Phenomenology of Spirit

Resumen: A la luz de la distinción elaborada por E. Tugendhat entre religión y mística, retomada a su modo por el teólogo J. Ratzinger, se examina la idea hegeliana según la cual la filosofía eleva la forma representativa propia de la religión a concepto. ¿Significa esto que la religión cristiana es reducida por Hegel a una mística? Se examinan los pros y contras de esta lectura, dejando abierta la pregunta, al condicionarla a una mejor comprensión del concepto hegeliano de libertad.

In the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel states that ‗philosophy … contains the sceptical as a moment within itself -specifically as the dialectical moment' ( §81, Addition 2), and that ‗scepticism' as ‗the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in the affirmative Science' ( §78). 1 On the one hand, the connection between scepticism and dialectic is obvious. Hegel claims that scepticism is a problem that cannot be just removed from the philosophical agenda by knock-down anti-sceptical arguments. Scepticism intrinsically belongs to philosophical thinking; that is to say, it plays a constructive role in philosophical thinking. On the other hand, scepticism has to be construed as the view according to which we cannot know whether our beliefs are true, i.e., scepticism plays a destructive role in philosophy no matter what. It is particularly this role that clashes with Hegel's claim of having established a philosophical system of true cognition of the entirety of reality. In the following I argue that for Hegel the constructive and the destructive role of scepticism are reconcilable. I specifically argue that it is dialectic that makes both consistent since scepticism is a constitutive element of dialectic. In order to show in what sense scepticism is an intrinsic feature of dialectic I begin by sketching Hegel's early view of scepticism specifically with respect to logic and metaphysics. The young Hegel construes logic as a philosophical method of human cognition that inevitably results in ‗sceptical' consequences in that it illustrates the finiteness of human understanding. By doing so, logic not only nullifies finite understanding but also introduces to metaphysics, i.e., the true philosophical science of the absolute. Later Hegel replaces the introductory function of logic by the Phenomenology of Spirit and assigns logic itself the status of metaphysics. In the second section, I outline the method of ‗self-fulfilling scepticism' which Hegel employs in the Phenomenology arguing that this is a constructive form of scepticism which guides consciousness through the systematic destruction of tentatively true knowledge claims and introduces to logic as metaphysics. Throughout the developmental changes of his philosophy Hegel holds onto the view that with respect to finite thinking, scepticism is destructive. However, with regard to metaphysics, scepticism plays a constructive role since from the point of view of logic, sceptical doubts have to be construed in terms of dialectic. In the third section, I show how, in his mature philosophy, Hegel conceives of the significance of scepticism for

s article, The Myth of the Taken: Why Hegel is Not a Conceptualist 2 , fits directly into the contemporary debate on the interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit and, in particular, the section dedicated to "Sense Certainty". Far from merely revisiting Hegel's well-known critique of the immediate, Wolf seeks to position himself in front of the conceptualist readings that have become dominant, especially in the wake of Sellars, McDowell and Brandom, presenting as a central thesis the idea that the attribution to Hegel of a full conceptualism ("de re" and "de dicto") would be an exegetical and philosophical mistake. According to Wolf, the interpretive line inspired by Sellars incurs in a movement that he calls undue assimilation between concept and name, or between concept and demonstrative. For these interpreters, the mere fact that consciousness, in sensible certainty, resorts to indexicals such as "this", "here" and "now" would be enough to show that experience is already conceptual. Wolf resists this conclusion. In his words, "Hegel never states the argument of 'Sense-Certainty' in terms of concepts or conceptuality". For him, the universal that emerges in Hegelian analysis is not yet the universal of the concept, but only the abstract universal of representation. Wolf's argument, therefore, moves on two fronts. On the one hand, he maintains that the involvement of language, in the form of deictics and names, does not authorize the inference to a "full conceptuality", because concepts have, by nature, a descriptive and predicative dimension that is lost when reduced to simple demonstrations. On the other hand, he insists that Hegel's critique of sense certainty is fundamentally negative, that is, it aims to show that the pretension of immediate knowledge fails, which would not be equivalent to positivizing the result of this failure as conceptuality. In this sense, Wolf warns against the reconstructive tendency to impose on the Hegelian text categories that are foreign to it.

Nesse trabalho nos propormos a delinear as principais características do idealismo objetivo de Hegel tal como este emerge em sua polêmica com as “filosofias da reflexão” nos escritos críticos de Iena (Jenaer Kritische Schriften). Na introdução defendemos o emprego do conceito de “idealismo objetivo” para caracterizar o idealismo hegeliano, sobretudo a partir de seu direcionamento ontológico (em oposição ao direcionamento epistemológico das filosofias da reflexão). Na primeira parte analisaremos as críticas de Hegel às limitações centrais dos aspectos teóricos das “filosofias da reflexão”, sobretudo a cisão entre sujeito e objeto que estas encerram e a pressuposição de um “mundo empírico” como seu fundamento teórico. Por fim, analisaremos como Hegel vê a explicitação dessas limitações nas filosofias práticas de Kant e Fichte, sobretudo no que diz respeito à incapacidade destas em apreender as determinações fundamentais da sociedade moderna e a dimensão histórica que circunscreve sua gênese. Conclui-se que um elemento central do idealismo objetivo de Hegel está no seu empenho em capturar as determinações objetivas da sociedade e da história, algo impossível quando se pressupõe uma forma puramente empírica de estruturação e encadeamento do mundo e a cisão entre sujeito e objeto.

Resumo: Conta-se que em meio as balas de canhão da invasão napoleônica em Iena que Hegel só se preocupava em preservar os manuscritos da sua magistral obra, a Fenomenologia do Espírito (1807). Obra densa, considerada de difícil compreensão, é essencial para o entendimento não apenas do sistema hegeliano, mas de toda a filosofia pós-hegeliana, como o marxismo ou o existencialismo. A incompreensão desta obra é uma lacuna que deve ser preenchida por todo jovem dedicado aos estudos filosóficos. Nosso objetivo é realizar uma breve introdução da obra Fenomenologia do Espírito, focando em como ela trata das formas que o sujeito (consciência) se relaciona com o objeto (mundo) e com outros sujeitos, com isso destacando conceitos fundamentais para o entendimento do hegelianismo. Esperamos auxiliar o leitor a iniciar a leitura da obra hegeliana, pois estará minimamente familiarizado com o vocábulo do importante filósofo alemão.

Schizophrenia is generally considered a severe psychiatric disorder, characterized by hallucinations, delusions, and altered social cognition. However, certain specific symptomssuch as thought insertion and thought broadcasting-may be interpreted as an attempt at direct mental communication. This article proposes a bold hypothesis: schizophrenia could represent an increased permeability of consciousness, opening the possibility of scientifically exploring interindividual communication of a telepathic type. After reviewing relevant neuroscientific findings (inter-brain synchrony, temporal processing anomalies, misattribution of thoughts), we present a rigorous experimental protocol to test this hypothesis. Epistemological, clinical, and societal implications are discussed, as well as the risks of prematurely rejecting this line of inquiry.

