Selective Realism

Scientific realists with traditional semantic inclinations are often pressed to explain away the distinguished series of referential failures that seem to plague our best past science. As recent debates make it particularly vivid, a central challenge is to find a reliable and principled way to assess referential success at the time a theory is still a live concern. In this paper, I argue that this is best done in the case of physics by examining whether the putative referent of a term is specifiable within the limited domain delineated by the range of parameters over which the theory at stake is empirically accurate. I first implement this selective principle into a general account of reference, building on Stathis Psillos's works. Then, I show that this account offers a remarkably reliable basis to assess referential success before theory change in the case of effective theories. Finally, I briefly show that this account still works well with other physical examples and explain how it helps us to handle problematic cases in the history of physical sciences.

A guiding thread in Mario Alai's longstanding research is the exploration of the nature and limits of our knowledge of reality. For at least 20 years now, he has focused specifically on scientific knowledge and the issue of scientific realism versus antirealism, making some rather significant contributions to the advancement of the debate. In particular, with his distinctive rigour and attention to the structure of the argument, Alai has played a key role in defining what is no doubt one of the most convincing, if not THE most convincing, formulations of scientific realism nowadays. Namely, a sort of selective 'deployment realism' urging a realist attitude only towards those elements within scientific theories that prove to be responsible for those theories' unexpected predictions. In this short note, I illustrate (what I take to be) the main components of Alai's views. Based on the proposed reconstruction, I then suggest a couple of points where Alai's arguments, and predictivist deployment realism more generally, could be objected to and might benefit from further reflection. 2. Mario Alai's scientific realism Scientific realism is the thesis that the best philosophical explanation of the success of scientific theories is that they are (approximately) true descriptions of the world. As is well-known, scientific realists have to respond to the antirealist critique based on Laudan-style (Laudan 1981) pessimistic meta-inductions. Even granting realism the status of 'default' position, the objection goes, several cases can be pointed at in the history of science in which theories that we now regard as false have nonetheless been successful. Therefore, scientific realism is untenable. Typical realist defences are based on the idea that a realist commitment is in fact still warranted, once it is restricted to those parts of theories that are responsible for their success and have been preserved across theory change. Consider, however, empirical success intended as the ability to account for what has been observed. A constructive empiricist, who is only committed to the empirical adequacy of a theory, i.e., to its ability to 'save the phenomena', can contend that nothing else is required in the case at hand: since that a theory T saves the phenomena means that T accounts for the known data, that T is empirically adequate suffices for explaining why T accounts for the known data. 'Deployment realists' such as Alai consequently embrace 'predictivism', putting a special emphasis on novel predictions. They argue that, while it is indeed reasonable to think that the accommodation of old data does not lend support to the claim that a certain hypothesis is true or approximately true, a theory's ability to apply to unexpected domains and make correct predictions about them strongly suggests that it latched onto the objective structure of reality. This leads to the problem that prediction and confirmation are logically on a par: after all, whether or not certain data are already known when a theory is formulated is a contingent fact, hence prediction cannot play any role that the confirmation by known data cannot also play. In response to this 'deductivist' objection, Alai (see, e.g., Alai 2014c) acknowledges the logical symmetry between prediction and confirmation but at the same time argues that the crucial features of novel predictions do not concern their logical relationship with the theory. Rather, what makes them instrumental to the realist case is that novel predictions are in at least some occasions genuinely surprising: as Alai explains, this happens when they are not used essentially in the construction of the relevant theories (Alai 2014c, 303-307; Alai 2018, 123-124; Alai, 2014a, 57), they are a priori improbable (Alai 2014c, 307-309), and they are heterogeneous with respect to the data that proved essential for producing the theory (Alai 2014c, 309-312). 1 Based on this conception of novel prediction, Alai also successfully deals with other challenges. For instance, Doppelt (2005, 2007) contends that deployment realism is in fact not efficacious in neutralizing the pessimistic meta-induction. Doing so, says Doppelt, requires a compelling account of a theory's ability to explain known data in a virtuous way, that is, to provide explanations that are simple, complete, plausible, consistent with background beliefs etc. This is because it is only by having recourse to these non-empirical virtues that one can make sense of the fact that some particular theories were selected among several empirically equivalent alternatives. Noticing that some of the false theories of the past were virtuous in this sense, however, Doppelt concludes that realists should restrict their claims to current theories, which are clearly successful in the most comprehensive sense, as well as non-falsified (Doppelt 2011). In response to this, Alai convincingly argues that novel predictions are normally made by virtuous theories, while being virtuous is by itself insufficient to licence realism. Indeed, says Alai, it is only the conjunction of novel predictions and theoretical virtues that counts, and requiring both sidesteps Doppelt's objection (Alai 2018, 126). According to Alai, however, Doppelt is right in saying that theories with the right features can plausibly be regarded as true only if one makes certain additional assumptions, ultimately at the metaphysical level (Doppelt 2005, 1082). How can one claim that a theory is (approximately) true 2 and virtuous, i.e., simple, unified, etc., if not by assuming that nature is itself simple, unified, etc.? Alai, however, also points out that what Doppelt specifically asks is whether it is an accident that true theories are also virtuous, and this seems to presuppose truth rather than using it as an explanans. The question 'Why are theories that make true predictions also virtuous?', adds Alai, is also potentially misleading, for it might be intended as asking of a theory why it is the case that it makes the predictions that it in fact does and has the internal structure that it in fact has, which of course are purely logical facts about the theory being itself (Alai, 2014a, 50, referring

