Principles of Justice

The research paper’s purpose is to analyze the legal framework for administering justice in the European Union from the standpoint of justice principles enshrined in various legal regulations (and their actual implementation as reflected in the practice of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights) as a component of general law principles, and to compare them with the corresponding provisions of current Ukrainian leg-islation. To fulfill the goal, a systematic approach was chosen from general scientific and special scientific methods; the ones most widely applied are: historical-legal, formal-legal, systemic-structu-ral, and comparative-legal. The paper presents a systematic ana-lysis of the current legislation and case-law of the European Union and Ukraine, singling out the principles of justice administration and the current legal positions of the courts on their application and protection. The author pinpoints that there is a high correla-tion between individual principles of justice within their system and suggests that the principles of justice should be viewed comprehen-sively, according to the most related groups. From the researcher’s perspective, current Ukrainian legislation contains a unified system of basic principles of justice, which meets the European standards, and the national judicial practice of ensuring their observance is developed with due consideration of European case law

Resumo: A adequada compreensão dos contornos jurídicos dos poderes do juiz de segunda instância no que concerne à reapreciação da matéria de facto abordada, ou não, em primeira instância não foi convincentemente resolvida pelo legislador, e possivelmente nem o poderia ou deveria ter sido. Torna-se assim imperioso abordar a problemática do ponto de vista teórico-principiológico, o que pressupõe a revisitação de alguns pontos essenciais da teoria do processo tributário. Nesta conformidade, procurar-seá saber, em primeiro lugar, quais são os fins que devem presidir a este último (teoria subjetivista e teoria objetivista) e, em segundo lugar, como deve ser encarado o princípio do inquisitório enquanto arma essencial do julgador para lidar com as questões que são colocadas à sua frente. Munidos desse travejamento teórico, a prudente conclusão aparece: sendo verdade que o juiz recursivo tributário não deve assumir uma simples atitude cassatória clássica, devolvendo o processo (litígio) e desresponsabilizando-se completamente de reapreciar a matéria de facto analisada (ou não) pelo seu antecessor de primeira instância, também não é menos certo que o mesmo não pode aniquilar os poderes deste último, sobrepondo-se-lhe e decidindo onde o primeiro tem possibilidade de poder decidir melhor. Palavras-chave: processo tributário, Direito tributário, função jurisdicional, recurso jurisdicional, conhecimento da matéria de facto, prova. * O presente texto tem natureza coloquial e pretende materializar em forma escrita a intervenção proferida na ação de formação especializada denominada "Temas de Direito Tributário", promovida pelo Centro de Estudos Judiciários, que decorreu em 06 de janeiro de 2017, em Lisboa. ** Texto originariamente publicado in "A prova no processo tributário" (E-book), Centro de Estudos Judiciários, Lisboa, 2018, pp. 55 e ss.

não declarou a inconstitucionalidade da norma incriminatória dos maus-tratos a animais de companhia constante do artigo 387.º do Código Penal. Sobre a jurisprudência constitucional quanto a maus-tratos a animais de companhia, cfr., criticamente, Jorge Reis Novais, «Restrições a direitos fundamentais, maus-tratos a animais e Constituição», em Constituição, política e direitos fundamentais -Estudos em homenagem ao Doutor entendeu que a Constituição não protege o bem-estar animal, enquanto no segundo acórdão entendeu o contrário. (ii) A interpretação da Constituição que o Tribunal Constitucional apresentou no Acórdão 268/2022 4 fez-se de acordo com o Direito da União Europeia. Na proposição (i), interpretação surge significando o resultado de um processo cognoscitivo ou decisório do Tribunal Constitucional acerca do significado de um enunciado normativo. Já na proposição (ii), interpretação surge enquanto processo ou atividade de descoberta ou atribuição de um significado a um enunciado normativo 5 . Neste artigo será privilegiado o segundo sentido de interpretação, i.e., a interpretação enquanto processo ou atividade 6 . Sendo uma atividade, a conduta interpretar pode ser objeto de normas jurídicas regulativas 7 , que imponham a consideração de determinados aspetos. É o caso das típicas normas de interpretação