Der Essay stellt Hegels revolutionäres Engagement 1789ff und seine Verarbeitung des Revolutionsverlaufs dar. Davon ausgehend entwickelt er die These, dass es das Scheitern der Revolution war, das Hegel dazu veranlasste, von der Politik zur Philosophie überzuwechseln: Als Philosoph sei Hegel zwar Revolutionär geblieben – aber gerade das habe ihn zu seinem System geführt, das die modernen Herrschaftsverhältnisse affirmierte. Dieser Widerspruch zwischen radikaler Kritik und Glorifizierung der Moderne, der zuerst von Marx herausgearbeitet worden sei, sei zentral für das Verständnis von Hegels Philosophie sowie für die Anknüpfung an sie, zum Beispiel in feministischen und antirassistischen Diskussionen. Aus diesem Widerspruch wird schließlich auch der bis heute fortwirkende Streit zwischen Links- und Rechtshegelianismus erklärt.

Riassunto: La polisemica complessità relativa alla nozione di libertà in Hegel, su cui si focalizza la presente analisi, riserva una qualche 'anima' per lo più nascosta nella trattazione dell'idea assoluta come descritta negli ultimi capoversi della Logica. Svelarne i tratti essenziali, le modulazioni e pieghe più profonde è indispensabile per approdare alla "assolutezza" della libertà senza la quale l'idea stessa sarebbe impossibile, ma anche nello scorgere che la libertà funziona in Hegel come dinamica onnicomprensiva della realtà infinita dell'idea stessa e principio autofondante del suo sistema appropriato, per cui, alla fine, anche essa, la libertà vera e propria, si deve 'liberare da sé stessa' per essere solo perfetta trasparenza della onto-logica realtà assoluta nella sua interezza, unità e unicità indefettibili.

As Agustín Fuentes suggests, evolutionary theory calls for the involvement of other disciplines to help reconstruct the picture of how the species homo not only created a niche in which to live but produced whole worlds of culture. As has been noted, "Most of the distinctively human traits are either adaptations for culture or the side effects of those adaptations." 1 In this essay, I will present some insights from philosophy that hopefully can converge with the investigations and proposals of other disciplines. In particular, I will examine the notions of "personhood" and "collective intentionality" which are, as we will see later, co-implicated.

This article examines the Shahada, the first pillar of Islam, from the perspective of Hegelian dialectics, arguing that Islamic faith is not a dogmatically accepted premise, but rather a logical synthesis of a rigorous epistemological process. By analyzing the Shahada as the culmination of a thesis (initial belief), an antithesis (empirical testing), and a synthesis (ontological conclusion), this study shows that Islamic faith has a methodological foundation aligned with the spirit of scientific inquiry. The Shahada (asyhadu), meaning "I bear witness," is understood not as an empty declaration, but as a statement of a thesis that has been personally verified and tested, distinguishing the ontology of Islamic faith from other Abrahamic traditions.

1 СОКРАТ. Ну что, Платон,-начнём? ПЛАТОН. Всегда! СОКРАТ. Итак? ПЛАТОН. Итак, Сократ, представляем "Городу и Миру" ("Urbi et Orbi") полный гексаграммный ключ из шести элементов (6) для разгерметизации и выведения на чистую воду всего и вся-всяких ложных, лживых, спрятанных, тайных, закрытых, сокрытых, украденных, мошеннических, злых и т.д. сущностей, смыслов, значений. СОКРАТ. Как американский Папа римский-Р. Ф. Превост? ПЛАТОН. Лев 14? СОКРАТ. Он. ПЛАТОН. Начинаем-сначала? СОКРАТ. С вне-начала. ПЛАТОН. С вне-всего? СОКРАТ. С него. ПЛАТОН. За всем видимым и скрытым, прошлым, настоящим и будущим, везде, во всём и всегда находится человек как внебытийно-вне-предельный Само-Субъект всего его-всякого содержания, сущности, смысла, понятия, бытия, процесса и действия и т.д. СОКРАТ. Он. ПЛАТОН. Этот первый элемент гексаграммного ключа Аритеросизма мы обозначим "звёздочкой" со скобкой-"*)". СОКРАТ. Почему? ПЛАТОН. Смысл в том, что вне-бытийно-вне-предельный Само-Субъект уподоблен сноске в тексте как в видимом и существующем бытии-"звёздочке" (*)),-которая нам указывает на отсутствующее "наличие", т.е. вне-наличие, вне-существование элемента вне данного текста как вне его бытия, во вне-бытии и вне-пределе, который не присутствует непосредственно в тексте (бытии), но из-вне-бытия определяет и удерживает его, даёт ему существование, смысл, обоснование, развитие, динамику, цель и завершение. СОКРАТ. Понятно. ПЛАТОН. Далее этот наш человека как вне-бытийно-внепредельный Само-Субъект из вне-бытия, вне-всего создаёт предел всего, границу удержания единства, тождество его целостности всего дальнейшего возможного бытия как его единственно действительную сущность, смысл, за рамки которого ничто его возможное последующее уже никогда и никак не выйдет. СОКРАТ. Не выйдет.