Selective Realism is the most-common 'type' of scientific realism. It groups many diverse approaches to science, theories, and truth, and so, it is very difficult to define it with precision. Yet, there are three elements which, allegedly, suffice for a general characterization of this view, namely: a Non-Miracles Argument motivation, a Pessimistic Meta-Induction motivation and selectivity. I contend that such characterization is not robust enough for pointing out all the elements that selective realists actually share. In particular, I argue that such characterization prevents selective realists from blocking the possibility of true contradictions, dialetheias, even if they are not desirable.

Fine, and the members of a number of graduate seminars i I have addressed these issues for helpful discussion, suggestions, and comme material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundatio Grant No. SES-0094001. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recomme expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily re views of the National Science Foundation (NSF). 'Two anonymous referees rightly note that I here follow the regrettably practice of characterizing the relevant sorts of success at a painfully vague or level, though I am happy to accept the appealingly commonsensical account success (grounded in the potential for solving practical problems of pr and intervention) offered by Kitcher (in "Real Realism: The Galilean Strate

Stanford's unconceived alternative argument is inductively based on the history of science and tells us that when a scientist is choosing a theory T1 at time t1 over a set of less promising alternatives, she is concurrently failing to conceive valid theoretical alternatives to T1, i.e., theories that will be accepted by a scientific community at later times, thus displacing T1. The aim of the present paper is to argue that the actual strength and reach of Stanford's argument sensibly vary according to the status of the unconceived alternatives at time t1, i.e, whether they are conceivable (theories that could be conceived by scientists at t1, but in fact are not) or inconceivable (theories which can not be conceived at t1 as they are incompatible with scientists' background knowledge at t1). As Stanford does not explicitly address this issue, we give reasons to conclude that alternatives considered in the unconceived alternative argument are supposedly conceivable at time t1, and we investigate the consequences of this conclusion for the alleged novel induction the argument draws upon. We then investigate what are the implications for Stanford's analysis if inconceivability is considered as a possible status of an unconceived alternative at t1, and we argue that, in this case, Stanford's antirealism has to be severily restricted to specific phases of theory-change, thus making room for tamed forms of realism.

The paper addresses the so-called miracle argument in favor of scientific realism and examines the viability of scientific reahsm as an explanation for the success of science. Scientific realism is committed to the claims that the theoretical terms in the mature sciences typically refer to real objects and that the theoretical laws in such sciences are typically approximately true. Instrumentalism or non-realism draws an the principles that factual claims need to be confirmed empirically and that experience fails to single out true assumptions. The miracle argument says that if a theory referred to fictitious objects, it would he miraculous that it is able to correctly predict observable effects. This argument transforms scientific realism into a hypothesis that is testable by the history of science. 1 perform such tests and conclude that the only type of realism that appears to be in agreement with the historical record is "reahsm of natural Kinds." Theories that enjoy distinguished explanatory success truthfully establish equivalence relations among phenomena.

This paper is a brief (and hopelessly incomplete) non-standard introduction to the philosophy of space and time. It is an introduction because I plan to give an overview of what I consider some of the main questions about space and time: Is space a substance over and above matter? How many dimensions does it have? Is space-time fundamental or emergent? Does time have a direction? Does time even exist? Nonetheless, this introduction is not standard because I conclude the discussion by presenting the material with an original spin, guided by a particular understanding of fundamental physical theories, the so-called primitive ontology approach.

