Philosophy of Human Rights

V roce 1989 jsme toužili po svobodě a demokracii. V následujících letech jsme proto začali přebírat řadu demokratických a konstitucionalistických institutů a principů od našich západních sousedů, které se postupně staly součástí našeho právního řádu. Tyto principy a instituty však byly často přijímány bez hlubší společenské debaty a ne vždy jsme plně chápali jejich význam. Předkládaná kniha se vrací k samotným základům ústavní demokracie a usiluje o objasnění významu jejích klíčových konstitucionalistických prvků. Autor, politický teoretik s desetiletou praktickou zkušeností z působení u Ústavního soudu, si klade řadu zásadních otázek: Proč o současné demokracii často hovoříme jako o ústavní či liberální? Jaké jsou meze tohoto politického režimu? Co přesně označuje pojem konstitucionalismus? Jak ústavní soudnictví proměňuje podobu demokratického vládnutí? Jaké myšlenky a hodnoty stojí v pozadí principu dělby moci? Jak vznikla lidská práva a v čem spočívá jejich fundamentální význam? A proč se lidská důstojnost stala ústřední hodnotou moderního konstitucionalismu? Publikace představuje mimořádně cenný příspěvek k současnému bádání, zejména díky hloubce teoretické reflexe základních stavebních prvků, na nichž spočívá ústavní demokracie. Autorem je Jiří Baroš, politický teoretik působící na Katedře politologie Fakulty sociálních studií Masarykovy univerzity v Brně.

El texto problematiza desde un enfoque feminista liberal la lucha de las mujeres en México para que se les reconocieran los derechos políticos en la Constitución de 1917 así como los argumentos esgrimidos por los actores políticos en ese momento para que no se asentara en la Carta Magna mexicana la posibilidad de la mujer para votar y ser votadas.

This article offers a critical review of John Rawls's 1955 essay Two Concepts of Rules and argues that a full understanding of his mature work requires examining his early philosophical development. The central hypothesis posits that Rawls's analysis of constitutive rules is essential for understanding the epistemic foundations of his later theory of justice. A key distinction is that drawn between justifying an action that falls within a rule (or practice) and justifying the rule itself. This distinction allowed Rawls to defend utilitarianism against its critics, highlighting their logical misunderstanding of how this theory evaluates actions. Furthermore, the article argues that Rawls's early concern with practices and social institutions directly influenced his subsequent interest in the basic structure of society, developed in A Theory of Justice. Ultimately, it reveals Rawls's nascent attention to the evaluation of systems of rules that shape social practices, rather than focusing solely on individual actions, representing a crucial step in the elaboration of his theory.

Bill Bowring’s presentation of ‘Misunderstanding MacIntyre on Human Rights,’ centers on three main points namely; first, MacIntyre’s Critics and Supporters of Human Rights, second, MacIntyre’s presupposition of Aristotelian conceptions on Human Rights as ‘socially embodied and located in history,’ and third, Human Rights as Substantive rather than Procedural.

The aim of this Article is to address some of the normative, as opposed to the purely metaphysical, issues raised by Michael Moore's analysis of the criminal law's act requirement. On several occasions, Professor Moore himself recognizes the role of ethics in finally settling issues of the application of the metaphysics of action to the criminal law. For example, he acknowledges that, ultimately, moral criteria are needed to determine whether an event is the consequence of a basic act or its circumstance. 1 Moreover, he explains that the orthodox view of Bentham and Austin (that in addition to a basic action, all crimes involve but two dimensions: circumstance and result) 2 is based on practical, and not metaphysical, concerns.' Moore argues that it is compatible with his metaphysical realism to accept that the categories of actions applied by the criminal law-killing, mayhem, assault, theft, fraud, etc.-are conventional: they do not denote natural events or kinds, but rather are concepts that have their origins in the practical interests of beings of our kind. 4 Moore's appreciation of the role of ethics and practical concerns in this area is commendable. Given the practical ends of the criminal law in a democracy, it is not only expedient but also desirable to avoid using the metaphysics of action as much as possible in the public realm. High metaphysics, including the metaphysics of action, is one area on which citizens in a democracy (including those within the legal community) cannot agree, even under the best of circumstances. Insofar as it is necessary to turn to metaphysics, it should be as a last resort, and then only to the degree necessary to resolve judicial and moral issues. Metaphysics ' See id. at 183. Vermont has adopted a duty to rescue statute. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973) (requiring one to give reasonable assistance to someone

Rights entail corresponding negative duties not to violate those rights. On this, all rights theorists agree. Yet, in our non-ideal world, these negative duties and thereby persons' rights are pervasively violated. What duties are there to right-holders whose rights are under threat and are violated? There is substantial disagreement among rights theorists here on whether rights also entail positive duties to protect and assist the right-holder if and when their rights are threatened and violated. While the Interest Justification of Rights supports such positive duties, defenders of the Inviolable Moral Status Justification of Rights reject them. On this latter view, all persons have an inviolable moral status that gives rise to particularly robust rights and stringent negative duties, but not additional positive duties, which are not necessary to reflect inviolability. This article challenges that view by demonstrating that positive duties to protect and assist right-holders against rights violations are in fact grounded by that very same justification invoked to ground robust rights and stringent negative duties: the inviolable moral status of persons.