Robert B. Pippin's The Culmination constitutes a meticulous examination of Heidegger's philosophical stance in conjunction with German Idealism, specifically in relation to the works of Hegel and Kant. A pivotal element of Pippin's argumentation is the assertion that Heidegger regarded Hegel as the apex of the Western metaphysical lineage, a lineage that, according to Heidegger, has neglected the quintessential inquiry of philosophy: What is the meaning of Being? This oversight is characterized by Heidegger as a deficiency that imparts a completed nature to Hegel's philosophical framework, consequently obscuring the essence of philosophical inquiry. The objective of this volume is to chronicle the development of Heidegger's engagement with and transcendence over that tradition, as articulated by Pippin. Pippin scrutinizes Heidegger's interpretation of Hegel's Science of Logic, which he posits as the most coherent articulation of the philosophical alignment of being with knowability. As Pippin articulates, "For Heidegger, Hegel had taken that mostly implicit assumption as far as it could be taken, and so was its 'culmination' in the claim that the Absolute had been achieved" (Pippin, 2024, p. x). Pippin contends that Heidegger perceives such fulfillment as problematic, as it suggests that all contradictions have been harmonized, reconciled, or synthesized away, thus precluding any further inquiry. According to Heidegger, Hegel's belief in attaining absolute knowledge is flawed; he argues that there has always been a more pressing question concerning being that Western philosophy has failed to tackle since the pre-Socratic times (Pippin, 2024, p. 3). Pippin meticulously delineates the essence of Heidegger's critique of metaphysical reasoning. Heidegger posits that Hegel's equation of Being with comprehensibility-whereby existence is equated with cognition-has resulted in an "encroachment in the very core" of human existence. Pippin observes that Heidegger contended that "being qua being should be understood as intelligibility and ultimately, in principle, knowability," a stance that Pippin asserts Heidegger dismissed as a manifestation of hyper-rationalism: "cannot claim to comprehend all that there meaningfully is and could be" (Pippin, 2024, p. xi). Heidegger argues that such a methodological approach neglects the finite nature of human existence, thereby reducing being to a mere collection of conceptual categories, rather than engaging with a more primordial lived experience of being that transcends discursive knowledge (Pippin, 2024, p. 9). A notable strength of Pippin's academic investigation lies in his examination of Heidegger's ambivalent relationship with Kant. Initially, Heidegger extols Kant for acknowledging the inherent limitations of human consciousness; however, he ultimately critiques Kant for not fully grasping the profound implications of this recognition. Pippin illustrates this separation, noting that Heidegger deemed Kant as 'the inception of German Idealism,' while at the same moment recognizing him as a philosopher who "did not effectively present the dilemma of human finitude" (Pippin, 2024, p. 6). Heidegger asserts that Kant remained ensconced within the metaphysical paradigm, presupposing that being could be entirely comprehended through human cognition, thereby failing to interrogate the foundational inquiry concerning the essence of being itself. (Pippin, 2024, p. 31). Pippin dedicates considerable attention to Heidegger's interpretation of Hegel as the "culminator" of this metaphysical lineage. Pippin posits that Heidegger regarded Hegel's Logic as the definitive expression of the Western philosophical tradition's conviction that reality could be thoroughly comprehended through conceptual reasoning. Pippin articulates, "For Heidegger, this culmination allowed us to see, in its very radicality and ambition, the disclosure of the inner dynamic of all Western philosophy" (Pippin, 2024, p. x). Heidegger argued that Hegel's attempt to equate thinking with being culminated in the assertion that philosophy had achieved absolute knowledge, a claim

انرژی خلاق
[سوامی ویشنو تیرثا ماهاراج]
اراده‌ی « او » منبع لایتناهی انرژی خلاق بود، که شروع به تجلیات نورانی نمود و در همه‌ی جهات ساری شد. هر شعاع منفردی از این پرتو، انرژی سرشار از «نیروی» زنده‌ی بی‌انتهای خستگی ناپذیری است که می‌آفریند و در تمام ادوار دوام می‌یابد، آگاهی کامل از همان «من» اصلی است که در هر شعاع خود گرایی ( individual egoism ) موجود است،  پرتوافکنی می‌کند، و به تپش می‌افتد.  به معنای دیگر، حوزه‌های وجود به سه لایه‌ی :
(1) آگاهی خالص کلی،  Pure universal consciousness
(2) آگاهی آمیخته به وحدت و کثرت،  Mixed consciousness of unity and diversity
(3) آگاهی ناخالص کثرت ها  Impure consciousness of diversities
تقسیم می‌شوند سالکان طریق معنوی با حوزه‌ی دوم آگاهی باهم درآمیخته‌اند که فردیت آن‌ها، با روان‌های آگاه جداشده، میل به کلیت (universaliy ) دارد. (1)
***
[یزدانپناه عسکری]
دنیا هوشمند و خودآگاه است، جامع جمیع اسماء حق، میدان‌های انرژی و عصاره آگاهی است. علت انبساط انسان بعد از خواب این است که قلب در تعقل  به موضع دیگری رفته و از آن موضع جدید انرژی ذخیره کرده است.
________________________________
1 – دواتما شاکتی (Devatma Shakti)، سوامی ویشنو تیرثا ماهاراج، مترجم حسین مریدی، هیئت‌ مدیره یوگا شری پیث (پراکاشان).

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Plato scholarship underwent fundamental changes. Most of these took place in Germany, centered on the two Romantic Plato scholars, Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich Schleiermacher. This theoretical revolution had already begun before these two, with the likes of Dietrich Tiedemann and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, but it culminated with Schlegel and Schleiermacher. Although Schlegel's Plato scholarship was largely overshadowed by Schleiermacher's work, his role in shaping romantic Plato and modern Plato is undeniable. This role was revealed by Dithery's edition of Schleiermacher's correspondence (Aus Schleiermacher's Leben). To understand the nature of modern Plato, as well as the Romantic view of philosophy, it is necessary to recognize the role of Schlegel and the influence of his Plato scholarship. The following article is devoted to Schlegel's understanding of Plato, which will be shown to be in line with his view of the ideal of philosophy in general. Relying on the documents, we first examine Schlegel's role in the Romantic movement of Plato studies and in launching the massive project of translating all Plato's writings into German. The philosophical elements of the Romantic interpretation of Plato are then addressed. These elements are: the idea of the inner expansion of Plato's philosophy, its asystematic nature, and the incomprehensibility or ineffability of the infinite, the whole, the reality. Three of Schlegel's main contributions to Plato studies are then emphasized: the idea of irony, his theory for the order and authenticity of Plato's dialogues, and his view on the "unwritten doctrines".

Final paper for a graduate seminar on Hegel. PHIL 721: Advanced Seminar in Philosophy: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Fall 2016. Professor Martin J. De Nys.

Course information:
https://philosophy.gmu.edu/courses/phil721/course_sections/29463

Course syllabus:
https://d101vc9winf8ln.cloudfront.net/syllabuses/29463/original/PHIL721001DeNysF16.pdf?1471979236

ABSTRACT:

From Hegel’s perspective, the Phenomenology of Spirit serves as both an introduction to a system of philosophy—a systemic philosophical methodology—in addition to being the first part of that system of philosophy. Textually and dialectically, its principle aim is to be first and foremost a work of philosophy. In this respect, it is a part of the system of philosophy, but is also an examination of various assumptions pertinent to what allows philosophy to begin—an examination, therefore, anterior to the system of philosophy. This view in large part results from the primacy given to necessity in the Phenomenology of Spirit, since, whatever the text does or does not involve, it must involve necessity in the development that moves from each part to the conclusion, one which brings everything together and gives it a sense of coherency. Necessity is essentially what allows us to observe an authentic philosophical movement, in addition to a genuine philosophy, going on in the text, even though, with respect to it being an introduction to the aforementioned system of philosophy, it is not one of the parts of the system, in the strictest sense.

Final paper for a graduate seminar on Hegel. PHIL 721: Advanced Seminar in Philosophy: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Fall 2016. Professor Martin J. De Nys.