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui bagaimana proses implementasi
rekrutmen, seleksi dan penempatan di bank Muamalat Kc Kendari dalam perspektif
syariah. Penelitian ini menggunakan jenis penelitian kualitatif. Untuk mengumpulkan
data, penelitian ini menggunakan instrument observasi, wawancara dan dokumentasi.
Selanjutnya, data yang telah terkumpul akan dianalisa secara umum kemudian akan
ditarik kesimpulan secara umum (Deduktif). Kemudian, pengujian kualitas data
dilakukan dengan menelaah data, mereduksi data, dan menyusun data. Hasil penelitian
menunjukkan bahwa proses rekrutmen di bank Muamalat dilakukan dengan
mengimplementasikan sifat amanah, siddiq, serta adil. Proses seleksi dilakukan secara
transparan, tidak membeda-bedakan, memperlakukan secara adil semua pelamar dan
menghindari nepotisme. Dalam proses penempatan, bank Muamalat KC Kendari
menempatkan tenaga kerja berdasarkan penetapan profesionalisme dalam perspektif
syariah yang meliputi kafaah (keahlian), himmatul‟amal (etos kerja yang tinggi), serta
amanah (terpercaya).

Discursive theories of justice have been questioned for putting forward high-level principles that should nevertheless play a role in practical discourses in which the justice of a claim is at stake. Here, I will critically examine and systematize the main tenets in Rawls’s and Habermas’s discursive theories, and will suggest that the principles of justice (Rawls) and universalization (Habermas) can and play the role of mandates of optimalization in real deliberations on justice.

Environmental justice is a core principle in sustainable development, advocating for fair distribution of environmental benefits and losses, inclusive decision-making, transparency, among others. Given the complexities of human interactions within ecosystems, conflicts inevitably arise, posing challenges to achieving environmental justice and making the dream for realizing sustainable development fade. Appropriate Dispute Resolution (ADR) emerges as an effective, inclusive, and a promising method to resolving these conflicts and mitigating their occurrence, thereby realizing environmental justice and sustainable development. Upon this contextualization, this article provides an overview of environmental justice, sustainable development, and ADR principles, highlighting why it is no longer merely an alternative, but recognized as an appropriate method of dispute resolution. Further, the paper discusses how ADR can be harnessed in the pursuit of environmental justice to achieve sustainable development.

The general perception is that social justice is another interpretation of distributive justice and that the idea of distributive justice has existed since ancient times; The idea of social justice, then, is not new, it is merely a new linguistic combination for the same well-known old content. The present article tries to show from an analytical point of view that, firstly, tourism justice itself has undergone conceptual and content evolutions in the context of history, and secondly, the idea of social justice in contemporary times is clearly beyond the scope of distributive justice concerns. Any notion of distributive justice is a form of social justice theory, but some theories of social justice cannot be reduced to distributive justice. The legibility of social justice and its cultural complexity is another important point that is emphasized in this article.

Martial arts are usually relegated to the sphere of sport and often lost within the trappings of combat. In recent times, scholars have taken interest in martial arts studies and explored how the psychosomatics of embodied practice reveals knowledge about culture and social phenomena. Commentators from within psychology, sociology, anthropology, and philosophy have spoken broadly about human connection through martial arts, although little has been researched in theology that links spiritual teaching to the lived experience of martial arts practice. The aim of this article is to illumine a theology that may inform the practice of martial arts. To that, I turn to Karol Wojtyla, and his seminal work on Theology of the Body. I will present two key aspects; 1) that the Christian ethic may inspire fresh insights into an alternate practice of martial arts. 2) in the light of a theology of the body, martial arts may be viewed as a practice that supports human flourishing.

