Relational Contract Theory

Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec. Le financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses organisations-membres, d'une subvention d'infrastructure du Ministère du Développement économique et régional et de la Recherche, de même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de recherche. CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its infrastructure and research activities are funded through fees paid by member organizations, an infrastructure grant from the Ministère du

We test the robustness of recent findings on the benefits of explicit contracts framed as penalties to the complex environments typical of B2B (and B2G) procurement, where penalty contracts are common. In our framework, matching is endogenous and competitive, there are contractible and non-contractible tasks, subjects play repeatedly and maintain their identity so that reputation-based relationships can form. We find that the introduction of explicit incentives boosts efficiency, strongly increasing effort in the contractible task while only mildly crowding it out in the non-contractible one. Bonuses and penalties are equiv-alent for efficiency and crowding-out, but different in distributional effects: sellers ’ surplus increases significantly with bonuses as buyers ’ offers become more generous. Consistently, buyers tend to prefer penalties, which may help explaining why they are so widespread in

La teoría relacional del contrato ha ofrecido a los estudios teóricos y dogmáticos sobre el derecho contractual un marco teórico persuasivo. El contraste entre la contratación discreta y la relacional revela la existencia de tipologías contractuales diferenciadas, así como lógicas y racionalidades disimiles que subyacen a contratos caracterizados por su imagen transaccional frente a otros en que se forja una genuina relación en las partes contratantes. A pesar de su rendimiento explicativo y justificativo, la visión de Macneil ha sido puesta en duda por sus dificultades al momento de delimitar conceptualmente la idea de contrato relacional y, a su vez, por la falta de claridad existente sobre el real impacto que acarrearía la visión relacional de los contratos.

Una arista que no ha sido del todo abordada versa sobre el vínculo que media entre los contratos relacionales y la solidaridad. La solidaridad constituye uno de los posibles modelos de fundamentación normativa alternativos al sustento tradicional del derecho contractual, que se efectúa con cargo al individualismo filosófico. Su reclamo insta a desafiar la fractura entre los intereses de los contratantes, abogando por la continuidad entre estos. De ahí que las partes pueden compartir las ganancias que disfrutan, así como soportar de manera conjunta las pérdidas que sufren.

Pese a su riqueza teórica, la solidaridad como ideal regulativo presenta una imagen más bien ambivalente. Su atractivo descansa en el papel que cumple como una manera de contrarrestar el individualismo asentado tanto en la reflexión filosófica sobre el derecho contractual, como en los estudios dogmáticos respecto del esfuerzo de fundar normativamente esta parcela de lo jurídico. Mas su ámbito de operatividad es menor al que se podría en principio desear. El presupuesto de la relación solidaria actúa como un dispositivo de confinamiento de los contratos que pueden efectivamente fundamentarse en términos solidarios. Este es precisamente el caso de los contratos relacionales.

El presente trabajo tiene por objetivo desarrollar la teoría relacional del contrato esgrimida por Ian Macneil y, a su vez, analizar en forma crítica su conexión con el fundamento normativo del derecho contractual provisto por la solidaridad. El trabajo se encuentra construido sobre la base de tres secciones. En la primera se presenta la teoría relacional del contrato y se anotan algunas dificultades que esta ha presentado. En la segunda, en tanto, se examina la idea de solidaridad como fundamento normativo del derecho de contratos, enfatizando su presupuesto de operatividad relativo a la existencia de intereses comunes. En la tercera, por último, se explora el posible encaje entre los contratos relacionales y el ideal regulativo de la solidaridad.

Se sostendrá que efectivamente puede acudirse a la solidaridad para fundamentar las demandas y exigencias que tienen las partes en el marco de un contrato relacional, pero esto transparenta la imagen ambivalente de la solidaridad. Su impacto en las relaciones intersubjetivas y sociales es menor del anhelado y, en este sentido, el contrato relacional sirve para visualizar su confinamiento justificativo.