Since the work of Elizabeth Anscombe, especially her landmark 1958 essay “Modern Moral Philosophy,” the movement known as “virtue ethics” has blossomed in the Anglophone academic world. We have not space here to recount the history of virtue ethics, which is sufficiently well-known and recent enough, nor will we extol its many virtues. I wish instead to identify an important problem that has plagued virtue ethics since its inception and to offer something of a solution. The problem to which I am referring is the inability of many virtue ethicists to understand properly the relationship between law and virtue. This essay unfolds in four sections. First, I discuss the causes of this failure among virtue ethicists to see clearly the connection between law and virtue. Second, I draw upon both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, two crucial sources for virtue ethics, to understand how law functions as a necessary foundation for virtue; we will argue that law is a training in and support for virtuous action, while virtue in turn perfects the law by bringing out its full dynamism and intelligibility. Third, I continue to discuss Aristotle’s understanding of law and virtue by appealing to his distinction between natural and legal justice, and I offer an Aristotelian account of how one comes to know the natural law. Finally, fourth, I develop points from the ancient craft analogy to virtue. Just as skillful activity is founded upon rules but transcends mechanical rule-following behavior, so too virtuous actions are founded upon law but transcend mere law-abiding behavior. This section shows that our account does not violate the so-called “non-codifiability” thesis, nor does it fall into law or rule “fetishism.”

This book is the first to examine in minutiae the politics of Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) and his connections with various traditions of far-right and fascist thought. Frege was a philosopher of logic, language, and mathematics. But he also believed that one could reconcile the politics of the far right with a firm commitment to reason-guided inquiry and scientific objectivity. The fundamental claim of the text is that Gottlob Frege was, from the early 1890s to the mid-1920s, an antidemocratic, nationalist political thinker and that his political thought eventually took on a fascist character. This book makes no attempt to vilify or demonize Gottlob Frege, nor does it try to rescue him from criticism. It simply seeks to tell the truth about Frege's descent into fascism: to document it in hitherto unprecedented detail; to situate it in the context of intellectual and political debates in early Weimar-era Germany; and to explain how it could have happened that someone so intelligent and so manifestly devoted to reason and logic could have embraced fascism with such unreserved enthusiasm. Frege and Fascism will be of interest to scholars of analytic philosophy, intellectual history, fascism, and anti-democratic thought.

This essay takes the European refugee crisis and the corresponding heated public moral market as a prime example to reflect upon a central moral conflict. It suggests that the present debate offers a clash between an absolute, limitless moral universalism with an ethos respecting the legitimacy of particular interests. In this conflict it argues for the recognition of plural, yet limited realms ofhuman responsibility which - at the same time - need to be challenged by universal claims. The essay criticizes the German Churches for losing sight of real limits, far over-stretching the notion of "world-responsibility" and for denying an unavoidable and unsolvable conflict: the universal claim for human rights can only be substantiated in reallife in concrete national states built upon particular interests. Against this background, the essay itself pleads for moral realism, which refrains from dissolving the tension between universalism and particular interests to either side.

Ein radikaler moralischer Universalismus prägt die Haltung der deutschen Kirchen in der Flüchtlingskrise, meint Günter Thomas. Der Professor für Systematische Theologie in Bochum fordert dagegen einen moralischen Realismus, der auch partikulare Interessen berücksichtigt und damit den Anforderungen realer Endlichkeit entspricht.

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La situation contemporaine de l’humanité se caractérise par un rétrécissement de notre monde. Ce dernier induit deux prises de conscience irrémédiablement liées et cependant contradictoires : d’une part celle de l’unité de notre monde et de sa finitude, et d’autre part celle de la diversité humaine. La contemporanéité  se situe en quelque sorte entre le « village global»  et un « archipel planétaire » , entre « un monde »  et le « choc des civilisations » , entre le « global » et le « local » . Ainsi la réflexion sur l’unité et la diversité humaine, qui constitue le cœur des interrogations anthropologiques, redevient centrale. Les défis de l’altérité, de la complexité et de l’interculturalité se font plus pressants. Et aucun de ces trois pôles ne semble pouvoir être privilégié par rapport aux autres. L’anthropologie du Droit  est plus particulièrement interpellée : enracinée dans le droit dont l’approche moderne se veut universaliste et dans l’anthropologie qui privilégie des approches plus relativistes et travaillant sur des questions contemporaines brûlantes quant à la transformation du champ socio-juridique à l’ère de la globalisation, elle est confrontée au défi de penser le pluralisme. Le pluralisme n’est ni l’universalisme, ni le relativisme . Ce n’est pas non plus un juste milieu entre les deux. C’est plutôt une situation où des visions du monde et de son organisation, toutes également légitimes, coexistent, et où l'on ne peut pas déterminer un point de vue juste qui devrait s’imposer à tous. On ne peut pas non plus se retrancher dans un simple relativisme qui ouvrirait la pente savonneuse pouvant conduire d’un droit à la différence à un droit à l’indifférence  - notre vivre ensemble est en jeu. Si le pluralisme ne permet pas la certitude du point de vue juste dont l’imposition à tous serait légitime il nous oblige à trouver d’autres fondements à notre praxis juridique.

Nous tenterons dans les pages suivantes de proposer quelques pistes pour repenser un Droit pluraliste en nous appuyant sur une réflexion sur les droits de l’homme face à la contemporanéité.

À l’aube du troisième millénaire les phénomènes de mondialisation ou globalisation, tout en faisant rétrécir notre monde nous font de plus en plus prendre conscience de sa diversité et nous lancent ainsi le défi de repenser nos paradigmes pour entrer en relation avec l’“Autre”, pour inventer avec lui un avenir partagé. Si la condition préalable la plus évidente pour ce faire  est de dégager des voies nous permettant de nous émanciper de notre ethnocentrisme, il nous semble que ceci n’est possible qu’à travers l’émancipation des paradigmes relativiste et universaliste. Il ne suffit plus aujourd’hui de penser en termes d’unité ou de diversité. Nous devons plutôt apprendre à penser ensemble unité et diversité et ainsi nous engager sur les voies d’un pluralisme sain. Il nous semble que le topos des Droits de l’Homme est particulièrement pertinent pour commencer à déblayer une telle voie. En effet, les Droits de l’Homme, représentent pour l’instant le discours global dominant quant à “la bonne vie” mais sont en même temps de plus en plus questionnés par différentes traditions culturelles - et le dilemme entre universalisme et relativisme semble insurmontable...