Is the quantum state part of the furniture of the world? Einstein found such a position indigestible, but here I present a different understanding of the wavefunction that is easy to stomach. First, I develop the idea that the wavefunction is nomological in nature, showing how the quantum It or Bit debate gets subsumed by the corresponding It or Bit debate about laws of nature. Second, I motivate the nomological view by casting quantum mechanics in a "classical" formalism (Hamilton-Jacobi theory) and classical mechanics in a "quantum" formalism (Koopman-von Neumann theory) and then comparing and contrasting classical and quantum wave functions. I argue that Humeans about laws can treat classical and quantum wave functions on a par and that doing so yields many benefits.

The aim here is to develop some of Alai’s ideas and strategies in order to defend a realist approach to scientific understanding. Although the notion of scientific understanding is not central to his work, I think his defence of scientific realism is helpful in disambiguating and defining the role of scientific understanding in arguing for or against scientific realism.  In particular, I argue that, in order to clarify their positions, philosophers of understanding should define them with respect to the realism-antirealism debate before digging into the subtleties of understanding (also scientific).
So, the focus here will be on the scientific realism issues, rather than on the Quinean themes which determined my first encounter with Alai. In §2 I sketch the main ideas taken from the debate about scientific understanding. In §3, I present Alai’s contribution to the scientific realism debate, namely his definition of deployment realism (DR), as an upgrading to resist anti-realist criticisms (Lyons 2002, 2016; Laudan, 1981). In §4, I present the defence of realism provided by Pincock (2023) on the basis of an analysis of scientific understanding. In §5, I sketch a possible line of connection between the debate about scientific realism and scientific understanding, and describe the role of essentiality in scientific understanding.

Why believe in scientific realism? The answer that overwhelms the mainstream debate is "the nomiracles argument" (NMA): realism best explains the observational success of scientific theories. Yet more than thirty years ago another argument was proposed by Smart, Devitt, Glymour, McMullin, and Salmon and called "the basic argument" (BA) by Devitt: realism best explains the observed phenomena. Rather than having been addressed and assessed since, BA has been almost entirely ignored. The paper carefully distinguishes BA from NMA and argues that whereas NMA is dubious, BA is good. Why has BA been ignored? Experience suggests that philosophers may find it too close to science and mistakenly hanker after a "more philosophical" justification for realism. No such justification is needed or desirable.

Total and sudden transformations of language seldom happen; conquests and migrations are now very rare: but there are other causes of change, which, though slow in their operation, and invisible in their progress, are perhaps as much superior to human resistance, as the revolutions of the sky, or intumescence of the tide.

In an attempt to avert Laudan's pessimistic induction, Kitcher, Worrall and Psillos introduce a narrower version of scientific realism. According to this version, which can be referred to as “localized realism,” realists need not accept every component in a successful theory. They are supposed only to accept those components that led to the theory's empirical success. Consequently, realists can avoid believing in dubious entities like the caloric and ether. This paper examines and critiques localized realism. It also scrutinizes Psillos's historical study of the caloric theory of heat, which is intended to support localized realism.

The “sloppy models” program originated in systems biology, but has seen applications across a range of fields. Sloppy models are dependent on a large number of parameters, but highly insensitive to the vast majority of parameter combinations. Sloppy models proponents claim that the program may explain the success of science. I argue that the sloppy models program can at best provide a very partial explanation. Drawing a parallel with renormalization group realism, I argue that it would only give us grounds for a minimal kind of scientific realism. Nonetheless, the program can offer certain epistemic virtues.

IT CERTAINLY strikes us as one of the most remarkable types of scientific achievement when apparently disparate phenomena are unified theoretically. What appeared to be disparate to the untutored eye turns out to arise from the same underlying mechanism and thus to be identical in kind. When a door slams because the windows are open and it is windy outside, this happens due to the same cause and according to the same mechanism that makes a plane lift off the ground. The prima facie conclusion is that science succeeds in going beyond the specious distinctions of the senses. It teaches us what things are truly alike. My aim in this paper is to examine the viability of this popular view. And the result will be that the view is basically correct. More precisely, I will try to show, first, that in some distinguished cases science arguably manages to induce the right classification or taxonomy among the phenomena, and that, second, this is the only access to reality that science is justifiably able to gain. Accordingly, what I am aiming to do is to support a particular and comparatively weak form of scientific realism. Scientific realism contends that claims about certain unobservable 'items' which emerge from the theoretical or experimental activity of scientists are literally true; these claims faithfully refer to what is, as it were, going on behind the scenes. There is some quarrel, however, about what these 'items' are legitimately supposed to be. The leading brand of this doctrine is theoryrealism. According to this position, the successful theories of mature science are approximately true. That is, these theories correctly portray the notdirectly-observable processes and mechanisms that make the phenomena occur the way they do. A more attenuated version of scientific realism is entity-realism. On the one hand, entity-realism is an immediate consequence of theory-realism. The truth of a theory implies the existence of its theoretical entities. On the other hand, there is also a more autonomous type of entity-realism which is advanced on the basis of experiment-centered arguments. In this version, entity-realism says that the capacity to manipulate certain unobservable entities, and, in particular, to manipulate them in order to experiment on something else, gives