Lo studio affronta il tema della conservazione del contratto alla luce
di sopravvenienze perturbative dell’equilibrio tra gli interessi oggettivati nella
stipula. Viene quindi effettuata la disamina degli istituti dello ius variandi e
della c.d. “rinegoziazione contrattuale”, strumenti in grado di salvaguardare il
contratto che, divenuto non più efficiente rischia di minare, in particolare, gli
interessi della parte contrattualmente più debole.

Peter Benson’s “Justice in Transactions: A Theory of Contract Law” is an ambitious book and is likely to become the definite modern statement of the venerable transfer theory of contract. “Justice in Transactions” carefully examines a variety of contract doctrines from formation to enforcement, and defends a normative vision of the parties and their relation. This Book Review critically examines transfer theory, which figures in some prominent philosophical accounts of contract, notably Kant’s and Hegel’s, by contrasting it to the choice theory of contracts. This comparison helps to refine three lines of critique of transfer theory. Transfer theory mis-represents law’s facilitation of contract as an exercise of implication; it marginalizes contract law’s robust commitment to relational justice; and it under-states the way law’s regard to the parties’ future-selves limits the range of enforceable commitments people can undertake. These pitfalls, I argue, are manifestations of a deepe...

A later draft was presented at a Villanova University School of Law faculty colloquium, where I received invaluable input from my colleagues. Their comments came at a critical juncture in this project and were instrumental in helping to propel this project forward. I give my sincere thanks to all of my fellow law teachers who took the time to read and to provide comments on this project. Finally, I acknowledge and thank my friends and family for their unwavering patience and support.

For many firms, designing governance structures for their inter-organizational relationships is a key strategic challenge. Strategic management and other management scholars have successfully applied concepts from sociology, economics, and organization theory to analyze this challenge. Despite their attention to the relational dimension of governance, however, these scholars have drawn very little from a stream of economics research that directly addresses relational governance and has become established in that field: namely, the economics of relational contracts. In this essay, we discuss what the economics of relational contracts can add to management studies of the governance of interorganizational relationships. We explain how the economics of relational contracts sheds light on the relative roles of, and interactions between, the shadow of the past and the shadow of the future in supporting interorganizational collaboration. In so doing, we suggest how economic models of relational contracts can radically change the interpretation of observations that management scholars have made about collaborative relationships they have studied. We also show how the economics of relational contracts literature can contribute to the extended debate about whether and when contracts are substitutes or complements for unwritten agreements. Finally, we discuss implications for the ways in which the economics of relational contracts can help us to better understand the governance of inter-organizational relationships.

This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of trust within organizations in order to expand and refine theoretical constructs. Trust is approached in the economic perspective. The study seeks to understand the role of trust in the informal coordination of relational contracts. Trust is approached as a critical element to the execution of specific organizational tasks and its role as a mediator of organizational performance is observed. Finally, an analytical model is proposed and the study concludes that trust is a central element to better understand relational contracts and that investments adopting a trust-based management style should observe the specific context and the nature of the organizational tasks.

SAGGI CARMELITA CAMARDI, "Natura" delle trattative e responsabilità precontrattuale. Modelli dogmatici e "tertium non datur" 3 TOMMASO DALLA MASSARA, Gli scenari dell'armonizzazione massima: note a margine del nuovo art. 135-septies c. cons. 56 GIORGIO DE NOVA, Disciplina convenzionale delle sopravvenienze 70 RENATO RORDORF, Autonomia negoziale e "giustizia del contatto" in tempo di pandemia 79 GIURISPRUDENZA I. Contratto in generale EDOARDO PESCE, Opzione put and call: tra causa in concreto e (divieto del) patto leonino MATTEO DELLACASA, Sottoscrizione del contratto di intermediazione finanziaria mediante "point and click" e valore probatorio del messaggio di posta elettronica: due pronunce in materia di documento informatico e firma digitale MATTEO DELLACASA, Intestazione fiduciaria di partecipazioni sociali: validità del contratto concluso oralmente e ammissibilità della prova per presunzioni LUCIANO ARCUDI, Quando il locatore non esige il pagamento del canone: contratto di locazione e "Verwirkung" FLAVIA ABBONDANZA, Quando la risoluzione del contratto di servizi consegue alla violazione di obblighi di protezione imputabili all'utente: sulla clausola che accorda al prestatore del servizio il diritto di ritenere il corrispettivo ricevuto