Self-defence is generally thought to be either a staple of martial arts practice or a way for the Crown to establish if an accused was acting in self-defence. That calls to mind two essential aspects about the actor in self-defence: 1) the subjectivity of the actor's intent and actions, and 2) the objective examination against what other prudent persons would or would not do given the same set of circumstances. Assessing criminal liability is essential to the legalities of self-defence but, the discovery of one's mind and actions after the fact is relevant to consequence and reflective practice which merely defines what may be considered reasonable, legitimate, and necessary as per case. More importantly, is there a divine preeminence of self-defence that can ameliorate one's actions of force against another to curtail the negative effects of a hostile attacker. In this article, I propose that both virtue and duty can lead the actor to discover the sacred site of the lived-body as the self known as I to value the self known as the other. To view the body as sacred in such a pre-emptive way may reestablish restraint and control over one's actions as to promote bodily integrity and the preservation of life.

This research aims to describe the implementation of the principles of justice in the employee recruitment and selection process from an Islamic perspective. The research method used is the library research method, where researchers access, study and analyze journals, books and articles from previous researchers to collect data. Based on research that has been carried out based on a review of existing literature, the research results state that the concept of human resource management (HRM) which is based on sharia principles emphasizes the application of sharia principles in management practices. Islam emphasizes that in selecting employees, considerations must be based on relevant abilities, skills and experience in the field.

We examine the role of need satisfaction in non-comparative justice ratings about endowments with goods. As normative approaches, we discuss utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism. Using a vignette experiment, we show that a need context increases the prevalence of prioritarianistic and sufficientarianistic justice ratings, which leads to an ethically problematic sigmoid shape of the justice evaluation function.

En este ensayo deseo hacer una presentación de carácter introductorio a las pretensiones de validez del pensamiento del filósofo y político norteamericano John Rawls. Me basaré en su obra de 1971, «Teoría de la justicia», pero tendré en cuenta otros escritos anteriores a la misma. En otra oportunidad espero mostrar el giro pragmático que hace el autor en su obra tardía.Considero que la pretensión del filósofo nos da qué pensar a nosotros, latinoamericanos y colombianos, sobre todo cuando miramos la aplicabilidad de sus principios al ámbito de la justicia distributiva desde las deprimentes condiciones socioeconómicas que viven los menos aventajadas de nuestras sociedades en este momento histórico.Con la convicción de no estar hablando para un grupo de especialistas en el tema, sino para un público más amplio, que busca ilustrar sus «posiciones políticas», voy a emplear un lenguaje no especializado, de tal manera que se pueda crear un clima propicio para el discernimiento político y p...

Dans la négociation internationale sur l'effet de serre, toutes les parties s'accordent pour rechercher des solutions justes et équitables. Mais chacune a une vision particulière de ce que représente l'équité. C'est que les conditions politiques nécessaires à un raisonnement en termes de justice ne sont pas réunies à l'échelle internationale. La suspension du jugement sur le juste reflète l'absence d'épreuves bien constituées permettant d'arbitrer entre des prétentions contradictoires, ce qu'on appelle une justice. C'est dans ce contexte qu'une problématique de la justice se rabat sur une problématique de l'acceptabilité. En fait les différentes conceptions de solutions justes à promouvoir dépendent tout à la fois des situations empiriques et des ordres de justification qui les ordonnent. En particulier le fait que les engagements quantifiés d'un régime comme celui de Kyoto soient conçus pour donner naissance à des échanges d'obligations et de droits affecte la nature même des problèmes d'équité à résoudre et les repères à utiliser pour juger de la justice d'une répartition. Dans le cas examiné, le marché est à la fois ce qui rend possible politiquement la prise en compte de critères d'équité et transforme le problème d'un problème de justice topique en un problème de justice globale qui oblige cependant à désenclaver le problème des droits à émettre des gaz à effet de serre.