Chaque culture est un mode unique d’interprétation ou de relation au monde et par là est source potentielle d’enrichissement pour toutes les autres cultures, voir pour une culture planétaire. Mais pour concrétiser cet enrichissement potentiel, pour permettre une hybridation bénéfique des cultures, il faut d’une part respecter la diversité pluripolaire des cultures, mais il faut d’autre part instaurer un dialogue entre ces cultures, dialogue qui nécessite une tolérance réciproque et un objet commun, et de plus peut être des “traducteurs interculturels”.

Les droits de l’homme semblent fournir un tel objet de dialogue commun: d’abord parce qu’ils se veulent universels et sont donc censés concerner tous les êtres humains de toutes les cultures; puis parce qu’on peut peut-être plus parler à leur sujet de “requis” que d’ “acquis”, et les voir comme véritable “défi” pour l’humanité pour qu’elle devienne plus “humaine” puisqu’ils sont pour le moment loin d’être universellement respectés et apparaissent plus comme de simples voeux pieux que comme véritables droits, voir comme “symbole universel assez puissant pour susciter la compréhension et l’accord” de tous (Panikkar) ”; enfin, parce que leur objet si délicat, si important et si universel l’“Homme” et l’”Humanité”, semble exiger qu’ils soient enrichis par un dialogue entre les cultures. L’anthropologue du droit pourra peut être servir d’interprète interculturel et pourra contribuer à l’élaboration d’un forum de dialogue interculturel.

“قُلْ شيئًا عن البحر” يطلب أساف عيني من فتى يجلس أمام الكاميرا. يبتسم الفتى ويردّ: “غدّار، البحر غدّار”
يعود اهتمام عيني بالبحر إلى قصة هجرة جدّه إلى إسرائيل من الدار البيضاء، مدينة مرافئ في المغرب. عند وصوله إلى البلاد طلب أن يسكن بالقرب من البحر. لم تتحقق رغبته هذه فأرسلته السلطات في حينه للعيش في مستوطنة في وبسبب شغفه الذي لم يكتمل بمجاورة البحر، راح الجد، الذي كان يعمل مزارعًا، يصنع منحوتات مكسوّة بالمحار والسفن. ينسج هذا التوق إلى البحر العاصف الذي لا يسكن وإخفاءه في عمل فني روايةً واحدة من بين تفسيرات عدّة يطرحها هذا الكتاب.

V článku sleduji tři vzájemně provázané cíle. Prvním z nich je prostřednictvím hohfeldovského rozboru pojmu práva vyjasnit, co se má na mysli, přisuzujeme-li politické autoritě obecné právo vládnout (prostřednictvím právních norem) a adresátům jejích rozhodnutí obecnou povinnost poslušnosti těmto normám. V tomto ohledu se jako klíčové jeví pečlivé odlišování legálních vs. morálních práv a povinností. Zadruhé budu argumentovat, že v kontrastu se standardním přístupem v politické a právní teorii interpretujícím právo vládnout jako hohfeldovský nárok a povinnost poslušnosti jako hohfeldovskou povinnost, přičemž tyto pozice jsou chápány jako symetrické a neodlučitelné ("korelativní"), je případnější zaměřit se na hohfeldovský vliv a jemu odpovídající otevřenost. To má dále za následek opuštění předpokladu obsahové bezpodmínečnosti a preemptivnosti rozhodnutí autority. Zatřetí, v protikladu k většině soudobých příspěvků zdůrazňuji, že morálka nemůže zůstat teoretickou černou skříňkou, jejíž obsah a platnost se v debatách o legitimní autoritě předpokládá, a ukazuji, jakým způsobem lze toto šedé místo zaplnit. Výklad a argumentace v textu jsou motivovány snahou najít stabilní teoretickou pozici, která nesklouzává ani k přijetí "sebechápání státu" jako v případě standardního přístupu, ani k "noční můře" filosofického anarchismu.

Předmluva ke knize Vladimír Čermák. Člověk -filosof -soudce, jejímž autorem je současný (2010) rektor Masarykovy univerzity Petr Fiala, nese název "Integrální osobnost Vladimíra Čermáka". To je ve své podstatě jen explicitněji formulovaná verze podtitulu celé knihy, a přestože pětistránková předmluva nemůže sama o sobě takto kompletní portrét nabídnout -a její autor si pochopitelně takový nárok ani nečiní -, po přečtení všech 290 stran naplněných odbornou interpretací Čermákova díla, vzpomínkami kolegů, studentů a blízkých přátel, ohlédnutím za jeho působením v roli soudce Ústavního soudu ČR i výběrem jeho publicistické tvorby dá čtenář editorovi i autorovi předmluvy s největší pravděpodobností za pravdu. Recenzovaná kniha v editorské péči Jiřího Baroše vyšla v nedávno otevřené edici Masarykovy univerzity Pocta osobnostem a jako taková představuje poněkud svébytný žánr, z pohledu recenzenta ne zcela snadný k uchopení: Nejde zde totiž o příspěvek do probíhajících odborných diskusí, ani o pokus postavit proti jednomu systematickému výkladu společnosti jiný, ani zcela nejobecněji o snahu přesvědčit publikum o vlastní "pravdě". V souladu s charakterem knihy proto ani tato recenze neusiluje v prvé řadě o kritické posouzení jejího pestrého obsahu, nýbrž v prvé řadě o jeho přiblížení, a v důsledku tedy i o připomenutí díla samotného Vladimíra Čermáka. Kniha je rozdělena do tří rozsahem víceméně srovnatelných částí. Po zmiňované Předmluvě následuje nejdelší, a z hlediska základní orientace v Čermákově díle i myšlenkovém systému nejzásadnější část, nazvaná "Vladimír Čermák jako filosof a soudce", jejímž autorem je Jiří Baroš. Jeho text, založený na diplomové práci obhájené na Právnické fakultě MU, tvoří převážnou většinu první části knihy, a přestože Baroš si klade spíše skromné cíle, nabízeje dle svých slov "svého druhu pomůcku, jak se s Čermákem -filosofem a soudcem -seznámit," je zřejmé, že ke zpřístupnění poměrně komplexního politického a právního myšlení V. Čermáka je člověkem více než povolaným. Multioborové vzdělání a znalosti samotného Čermáka (zahrnující