In most of the land tenancy literature the type of contract is exogenous. Also even though these contracts vary a lot among farms, between regions and over time, the theoretical literature has not always acknowledged this idiosyncrasy. Building on the strategic bargaining theory initiated by Rubinstein, this model not only makes the type of contract endogenous, but also provides the surplus sharing rules and the conditions giving rise to each type of contract, showing how the type and terms of the contract are tailored to fit the characteristics of the parties and their economic environment. Pairwise bargaining is embedded into a market context by putting "competitive pressure" on the players through the opportunity they have to break up bargaining and look for alternative partners. Because of this threat of opting out, the outcome of the bargaining process depends not only on the characteristics of the players, but also on events outside their match and the information they have about them. The model departs from price-taking assumptions. Type and terms of the contract result from negotiation and are shaped by the "relative bargaining powers" of the players whose relevant components are identified in a precise way in the model.

Managing innovation involves double moral hazard because the principal delegates R&D to a specialized agent and then makes decisions to apply the resulting invention. Double moral hazard is significant because innovation by the principal implies that the optimal incentive contract satisfies monotonicity conditions. The analysis shows that the optimal incentive contract for delegated R&D is an option. Delegated R&D with simultaneous sampling results in shirking but delegated R&D with sequential sampling attains the efficient outcome. The analysis considers a combined problem with simultaneous and sequential search and gives sufficient conditions under which delegated R&D attains the first best. The discussion also considers delegated R&D with stochastic innovation and with stochastic quality of inventions.

ABSTRACTWe examine how firms' management accounting information influences interfirm contract design. We theorize that comprehensive accounting information enables firms to design more complete contracts with suppliers, as indicated by increased issue inclusiveness and clause specificity. Survey data of Japanese manufacturing firms about the management of supplier relationships support the expectation that comprehensive management accounting information enables the development of more inclusive and specific contracts with suppliers. These contracts are also less subject to additional informal agreements between exchange partners. These results are consistent with the idea that better accounting information enables more complete contracting.

''Contract as Thing.'' The present enterprise, however, differs from Leff 's in at least two important ways. First, whereas Leff emphasized the thing-ness of standard-form ''contracts of adhesion,'' the present article applies this perspective to all contracts, whether readymade or carefully negotiated. After all, handcrafted objects are no less ''artifacts'' than their mass-produced counterparts, although, of course, they may be very different kinds of artifacts, reflecting very different social conditions. Second, whereas the primary focus of Leff 's article fell on the legal implications of regulating contracts as things, the primary focus of the present article falls on the social-scientific implications of researching contracts as things. Thus, although Leff 's analysis and this one share a central metaphor, the two pursue that metaphor to very different (albeit mutually compatible) ends.

This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who undertake costly actions or investments which produce a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division of the surplus over time so as to avoid expropriation. It is shown that investments may be either above or below the efficient level and that actions and the division of the surplus converges to a stationary solution at which either both investment levels are efficient or both are below the efficient level.

Contracting relationships vary in the extent to which they are complete and involve formal contract specification as well as the extent to which they are based on strong relationships and rely on cooperation and trust. Where a contracting arrangement falls on these two continuums constitutes what this paper refers to as relationship design and is likely to impact contractor performance. We use data from a survey of child-care centers and Head Start agencies in Ohio to examine the association between the design of contracting relationships and contractor performance. Contractor performance is assessed in two ways: an objective measure of violations identified by government inspectors and a perceptual self-rated measure of performance reported by the contracted service providers. Measures of relationship design are constructed using multiple survey items and are included in multivariate regression analyses while controlling for a variety of organizational characteristics. Findings sug...

