Nuclear Terrorism

He joined the Rice faculty in 1979 after receiving his doctorate from the University of Michigan. His undergraduate degree is from the University of Rochester. His research interests are in the study of international conflict and American national security policy. He has published six books and more than 30 articles and book chapters. During his time at Rice he has won 10 teaching awards.

W okresie zimnej wojny istniało wiele miejsc objętych tajemnicą państwową, które mają dziś bardzo szczątkową dokumentację lub nie posiadają jej wcale. Do grupy tej zaliczają się także trzy magazyny amunicji atomowej, powstałe w Polsce w końcu lat 60. XX wieku. Materialne pozostałości tych kompleksów oraz historyczny kontekst ich funkcjonowania są głównym tematem niniejszej książki . Obiekty te zbudowano w ramach przedsięwzięcia o kryptonimie "Wisła" w Dobrowie (Podborsku) w pobliżu Białogardu (obiekt 3001), Sypniewie (Brzeźnicy-Kolonii) koło Jastrowia (obiekt 3002) i Grochowie (Templewie) nieopodal Trzemeszna Lubuskiego (obiekt 3003). Decyzję o ich utworzeniu podjęto w związku z realizacją spójnego strategicznego planu. Jego główne wytyczne i założenia są wyartykułowane w odtajnionych dokumentach archiwalnych. Ułatwia to w pewnym stopniu zrozumienie roli jaką magazyny specjalne miały odegrać w przyszłym europejskim konflikcie zbrojnym. W świetle umów zawartych pomiędzy ZSRR i PRL w miejscach tych przechowywano taktyczną broń jądrową, przeznaczoną dla jednostek polskich wojsk rakietowych, artylerii i lotnictwa. Obiekty "Wisła" były jednym z elementów rozległego systemu składowisk broni nuklearnej, które według identycznego wzoru powstały z inspiracji Związku Radzieckiego również w innych krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Ramy chronologiczne i tematyczne tej książki, w częściach poświęconych losom kompleksów "Wisła", obejmują okres od podjęcia decyzji o ich budowie w połowie lat 60. XX wieku do dziś. W celu zarysowania szerszego kontekstu polityczno-historycznego w niektórych rozdziałach tej monografii odwołuję się również do czasów wcześniejszych.

This paper reviews the current thinking on threat assessment at nuclear facilities in the United States. It surveys and compares the risk assessment methods used by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Defense (DOD), and it explores alternative and complementary approaches. All three agencies rely on some form of the design basis threat (DBT) as the foundation of their physical protection strategy. We identify shortcomings in the DBT approach, but also in the proposed alternatives.

The Turkic Accelerator Complex (TAC) project has been developed with the support of the Turkish State Planning Organization by the collaboration of 10 Turkish universities. The complex is planned to have four main facilities, namely: SASE FEL Facility Based on 1 GeV Electron Linac, Third Generation Synchrotron Radiation Facility (SR) Based on 3.56 GeV Positron Synchrotron, Super-Charm Factory ($\sqrt{s} = 3.77$ GeV) by colliding the electron beam coming from the linac with an energy of 1 GeV and positron beam coming through the positron ring with an energy of 3.56 GeV, GeV scale proton accelerator. Later has two-fold goal: Neutron Spallation Source (NSS) and ADS. The proton accelerator construction will have 3 MeV, 100 MeV, and 1 GeV phases. The technical design report is planned to be finished in 2013. Since Turkey has essential Thorium reserves the ADS becomes very attractive for our country as emerging energy technology.

The SilentBorder project aims to develop and construct a new high-technology scanner for the identification of hazardous and illegal goods hidden in trucks and sea containers. The scanner will enable scanning of shipping containers or cargo and is based on muon tomography, a technology that uses natural cosmic ray muons and therefore is inherently safe for people. We report on the development of a simulation and reconstruction framework aimed at optimizing the geometry of the detector and exploring feasibility of CRT in real smuggling scenarios using simulated data. The framework includes GEANT4 modeling of light transport in a scintillating fiber tracker to optimize the geometry and materials used to produce fiber mats. A systematic comparison was made of particle generators such as CRY, MUSIBO, and EcoMug interfaced with the GEANT4 toolkit to find the most effective one for modeling real smuggling scenarios. The Point-of-Closest-Approach reconstruction algorithm was used to create 3D images of sea containers or trucks. An analysis of the sensitivity of CRT was performed using simulated synthetic data generated for different smuggling scenarios of contraband of low-Z organic materials and high-Z inorganic materials. Results of our research indicate that by using muon tomography, it would be possible to improve the performance and sensitivity of sea container and cargo screening systems to overcome limitations of traditional screening methods, such as X-ray scanners, when it comes to detecting illicit materials that may be well concealed. CRT can provide a complementary imaging technique that could enhance the detection capabilities of existing systems.