Course information:
https://philosophy.gmu.edu/courses/phil721/course_sections/29463

Course syllabus:
https://d101vc9winf8ln.cloudfront.net/syllabuses/29463/original/PHIL721001DeNysF16.pdf?1471979236

ABSTRACT:

From Hegel’s perspective, the Phenomenology of Spirit serves as both an introduction to a system of philosophy—a systemic philosophical methodology—in addition to being the first part of that system of philosophy. Textually and dialectically, its principle aim is to be first and foremost a work of philosophy. In this respect, it is a part of the system of philosophy, but is also an examination of various assumptions pertinent to what allows philosophy to begin—an examination, therefore, anterior to the system of philosophy. This view in large part results from the primacy given to necessity in the Phenomenology of Spirit, since, whatever the text does or does not involve, it must involve necessity in the development that moves from each part to the conclusion, one which brings everything together and gives it a sense of coherency. Necessity is essentially what allows us to observe an authentic philosophical movement, in addition to a genuine philosophy, going on in the text, even though, with respect to it being an introduction to the aforementioned system of philosophy, it is not one of the parts of the system, in the strictest sense.

Paper for a graduate seminar on Hegel. PHIL 721: Advanced Seminar in Philosophy: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Fall 2016. Professor Martin J. De Nys.

Course information:
https://philosophy.gmu.edu/courses/phil721/course_sections/29463

Course syllabus:
https://d101vc9winf8ln.cloudfront.net/syllabuses/29463/original/PHIL721001DeNysF16.pdf?1471979236

ABSTRACT:

As Hegel made his way through the text, we observed many of the same difficulties encountered in earlier sections of the book. As we approached the transition into self-consciousness, a conclusive turn for understanding occurred. This turn demonstrated that understanding, as a distinct shape of consciousness, “must look for satisfaction in another way, as it no longer appears it can find intellectual harmony of the world” (Stern 77). This, to reiterate what has been discussed in a previous essay, is the direct result of understanding’s inability to “grasp for itself this solution to its difficulties” (Stern 77)—specifically those difficulties leading to Hegel’s transition into self-consciousness, where, as we have seen, “the focus switches from how consciousness conceives of things in the world, to how it conceives of itself qua subject” (Stern 79). The transition from understanding to self-consciousness, in other words, involves a shift “from ways of thinking about objects and the world around us, to ways of thinking about ourselves as subjects” (Stern 84). In turn, having “moved from consciousness to self-consciousness,” Hegel investigates how a given subject “first conceives of itself,” which, as Stern describes, “is as a pure will or desire that affirms itself in overcoming the world around it.” And, because “the subject,” as we find in our investigation, “continually needs new objects to overcome,” we find, as before, this transition to be problematic. Stern explains that “it must find its satisfaction instead in other subjects, where this will eventually lead us on to Spirit, in which individuals find unity with others while preserving their independence” (112). This essay, consequently, will provide a brief exegesis of Hegel’s subsequent transition into mastership and servitude.

Paper for a graduate seminar on Hegel. PHIL 721: Advanced Seminar in Philosophy: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Fall 2016. Professor Martin J. De Nys.

Course information:
https://philosophy.gmu.edu/courses/phil721/course_sections/29463

Course syllabus:
https://d101vc9winf8ln.cloudfront.net/syllabuses/29463/original/PHIL721001DeNysF16.pdf?1471979236

ABSTRACT:

As Hegel made his way through the text, we observed many of the same difficulties encountered in earlier sections of the book. As we approached the transition into self-consciousness, a conclusive turn for understanding occurred. This turn demonstrated that understanding, as a distinct shape of consciousness, “must look for satisfaction in another way, as it no longer appears it can find intellectual harmony of the world” (Stern 77). This, to reiterate what has been discussed in a previous essay, is the direct result of understanding’s inability to “grasp for itself this solution to its difficulties” (Stern 77)—specifically those difficulties leading to Hegel’s transition into self-consciousness, where, as we have seen, “the focus switches from how consciousness conceives of things in the world, to how it conceives of itself qua subject” (Stern 79). The transition from understanding to self-consciousness, in other words, involves a shift “from ways of thinking about objects and the world around us, to ways of thinking about ourselves as subjects” (Stern 84). In turn, having “moved from consciousness to self-consciousness,” Hegel investigates how a given subject “first conceives of itself,” which, as Stern describes, “is as a pure will or desire that affirms itself in overcoming the world around it.” And, because “the subject,” as we find in our investigation, “continually needs new objects to overcome,” we find, as before, this transition to be problematic. Stern explains that “it must find its satisfaction instead in other subjects, where this will eventually lead us on to Spirit, in which individuals find unity with others while preserving their independence” (112). This essay, consequently, will provide a brief exegesis of Hegel’s subsequent transition into mastership and servitude.

Paper for a graduate seminar on Hegel. PHIL 721: Advanced Seminar in Philosophy: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Fall 2016. Professor Martin J. De Nys.

Course information:
https://philosophy.gmu.edu/courses/phil721/course_sections/29463

Course syllabus:
https://d101vc9winf8ln.cloudfront.net/syllabuses/29463/original/PHIL721001DeNysF16.pdf?1471979236

ABSTRACT:

Continuing to weave his ontological tapestry, Hegel proceeds from sense-certainty and perception to understanding. In the former two sections, Hegel’s rigorous examination of these shapes of consciousness demonstrated their failure to maintain the types of ontological and, consequently, epistemological commitments that they were thought to have established at the outset. Sense-certainty, on the one hand, was characterized as “immediate and purely apprehensive,” and, in turn, taken by Hegel as the source of the richest and truest type of knowledge (Stern 82). The two types of elements to the knowledge that this shape of consciousness was initially thought to provide—the “I” and the “This—with respect to the myriad relationships it maintains with its objects, were shown to fail in their differentiation with sense-certainty; that is, sense-certainty’s transparency, its direct acquaintance “with the individual ‘This’, as what is present Now and Here in its experience,” failed to differentiate itself from individuals or particulars. Hegel then showed that sense-certainty failed to differentiate itself from other “I’s,” and furthermore failed to differentiate “between its ‘I-This’ relation and that between other subjects and objects,” resulting, finally, in the demonstrative, descriptive undermining of sense-certainty’s ontological and epistemological adequacy with respect to what it set out to provide in terms of knowledge. This inadequacy, in other words, took its leave with the conclusion that “reality is not made up of bare individual Thises, to which the senses alone can give us privileged access” (Stern 83).

Hegel proceeds, in turn, to perception, which initially attempts to treat “the object as an individual thing with universal properties” (Stern 83). Hegel begins by examining this type of relation between an individual object and its properties in two ways. The first, which he demarcates using “Also,” pertains to how an individual object is essentially composed with respect to its bundle of properties. The second, demarcated as “One,” is characterized “as a single substance underlying … [the individual object’s] properties” (Stern 83). The central problem that arises, as Stern points out, is that “the former view struggles to explain what makes the properties into a unity, while the latter struggles to differentiate one propertyless [sic] substratum from another.” Consciousness at the level of perception, therefore, attempts to resolve this problem by distinguishing “between the object itself and how it appears to consciousness,” initially by “treating the object as One but its many properties as a product of our experience,” and subsequently by “treating the object as an Also but its unity as a product of our experience”. This, as Stern rightly notes, fails yet again, resulting in “an oscillation it cannot resolve,” leaving consciousness at this level in a final attempt to “see the object as unified in itself, but as a plurality in relation to other things,” whereby the object is treated as essential and the relation to other things as inessential. These distinctions, however, collapse in light of both being “required to make sense of the object qua individual” (Stern 83-84).