In this article, we discuss the current state of Alternative Dispute Resolution ('ADR') law, practice and education in South Africa, with a particular focus on the potential role for mediation in commercial disputes. Our angle is to frame the material with a discussion of economic and contract theory, particularly that on private ordering and relational contracting. We link this socio-legal theory to more specific theory on ADR itself, and then contextualise ADR in South Africa. We discuss the role of ADR in commercial practice generally and provide a detailed account of the South African construction industry specifically. Our major conclusion is that ADR is often the most appropriate form of dispute resolution, particularly where social capital is at stake. This provides the link between ADR theory and private ordering/relational theory. Another important conclusion is that South Africa needs more specialist mediators, as well as a legal and political environment which incentivises such training. * This work is based on research supported by the National Research Foundation ('NRF') (grant number 10989). Any opinion, finding and conclusion, or recommendation expressed in this material is that of the authors and the NRF does not accept any liability in this regard. 1 This is the role of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration ('CCMA'), set up under the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 2 The National Consumer Tribunal is mentioned as a forum for dispute resolution in both the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 and the National Credit Act 34 of 2005. On ADR in the consumer law sphere, see generally Tanya Woker 'Consumer protection and alternative dispute resolution' (2016) 28 SA Merc LJ 21. 3 This forum determines disputes related to residential leases as a preliminary step before formal litigation under the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999. See further Maphango v Aengus Lifestyle Properties (Pty) Ltd 2012 (3) SA 531 (CC). 4 Insurance (both the long-term and short-term insurance industries separately), banking and financial services (generally) are examples of industries that have dedicated ombuds set up by statute. There is also a general Consumer Goods and Services Ombud. 5 Compare the general trend of the underlying narrative in P M Nienaber 'Toegepaste reg oor arbitrasies en dies meer' (2016) 27 Stellenbosch LR 393.

We study the effects of envy on relational employment contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which reflects an agent's individual contribution to firm value. Both agents exhibit horizontal disadvantageous inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial; in the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates, relational contracts may be more profitable. For some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with envious agents.

In this paper, I compare the feasibility and the pro…tability of group vs. individual performance pay when workers are envious and when veri…able signals on the workers'performances are not available. The group bonus contract is superior as long as the principal faces no credibility problem. This is due to the fact that group performance pay avoids the occurrence of inequity. However, the relational individual bonus contract may become dominant although it introduces the prospect of unequal pay. The reason is that precisely the worker's distaste for wage inequity may actually soften the principal's credibility constraint.

We study the e¤ects of envy on the feasibility of relational contracts in a standard moral hazard setup with two agents. Performance is evaluated via an observable, but non-contractible signal which re ‡ects the agent's individual contribution to …rm value. Both agents exhibit disadvantageous inequity aversion. In contrast to the literature, we …nd that inequity aversion may be bene…cial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of interest rates relational contracts may be more pro…table. Furthermore, for some interest rates reputational equilibria exist only with inequity averse agents.

in the long run. bz contrast to standard exchange contracts in law, which are specifically designed to bring about the completion of an exchange efficiently, franchise contracts are designed to make it possible for the entrepreneurs to initiate, to mai.tain, and to eventually terminate their rehltionship without dispute. The research reported in this article is an attempt to see how the dual purpose of J?anchising contracts are achieved. The article.first describes the internal organization gl~franchis'e contracts (what we called the micro-contractual aspects) and how different kinds o frights attd obligations are allocated to accomplish these multiple ends. The second part of the article provides an empirical examination of 30 franchise contracts to see if the internal organization of the contracts influence both the expansion of the franchise operations through new fkanchises and the amount of dispute between the two sides of franchise contracts. Every franchise contract includes a set (~f provisions that define the commencement, termination, and ongoing operations of franchise relations. The internal organization of franchise contracts speeifies what kinds of rights" and obligations are distributed to the parties and the nature of this allocation within each domain of provisions. We argue that the commencement and termination aspects or franchise contracts' are usually written in order to make the relationship between the parties clear, and the contingencies specific. In these provisions, the contract is written in discrete terms in which each party's rights and duties are specifically delineated. The contractual provisions dealing with the ongoing operations and the conduct of the parties, on the other hand, cannot be made specific because it is impossible to define all the future contingencies and possible business opportunities. Under these conditions, the contract is usually