Events in the recent past have focused the world on the al Qaeda terrorist organization and its efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD). WMD can be defined as nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. The U.S. Code, Title 5, defines WMD as "any weapon or device that is intended, or has the capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people through the release, dissemination, or impact of (A) toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precursors; (B) a disease organism; or (C) radiation or radioactivity."[1] According to Deputy Defense Secretary Wolfowitz, "Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden said in the past that the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by his terrorist gang is a religious duty. U.S. and coalition troops in Afghanistan found evidence that al Qaeda was aggressively pursuing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear information and material."[2] Now CNN has obtained tapes recording al...

This book represents a comprehensive contemporary view of the current, hot, and controversial issues revolving around nuclear energy. It involves issues of international/national security where realpolitik, in terms of power politics, remain key features in State relations. States, through international law and cooperation, managed to put in place a nuclear energy management regime with the Non-Proliferation Treaty as its main pillar. The book analyzes the role of international law in this highly sensitive issue, with referral to specific cases of proliferation and the current standings in the control of nuclear energy. (Series: International Law and International Relations / Volkerrecht und internationale Beziehungen - Vol. 9)

Following a reorientation in 2005/2006, the focus of activities at TSL was shifted from nuclear physics to proton therapy and radiation testing with protons and neutrons. In order to use the beam as efficient as possible beam sharing is employed. The paper describes the development of a range of control system utilities, for example switching of the beam between users by the principal user instead of being controlled via a cyclotron operator.

Statement of the problem: society and criminal system, in pursuit of the goals they seek to fulfill by indicting criminals and punishing them, sometimes encounter people who do not have a normal mental state in any of the situations of being in the society or in the different stages of committing a crime until the end of the punishment, and this issue makes challenges for the realization of these goals possible. In the current situation, apart from the medical and psychiatric guidelines, there are no comprehensive regulations that include a mechanism for identifying, introducing, guiding, treating people with mental disorders and protecting their rights against the guardians and duties they have towards them, and on the other hand, determining the status of judicial authorities in dealing with them, or they do not have the necessary comprehensiveness. Consideration of the provisions of the new bill as far as it is related to the patients and their rights in the criminal process has been considered in writing this article.
Research method: The present article is taken from the library research method in its first speech and from the analytical-descriptive method in the other speeches.
Research findings: The new bill, while innovating in some of its regulations, has tried to fix the existing deficiencies, but it faces challenges in terms of the efficiency and the possibility of applying those regulations.
Keywords: mental disorder  Criminal proceedings  Individual rights  social defense.

The papers presented at this workshop are invaluable contributions to thinking about an important aspect of the nuclear danger -the potential for loss of control as states with nuclear weapons go through periods of political turmoil and unrest. From Sokov, we have the alarming spectacle of military forces digging a trench in the runway with cannon fire to scare off a crowd, in order to be able to fly nuclear weapons away before tarmed gangs arrive and seize them. From Tetrais, we have the spectacle of uncertainty over which group of generals those with control of a nuclear weapon to be tested will be loyal to -and then the nuclear core being driven across the desert in an deux chevaux. From Stokes we have the world's only case of an armed nuclear missile being fired over long range and then detonated -and word of radical factions among nuclear custodians squabbling with other factors over control of key nuclear facilities. From Khan, we have a more reassuring argument that Pakistan's seemingly endless political turmoil has never seriously threatened its nuclear controlthough well-organized attacks on heavily guarded strategic targets such as the Rawalpindi General Headquarters and the Mehran naval base -apparently with insider help -inevitably raise worries about the possibility of similar attacks on nuclear facilities.

This paper was made possible by generous financial support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, with additional funding from the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. We are grateful to numerous officials of the U.S. government, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other governments who gave generously of their time, information, and insights; they prefer to remain anonymous. We would like to thank

Despite substantial progress in improving nuclear security in recent years, there is more to be done. The threats of nuclear theft and terrorism remain very real. This paper recommends learning from the much stronger national and international efforts in nuclear safety, and in particular taking steps to build international understanding of the threat; establish effective performance objectives; assure performance; train and certify needed personnel; build security culture and exchange best practices; reduce the number of sites that need to be protected; and strengthen the international framework and continue the dialogue once leaders are no longer meeting regularly at the summit level.