AlejAndro Victor thiry T he dispute between scientific realism and anti-realism is one of the most exciting topics in the current general philosophy of science. In the debate, the anti-realists attack their opponents with two main arguments, the pessimistic induction and the underdetermination of theories by all possible data. The realists, on the other hand, defend their position through the famous no miracle argument, which seems to be their most important standpoint. Scientific realism 1 has been the subject of various characterizations throughout this struggle (see, for example, van Fraassen 8, Kukla 3-4, Carman 43-6, Diéguez Lucena 252-253). We could summarize this position in the following four theses:

This article elaborates local selective realism in view of the shifting from classical to quantum electrodynamics. After some introductory remarks, we critically address what we call global selective realism, hence setting forth the background for outlining local selective realism. When examining the transition from classical to quantum electrodynamics, we evaluate both continuities and discontinuities in observational features, mathematical structures, and ontological presuppositions. Our argument leads us to criticise the narrow understanding of limiting-case strategies, and to reject the claim that we need a fully coherent theoretical framework to account for the transition from one theory to its successor in the case of electrodynamics. We close with a few remarks on the scope of local selective realism.

IN SPITE OF appearances to the contrary, I will not present an exercise in applied theology but rather in applied philosophy of science. That is, I will draw some systematic conclusions from some historical case studies. More specifically, my aim is to show that the so-called "Miracle Argument" that is frequently advanced in favor of scientific realism doesn't hold water. Before I can address the problematic aspects of that argument, I must first straighten out the argument itself as well as the position it is intended to support.

This article elaborates local selective realism in view of the shifting from classical to quantum electrodynamics. After some introductory remarks, we critically address what we call global selective realism, hence setting forth the background for outlining local selective realism. When examining the transition from classical to quantum electrodynamics, we evaluate both continuities and discontinuities in observational features, mathematical structures, and ontological presuppositions. Our argument leads us to criticise the narrow understanding of limiting-case strategies, and to reject the claim that we need a fully coherent theoretical framework to account for the transition from one theory to its successor in the case of electrodynamics. We close with a few remarks on the scope of local selective realism.

For many years—and with some energy since Laudan’s “Confutation of Convergent Realism” (1981)—the scientific realist has sought to accommodate examples of false-yet-successful theories in the history of science. One of the most prominent strategies is to identify ‘success fueling’ components of false theories that themselves are at least approximately true (judging by our current understanding). In this article I develop both sides of the debate, introducing new challenges from the history of science as well as suggesting adjustments to the divide et impera realist strategy. A new ‘recipe’ for the prospective identification of (at least some) working/idle posits is considered.

Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold Sommerfeld’s ([1916]) derivation of the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. Not only were his predictions good, he derived exactly the same formula that would later drop out of Dirac’s 1928 treatment (something not possible using 1925 Schrödinger–Heisenberg quantum mechanics). And yet the most central elements of Sommerfeld’s theory were not even approximately true: his derivation leans heavily on a classical approach to elliptical orbits, including the necessary adjustments to these orbits demanded by relativity. Even physicists call Sommerfeld’s success a ‘miracle’, which rather makes a joke of the so-called ‘no miracles argument’. However, this can all be turned around. Here I argue that the realist has a story to tell vis-à-vis the discontinuities between the old and the new theory, leading to a realist defence based on sufficient continuity of relevant structure. 1Introduction2No Realist...

with Vit Stritecky.

We ask how to use machine learning to expand observability, which presently depends on human learning that informs conceivability. The issue is engaged by considering the question of correspondence between conceived observability counterfactuals and observable, yet so far unobserved or unconceived, states of affairs. A possible answer lies in importing out of reference frame content which could provide means for conceiving further observability counterfactuals. They allow us to define high-fidelity observability, increasing the level of correspondence in question. To achieve high-fidelity observability, we propose to use generative machine learning models as the providers of the out of reference frame content. From an applied point of view, such a role of generative machine learning models shows an emerging dimension of human-machine cooperation.