Paper for a graduate seminar on Hegel. PHIL 721: Advanced Seminar in Philosophy: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Fall 2016. Professor Martin J. De Nys.

Course information:
https://philosophy.gmu.edu/courses/phil721/course_sections/29463

Course syllabus:
https://d101vc9winf8ln.cloudfront.net/syllabuses/29463/original/PHIL721001DeNysF16.pdf?1471979236

ABSTRACT:

Continuing to weave his ontological tapestry, Hegel proceeds from sense-certainty and perception to understanding. In the former two sections, Hegel’s rigorous examination of these shapes of consciousness demonstrated their failure to maintain the types of ontological and, consequently, epistemological commitments that they were thought to have established at the outset. Sense-certainty, on the one hand, was characterized as “immediate and purely apprehensive,” and, in turn, taken by Hegel as the source of the richest and truest type of knowledge (Stern 82). The two types of elements to the knowledge that this shape of consciousness was initially thought to provide—the “I” and the “This—with respect to the myriad relationships it maintains with its objects, were shown to fail in their differentiation with sense-certainty; that is, sense-certainty’s transparency, its direct acquaintance “with the individual ‘This’, as what is present Now and Here in its experience,” failed to differentiate itself from individuals or particulars. Hegel then showed that sense-certainty failed to differentiate itself from other “I’s,” and furthermore failed to differentiate “between its ‘I-This’ relation and that between other subjects and objects,” resulting, finally, in the demonstrative, descriptive undermining of sense-certainty’s ontological and epistemological adequacy with respect to what it set out to provide in terms of knowledge. This inadequacy, in other words, took its leave with the conclusion that “reality is not made up of bare individual Thises, to which the senses alone can give us privileged access” (Stern 83).

Hegel proceeds, in turn, to perception, which initially attempts to treat “the object as an individual thing with universal properties” (Stern 83). Hegel begins by examining this type of relation between an individual object and its properties in two ways. The first, which he demarcates using “Also,” pertains to how an individual object is essentially composed with respect to its bundle of properties. The second, demarcated as “One,” is characterized “as a single substance underlying … [the individual object’s] properties” (Stern 83). The central problem that arises, as Stern points out, is that “the former view struggles to explain what makes the properties into a unity, while the latter struggles to differentiate one propertyless [sic] substratum from another.” Consciousness at the level of perception, therefore, attempts to resolve this problem by distinguishing “between the object itself and how it appears to consciousness,” initially by “treating the object as One but its many properties as a product of our experience,” and subsequently by “treating the object as an Also but its unity as a product of our experience”. This, as Stern rightly notes, fails yet again, resulting in “an oscillation it cannot resolve,” leaving consciousness at this level in a final attempt to “see the object as unified in itself, but as a plurality in relation to other things,” whereby the object is treated as essential and the relation to other things as inessential. These distinctions, however, collapse in light of both being “required to make sense of the object qua individual” (Stern 83-84).

Das Prinzipium Individuationis ist unumgänglich: und es ist unumstößlich: Alles Ideelle, alles Ideale realisiert sich immer nur individuell: es gibt real-empirisch gar keinen "Wald". Sondern real, empirisch gibt es nur Bäume: und ein jeder Wald ist nur dann ein Wald, wenn in ihm Individuelles lebt; also Bäume: diese individuellen Bäume lokalisieren den "Wald." Dieser "Wald" ist ein Gebilde des Allgemeinen: der Idee: denn wir Menschen verallgemeinern: wir schaffen immer aus je Individuellem Allgemeines: so gibt es real, empirisch kein Volk, und auch keine Gattung: sondern real gibt es immer nur individuelle Menschen und individuelle Völker: aber die "Gattung" ist eine Form des Allgemeinen: darin dann lebt das Prinzipium Individuationis: das Je-Besondere: und ohne dieses Je-Besondere gibt es kein Allgemeines: nirgends und niemals. Eine jede Bildung von Allgemeinem also wurzelt im Besonderen. Im Individuellen. Dieses kann und darf niemals außer Kraft gesetzt werden: denn wer das Je-Individuelle außer Kraft setzt, setzt die ganze Welt, die ganze Menschheit außer Kraft und subsummiert sie unter ein Falsch-Allgemeines: Konkret: Die vergangene SU=Sowjetunion war solch ein Falsch-Allgemeines: darin und darunter waren viele Nationen subsumiert, aber subordiniert: sie waren in ihrer Jeeigenen Individualität ausgelöscht: sie waren dem Gebilde der SU, das von Anfang an ein Kunst-Gebilde war, unterworfen; subordiniert. Eine je-eigene Befreiung hin zu Freiheit und Recht, hin also zu "Sozialismus" gab es in der gesamten SU nie: deshalb war ich auch immer für die schleunigste Auflösung dieses falschen Gebildes; dieses Falsch-Allgemeinen. Denn ohne das je-eigene Recht auf Individuation gibt es nirgends und niemals ein Allgemeines: Bei den Nazis war dieses genuine Recht auch nicht vorhanden: denn im Nazi-Reich war das Je-Individuelle noch mehr subordiniert: unter ein Dach eines Falsch-Allgemeinen unterjocht: darin und darunter wurde dann die Ideologie vom Tausendjährigen-Reich verkündet, das in sich niemals mehr enden soll. Gemeint war damit, daß alle Widersprüche des Seins, der ganzen Geschichte aufhören und nur noch ein Reich der totalen Identität existiert: dieses "Tausend-jährige-Reich" war also ein Falsch-Allgemeines, weil darin alles Je-Individuelle subordiniert war. Ausgeschaltet war. Wenn also das Je-individuelle leben soll, dann muß dies in der Form geschehen, in der einzig und allein es geschehen kann: der Mensch, und zwar der individuelle Mensch hat unverbrüchlich das Recht, sich selbst zu bestimmen: das ist ein oberster Topos aller Philosophie.

Und nur in einem Welt-WIR ist auch das Ich des Menschen ein Welt-Ich. Und nur als Welt-Ich ist das Ich des Menschen auch individual-global-universal. II. Das WIR des Menschen ist keine leere Attrappe. Sondern das WIR des Menschen ist nur dann ein Wort, wenn es in seinem Wesen, in seinem Inhalte existiert. Das WIR ist die Sonne der Menschheit. Aber deshalb, weil auch das Ich die Sonne der Menschheit ist. Denn der Mensch lebt immer in seinem Ich, aber der Mensch lebt auch immer in seinem WIR. Sonst aber lebt der Mensch gar nicht. Sonst aber ist der Mensch keine Sonne. Sonst aber ist im Menschen keine Sonne. Und ohne Sonne kann der Mensch nicht leben.

