuado en el que encajar las apelaciones a la autoridad y los argumentos basados en el ethos del orador en general. Entre estos últimos se incluyen los argumentos ad hominem apoyados en la epistemología de las virtudes.

Artykuł przedstawia koncepcję, która opracowana została na potrzeby rozumowania prawniczego. Jednak oparcie jej na założeniach wykraczających poza obszar prawa sprawia, że mogłaby być szerzej uwzględniana. Główne założenia omawianej teorii i interdyscyplinarne spojrzenie na cechy charakterystyczne koncepcji prowadzą do uwydatnienia jej wszechstronności. Teoria Chaima Perelmana jest ukierunkowana na rozstrzygnięcia. We współczesnym państwie rozstrzygają nie tylko sędziowie w sądach, ale także urzędnicy i inni decydenci.

Early artificial intelligence research was dominated by intellectualist assumptions, producing explicit representation of facts and rules in “good old-fashioned AI”. After this approach foundered, emphasis shifted to deep learning in neural networks, leading to the creation of Large Language Models which have shown remarkable capacity to automatically generate intelligible texts. This new phase of AI is already producing profound social consequences which invite philosophical reflection. This paper argues that Charles Peirce’s philosophy throws valuable light on genAI’s capabilities first with regard to meaning, then knowledge and truth. Firstly, I explore how Peirce’s icon/index/symbol distinction illuminates the functioning of genAI. I argue that genAI’s engineers have skilfully captured a form of symbolicity, but no other sign-kind. In lacking indexical signs, LLMs lack connection with, and accountability to, particular worldly objects. In lacking iconic signs, LLMs are insufficiently disciplined by structural – most notably logical – relationships. Then I argue that GenAI’s astounding stream of articulate, truth-semblant, yet worthless texts issues a timely reckoning to modern philosophy’s representational realism. By contrast, Peirce’s pragmatism scaffolds a rich relational realism (Gili and Maddalena 2022), which shows how meaningful concepts, and a grasp of truth, can only occur across multiple cognitive systems who are simultaneously richly related with one another, and a shared environment in which they continually act and receive feedback, within a logical space of reasons. As Peirce himself noted, “Mere knowledge, though it be systematized, may be a dead memory; while by science we all habitually mean a living and growing body of truth”.

The monograph elucidates a pivotal stage in the development of official communication patterns, marked by an institutional model of interaction grounded in the dynamics between authority and the subordinate community. The external framework of this communication was delineated by the European placement law established since the Middle Ages, governing the affairs of both urban and rural communities through distinct regulations and legalistic ritual practices. The research material is Polish-language office sources from several towns of Upper Silesia (Tarnowskie Góry, Woźniki, Chorzów, Mysłowice, Opole), recording the work of local offices in the 16th–18th centuries. These are extensive and functionally diverse collections due to the broad competences of the office in the Middle Polish era, consisting in administering, registering reported legal acts and ensuring social order. Despite Upper Silesia being situated beyond the borders of the Republic of Poland during that period, and subject to Czech and subsequently Prussian state authorities, the preserved collections predominantly feature the Polish language. This observation suggests that they represent a specimen of Polish institutional discourse, which remains largely unexplored both historically and linguistically. This monograph successfully fills this gap. The author’s assumed goal was to use a new research method that allowed for a multidimensional view of Upper Silesian monuments of official literature as texts produced within a specific type of discourse, determined by the official and legal type of contact and the obligatory participation of a collective institutional entity. Owing to the multifaceted functions of the same administrative entity and the diverse intentions of residents seeking assistance from the office, two distinct categories of activities emerged from the analyzed material: the first involves sanctioning and recording legal transactions conducted among community members (such as purchases, sales, donations, waivers of claims, settlements, prenuptial agreements, wills, etc.), while the second pertains to adjudicating disputes and upholding public order. This distinction allowed to define two types of discourse: 1) office discourse, the overriding goal of which was to provide legal security to all entities participating in legal acts, and 2) court discourse, which at the communication level was about resolving the dispute and punishing the guilty parties, while at the written level – about creating documentation that could be used in the case of appeal proceedings. These discourses are delineated in separate chapters, each containing extensive illustrative material for elucidation.
Both forms of discourse were employed within institutional communication, manifesting in two dimensions: through the actual proceedings taking place within the office and through their documentation in written form. The situational dimension, being inherently ephemeral, can only be partially reconstructed by contemporary researchers. Therefore, focusing on preserved texts was deemed a more appropriate research methodology. Their form was shaped by the type of
discourse and specific parameters, including transceiver relations, the roles of entities within the text, situational context, record structure, mechanisms of text coherence, genre, and stylistic features.In the chapter devoted to office discourse, the documentation created in the office was characterized in terms of text categories, among which an important role was played by the external transceiver system (institutional sender – social recipient) and the internal one, reflected by speech
acts determining the structure of entries. Attention was also devoted to numerous recorded situational and factual elements. The primary genre of this discourse was identified as the chancellery entry, which manifested in various forms determined by the nature of the legal act involved. The will was already a fully formed office genre at that time. From the point of view of the diachronic view, it seems most important to indicate a certain evolution in the documentation of legal changes regarding ownership relations. Initially, the communication situation of an official event was meticulously recreated, in which the participants of the legal act declared its existence in the presence of representatives of the institution, and the documentation created by the office sanctioned and introduced changes in the legal reality. The development of office forms consisted in limiting the elements of the situational background in favor of exposing the legal act itself and its participants
and in introducing a number of formal elements that emphasized the legitimacy of the changes made. This, in turn, resulted in the standardization of documents in an increasingly schematic form, and in the following stages – going beyond the analyzed period – led to the formation of formalized genre forms, such as a purchase and sale agreement, donation deeds and many others.
In the chapter devoted to judicial discourse, attention was paid to the primary role of the institutional entity, acting as an arbitrator and formulating judgments, to which all parties to the proceedings had to submit. The roles of the participants in the trial were strictly defined (applicant, defendant, judge, witness) and their behaviour was distinctly ritualised. At the level of written text, the consistent identification of the participants in the proceedings, along with their assigned speech acts, significantly influenced the structure of the text. The preserved documentation did not record the entire court proceedings, but rather was limited to the most important stages of the
process, such as: filing a complaint – response of the defendant – court judgment. All statements were molded into predefined construction diagrams characterized by a high degree of syntactic formalization. The testimonies of trial witnesses and their oaths were rarely recorded. From the few surviving accounts of witnesses, as well as from the statements of the trial parties, it is possible to recreate some elements of the common way of communication in the Middle Polish era, as well as the common way of thinking and valuing.
The analysis of old official texts makes a modern researcher aware that many current communication practices related to the application of law have their origins in the distant past. Discursive continuity arises from the perpetuation of pragmatic objectives that have remained unchanged for centuries – namely, the imperative to legally govern property (and other) matters among citizens, and to equitably adjudicate disputes and uphold public order within organized local communities.
All these needs are met within the framework of power and civil subordination. Due to the antiquity of this system, deeply rooted in the medieval legal framework, discourses concerning the practical application of law were already established during the Middle Polish era. As legal systems underwent transformations in subsequent centuries, the rituals of behavior, the formulation of legal texts, and
the established genre patterns were largely retained and adapted. Their contemporary form is the outcome of a standardization process that has been evolving since the 19th century.