This paper analyzes relational contracts under moral hazard. We first show that if the available information (signal) about effort satisfies a generalized monotone likelihood ratio property, then irrespective of whether the first-order approach (FOA) is valid or not, the optimal bonus scheme takes a simple form. The scheme rewards the agent a fixed bonus if his performance index exceeds a threshold, like the FOA contract of Levin (2003), but the threshold can be set differently. We next derive a sufficient and necessary condition for non-verifiable information to improve a relational contract. Our new informativeness criterion sheds light on the nature of an ideal performance measure in relational contracting.

Early research on buyer–supplier relationships was based on two cornerstones: relational governance mechanisms and superior value creation for the whole supply chain. Relational governance mechanisms, based on trust and informal safeguards, can lead to higher value creation, while lack of trust and opportunism can be controlled by contractual governance mechanisms. To date, however, few studies have investigated the role of power asymmetry in collaboration and how the total value is distributed between buyer and supplier. The amount each partner appropriates depends on their relative power in the relationship, which has further implications in governance and relationship continuation, yet that has not been thoroughly explored in the literature. To fill this gap, this study investigates the influence of power asymmetry on governance and value appropriation in collaborative relationships, from both the buyers’ and suppliers’ perspectives. This article contributes to the buyer–supplier...

This article aims to analyze the consequences of environmental uncertainty on trust relations within business organizations. Specifically, this study tries to understand the possible differences in the levels of trust between two paradigms: the Old Economy and ...

Despite the prominent role of asset specificity in buyer-supplier exchanges, its influence on opportunism remains controversial. While transaction cost economics (TCE) addresses its potential to encourage opportunism, relational exchange theory (RET) highlights its role in discouraging opportunism. We extend this debate by considering (1) the effects of asset specificity asymmetry, (2) changes in supplier opportunism over time, and (3) the moderating roles of supply market uncertainty and prior exchange history. We argue that the logics of TCE and RET are not fundamentally irreconcilable; instead, we suggest a perspective combining the calculative logic of TCE within the relationship logic of RET such that they jointly affect opportunism changes. Our propositions are supported by the results of a matched sample of 193 buyer-supplier relationships at two time points.

The topic of the paper is the possible implementation of the Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) concept in the field of law. The CAS concept rests on the existence of a dynamic network with many actors (individuals, companies, states, and international institutions), acting simultaneously and constantly responding to the behavior of other actors in the network. The Complex Adaptive System is based on connections that are generated by gradual induction of certain rules; thus, the newly established order is not conditioned by a superior authority, but it functions as a self-regulated one. The CAS concept is not hierarchical, but heterarchical. Unlike the hierarchical structure, heterarchy is a structure that rests on a number of centers of equal standing in the system. The heterarhical system does not rest on the premise of fundamental unity, universal interests, and alike (as common features of the hierarchical system). Instead, the heterarchical system generates rules that cannot be observed and analyzed separately from the application process. The ability of actors or agents to respond to new challenges determines the adaptive character of this system. Applied to the field of law, the CAS concept is especially important when the legal situation at stake is prone to the change of the fundamentals on which it was based at the outset. The actors of the legal relationship (viewed as part of the CAS network) define mutual relations on the basis of the acquired experience resulting from the operation of the particular system. The Complex Adaptive System has tendency to retain patterns that have proved to be adequate and usable for a further process of self-construction of the order in the system. The factors driving and enabling the connection within the Зборник радова Правног факултета у Нишу | Број 84 | Година LVIII | 2019 64 elements of "law-oriented" complex adaptive systems are embodied in common values, principles and methods of interpretation. The paper illustrates the application of the CAS concept by providing the example of convergence among the agreements from the field of Foreign Investments Law (FIL).