We developed a Quantum Mechanics Conceptual Understanding Survey (QMCUS) in this study. The survey was conducted using a quantitative methodology. A multiple-choice survey of 35 questions was administered to 338 undergraduate students. Three experienced quantum mechanics instructors examined the validity of the survey. The reliability of our survey was measured using Cronbach's alpha, the Fergusson delta index, the discrimination index, and the point biserial correlation coefficient. These indices showed that the developed survey is reliable. The statistical analysis of the students' results using SPSS shows that the scores obtained by the students have a normal distribution, around the score of 7.14. The results of the t-test show that the students' scores are below the required threshold, which means that it is still difficult for the students to understand the concepts of quantum mechanics. The obtained results allow us to draw some conclusions. The students' diff...

IN SPITE OF appearances to the contrary, I will not present an exercise in applied theology but rather in applied philosophy of science. That is, I will draw some systematic conclusions from some historical case studies. More specifically, my aim is to show that the so-called "Miracle Argument" that is frequently advanced in favor of scientific realism doesn't hold water. Before I can address the problematic aspects of that argument, I must first straighten out the argument itself as well as the position it is intended to support.

Recent studies examine the determinants of entrepreneurial efforts among immigrants (Borjas, 1986; Fairlie and Meyer, 1996; Lofstrom 2002). In general, studies point out that migrant status and ethnicity affect the individual propensity to start a new business (Levie, 2006) and that ...

Recent studies examine the determinants of entrepreneurial efforts among immigrants (Borjas, 1986; Fairlie and Meyer, 1996; Lofstrom 2002). In general, studies point out that migrant status and ethnicity affect the individual propensity to start a new business (Levie, 2006) and that ...

Lyons (2016, 2017, 2018) formulates Laudan's (1981) historical objection to scientific realism as a modus tollens. I present a better formulation of Laudan's objection, and then argue that Lyons's formulation is supererogatory. Lyons rejects scientific realism (Putnam, 1975) on the grounds that some successful past theories were (completely) false. I reply that scientific realism is not the categorical hypothesis that all successful scientific theories are (approximately) true, but rather the statistical hypothesis that most successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. Lyons rejects selectivism (Kitcher, 1993; Psillos, 1999) on the grounds that some working assumptions were (completely) false in the history of science. I reply that selectivists would say not that all working assumptions are (approximately) true, but rather that most working assumptions are (approximately) true.

Scientific realists use the "no miracle argument" to show that the empirical and pragmatic success of science is an indicator of the ability of scientific theories to give true or truthlike representations of unobservable reality. While antirealists define scientific progress in terms of empirical success or practical problem-solving, realists characterize progress by using some truth-related criteria. This paper defends the definition of scientific progress as increasing truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Antirealists have tried to rebut realism with the "pessimistic metainduction", but critical realists turn this argument into an optimistic view about progressive science.

It is generally assumed that relations of necessity cannot be known by induction on experience. In this paper, I propose a notion of situated possibilities, weaker than nomic possibilities, that is compatible with an inductivist epistemology for modalities. I show that assuming this notion, not only can relations of necessity be known by induction on our experience, but such relations cannot be any more underdetermined by experience than universal regularities. This means that any one believing in a universal regularity is as well warranted to believe in the corresponding relation of necessity. We seem to know a great deal about what is possible or not in this world. For example, I know that glass is fragile, and that if I had let a glass vase fall from my window, it would have 1/17 they can make room for modalities, while modal realists can defend their views in an empiricistfriendly way. This, I think, makes both position less uncomfortable. My arguments assume from the start that there are possibilities of the kind considered in nature, and an empiricist might still be reluctant to accept this. Although I will give few reasons to accept them in passing, the purpose of the paper is not to argue for the existence of situated possibilities. However, it defuses one of the main arguments to reject them: their alleged principled unknowability. Note that there has been a resurgence of empiricist epistemology for modalities in recent years. Some authors have argued in favour of the idea that knowledge of metaphysical possibilities is attainable by induction on experience (Roca-Royes, 201 7 ; Hawke, 2011, ch. 4.2.3; Strohminger, 2015). I am sympathetic to these accounts, and mine shares similarities. However it differs in its focus on natural modalities rather than metaphysical ones, which makes it more modest in this respect. It is also more ambitious in other respects, because I aim to show that one can have knowledge not only of possibilities, but of relations of necessity from experience, and that they are as well-justified as universal regularities.