This paper addresses the question of how nature should be philosophically studied within a Hegelian framework. The focus is epistemological: it examines the relationship between philosophy and the empirical sciences in the constitution of natural categories. I argue that this relationship is neither strictly a priori nor strictly a posteriori but unfolds through a speculative interplay between an a priori philosophical principle of unity and an a posteriori attentiveness to empirical discovery. To support this view, I engage with prominent positions in the secondary literature – namely, Alison Stone’s strong a priorism and John Burbidge’s a posteriorism. After addressing two key problems in these interpretations, I show how both mistakenly attempt to read Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature through the rigid Kantian dichotomy of a priori and a posteriori, which speculative thought seeks to overcome. Drawing on the work of Brigitte Falkenburg, Cinzia Ferrini, and Sebastian Rand, I propose that natural categories should be understood as the result of empirical content that is reorganized, a posteriori, in accordance with an a priori principle of systematic unity. This interpretation not only aligns with Hegel’s own texts but also highlights the dynamic and active character of his philosophy.

Il contributo si propone di considerare l’Entäusserung del sapere assoluto, così come Hegel lo presenta nell’ultimo capitolo della Fenomenologia dello spirito, come ineliminabile dispositivo di mediazione tra natura e storia: trovando questi distinti ambiti della Realphilosophie la loro origine comune nel movimento di estrinsecazione dello spirito, il loro rapporto non può essere inteso alla stregua di una dicotomia, dal momento che natura e storia condividono il medesimo fondamento genetico, di cui al contempo risultano condizione di possibilità.

The article “Beyond Unhappy Consciousness: Plotinus and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit” by Sui Han begins by discussing the historical and conceptual links between Plotinus and Hegel. She references Jens Halfwassen's work, which provides documentary evidence of the Neoplatonic origins of Hegel's thought, particularly in the development of his dialectical method and the concept of the Absolute. This paper argues that the moment corresponding to Neoplatonism in the Phenomenology of Spirit is located in the transition from “unhappy consciousness” to “reason.” Neoplatonism provided Hegel with a historical template for transcending unhappy consciousness, characterized by the transcendence of separation of singular from the universal and the eventual complete interpenetration of singular with the universal. By comparing Plotinus’ proposal for dealing with the unhappiness of his time with Hegel’s plan for overcoming the unhappy consciousness of the new era, this paper highlights the connections and differences between the two and, based on this, evaluates Hegel’s modern proposal.
This paper points out that the unhappy consciousness that permeated Plotinus’ time originated from the singularisation of the self by the body, which led to separation from the universality of the intelligible world. Transcending unhappiness means transcending the singular self as a physical body and ascending to the intelligible world, in which the one is all. The singularity and finitude that cause unhappiness are thereby transcended. However, individuality is not directly negated but is instead preserved within the ultimate whole. Plotinus’ solution was a vertical transcendence in the direction of removing the world, historical time, and achieving inaction and silence.
In the new period, under the name of unhappy consciousness, Hegel thought of various forms of individualism. The unhappiness still stemmed from the separation of the singular and the universal. However, the concepts of singular, universal, and separation all acquired new meanings: the singular was the acting individual, and the universal was the human community. Hegel’s solution to unhappy consciousness was his dialectics. This text analyzes how different levels of unhappy consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit are respectively transcended. In the abstract self-consciousness stage, the unhappy consciousness represents the extreme development of self-consciousness. It is a form of consciousness that is aware of its own internal duality. One pole of its contradiction is aware that the universal God is the essence, while the other pole is aware that its own singular being-for self is non-essential. To transcend this unhappy consciousness, simply and directly negating singular being is not feasible. Hegel employs his dialectical method to demonstrate how the unhappy consciousness can sublate itself through mediation. First, the infinite separation of the singular self-consciousness from God is manifested as the former's striving to ascend to the latter, yet inevitably failing to reach it. In the second step, God appears in the world in the form of Christ, becoming the concrete universal. With Christ's passing away, the Holy Spirit lives on in the Christian community. Since the Church has a direct relationship with God, it can advise singular consciousness on what is correct. The singular consciousness follows the Church's decisions, alienates its inner and outer freedom, and finally, through participating in the Church's rituals, establishes itself as the universal will within the Church community. This article particularly emphasizes that although the unhappy consciousness is ultimately sublated in the universal self, this is not just any community, but the sacred community after the incarnation of God. Otherwise, it would not have the legitimacy to make decisions on behalf of the singular self-consciousness.
In the stage of modern individualism, this paper analyzes the three forms of consciousness of Faustianism, sentimentalism, and the cavalier of virtue, pointing out that the dialectical evolution is characterized by the relationship between the singular and the universal becoming increasingly close. The individual sublates the division between meaning for self and reality in itself through actions in the world. The achievement of the individual's actions is contingent, while the action itself is necessary. After sublating this opposition, one ascends to the thing-in-itself (die Sache selbst). The thing-in-itself ultimately develops into the objective spirit (Geist), which is the achievement of the actions of everyone and each individual, where I am we, and we are I. This article lists the correspondence between the text of the Enneads and the paragraphs of the Phenomenology of Spirit to show how Hegel's concepts of die Sache selbst and Geist are related to the teaching of idea and the concept of νοῦς in Platonism, and particularly emphasizes that the template role of Platonism for Hegel lies in its conception of the unity of the singular and the universal, in which individuality is not sacrificed.
Hegel’s dialectics was a modern interpretation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Although the Christian doctrine had a corresponding structure ὄν-ζωή-νοῦς in Neoplatonism, the latter did not use it to address the unhappy consciousness of its time. No matter how similar Neoplatonism and Hegel may appear on the surface, Hegel’s modernity lies in his introduction of action, history, and intersubjectivity into the scheme for overcoming unhappy consciousness. Whether his plan is successful is a question worth reflecting on through comparison with Plotinus’ proposal.

Es ist eine "Zärtlichkeit für die weltlichen Dinge", so schreibt Hegel, die den "Makel des Widerspruches" vom "weltlichen Wesen" fernhält und dem "Wesen des Geistes", der "denkenden Vernunft" zuschreibt. 1 Die Verlagerung der Widersprüchlichkeit des Gegenstandes in die subjektive Seite des Bewusstseins, wie es in den Kantischen Antinomien gegenständlich wird, kommt einer Tilgung derselben gleich, die in Demut vor dem Bestehenden gipfelt. 2 In dieser Tätigkeit, einen Widerspruch und das heißt auch einen Unterschied am Gegenstand auf eine Weise zu setzen, dass der Unterschied zugleich kein Unterschied des Gegenstandes ist, äußert sich das Bewusstsein als Verstand. 3 Dem Verstand ist jedoch das Sich-Widersprechende ein Verschwindendes, Sich-Auflösendes, Nichtseiendes oder vielmehr etwas, das nicht nur nicht ist, sondern vielmehr nicht sein darf. Diese subtile normative Implikation des Verstandesdenkens ist es, gegen die sich die Hegelsche Interpretation des pyrrhonischen Skeptizismus als ideologiekritisches und antidogmatisches Verfahren aufbäumt.