Heidegger and his followers claimed to have revolutionized philosophy in the second half of the 20th century. But his legacy has been gradually challenged as further research has demonstrated how much his philosophy cannot be dissociated from his political engagement in support of Nazism. The publication beginning in 2014 (and still ongoing at the time this writing) of Heidegger’s Black Notebooks, written between 1931 and 1970, has been the latest evidence of the intimate relationship between Heideggerian philosophy and Nazi ideology.

For a long time, the philosopher inspired far-right thinkers the world over, from Europe to Russia and even Iran. Heidegger’s concept of Dasein posits national identify in a specifically primitivist racial-cultural Volkishness. In the context of Heidegger’s writings after Hitler took power, it is clear that his pre-1933 definition of Dasein fit neatly into the ideology of the emerging Nazi state and particularly that of the primitivist ideology of the Sturmabtllung (SA), and the later Ahnenerbe. The incorporation of his ideas offers an easy cachet to far-right ideologies in search of a source of philosophical legitimacy.

The concept of Dasein can indeed be read as a straightforward legitimation of a Volkish ontology: it calls for rootedness and nativity, arguing that every worldview is justified through its being anchored by a local identity, thereby destroying any idea of universalism. Heidegger’s language of the “end of philosophy” also fits an eschatological vision of the end of the Western world, a requiem for a dying world, and by a domino effect, the annunciation of the rebirth of anti-Western civilizations. The Dasein concept can then be repurposed for many different contexts: with a white-supremacist narrative for those hoping for a rebirth of the white race after its having been killed off by Western liberalism; or in a Russian version as done by the infamous geopolitician Alexander Dugin.

Dugin discovered Heidegger partly late in his intellectual journey. For a long time, the Russian ideologist was focused on classic figures of pro-Nazi traditionalism such as Julius Evola, and on the whole ideological construction of Nazi esotericism, before realizing how much Heidegger could offer to his theories. After several works about Heidegger were published in Russian (and at least one translated into English), and several translations of Heidegger were published in Russian, Dugin adopted the Dasein concept in his Fourth Political Theory (2009), which, in a sense, is a tribute to Heidegger’s engagement with a“spiritual” National Socialism. In this volume, our contributors address how the Black Notebooks have dramatically reshuffled the deck of Heidegger studies (Richard Wolin), how Heidegger has been read in the Soviet-Russian context (Michail Maiatsky), and how Dugin has been reading Heidegger’s philosophy, projecting his own interpretation back into the Western far-right world (Emmanuel Faye).

The nature and sources of rights and duties have continued to generate interest among scholars and intellectuals across disciplines such as philosophy, law, political theory, and ethics. Joseph Raz is one of those scholars who theorized about rights and duties. According to him, there are two kinds of rights: Core rights and Derivative rights. He claims that Core rights are grounds for duties and duties impose a command for an action. Raz argues that interests justify rights, while rights justify duties, and that it is possible for duty-bearers to resolve dilemmas on account of attenuating circumstances, rather than on account of the grounding dependency of duty-bearing in relation to the rights-claim. This paper, therefore, investigates the conflict between Core and Derivative rights and examines the distinction between Core right in relation to the conflict of rights by Raz. It critically appraises the logic of resolving conflicts of rights and duties and argues that rights and duties cannot be mapped upon the logic of grounding. We shall argue that rights and interest do not share equivalence, but that rights certainly entail duties, and the grounds for duties need not follow from the interest of rights.

The drive for recognition, I argue here, is a normative claim inherent in the many polysemic uses of human rights around the world. By critically re-reading Axel Honneth's theory of recognition with the anthropological literature on human rights, I wish to observe how conceptions of universal dignity and personhood are present in culturally situated struggles for political participation. This is neither the vernacularisation of canonical liberal ideas nor their careless strategic deployment in local contexts. On the other hand, actors on the margins speak the idiom of human rights to produce a contingent sense of self that is nevertheless universal in its ambition. In line with Honneth, I divide the ethnographic cases I consider into the institutional spheres of love, legality and solidarity to imagine three qualitatively different praxes of recognition. It is time to move beyond the dated universalism-versus-relativism debate. By shifting the focus to recognition, I hope to design an alternative theoretical scaffolding of human rights that makes sense of why the disenfranchised still use it, wherever and whenever they do, despite its persistent failures.

Wolff's cosmopolitanism derived from the idea every people must contribute as much as is possible and necessary to the perfection of other peoples because doing so contributes to their own perfection. One of the reasons why his cosmopolitanism never became influential can be found in the controversy about the concept of a world-encompassing citizenry (civitas maxima) during the decade after the publication of the Law of Nations (1749). Whereas thinkers such as Emer de Vattel rejected the concept, thinkers such as Michael Christoph Hanov and Hermann Friedrich Kahrel contested Wolff's suggestion that the civitas maxima should be regarded as a fiction. This article focuses on a particular aspect of this controversy. Kahrel eliminated the concept of fiction by assigning a central role to the presumption of goodness that was prominent in the early modern legal tradition and that can also be found in Wolff. I will use Kahrel's work as a point of comparison that helps to bring to light that Wolff's conception of cosmopolitan obligations is grounded in his views concerning the rationality of presumptions rather than in his problematic views about the role of fictions in natural law.