Gerald Doppelt claims that Deployment Realism cannot withstand the antirealist objections based on the “pessimistic meta-induction” and Laudan’s historical counterexamples. Moreover it is incomplete, as it purports to explain the predictive success of theories, but overlooks the necessity to explain also their explanatory success. Accordingly, he proposes a new version of realism, presented as the best explanation of both predictive and explanatory success, and committed only to the truth of best current theories, not of the discarded ones (Doppelt (2007, 2011, 2013, 2014). Elsewhere I criticized his new brand of realism. Here instead I argue that (a) Doppelt has not shown that Deployment Realism cannot solve the problems raised by the history of science, (b) explaining explanatory success does not add much to explaining novel predictive success, and (c) Doppelt is right that truth is not a sufficient explanans, but for different reasons, and this does not refute Deployment Realism,...

The empirical underdetermination of theories is a philosophical problem which until the last century has not seriously troubled actual science. The reason is that confirmation does not depend only on empirical consequences, and we can choose among empirically equivalent theories on the basis of theoretical virtues. True, in current quantum mechanics not even theoretical virtues allow to choose among many competing theories and interpretations, but this is because none of them possess those virtues to a sufficient degree. However, first, we can hope for some advancement in the state of the art: in past history we never witnessed unsolvable scientific problems. Second, even if no further progress came forth, all the most credited competitors agree on a substantial core of theoretical assumptions. Therefore underdetermination does not show that we cannot be realist on unobservable entities in general, but at most that in particular fields our inquiry may encounter some de facto limits. Realism is not a claim of omniscience: since the reality we know is subjectindependent, gaps or mistakes are always possible in principle.

There are two possible realist defense strategies against the pessimistic meta-induction and Laudan's meta-modus tollens: the selective strategy, claiming that discarded theories are partially true, and the discontinuity strategy, denying that pessimism about past theories can be extended to current ones. A radical version of discontinuity realism is proposed by Gerald Doppelt: rather than discriminating between true and false components within theories, he holds that superseded theories cannot be shown to be even partially true (except insofar they agree with current ones), while present best theories are demonstrably completely true. I argue that this position, running counter both the cumulativity of science and fallibilism, is untenable; it cannot account for the success of past theories, nor for the failures of current theories, and rather than shutting the door to the pessimistic historical objections it opens it wide. The best strategy, instead, joins the selective idea there was both some truth and some falsity in discarded theories, like in current ones, with the moderate discontinuity idea that the truth rate in present best theories is much greater than in past ones. Keywords Gerald Doppelt • Best theory realism • Selective realisms • Pessimistic meta-induction • No miracles argument • Historical meta-modus tollens 1 Two pessimistic arguments against realism and two defence strategies We can broadly understand scientific realism (ScR; as opposed to van Fraassen's constructive empiricism) as the claim that there can be compelling reasons to believe in the at least partial and/or approximate truth of scientific theories.

Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that ''novel'' predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of ''old'' data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan's criticisms of the no miracle argument. So, if the deductivists are right, the most powerful argument for realism collapses. There seems to be an inescapable contradiction between these prima facie plausible arguments of predictivists and deductivists; but this puzzle can be solved by understanding what exactly counts as novelty, if novel predictions must support the no miracle argument, i.e., if they must be explainable only by the truth of theories. Taking my cues from the use-novelty tradition, I argue that (1) the predicted data must not be used essentially in building the theory or choosing the auxiliary assumptions. This is possible if the theory and its auxiliary assumptions are plausible independently of the predicted data, and I analyze the consequences of this requirement in terms of best explanation of diverse bodies of data. Moreover, the predicted data must be (2) a priori improbable, and (3) heterogeneous to the essentially used data. My proposed notion of novelty, therefore, is not historical, but functional. Hence, deductivists are right that confirmation is independent of time and of historical contingencies such as if the theorist knew a datum, used it, or intended to accommodate it. Predictivists, however, are right that not all consequences confirm equally, and confirmation is not purely a logical theory-data relation, as it crucially involves background epistemic conditions and the notion of best explanation. Conditions (1)-(3) make the difference between prediction and

Dark matter in the universe evolves through gravity to form a complex network of halos, filaments, sheets and voids, that is known as the cosmic web. Computational models of the underlying physical processes, such as classical N-body simulations, are extremely resource intensive, as they track the action of gravity in an expanding universe using billions of particles as tracers of the cosmic matter distribution. Therefore, upcoming cosmology experiments will face a computational bottleneck that may limit the exploitation of their full scientific potential. To address this challenge, we demonstrate the application of a machine learning technique called Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) to learn models that can efficiently generate new, physically realistic realizations of the cosmic web. Our training set is a small, representative sample of 2D image snapshots from N-body simulations of size 500 and 100 Mpc. We show that the GAN-generated samples are qualitatively and quantitative...

Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold Sommerfeld’s ([1916]) derivation of the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. Not only were his predictions good, he derived exactly the same formula that would later drop out of Dirac’s 1928 treatment (something not possible using 1925 Schrödinger–Heisenberg quantum mechanics). And yet the most central elements of Sommerfeld’s theory were not even approximately true: his derivation leans heavily on a classical approach to elliptical orbits, including the necessary adjustments to these orbits demanded by relativity. Even physicists call Sommerfeld’s success a ‘miracle’, which rather makes a joke of the so-called ‘no miracles argument’. However, this can all be turned around. Here I argue that the realist has a story to tell vis-à-vis the discontinuities between the old and the new theory, leading to a realist defence based on sufficient continuity of relevant structure. 1Introduction2No Realist...

In this paper, I wish to connect the recent debate in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerning the nature of the wave function to the historical debate in the philosophy of science regarding the tenability of scientific realism. Advocating realism about quantum mechanics is particularly challenging when focusing on the wave function. According to the wave function ontology approach, the wave function is a concrete physical entity. In contrast, according to an alternative viewpoint, namely the primitive ontology approach, the wave function does not represent physical objects. In this paper, I argue that the primitive ontology approach can naturally be interpreted as an instance of the so-called explanationist realism, which has been proposed as a response to the pessimistic-meta induction argument against scientific realism. If my arguments are sound, then one could conclude that: (1) contrary to what is commonly thought, if explanationism realism is a good response to the pess...

IT CERTAINLY strikes us as one of the most remarkable types of scientific achievement when apparently disparate phenomena are unified theoretically. What appeared to be disparate to the untutored eye turns out to arise from the same underlying mechanism and thus to be identical in kind. When a door slams because the windows are open and it is windy outside, this happens due to the same cause and according to the same mechanism that makes a plane lift off the ground. The prima facie conclusion is that science succeeds in going beyond the specious distinctions of the senses. It teaches us what things are truly alike. My aim in this paper is to examine the viability of this popular view. And the result will be that the view is basically correct. More precisely, I will try to show, first, that in some distinguished cases science arguably manages to induce the right classification or taxonomy among the phenomena, and that, second, this is the only access to reality that science is justifiably able to gain. Accordingly, what I am aiming to do is to support a particular and comparatively weak form of scientific realism. Scientific realism contends that claims about certain unobservable 'items' which emerge from the theoretical or experimental activity of scientists are literally true; these claims faithfully refer to what is, as it were, going on behind the scenes. There is some quarrel, however, about what these 'items' are legitimately supposed to be. The leading brand of this doctrine is theoryrealism. According to this position, the successful theories of mature science are approximately true. That is, these theories correctly portray the notdirectly-observable processes and mechanisms that make the phenomena occur the way they do. A more attenuated version of scientific realism is entity-realism. On the one hand, entity-realism is an immediate consequence of theory-realism. The truth of a theory implies the existence of its theoretical entities. On the other hand, there is also a more autonomous type of entity-realism which is advanced on the basis of experiment-centered arguments. In this version, entity-realism says that the capacity to manipulate certain unobservable entities, and, in particular, to manipulate them in order to experiment on something else, gives

IT CERTAINLY strikes us as one of the most remarkable types of scientific achievement when apparently disparate phenomena are unified theoretically. What appeared to be disparate to the untutored eye turns out to arise from the same underlying mechanism and thus to be identical in kind. When a door slams because the windows are open and it is windy outside, this happens due to the same cause and according to the same mechanism that makes a plane lift off the ground. The prima facie conclusion is that science succeeds in going beyond the specious distinctions of the senses. It teaches us what things are truly alike. My aim in this paper is to examine the viability of this popular view. And the result will be that the view is basically correct. More precisely, I will try to show, first, that in some distinguished cases science arguably manages to induce the right classification or taxonomy among the phenomena, and that, second, this is the only access to reality that science is justifiably able to gain. Accordingly, what I am aiming to do is to support a particular and comparatively weak form of scientific realism. Scientific realism contends that claims about certain unobservable 'items' which emerge from the theoretical or experimental activity of scientists are literally true; these claims faithfully refer to what is, as it were, going on behind the scenes. There is some quarrel, however, about what these 'items' are legitimately supposed to be. The leading brand of this doctrine is theoryrealism. According to this position, the successful theories of mature science are approximately true. That is, these theories correctly portray the notdirectly-observable processes and mechanisms that make the phenomena occur the way they do. A more attenuated version of scientific realism is entity-realism. On the one hand, entity-realism is an immediate consequence of theory-realism. The truth of a theory implies the existence of its theoretical entities. On the other hand, there is also a more autonomous type of entity-realism which is advanced on the basis of experiment-centered arguments. In this version, entity-realism says that the capacity to manipulate certain unobservable entities, and, in particular, to manipulate them in order to experiment on something else, gives