In this paper, I present a phenomenological argument against the possibility of artificial general intelligence (AGI) by considering it in the context of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. I contend that, while artificially intelligent technologies can mimic consciousness, their inevitable deficiencies can be understood as the result of their lack of self-consciousness. First, I will give a very general overview of the relevant sections of the Phenomenology of Spirit. I will then consider the shortcomings of artificial intelligence in the context of this phenomenological account of what it means to be a thinking being.

Despite a profound concern for the epistemological, ontological and ethical conditions for being-at-home-in-the-world, G.W.F. Hegel published very little on a particularly serious threat to being-at-home: mental illness and disorder. The chief exception is found in Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). In this work, Hegel briefly provides an ontology of madness (Verrücktheit), wherein madness consists in the inward collapsing of subjectivity and objectivity into the individual's unconscious and primordial feeling soul. While there has been an increasing number of studies on Hegel's conception of madness, I propose that there is another overlooked way to understand madness in Hegel's system: as social pathology. I argue in this article that Hegel offers a compelling social account of madness in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), which arises at the elevated, self-reflective and community level of spirit. This sociality of madness, as I call it, occurs when spirit is unable to reconcile two contradictory yet equally essential aspects of its reality, resulting in spirit's structural homelessness. I argue that by examining this overlooked sociality of madness, we may read Hegel's political-philosophical project in a new light: on the one hand, the ethical life (Sittlichkeit) presented in the Philosophy of Right (1821) becomes understood as a political therapeutic. On the other hand, if the ethical life fails to live up to the demand of being an adequate spiritual therapeutic, then the traditional reading of the Philosophy of Right as a reconciliatory hermeneutic becomes problematized, opening up new avenues for the proliferation of social pathology.

Paper for a graduate seminar on Hegel. PHIL 721: Advanced Seminar in Philosophy: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Fall 2016. Professor Martin J. De Nys.

Course information:
https://philosophy.gmu.edu/courses/phil721/course_sections/29463

Course syllabus:
https://d101vc9winf8ln.cloudfront.net/syllabuses/29463/original/PHIL721001DeNysF16.pdf?1471979236

ABSTRACT:

Hegel introduces the Phenomenology of Spirit against the background of a structural motif that serves as catalyst for a more encompassing dialectic resulting from an engagement with the text. This pertains to the way in which the organization of the text as it is presented is predicated on the deeper unfolding of the paradigmatic structures of descriptive consciousness from the possibilities of the ways in consciousness relates to its objects. Consciousness relates to its objects according to various attitudes that it takes towards them on this account, and it does so at different levels of fundamentality in the shapes, as Hegel refers, that consciousness can take with respect to the attitudes it has towards its object in the relationship it has with it as a result. The relationships, as established and examined descriptively, lead to an increasing horizon of possibility for knowledge as a specific relationship between shapes of consciousness and their respective objects, and specifically for the knowledge that consciousness takes towards itself.

This essay, in turn, will provide a brief exegesis of the first and most fundamental shape of consciousness that Hegel examines, referred to as sense-certainty. It will provide a basic analysis of the main arguments and movements from sense-certainty into perception, explaining how sense-certainty conceives knowledge, how sense-certainty’s conception of its object and the self-conception of consciousness cannot account for the knowledge it was initially responsible for, and finally concluding with an overview of how the failure to establish knowledge by way of this relationship and conception, knowledge must be accounted for in Perception.

Paper for a graduate seminar on Hegel. PHIL 721: Advanced Seminar in Philosophy: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Fall 2016. Professor Martin J. De Nys.

Course information:
https://philosophy.gmu.edu/courses/phil721/course_sections/29463

Course syllabus:
https://d101vc9winf8ln.cloudfront.net/syllabuses/29463/original/PHIL721001DeNysF16.pdf?1471979236

ABSTRACT:

Hegel introduces the Phenomenology of Spirit against the background of a structural motif that serves as catalyst for a more encompassing dialectic resulting from an engagement with the text. This pertains to the way in which the organization of the text as it is presented is predicated on the deeper unfolding of the paradigmatic structures of descriptive consciousness from the possibilities of the ways in consciousness relates to its objects. Consciousness relates to its objects according to various attitudes that it takes towards them on this account, and it does so at different levels of fundamentality in the shapes, as Hegel refers, that consciousness can take with respect to the attitudes it has towards its object in the relationship it has with it as a result. The relationships, as established and examined descriptively, lead to an increasing horizon of possibility for knowledge as a specific relationship between shapes of consciousness and their respective objects, and specifically for the knowledge that consciousness takes towards itself.

This essay, in turn, will provide a brief exegesis of the first and most fundamental shape of consciousness that Hegel examines, referred to as sense-certainty. It will provide a basic analysis of the main arguments and movements from sense-certainty into perception, explaining how sense-certainty conceives knowledge, how sense-certainty’s conception of its object and the self-conception of consciousness cannot account for the knowledge it was initially responsible for, and finally concluding with an overview of how the failure to establish knowledge by way of this relationship and conception, knowledge must be accounted for in Perception.

El presente escrito centra sus esfuerzos en la comprensión interna del capítulo IV. B de la Fenomenología del espíritu. Las tres escuelas histórico-filosóficas de este apartado serán concebidas como tres figuras formales de la historia del espíritu. La tesis de lectura sostiene la condición autogenerativa de lo lógico como fundamento de la exhibición de los contenidos de la autoconciencia en la fenomenología hegeliana.

Human beings, while tending to the utmost rationality, understood as coherence with the objectives that they set themselves, both emotional-sentimental and cognitive-logical, have completely random emotional and behavioral deviations, which, consistently with the whole cosmic nature, make partially unpredictable: their emotions, thoughts, and behavior.
These elements of randomness, completely innate with cosmic nature, have determined the need for control over individuals. This control has ended up being delegated to regulations that are foreign to the natural, or rational, morality inherent in every individual. Control that was entrusted to artificial mechanisms, crystallized in structural universes, completely foreign to the nature of living beings of any species, and definable as archetypes, having a logic completely foreign to the living beings that use them, being, in fact, bodies foreign to nature and, therefore, to the species of animals that have evolved to a minimal sociality and a very limited individualization and deviated towards an interest directed exclusively to the individual, or to the basic procreative nucleus.
Sufficiently advanced human beings may be able to self-control, making it possible to practice the rationality inherent in natural morality. This will allow the creation of a model of organization of human society consistent with such rational morality.