This study compares the effects of governance mechanisms on relationship continuity in the aftermath of exchange interruptions in interfirm relationships. We propose that cooperative relationships can be renewed by matching governance mechanisms (formalization or socialization) to specific types of exchange interruptions (opportunism and misunderstanding). Using data collected from two types of senior managers in 304 buyer firms in China (a total of 608 senior managers), we found that the effects of formalization and socialization on relationship continuity are contingent on exchange interruption type. Socialization is more effective than formalization in renewing relationships when the level of opportunism is high, while formalization works better than socialization when the level of misunderstanding is high. Based on our findings, we encourage firms to diagnose exchange interruption types and then choose a proper governance structure.

The authors discuss the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada to approve a plan of arrangement privatizing BCE Inc. over the objections of bondholders. Summarizing the arguments for "shareholder primacy" and debenture covenants delimiting contractual rights against boards and management, they argue that an expanded conception of relational contract theory is useful in analyzing the competing claims in the BCE deal and litigation. This approach requires that broader contextual factors are necessary to consider in the functioning of the corporation, especially by after-the-fact decision-makers.

Recent research on alliance governance has emphasized that contracts can have both a control and coordination function. In this paper, we test the impact of these different contract functions on alliance performance. Conducting structural equation analyses on a sample of 270 Dutch technology alliances, we disentangle the relationship between different contract functions, partner cooperation and alliance success. Our data show that different contract roles have a different impact on partner cooperation within the alliance. In addition, we find strong indications that the presence/absence of prior trustful collaboration and the number of alliance partners moderate the relationship between contract functions and partner cooperation. Finally, our data provide evidence that contract functions indirectly influence alliance success via partner cooperation.

Most scholarly work on trust recognizes its importance as part of a nonmarket form of governance in exchanges between firms. However, trust is only one such governance device that can be used; other devices such as reputation, bargaining power, and contracts can also be used to govern exchanges. This article empirically examines the relationships between trust, reputation, bargaining power, and contracts as governance devices in agreements between smaller entrepreneurial firms and larger, more established firms. The findings suggest that while the role of trust is an important one, it may be more effective when combined with other governance devices.

Contracts have played a central role in public sector reforms in developed countries over the last decade, and research increasingly highlights their varied nature. In low and middle income countries the use of contracts is encouraged but little attention has been paid to features of the setting that may influence their operation. A qualitative case study was used to examine different dimensions of a contract with private GPs in South Africa. Features of the contract are compared with the notions of classical and relational contracts. Formal aspects of the contract such as design, monitoring and resort to sanctions were found to offer little control over its outcome. The relational rather than classical model of contracting offered a more meaningful framework of analysis, with social and institutional factors found to play an important role. In particular, the individual nature of GP practices highlighted the role played by individual motivation where a contract exercised little formal control. Due to the similarity of factors likely to be present, results are argued to be relevant in many other LMIC settings, and policymakers considering contracts for clinical services are advised to consider the possibility of experiencing a similar outcome.

Contract violations are ubiquitous. There has been little attention, however, dedicated to understanding the mechanisms involved in making sense of and addressing such occurrences. Two experimental studies investigated how people interpret contract violations and how these interpretations affect trust and the management of relationships. By drawing on the distinction between violations of the letter versus spirit of the law, we show that letter violations are more difficult to overcome than spirit violations, due to higher perceived intentionality. These effects generalized across different populations, levels of contracting experience, types of contracting contexts, levels of ambiguity within the contract, and degrees of contract complexity. The results yield important implications for understanding contract violations, trust, and organizational responses as a relationship management capability.