The paper addresses the so-called miracle argument in favor of scientific realism and examines the viability of scientific reahsm as an explanation for the success of science. Scientific realism is committed to the claims that the theoretical terms in the mature sciences typically refer to real objects and that the theoretical laws in such sciences are typically approximately true. Instrumentalism or non-realism draws an the principles that factual claims need to be confirmed empirically and that experience fails to single out true assumptions. The miracle argument says that if a theory referred to fictitious objects, it would he miraculous that it is able to correctly predict observable effects. This argument transforms scientific realism into a hypothesis that is testable by the history of science. 1 perform such tests and conclude that the only type of realism that appears to be in agreement with the historical record is "reahsm of natural Kinds." Theories that enjoy distinguished explanatory success truthfully establish equivalence relations among phenomena.

IN SPITE OF appearances to the contrary, I will not present an exercise in applied theology but rather in applied philosophy of science. That is, I will draw some systematic conclusions from some historical case studies. More specifically, my aim is to show that the so-called "Miracle Argument" that is frequently advanced in favor of scientific realism doesn't hold water. Before I can address the problematic aspects of that argument, I must first straighten out the argument itself as well as the position it is intended to support.

Virtually all prominent critics of the Pessimistic Induction have so far assumed that in order to defeat the argument, one must show that there is a degree of continuity in the history of science at the level of theory. In my dissertation I challenge this assumption and argue for three theses: (I) The assumption in question can lend support to at best a very impoverished form of optimism about only bits and pieces of our best scientific theories is warranted. (II) A more promising strategy is possible: The Pessimistic Induction can be defeated if we can show that the evidence today's scientific community has for our best theories is qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the evidence past scientists had for their best theories. (III) The evidence today's scientific community has for some of our best theories (such as the Fermi-Landau Liquid theory) is unequivocally better than its historical predecessors.

My current opinion is that the selective realist is in a strong position vis-à-vis the historical challenges. Certainly the realist needs to invoke some careful criteria for realist commitment, and various nuances concerning the nature of her epistemic commitment, and this may raise the ‘death by a thousand qualifications’ question mark. But the concern is unfounded: the qualifications are all independently motivated, and indeed necessary given the philosophical complexity. Qualifications are to be welcomed here; often the truth is far from simple!

My current opinion is that the selective realist is in a strong position vis-à-vis the historical challenges. Certainly the realist needs to invoke some careful criteria for realist commitment, and various nuances concerning the nature of her epistemic commitment, and this may raise the ‘death by a thousand qualifications’ question mark. But the concern is unfounded: the qualifications are all independently motivated, and indeed necessary given the philosophical complexity. Qualifications are to be welcomed here; often the truth is far from simple!

Scientific realists use the "no miracle argument" to show that the empirical and pragmatic success of science is an indicator of the ability of scientific theories to give true or truthlike representations of unobservable reality. While antirealists define scientific progress in terms of empirical success or practical problem-solving, realists characterize progress by using some truth-related criteria. This paper defends the definition of scientific progress as increasing truthlikeness or verisimilitude. Antirealists have tried to rebut realism with the "pessimistic metainduction", but critical realists turn this argument into an optimistic view about progressive science.

This paper argues that the difference between contemporary software intensive scientific practice and more traditional non-software intensive varieties results from the characteristically high conditionality of software. We explain why the path complexity of programs with high conditionality imposes limits on standard error correction techniques and why this matters. While it is possible, in general, to characterize the error distribution in inquiry that does not involve high conditionality, we cannot characterize the error distribution in inquiry that depends on software. Software intensive science presents distinctive error and uncertainty modalities that pose new challenges for the epistemology of science.

The currently most plausible version of scientific realism is probably “deployment” (or “partial”, or “conservative”) realism, based on various contributions in the recent literature, and worked out as a unitary account in Psillos (1999). According to it we can believe in the at least partial truth of theories, because that is the best (or the only non-miraculous) explanation of their predictive success (especially novel predictive success), and discarded theories which had novel predictive success had nonetheless some true parts, those necessary to derive their novel predictions. According to Doppelt (2005, 2007) this account cannot withstand the antirealist objections based on the “pessimistic meta-induction” and Laudan’s historical counterexamples. Moreover it is incomplete, as it purports to explain the predictive success of theories, but overlooks the necessity to explain also their explanatory success. Accordingly, he proposes a new version of realism, presented as the best ex...