En este trabajo mi propósito es revisar el papel peculiar que desempeña la filosofía del arte dentro del sistema hegeliano. Se argumenta aquí que el estudio de los rasgos esenciales de esta rama de su pensamiento reviste un particular peso e interés para entender no solo la naturaleza del arte, en cuanto mero fenómeno estético, sino también como instancia de reflexión y de comprensión de un amplio registro de fenómenos sociales y culturales que son de gran importancia para los seres humanos.
Para defender este punto desarrollo una revisión de la tesis de la noción del “carácter pretérito del arte” (Vergänglichkeit der Kunst) en Hegel. Con ello pretendo mostrar cómo una reinterpretación de esta noción puede resultar fértil a fin de comprender el horizonte teórico de posibilidades que se encuentra disponible para la filosofía del arte.

تاریخ فلسفۀ غرب: ۵
تجربه گرایان
ر. ا. وولهاوس
ترجمۀ محمدسعید حنایی كاشانی
انتشارات روزنه

«یکی از مناقشات تاریخی بزرگ در فلسفه» توصیفی بود که برتراند راسل برای ستیز ایدئولوژیکی میان عقل گرایان و تجربه گرایان برگزید، یعنی ستیز میان عقل و تجربه در مقام منابع شناخت و تصورات یا اندیشه ها. ولی ر. ا. وولهاوس در این تحقیق دربارۀ تجربه گرایان چندان دل مشغول توجیه این برچسب های قراردادی در خصوص مطرح کردن اندیشه های فلسفی حاکم نیست و این اجازه را می دهد که آن اندیشه ها خود از جانب خویش سخن بگویند.   

نویسنده با قرار دادن فیلسوفان تجربه گرا در بستر فرهنگی معاصرشان رویکردهای متنوع آنان به فلسفه را می آزماید. او در وهلۀ نخست بر روی شخصیت های اصلی ـــ بیکن، هابز، لاک، بارکلی و هیوم ـــ تمرکز می کند اما از فیلسوف فرانسویِ به ناحق مورد غفلت قرار گرفته پی یر گاساندی نیز بحث می کند و فصلی را به «انجمن سلطنتی لندن برای بهبود دانش طبیعی» اختصاص می دهد که در دهۀ 1660 بنیاد شد. او، در حالی که بر روی سهم آنها در «فلسفۀ نوین» قرن هفدهم تمرکز می کند، که در وهلۀ نخست به بحث از طبیعتِ شناخت و علم تجربی می پرداختند، جنبه های اخلاقی و سیاسی کار آنان را نیز برجسته می کند و بر اهمیت اندیشه های آنان برای تفکر قرن بیستم تأکید می ورزد.

Being manifests itself, in different ways and measures, in every living being. All living beings participate in the universal process of progressive civilizing, which materializes in the progress of the process of individualization of the individuals belonging to each living species and in the progress of the process of socialization between individuals belonging to the same species.
The instrument adopted to achieve such progress in the civilizing process consisted of the use of different forms of structural universes. Each structural universe was used when some individual belonging to a given species reached a certain level of manifestation of being superior to the individuals belonging to the same community and therefore decided to use a structural archetype of a new type for that species.
With the use of that particular structural archetype, the level of civilizing achieved by such individuals is generalized (as an effective potential of the manifestation of being) to all members of a specific society and the individuals belonging to that specific society will manifest a level of civilizing consistent with that particular structural archetype, but they will not be able to go beyond in manifesting on's level of civilizing, since they will be caged and constrained by that certain structural archetype, except to emancipate themselves spiritually, at least partially, while waiting to be able to build a different model of organization of human society.

Generally speaking, feminism has been the practice of critically uncovering how we, individually and socially, are engaged in sexist oppression. In revealing how we have been habituated into sexism by virtue of our developmental dependence upon others, it also illuminates this interdependence, opposing the dishonest individualism that has propped up sexist oppression by concealing the reliance of individuals upon, among other things, the historically women’s labour they require as interdependent beings. In this way, feminism is essentially a critical orientation to the individualism that does not recognize social structures of development and dependence. Hegel’s philosophy—and especially the phenomenon of ethical life—speaks powerfully to this aspect of the feminist project. With the idea of ethical life, he captures, phenomenologically, a basic structure of experience: the experience of belonging or of membership in a community, a “we.” In this paper I will show why a feminist critical posture requires respect for the phenomenon of ethicality and the dangers and powers it entails, and illuminate its relevance for specific dimensions of the feminist project—including, most centrally, that of transcultural feminist practice.

This work, In the Wake of Thought: The Dialectics of Scientific Knowledge, analyses the relationship between philosophical inquiry and scientific understanding, as explored through the lens of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Written with a deep commitment to Hegelian thought, the paper seeks to illuminate the nature of scientific knowledge, its emergence through the dialectical process, and its ultimate place within the development of universal spirit. The exploration is rooted in a critical engagement with Hegel’s Preface, where the role of the concept in shaping knowledge and truth is examined, and where the shift from individualism to collective understanding is thoroughly analyzed.

The author argues that the true nature of science transcends the empirical and the abstract, drawing attention to the inherent self-movement of concepts. By focusing on the dialectical process, the paper distinguishes between mere reasoning and conceptual thinking, asserting that the former often falls into superficiality while the latter leads to the unfolding of truth. The paper also challenges conventional philosophical approaches that reduce knowledge to static propositions, urging a reconsideration of how science and philosophy must combine in their search for the truth of the whole. Through this philosophical examination, the work invites readers to reconsider the boundaries of thought and to engage with knowledge in a more dynamic, transformative way.

Written entirely by the author, this paper positions itself within the rich tradition of Hegelian dialectics while also offering a contemporary perspective on the intersection of science, philosophy, and universal knowledge. It invites readers to engage with Hegel’s insights on knowledge as a self-sustaining process that must be understood not in isolation but within the organic unity of all concepts. Through this lens, In the Wake of Thought not only serves as a scholarly contribution to Hegel studies but also as a meditation on the deeper, often overlooked dimensions of scientific inquiry and philosophical thought.

Hegel's system of philosophy offers a complex line of thought for a type of idealism, drastically different from its widely known critical readings. By examining the relationships between logic-nature and nature-spirit, the paper aims to prove that the place of nature in Hegel's system does not allow to be conceived of as mystically idealist since philosophy, as a system of thought, in its development has to have some bearings on the material world at some point. The paper firstly provides compatible definitions of the terms, idealism and naturalism, with Hegel's system. While the paper takes the definition of idealism in a Hegelian sense, for the purpose of the paper, non-reductive naturalism is regarded as compatible type of naturalism with Hegel's system. In the light of the given definitions, the paper secondly examines the relation of nature to the Logic in Hegel's system, and thirdly, examines the relation of nature to spirit. The relations of nature to logic and to spirit enable us to conclude that Hegel's system of philosophy is open for involving the elements of non-reductive naturalism along with idealism.