For a long time, human beings have been wishing to improve the genetic composition of their generation and clearing it of some disabilities and defects, and this concern has always been pursued in different ways in different eras. The existence of authoritarian and racist policies and discriminatory methods in the old Eugenics made it easy to rule that it was immoral, but it is somewhat difficult to judge the liberal and new Eugenics because one group, citing the scientific contexts and social contexts resulting from the advances in genetics and the values of liberal societies, dictates its moralization, while the other group, despite these contexts, still retains the relevant ethical challenges. One of these important challenges is the violation of the principle of justice, albeit in a different way than in the past. Injustice in the old Eugenics was discriminatory due to the imposition of a Eugenics program on a particular class, and the manifestation of injustice in the new Eugenics is that by prescribing that its benefits belong to certain classes, it is not possible for the public to benefit from it. The author of this article believes that various ethical challenges still exist in the liberal and modern Eugenics program with a focus on the principle of justice, and the present article seeks to identify, examine and analyze them from a point of view. The findings of this paper are that some of the ethical considerations related to the application of the principle of justice to Eugenics are: 1. Although some solutions may be effective at some level, it is not possible to provide an absolute and general solution for all cases of breeding.

Discursive theories of justice have been questioned for putting forward high-level principles that should nevertheless play a role in practical discourses in which the justice of a claim is at stake. Here, I will critically examine and systematize the main tenets in Rawls’s and Habermas’s discursive theories, and will suggest that the principles of justice (Rawls) and universalization (Habermas) can and play the role of mandates of optimalization in real deliberations on justice.

This paper offers a reflective discussion on the psychological aspects of conflict and how Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) practitioners involved in mediation can effectively identify and address the psychological aspects of conflicts as a way ensuring that the process achieves lasting outcomes for the parties. This is because in almost all conflicts, there are usually underlying needs of the parties to have the root causes of the conflict fully addressed to avoid recurrence of the problem. Arguably, the ability of any mediator to identify and address these aspects will not only boost their reputation as competent mediators but will also go a long way in helping parties negotiate meaningfully and achieve outcomes that are win-win and long lasting. The author thus offers some thoughts on how mediators can achieve this.

This paper discusses the concept of empowerment in the context of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 with a view to demonstrating how Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) can be employed as a tool for the empowerment of the Kenyan People to boost their participation in conflict management, governance matters, and improve the socioeconomic aspects of their lives. The discourse conceptualizes empowerment in the context of Kenya, based on the various elements of the same. It highlights the main challenges hampering efforts to empower the Kenyan people and proposes the way forward. The paper ends by suggesting ways in which empowerment can be achieved for the Kenyan people, for the realisation of an environment based on the values of human rights, equality, freedom, democracy, social justice and the rule of law as envisaged in the preamble to the current Constitution of Kenya 2010.

With the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms and Traditional Dispute Resolution Mechanisms (TDRMs) in managing natural resource conflicts was formalised. The Constitution envisages a situation where conflicts, and specifically the natural resource ones, should first be dealt with using ADR and TDRMs and only resort to court where necessary. Communities are required to make legitimate attempts to resolve the matter using the most appropriate mechanisms available to them. Despite this, there has not been evidence of genuine attempts at taking up these processes in managing natural resource conflicts, which are still prevalent and a cause of concern. While singling out negotiation and mediation, the author examines the opportunities that ADR mechanisms and particularly negotiation and mediation present in realising the goal of effective management of natural resource conflicts in Kenya through discussing the advanta...

This paper examines the current trends, successes and challenges facing the arbitration institutions in Africa. Due to the importance of international arbitration and its ever growing popularity across the world, it is important that the African Continent, being a key global economic partner is not left behind in entrenching the practice of arbitration in settling international commercial disputes. The author analyses the international arbitration institutions in the East African region with a view to highlighting the state of legal and institutional frameworks for the effective determination of international disputes through arbitration. The discussion highlights some of the emerging trends with regard to the users of international arbitration in the region. The ultimate goal is to recommend ways of reawakening arbitral institutions for development of arbitration in the East African region and Africa as a whole.