Social bonds are crucial for the success of buyer-supplier relationships. This paper investigates whether individual social preferences may explain inter-firm social bonds built on trust and reciprocity in supply chain relationships. The research questions are explored by means of a case study involving the first-tier suppliers of a large organization in the automotive component sector. The research has practical implications for firms’ staffing decision and supplier selection

The aim of this research was to investigate the impact of transactional and Relational contract on turn over intention in employees of Peshawar University business affiliated institutions in region of Peshawar Pakistan. The effect of both contracts on the turnover intention was investigated individually. A sample size of one hundred individuals was used in the study. For the analysis part

Истраживач на пројекту "Заштита људских и мањинских права у европском правном простору" (179046), који се реализује на Правном факултету Универзитета у Нишу, уз подршку Министарства за науку и технолошки развој Републике Србије. Истраживач на пројекту "Одрживост идентитета Срба и националних мањина и пограничним општинама источне и југоисточне Србије" (179013), који се реализује на Универзитету у Нишу-Машински факултет, а финансира га Министарство за науку и технолошки развој Републике Србије.

This study compares the effects of governance mechanisms on relationship continuity in the aftermath of exchange interruptions in interfirm relationships. We propose that cooperative relationships can be renewed by matching governance mechanisms (formalization or socialization) to specific types of exchange interruptions (opportunism and misunderstanding). Using data collected from two types of senior managers in 304 buyer firms in China (a total of 608 senior managers), we found that the effects of formalization and socialization on relationship continuity are contingent on exchange interruption type. Socialization is more effective than formalization in renewing relationships when the level of opportunism is high, while formalization works better than socialization when the level of misunderstanding is high. Based on our findings, we encourage firms to diagnose exchange interruption types and then choose a proper governance structure.

Los efectos de la pandemia han evidenciado la insuficiencia de herramientas jurídicas como la fuerza mayor o la imprevisión para hacer frente a las diversas dificultades que enfrentan los contratantes por circunstancias extraordinarias posteriores a la celebración de los acuerdos, más allá de la imposibilidad de cumplimiento o la excesiva onerosidad prestacional. Este artículo pretende analizar aproximaciones diferentes que puedan dar luces para encontrar una salida que tenga como norte una mayor justicia contractual, tales como la doctrina del solidarismo contractual y la teoría de los contratos relacionales.

The article addresses a puzzle. The puzzle is the neglect of the vast literature on relational and long-term contracts to explore a seemingly key aspect, namely: How, if at all, should the relational nature of a contractual transaction affect the basic rules governing the award of remedies for breach of contract? The authors argue that contrary to a widely held assumption, formal rules of remedy do play a significant role in the relational context. Furthermore, understanding the function of formal remedies in the relational context is crucial for the development of a full-scale relational theory of contract. In light of this basic assertion, a theoretical model of relational remedies is then introduced. The model offers a number of guiding principles, which should be taken into account by courts (or legislators) when awarding remedies for the violation of contractual rights in a relational setting.

In buyer-supplier relationships, effective partnerships require mutual adaptation to execute strategies effectively. Using LISREL, we test a model of relational exchange factors that includes dependence, joint action and trust and their influence on the mutual adaptation of supplier and buyer firms in the U.S. automotive industry. The results of the study indicate that both economic and social dimensions of the relationship impact mutual adaptation, but that these two are not necessarily complementary. Specifically, supplier adaptation is negatively impacted by trust between supplier and buyer, but positively impacted by dependence and joint action. Buyer adaptation, on the other hand, is positively impacted by trust between the two, joint action and the adaptation undertaken by the supplier. The negative relationship between trust and supplier adaptation may be symptomatic of deeper issues in the U.S. automotive industry that should merit concern.

We examine the volitional, non-rational nature of motivation and its impact on symbolic production at work. Based on a ethnographic study on a Brazilian special police force we argue that institutional stability and stable symbolic frames of references have long been taken for granted in studies of motivation, thus leaving aside the role of aesthetical demand in producing active symbolic elaboration at work. Unstable institutional frames of reference are relevant to understand the efforts of internal integration, identity building and relations of alterity at work. In this sense, this article has the main objective of contributing to the studies on intrinsic motivation within organizations.