The german social theorist Hans Joas has put forward the thesis that the development of human rights is not to be traced back to anti-religious secularism: what we are talking about here is a peculiar process of sacralization, in the course of which an “aura of sacredness” is created around the members of modern societies. Kantian philosopher Otfried Höffe thinks that Joas strives to create an “affirmative genealogy”: i.e. the elaboration of a method following which we could get an overview of the “authentic history” of the development of human rights and acknowledge the claim to the validity of these rights at the same time. The theory of Joas is seen by Höffe as the unauthorized intervention of a sociologist into the area of rational philosophical argumentation. In my study, I’m trying to outline an answer on Höffe’s criticism. Firstly I’m demonstrating that according Joas’s view the normative philosophy can be replaced by a historical-sociological analysis. Instead, he was thinking in terms of a complementary relationship: he regarded that the involvement of the perspective of historical sociology had a seminal effect on the reconsideration of the familiar normative positions. Secondly that I’m trying to outline Joas’s normative theory in contrast of Habermas’s discourse theory. I’arguing that the outlined theory the development and maintenance of rational discourses depend on preserving certain social practices that evolve spontaneously: consequently, comprehensive social criticism cannot be purely based on the requirement of the discursive rationality. Finally, I will also highlight the problems and restraints of the “Joasian” normative theory.

This article presents a comparative reading of Schelling's Neue Deduktion des Naturrechts and Fichte's Grundlage des Naturrechts. Both thinkers adopt the idealist strategy of deducing right (Recht) from I-hood (Ichheit) and insist, as a result, that right neither derives from nor depends on the moral law. But while Fichte deduces right from the “pure I-hood” uncovered in intellectual intuition, Schelling deduces it from the “absolute I-hood” postulated by practical reason. This difference generates a disagreement regarding the derivative relationship between right and morality. Whereas Fichte assigns right (unlike morality) a merely conditional and limited practical validity, Schelling contends that right is as unconditionally and universally valid as the moral law.

Praca naukowa finansowana ze środków na naukę w latach 2006—2007 jako projekt badawczy nr 1 H01C 052 30Można zapytać w sposób uczony i chłodny: Czy wspólnotowa („polityczna”) aktywność bądź wspólnotowy („polityczny”) dystans, „polityczna” neutralność (fraza ta jest zaiste oksymoronem!) są właśnie „politycznym” zaangażowaniem twórczej wyobraźni i fantazji pisarza /artysty ? Czy są jednoznacznym wprzęgnięciem tego, co kreatywne, witalne, tętniące życiem i pulsem krwi do szalonego, pędzącego na złamanie karku rydwanu społecznych potrzeb, oddziaływań, oczekiwań, walk? I drugie pytanie: Czy owo zaangażowanie w sprawy wspólnoty, zaangażowanie wspólnotowe, a nie „polityczne”, bądź szlachetny dystans do nich są od razu zdradą sztuki, wiarołomstwem kreatora/poety? Szkic jest skromną próbą odpowiedzi na postawione tu pytania — przede wszystkim z perspektywy lektur Jungeriańskich, a także krokiem ku szerszemu zmierzeniu się z myślą Jüngera w kontekście fenomenu wspólnoty (nie w aspekcie proble...

Joseph Raz is among the most celebrated and influential scholars in the Anglophone legal-philosophical debate. This author’s thought occupies a less central place in Italy and, more generally, in the non-Anglophone world. Beginning with a reconstruction of the causes that produced this difference, this essay proposes a wide-ranging – and, for this reason, necessarily partial and superficial – reconstruction of Raz’s thought and its main problematic cores. In particular, the following will be critically discussed: 1) the Razian notion of “reason for action”; 2) the distinction between reasons of different levels; 3) the notion of authority and its relevance to law; and, finally, 4) the way Raz reconstructs the relations between law and morality. In general, one can view Raz’s thought as an attempt to defend through moral arguments an a-moral law, that is, a law whose individuation prescinds (must prescind) from moral criteria. Raz’s is perhaps the best possible version of legal positivism in a historical period when this legal-philosophical perspective no longer expresses the esprit du temps.

Nós consideramos estas verdades como evidentes por si mesmas: que todos os homens foram criados iguais, que foram dotados pelo Criador de certos direitos inalienáveis, que entre estes se encontram a vida a liberdade e a busca da felicidade". Declaração Unanime dos treze Estados Unidos da América, 4 de julho de 1776. A Assembleia Nacional reconhece e declara, na presença e sob os auspícios do Ser Supremo, os seguintes direitos do Homem e do Cidadão: Artigo 1º-Os homens nascem e são livres e iguais em direitos. As distinções sociais só podem fundar-se na utilidade comum. Artigo 2º-O fim de toda a associação política é a conservação dos direitos naturais e imprescritíveis do homem Declaração dos Direitos do Homem e do Cidadão da Revolução Francesa, 2 de outubro de 1789. A Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas proclama a presente "Declaração Universal dos Direitos do Homem" como o ideal comum a ser atingido por todos os povos e todas as nações, com o objetivo de que cada indivíduo e cada órgão da sociedade, tendo sempre em mente esta Declaração, se esforce, através do ensino e da educação, por promover o respeito a esses direitos e liberdades, e, pela adoção de medidas progressivas de caráter nacional e internacional, por assegurar o seu reconhecimento e a sua observância universais e efetivos, tanto entre os povos dos próprios Estados Membros, quanto entre os povos dos territórios sob sua jurisdição. Artigo 1. Todos os seres humanos nascem livres e iguais em dignidade e direitos. São dotados de razão e consciência e devem agir em relação uns aos outros com espírito de fraternidade. Artigo 2. I) Todo ser humano tem capacidade para gozar os direitos e as liberdades estabelecidos nesta Declaração sem distinção de qualquer espécie, seja de raça, cor, sexo, língua, religião, opinião política ou de outra natureza, origem nacional ou social, riqueza, nascimento, ou qualquer outra condição.