In this article, we argue that migrants’ socio-legal experiences in the places where they settle are formed in interaction with how local residents morally reason about the law. Specifically, based on nine months of fieldwork in an impoverished Italian town, we argue that aligning with how local residents approach the law, including when they justify disobeying it, matters a great deal for migrants’ lives. Focusing on the workings of a reception center for asylum seekers, we first show how local residents regularly support various violations of the law by referring to alternative—and in their view higher—principles of justice. Migrants find themselves caught up in these local moral tensions, at times even becoming involved in illegal practices unbeknownst to them. We then show how migrants’ reactions to the marginality of the law in the town affect their access to local support. Those who align with local nonlegal moral norms obtain access to opportunities, while those who in similar situations invoke the primacy of legality tend to experience ostracization. By investigating the dynamic role of local moralities in situated interaction, this article contributes to both the sociology of morality and the sociology of migration. It shows how moral decision-making processes can and should be studied in their collective dimension, beyond individual-level experiments. Further, with its focus on processes of moral (mis)alignment, it allows us to grasp how place matters for migrants’ lives beyond overly general notions of ‘hostile’ versus ‘hospitable’ localities.

The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 is the Supreme law of the land, a principle entrenched under Article 2 thereof. Kenya has in place an Arbitration Act to define the scope, responsibilities and limitations of arbitral tribunals so as to allow parties determine disputes in a manner consistent with law. Against the backdrop of the constitutional supremacy, the author argues that while Article 159(2) of the Constitution acknowledges the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms, arbitration practice in Kenya must be carried out in a manner consistent with constitutional principles and values. Any deviation from such manner can potentially be challenged as unconstitutional and thus invalid. This is important in ensuring that arbitration remains relevant even in the current constitutional dispensation. Examined in this paper is the interpretation of the concept of constitutional supremacy by Kenyan courts. This paper examines constitutional supremacy in Kenya and its likely im...

Rapid changes in university structure and mission present various conflicts that require effective management. This study evaluated the effectiveness of distributive bargaining, integrative bargaining, and interactive problem solving models of conflict resolution in facilitating positive change in student's intergroup expectancies and attitudes. 120 undergraduate students of Kenyatta University took part in the study. Data were collected using questionnaires and oral interviews. The findings revealed that conflict resolution approaches that increase optimistic expectancies and perceptions of greater compatib ility between the positions, interests, and needs of disputants may be more useful for a wide range of conflicts. Recommendations for practice and further research are g iven.

The concept of efficiency has great importance in the literature of law and economics. Amongst different efficiency criteria, Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency Criterion has received several positive and negative comments. A fundamental issue in economic analysis of law is to change laws for obtaining more efficient laws. Kaldor-Hicks criterion claims that in certain circumstances, it is possible to change available rules for obtaining more economic benefit and efficiency, while this change may create loss to some specific groups. This question has specific practical importance; since, legal and social decisions should be made according to advantages and disadvantages and their impact on different classes of society. In fact, those suggesting this criterion have offered a rule for making collective decisions that are not applicable by Pareto criterion. In this regard, Kaldor-Hicks criterion is observed as basis for making social decisions and changing laws. However, applying this criterion has other consequences as well that attracts critical attentions. The present article attempts to evaluate these critiques with respect to technical issues and incoherence, moral principles, political decision making and social justice.

Rawls scholarship has not paid much attention to Rawls's early methodological writings so far, pretty much focusing on thereflective equilibrium(RE) which he is understood to have adopted inA Theory of Justice. Nelson Goodman's coherence-theoretical formulations concerning the justification of inductive logic inFact, Fiction and Forecasthave been suggested as the source of the RE. Following Rawls's methodological development in his early works, we shall challenge both these views. Our analysis reveals that the basic elements of RE can be located in his ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ essay. We shall further show that the origins of RE go all the way back to Aristotle's methods of ethics, as RE accords with the methodology entitledsaving the appearances(SA) in recent Aristotle scholarship.

In this article I examine the importance of self-respect in the justification of Rawls's theory of justice. First, I present two elements that are part of the contemporary debate on self-respect as a form of self-worth-namely, moral status and merit. Second, I specify the bases that support self-respect within A Theory of Justice. Finally, I discuss at length the function of self-respect in justifying the principles of justice. This inquiry implies an analysis of the relationship between self-respect and the component parts of the two principles of justice: basic liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle. I also explore the connection between self-respect and the sense of justice in light of the stability argument, and how the relationship between the two is important for achieving social stability.