This article explores the translation of the discourse marker mais in Arabic subtitles for the film Mon Colonel, addressing subtitling's technical constraints and their impact on preserving pragmatic and argumentative nuances. Research by Chaume (2004) and Khalifa (2015) highlights the importance of discourse markers for communicative effects, though studies on French-to-Arabic marker translation remain scarce. The analysis shows that mais, translated mainly as "لكن," retains its semantic meaning but often loses interpersonal and argumentative subtleties. Simplification and explicitation reduce its discursive impact, affecting reception. The article suggests integrating markers into audiovisual codes to enhance pragmatic fidelity and enrich viewer interactions.

In this article I aim to show the limits of certain "ways of considering" nature, as well as the intrinsic contradictions in their modus operandi, following Hegel's analysis in the Introductions to the Encyclopaedic Naturphilosophie and the Berlin Lectures on the Philosophy of Nature. After framing the problem within the broader theme - already explored in Jena - of the relationship between nature and spirit, I will show that both the practical and the theoretical, insofar as they are founded in an original separation between man and nature, result in a subjection of the natural being to man. In order for this to be redeemed from one-sided conduct towards it, it is necessary to access through living intuition a philosophical consideration – both of the living being and of nature as a whole –, the activity of which Hegel understands as a rediscovery of the rationality of nature and its "liberation”.

O presente trabalho aborda os diversos métodos clássicos de interpretação das normas jurídicas com a finalidade de demonstrar a atualidade dos mesmos na interpretação das normas jurídicas em geral, inclusive as normas constitucionais. Atenção especial é dada à interpretação dessas últimas, tendo em vista constituírem-se as mesmas no fundamento de validade de toda a ordem jurídica.

JURIMETRIA é a aplicação da estatística, da ciência de dados e da computação ao Direito. Trata-se de uma disciplina interdisciplinar. A ênfase inicial deve ser dada à palavra APLICAÇÃO. E tal ênfase implica que consideremos o que é uma e outra disciplina. Discriminar uma e outra disciplina no plano conceitual aqui tem um sentido ainda mais preciso, ie, significa que para apresentar as condições de possibilidade da interdisciplinaridade será preciso adentrar o aspecto metodológico pressuposto. Como as disciplinas quantitativas lidam basicamente com dados, sua coleta, organização,

In the article some applications of the concept of legal narrative are undertaken in the perspective of Bernard Jackson's legal semiotics. The analysis are developed in the perspective of Polish social and economical changes of recent decades. The leitmotif is constituted by remarks on sociolinguistic aspects of teaching legal narratives in changing reality. In this context a notion of "legal grapholect" is introduced to discuss possible influence of "deep layer" of legal language on evolving Polish lawyers' language and vernacular. Additionally, issues of semiotic group of lawyers and legal register are discussed on the basis of the sociolinguistic paradigm. Reasoning is enriched by remarks of possible merger of Jackson's legal semiotics and Ch. Perelman's theory of legal argumentation.

pour décider de la validité d'un concept juridique ? L'étude examine trois réponses possibles. D'abord, les concepts juridiques peuvent prendre comme modèle les sciences de la nature. Ensuite, selon un équivalent fonctionnel de la falsifiabilité, les concepts juridiques peuvent être dits révisables dans certaines hypothèses. Enfin, les concepts juridiques peuvent être déclarés totalement inaptes à satisfaire aux exigences poppériennes. Summary. Are legal concepts falsifiable with the criteria of refutability of Karl Popper ? This paper examines three possible answers. First, legal concepts can take as model empirical sciences. Second, according to a functional equivalent of the falsifiability, legal concepts can be known as revisable on certain assumptions. Third, legal concepts can be declared completely inapt to satisfy the requirements of Karl Popper.