Saying that human dignity constitutes a problem may require explanation. It is in fact one of those things that we like to take for granted, and thus not to consider a problem. At the same time, paradoxically, we may be so sceptical about the possibility of bringing it into focus that we aren’t willing even to consider as amounting to a problem. Between these two extreme, but common, attitudes this article addresses the problem of identifying what human dignity is, what we mean by the expression and what we refer to when we intend what is meant by the expression. Discussions about this have often turned into a competition between different traditions and worldviews that provide incompatible ‘foundations’ for human dignity, a competition that seems to have to be ‘won’ before a discussion of the nature of human dignity can begin. Such competition misses the point that we must mean something by the word for us to find it meaningful in order to fight about it. The ‘problem’ of human dig...

W yd aw nictw o Naukowe Uniwersytetu M ikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2012, ss. 644 Mogłoby się wydawać, że kompetencje etnologa nie są wystarczające do rzetelnego zrecenzowania socjologicznej monografii wsi, jednak wydana w serii Monografie Fundacji na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej książka Michała Łuczewskiego jest pozycją o tyle ciekawą, że otwiera przed czytelnikiem wiele perspektyw interpretacyjnych. Autor wykorzystuje na rzędzia nie tylko socjologii, ale także antropologii i historii, łączy ponadto różne podejścia teoretyczne, proponując oryginalną metodę badań procesów tożsamościowych. Interdy scyplinarność badań oraz wielość możliwych odczytań czynią z Odwiecznego narodu... pozycję interesującą również (a może przede wszystkim) dla etnologów i folklorystów, i z tej perspektywy postaram się przyjrzeć monografii Michała Łuczewskiego. Po pierwsze: rozważania Łuczewskiego stanowią kontynuację ponadstuletnich ba dań nad wsią Żmiącą (woj. małopolskie, pow. limanowski, gm. Laskowa). Sam autor, powołując się na przegląd Michaela Burawoya1, nazywa ją "najdłużej badaną wsią na świecie" (s. 46). Historię zainteresowania ludzi nauki tą miejscowością rozpoczyna wizy ta Franciszka Bujaka w 1901 roku. Efektem badań socjologa jest, wydana w 1903 roku, pierwsza monografia wsi2, która stała się punktem odniesienia dla późniejszych badaczy Żmiącej. Należy wśród nich wymienić Piotra Stacha (historyk, opisał Żmiącą w latach 1941-45), Tomasza Rykałę (pracował nad ekonomiczną monografią wsi), Czesława Blajdę (nauczyciel, etnograf-amator) oraz Stanisława Ossowskiego i Stanisława Nowaka, których badania podjął Zbigniew Wierzbicki, autor kolejnej monografii miejscowości3, wydanej dokładnie 60 lat po ukazaniu się pracy Bujaka. Wiele opisów wsi pozostawili także lokalni inteligenci, m.in. nauczycielka Zofia Oleksy czy Małgorzata Sromek4. Książka Łuczewskiego wpisuje się zatem w długą historię badań Żmiącej, stanowiąc trzecią jej monografię. Autor, mając świadomość niezwykłości sytuacji, w jakiej znajduje się pisząc re-revisit, czyli monografię po-powtómą (s. 51), deklaruje, że dystansuje się wo-1

W yd aw nictw o Naukowe Uniwersytetu M ikołaja Kopernika, Toruń 2012, ss. 644 Mogłoby się wydawać, że kompetencje etnologa nie są wystarczające do rzetelnego zrecenzowania socjologicznej monografii wsi, jednak wydana w serii Monografie Fundacji na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej książka Michała Łuczewskiego jest pozycją o tyle ciekawą, że otwiera przed czytelnikiem wiele perspektyw interpretacyjnych. Autor wykorzystuje na rzędzia nie tylko socjologii, ale także antropologii i historii, łączy ponadto różne podejścia teoretyczne, proponując oryginalną metodę badań procesów tożsamościowych. Interdy scyplinarność badań oraz wielość możliwych odczytań czynią z Odwiecznego narodu... pozycję interesującą również (a może przede wszystkim) dla etnologów i folklorystów, i z tej perspektywy postaram się przyjrzeć monografii Michała Łuczewskiego. Po pierwsze: rozważania Łuczewskiego stanowią kontynuację ponadstuletnich ba dań nad wsią Żmiącą (woj. małopolskie, pow. limanowski, gm. Laskowa). Sam autor, powołując się na przegląd Michaela Burawoya1, nazywa ją "najdłużej badaną wsią na świecie" (s. 46). Historię zainteresowania ludzi nauki tą miejscowością rozpoczyna wizy ta Franciszka Bujaka w 1901 roku. Efektem badań socjologa jest, wydana w 1903 roku, pierwsza monografia wsi2, która stała się punktem odniesienia dla późniejszych badaczy Żmiącej. Należy wśród nich wymienić Piotra Stacha (historyk, opisał Żmiącą w latach 1941-45), Tomasza Rykałę (pracował nad ekonomiczną monografią wsi), Czesława Blajdę (nauczyciel, etnograf-amator) oraz Stanisława Ossowskiego i Stanisława Nowaka, których badania podjął Zbigniew Wierzbicki, autor kolejnej monografii miejscowości3, wydanej dokładnie 60 lat po ukazaniu się pracy Bujaka. Wiele opisów wsi pozostawili także lokalni inteligenci, m.in. nauczycielka Zofia Oleksy czy Małgorzata Sromek4. Książka Łuczewskiego wpisuje się zatem w długą historię badań Żmiącej, stanowiąc trzecią jej monografię. Autor, mając świadomość niezwykłości sytuacji, w jakiej znajduje się pisząc re-revisit, czyli monografię po-powtómą (s. 51), deklaruje, że dystansuje się wo-1