This article is a defense of John Rawls against recent criticism, ironically my own, though it is also a critique insofar as it addresses a problem that Rawls never does. The original charges were that Rawls’s decision procedure for ethics does not justify his own moral principles, especially those making up his liberal conception of justice, and that the underlying problem may well keep the decision procedure from justifying any moral principles whatsoever, or at least any normatively useful ones. These difficulties are manifested in the work of Rawls as the dogmatism of championing a distinctive conception of justice, a liberal one as he himself calls it, through a justification model that comes across as too objective to permit such a bias and too universal to support any substantive conclusions at all. The solution contemplated here is to position the decision procedure as a justification model responsive to moral progress, and thereby equally open to all moral input, thus removing the inconsistency between the inherent universalism of the design and the distinctive character of the outcome, including the moral principles Rawls himself recommends, so long as they are consistent with moral progress.

If “x” then “y.” This simple formula of logic is often used metaphorically to demonstrate one of the most deeply rooted phenomena about human moral action, the principle of retribution, or retributive justice. Most religions, societies, and their corresponding systems of justice, and most personal relationships, seem governed by the simple rule that if one does evil, then he should reap punishment, while if one does good, she should reap reward. However, for those who hold to the authority of the biblical revelation, it raises the question, “How does the God of the Bible relate to this principle of justice?” Or from a more human perspective, “is there some other justice, outside of retribution, that applies to the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as He interacts with mankind?” This paper will endeavor to find answers to those two questions in three Old Testament Wisdom books: Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job.

G.A. Cohen has produced one of the most sharply focused examinations of John Rawls’s political philosophy. Cohen has pointed out that Rawlsian constructivism made the concept of justice depend on factual considerations, like those pertaining to the functioning of free market or those linked to features of human psychology. The same method is also the cause of merging justice with other values or social ideals, like efficiency or stability. One reason for these confusions is the preferred construction procedure, the idea of selecting the principle of justice in the original position. This idea sets unjustified constraints to the concept of justice. Cohen states that this procedure cannot offer fundamental normative principles about what justice requires but only rules of regulation for a liberal society. At the same time, Cohen anticipates the possibility of a factless constructivism. In this study I analyze this possibility and come to a conclusion which is different from what Cohen predicts that this version of constructivism will yield. A revised original position in line with the idea of removing facts from the normative theory of justice will not provide the convergence towards egalitarianism assumed by Cohen. I will argue that the revision a factless constructivism might propose can be justified if it better secures the impartiality of the debate. The principles chosen in the original position and each distribution resulted afterwards should not be affected by arbitrary factors from a moral point of view, such as aspects reflecting a kind of natural lottery. Principles of justice have to be more than a way to secure equal initial distributive shares. They should function as instruments that can mitigate arbitrary influences exerted upon future distributions as well.

This article is a critique of the ethical justification model that John Rawls employs in his defense of a liberal conception of justice. Rawls is famous for two things: his attempt to ground morality in rationality and his conception of justice as fairness. His work has been resounding on both fronts, the first constituting the justificatory framework for the second. Yet from the beginning, the outcome has been more doctrinaire than the method should have allowed with design details promising objectivity. This article goes to that beginning, or to a reasonable proxy for it anyway, in the “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” (1951), with the aim of exposing and examining the discrepancy where it originates. The goal is not to prey on the earliest version of an initiative later undergoing revision but to identify and investigate the inception of a systematic bias that is retained rather than revised in subsequent iterations. The conclusion is that the decision procedure comes across as too objective to favor a liberal conception of justice over competing alternatives and too universal to identify, produce, or support specific moral principles informing a normative ethical system.

АННОТАЦИЯ
В статье дается определение правовому понятию «правосудие», для чего анализируется российская и абхазская юридическая литература. Рассматриваются взаимоотношения таких правовых как понятий «правосудие» и «судебная власть». Проводится исследование основополагающих принципов правосудия и отмечаются особенности их реализации в Республики Абхазии.

ABSTRACT
The article defines the legal concept of "justice", for which the Russian and Abkhazian legal literature are analyzed. The relationship of such legal concepts as "justice" and "judicial power" is considered. A study of the basic principles of justice is under way and specifics of their implementation in the Republic of Abkhazia are noted.

КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА:
СУДЕБНАЯ ВЛАСТЬ, ПРАВОСУДИЕ, ПРИНЦИПЫ ПРАВОСУДИЯ, РЕСПУБЛИКА АБХАЗИЯ, АБХАЗИЯ, JUDICIAL POWER, JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE, REPUBLIC OF ABKHAZIA, ABKHAZIA

‘It will take us (judges) three years and eight months to hear and determine cases pending before the High Court even without new matters being filed. Therefore, the judiciary is encouraging adoption of Alternative Disputes Resolution mechanisms in line with the Constitution because resolution of disputes will be easier and faster through alternative disputes resolution methods like arbitration and reduce case backlog in courts’
High Court Judge, Lady Justice Jacqueline Kamau, 2015.

Power is a dynamic that every mediation practitioner and academic will have confronted at some stage. Much has been written on the nature and types of power, and the implications of power differences for participants, the mediator and the process itself. How ...

Arbitral institutions play an important role in the growth and development of international arbitration the world over. They are tasked with promoting and safeguarding the discipline, both through ensuring development of sound legal framework and facilitating the practice of arbitration and other Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms. While international arbitration is ‘international’ in nature, various regional blocks have developed arbitral institutions that target particular economic areas and take care of commercial disputes in that area. While these institutions have been established under various legal regimes, they strive to maintain professional standards that correspond to the international best practices in arbitration. The authors, in this paper, critically discuss the potential of the Nairobi Centre for International Arbitration in promoting effective management of commercial disputes in Kenya and the African region as a whole. The paper offers recommendations on how to tackle the potential challenges that the Centre is likely to encounter in discharging its statutory mandate of facilitating and encouraging the conduct of international commercial arbitration in accordance with the Act, and administering domestic and international arbitrations as well as alternative dispute resolution techniques under its auspices.

Posner adopted the economic principle of wealth maximization as a guiding principle for the dispensation of justice. This resulted in his endorsing the Kaldor-Hicks principle (also known as the potential Paretian improvement principle) as a basis for just laws. This article explores whether this principle is an adequate basis for environmental law. As can be deduced from Fleming, the legal approach adopted by Posner is by no means new because early British tort law was applied in a manner intended to foster economic growth. Nevertheless, the wealth maximization principle is not adequate as a basis for just environmental laws because for one thing it ignores questions involving changes in income distribution. Consequently, Rawls’ principle of justice is examined and compared with that of Posner. The role of property rights in relation to the state of the environment is assessed in the light of Posner’s principle of justice, as is Coase’s theorem supporting a clear definite allocation of private property rights as a solution to environmental problems. Furthermore, in this context, the justification for the taking of private property by the state is examined. It is argued that additional factors to wealth maximization and income distribution must be taken into account in determining whether laws are just. In addition, it is suggested that it is not the sole purpose of the law to dispense justice.

In the first section of the study we deal with the organization of justice principles.
Afterward, we examine how people experienced the social changes brought about by the
transitions, and what images of society they use to describe their world. In the third section we
analyze the relationship between the images of society and justice principles. In all three
sections, we utilize a unique logic: the two cross-sectional analyses are handled in a dynamic
way. By this we mean that we compare not only the 1991 and 1996 data sets with one another,
but we also introduce how the respondents would have responded in 1991, should they have
been subject to the 1996 social environment and opinion spectrum. In this way, each section
incorporates a three-way comparison: the 1991 responses can be compared with the 1991
opinion spectrum, which has been modified by incorporating the 1996 results. Further, we can
examine to what degree changes in ideology, opinion, and values can be attributed to changes
in the social environment or to changes in the way of thinking and evaluations of respondents.
By incorporating 1996 data into the analysis of 1991 data, we reduce the role of social changes
in the explanation of opinions, and as such, the ideologies from the 1991 survey can be
compared with the 1996 data in a way which reflects changes in the evaluation process instead
of changes resulting from objective processes.