هذه الورقة هي تطوير لورقة سابقة كانت بعنوان "متى تدخل السينما مناهج الجامعة؟"  يأتي هذا التطوير في سياق ورشة العمل التي بدأتُها في كلية الآداب جامعة القاهرة، مع تطبيق اللائحة الجديدة لكليات الآداب، بما تحتويه من مواد فنية مبتكرة، تعد مكسبا كبيرا لدراسة الإنسانيات، يساهم بقوة في الارتقاء بذوق وثقافة، وإبداع الطالب، وحساسيته الفنية، والنقدية. وحتى يتحقق المنشود من تدريس هذه المواد، وفي إطار نقص الخبرات المهنية اللازمة لتدريسها في كليات الآداب بشكل عام، عرضتُ مقترحا بتنظيم دورة تدريبية لأعضاء هيئة التدريس في الكلية، ممن يرغبون في تدريس مقرر فن السينما في أقسامهم، أُقدم فيها منهجا لتدريس هذا المقرر للطلاب. ويعتمد هذا المنهج على منح الأساتذة المحتوى والأدوات اللازمة لقراءة الفيلم السينمائي وربطه بتخصصات الإنسانيات، بحيث يتحقق لكل قسم خصوصيته في تناول فن السينما من خلال التخصص، كذلك الإلمام بالمبادئ العامة المشتركة التي يجب أن تتوفر لدى الطلاب على اختلاف تخصصاتهم عند التعاطي مع الصورة السنيمائية وثقافتها.
هذه المحاضرة التمهيدية تضع السياق النظري والمعرفي لتدريس مقرر فن السينما وتؤهل لمجموعة اللقاءات القادمة التي ستنصب على محتوى مقترح وعدد من الأدوات اللازمة لقراءة الفيلم السينمائي.

Aristotle discusses the 'best constitutional regime' in Books 7 and 8 of his work, Politics. The central concepts in this discussion are happiness and virtue. The combination of happiness and virtue finds its expression in virtuous friendship. The best constitutional regime assists individuals and society in reaching their highest potential, both individually and collectively. It provides the necessary institutional structure for the justice and welfare of society, which in turn fosters the development of virtuous friendships. According to Aristotle, the highest and most genuine relationship among people is 'virtuous friendship'. Such friendships enable individuals to understand and support each other based on ethical values and to seek happiness together. This study argues that there is an identity between the nature of the best constitutional regime and virtuous friendship. This claim is based on the idea that the best constitutional regime is the perfect end (telos). In this sense, the perfect end is virtuous friendship.

Why Human Rights? A Philosophical Guide (Routledge, 2024) addresses universal human rights as moral mandates – rights to justice that all persons have by virtue of their humanity alone. These are not the legal rights of statutes and treaties, but moral rights of the kind Gandhi, King, and Mandela invoked to oppose unjust laws.  All such rights presuppose three claims: (1) that some duties of justice apply universally, (2) that all human beings have equal moral significance, and (3) that states must protect or serve certain individual interests regardless of the societal impact of doing so.

Can these three premises be justified?  Is the human equality claim, for example, rationally supportable, or is it no less faith-based than hierarchical doctrines like caste?  This book explores the case for these foundational claims along with other philosophical controversies pertaining to human rights.  Because these issues lie at the heart of moral and political philosophy, readers will also obtain a broad appreciation of these disciplines and their leading theorists, including Mill, Kant, Rawls, Sandel, Nozick, Rorty, and many others. Written in concise, jargon-free language, this book presents a high-relief map of the philosophical issues surrounding human rights.

The downloadable pdf is excerpted from the introduction to the book.

Rezensiert von Hannes Kaufmann (Universität Gießen) "Nicht haltbar ist, daß der Mensch von Geburt an frei und gleich sei. Es gibt keine angeborenen Rechte, sie sind alle erworben oder müssen im Kampf noch erworben werden." (Bloch 1972: 215) Mit dieser These beginnt Ernst Bloch den Abschnitt seines Buches über Naturrecht und menschliche Würde, der "Illusionen im bürgerlichen Naturrecht" übertitelt ist. Und weiter: "Der aufrechte Gang"-Blochs Metapher für die menschliche Würde-"veranlagte erst zu etwas, das gewonnen werden muß" (Ebd.). Letztlich versteigt er sich gegen Ende des übergreifenden Kapitels zu dem Resümee: "Das naturrechtliche Anliegen war und ist das Aufrechte als Recht" (Ebd. 237, Hervorhebung im Original). Nun geht es Arnd Pollmann in seinem Buch Menschenrechte und Menschenwürde. Zur philosophischen Bedeutung eines revolutionären Projekts keineswegs um eine Verteidigung oder extensive Ausdeutung des Naturrechts, dennoch könnte man sagen, dass er mit der hier präsentierten Passage von Bloch nicht nur ein Anliegen, sondern auch eine zentrale Spannung teilt. In seiner umfassenden Studie unternimmt Pollmann den Versuch, das Verhältnis der titelgebenden Begriffe der Menschenrechte und der Menschenwürde in ihrer historischen Konstellation v.a. seit 1945 darzustellen. Denn wie Pollmann auch gleich zu Beginn konstatiert, sind weder Menschenrechte noch Menschenwürde schon per se gegeben; vielmehr müssen sie permanent erkämpft und gesichert werden. Darüber hinaus gilt ebendas auch für den Zusammenhang beider Konzepte, der historisch gewachsen ist-oder vielmehr: in der Negation massiver Gewalt geprägt wurde. Denn, so eine der Grundthesen von Pollmanns Buch: "'Neu' sind nicht etwa die beiden Begriffe als solche, neu ist lediglich deren konzeptionelle Verknüpfung." (16) Damit wären wir bei der Kernthese des Buches, denn diesen Zusammenhang zu deuten und die Schlüsse daraus zu ziehen macht die Besonderheit der von Pollmann vorgelegten (explizit politischen) Menschenrechtskonzeption aus. Um die These vorwegzunehmen: Pollmann argumentiert, dass die Würde keineswegs ein (wie auch immer) ‚natürlich' gesetzter Grund im Sinne einer unhintergehbaren Voraussetzung für die Menschenrechte ist, sondern ein konstruktiv gesetzter Grund im Sinne eines Zwecks oder Anspruchs, der ge

O que o pensamento ético-político de Aristóteles teria a ver com os direitos humanos? Aparentemente nada. Se por direitos humanos entendemos uma doutrina que afirma que “por natureza todos os homens nascem livres e iguais em dignidade e direitos” , nada de mais distante desse pensamento do que a doutrina aristotélica, segundo a qual a desigualdade é uma característica intrínseca e natural. Ao mesmo tempo, porém, uma leitura da Ética a Nicômacos e da Política nos indica que a maioria dos conceitos-chave que nós utilizamos hoje tem sua origem justamente na Antiga Grécia e foram sistematizados pelo próprio Aristóteles. O Isso inclui o conceito de “cidadãos livres e iguais” (polites eleutheroi kai isoi), assim como as definições clássicas das formas de governo: monarquia — governo de um, quando o rei governa em favor do povo e tirania, ou quando governa em proveito próprio, aristocracia, — governo de poucos, quando esses poucos são os melhores —, oligarquia — quando são os ricos que governam em benefício próprio; politia — governo dos muitos , quando a maioria governa seguindo as regras “constitucionais” — e democracia — quando a maioria governa contra a minoria .

DFPAIlTAME"'I'O DE FILOSOFIA DA UPIWCNPQ Na nossa vida cotidiana costumamos falar da atribui~ de direitos. Atos deste tipo fazem parte de nossas r~Oes sociais. Outorgamos wndireitoa alguem quando,por eKemplo, lheprome temosalgo. Quando digo a uma pessoa:"prometo devolver0 Iivro naproxima semana" •.usumo urncompromisso peraotea mama, e !he wtorgo 0 direito de exigir0 a.unprimemo doquelhefOiprometido. A partirde um tal contexto,swgem os chamadosdireitosespeciais au pessoais. Quando minha promessa oio emantida, infrinjo as regras destejogo, e com isto dimino, ao menostemporariamente, minha possibilidade departi~ no mesrt1O. Direitospessoaispodem ser fortalecidosquando encontram wna expressiolegal. Neste caso, serio chamadosdireitos legais. A i~ de urn direito legal significa 0 desrespeito alei, e a eta

In the following article, I mainly discuss the place and history of the concept of rights in Western thought. My goal is to trace the history of the concept of rights from ancient Greece to the modern era. The main argument is that although the concept of subjective right arose along the Western tradition and using the possibilities of the Greek and Christian traditions, it is a modern concept with no meaningful precedent in premodern thought. By criticizing rival interpretations, I have tried to show that subjective right is a modern concept that emerged in the 17th century, mainly with Hobbes. As a result, this article is intended to be a brief, coherent, if not all-encompassing and exhaustive, history of the concept of right that argues in favor of the modernity of this concept.

Two problems about rights have received so far little attention. One is the problem of identifying a general value in the practice of rights. The second is to see when, if at all, rights violations wrong the rightholder, in a morally significant sense. In the present essay, I address the first question by investigating the second. I first show that if we commit to the two ideas, common in the contemporary philosophy of rights, that claim-rights always correlate with directed duties and that rights aspire to protect interests of the right-holder, we make it hard to explain why rights violations, in general, wrong right-holders. In the final section, I present what I see as a promising solution to the puzzle. I describe a particular social environment (the society of equals) where interacting with others through rights is indeed valuable because respecting rights communicates that one takes seriously others' equal moral status. In such a society and only in such a society, I conclude, moral agents are required to treat all rights violations as wrongs perpetrated against the right-holder.

Este libro tiene como objetivo analizar los llamados Órganos Constitucionales Autónomos (OCAs) en México, sus funciones, su importancia y la autonomía de la que gozan para desempeñarse. En los
hechos, si bien dichos órganos sustraen atribuciones nominales a la figura presidencial y realizan funciones estratégicas para el Estado, también son arenas de disputa por el poder. En particular, como ejemplo de OCA, se examina el caso del Instituto Nacional Electoral (INE).

The article deals with the core area of the Just War discipline, which is the set of criteria for deciding whether the start of war can be regarded as just or unjust. It presents the six most frequently mentioned criteria and offers a critical commentary on the content and meaning. By thoroughly studying over forty selected sources of Czechoslovak origin, it captures the current state of discussions in the area and simultaneously documents the fragmentation of fundamental terminology. Therefore, it also presents an argument-based proposal for the most appropriate Czech language terms of the mainstream criteria, aiming to unify the lexical field of the Just War discipline in the Czech academic discourse.

Philosophers, lawyers, and political scientists have for a long time attempted to solve issues related to human rights, crises, and catastrophes. This article aims at bringing these debates together, to show that human rights and crises are mutually interdependent. More precisely, I will illustrate that the instincts and emotions triggered by the materialization of certain crises and catastrophes might devalue the implementation of human rights law as it influences our conception of the grounding of human rights qua moral rights. For this reason, a call for a “theory of want” as a justification for the grounding and the implementation of human rights in times of crisis is needed.