This paper was made possible by generous financial support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, with additional funding from the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. We are grateful to numerous officials of the U.S. government, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and other governments who gave generously of their time, information, and insights; they prefer to remain anonymous. We would like to thank

Despite substantial progress in improving nuclear security in recent years, there is more to be done. The threats of nuclear theft and terrorism remain very real. This paper recommends learning from the much stronger national and international efforts in nuclear safety, and in particular taking steps to build international understanding of the threat; establish effective performance objectives; assure performance; train and certify needed personnel; build security culture and exchange best practices; reduce the number of sites that need to be protected; and strengthen the international framework and continue the dialogue once leaders are no longer meeting regularly at the summit level.

Urgent actions are needed to prevent a nuclear or radiological 9/11. Terrorists are actively seeking nuclear weapons and Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) and the materials to make them. There are scores of sites where the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons exist, in dozens of countries worldwide. There are thousands of sites worldwide where radiological materials exist. Many of these sites are not sufficiently secured to defeat the kinds of threats that terrorists and criminals have demonstrated they can pose. A dangerous gap remains between the urgency of the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism and the scope and pace of the U.S. and world response. While the gap has narrowed significantly in recent years, much more needs to be done. This paper describes the nuclear and radiological terrorism threats, analyzes the actions taken so far to address these threats, and recommends further actions going forward. Nuclear terrorism remains a real and urgent danger. Despite the post-9/11 disruptions it has faced, the evidence suggests that al Qaeda continues to seek nuclear weapons and the materials and expertise to make them. In his memoir, former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet provides frightening new information on al Qaeda's nuclear efforts -including a report from a senior al Qaeda operative that the group's nuclear weapons program had advanced to the point of conventional explosive testing. Tenet says that he is "convinced" that Osama bin Laden still "desperately" wants a nuclear bomb. The 2006 call from the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq for "nuclear scientists" to join the jihad highlights the continuing threat. The removal of al Qaeda's sanctuary in Taliban-led Afghanistan and the disruption of al Qaeda's central command reduced, but did not eliminate, the risk of such complex attacks. Unfortunately, al Qaeda's central leadership appears to be reconstituting itself, primarily in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas, and "retains the ability to organize complex, mass-casualty attacks," according to Lt. Gen. Michael Maples, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Similarly, there is substantial evidence that al Qaeda and the global jihadi network it has spawned have repeatedly sought radioactive material for a radiological dispersal device (RDD), and considered attacking nuclear power plants. (Indeed, both Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Mohammed Atta considered including nuclear power plants in the 9/11 targets, but put this effort as too uncertain. 4 ) In two recent cases, al Qaeda affiliated groups have been apprehended while planning to acquire radioactive materials for "dirty bomb"-attacks. In August 2004, British police arrested Dhiren Barot, leader of a group of eight men, which planned to carry out multiple terrorist attacks in Britain and in the United States. Among the group's plans was setting on fire ten thousand household smoke detectors to disperse the small amounts of americium which they hold. In January 2005, German police arrested an Iraqi and a Palestinian who unsuccessfully attempted to acquire 46 grams of highly enriched uranium from a group in Luxemburg, allegedly on behalf of al Qaeda. Both these plots involve radioactive materials in types or quantities that would not cause much damage if used as an RDD, but they demonstrate the interest of jihadi extremists in mounting RDD attacks. Highly enriched uranium (HEU) or separated plutonium, the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons, exist in hundreds of buildings at scores of sites in dozens of countries around the world. Security at some of these is buildings is excellent; at others, it amounts to little more than a night watchman and a chain-link fence. 7 Many sites have security and control measures that are demonstrably insufficient to defeat the kinds of sophisticated insider conspiracies or large-scale outsider attacks that terrorists and criminals have successfully carried out in a variety of countries around the world.

The performance of the C-30 compact, isochronous cyclotron at the Soltan Institute for Nuclear Studies (SINS) was improved during last years. The magnetic field distribution in the accelerating region of the machine was measured and field corrections were done. The stability of the RF feeding system operation was improved. The shape of a puller electrode was modified to improve the conditions of ion extraction from the source and gas pumping speed in the central region. The geometry of an internal PIG I-I-ion source was optimised and discharge power increased. The peak accelerated W beam intensity at the extraction radius reached 12 PA (in pulse) and internal proton beam current -300 PA. The H-current is still limited by stripping on residual gas molecules. An external ion source is being completed. A new computer system for monitoring of the machine operation was developed and implemented. Two experimental programmes which utilise proton beam from the cyclotron were started in 1993: 1) study of the neutron-rich nuclei from the region of symmetric fission, produced in an uranium target bombarded by 25 MeV protons, 2) study of the charged particle spectra and angular distriiutions from the proton induced reactions.

Two decades have passed since the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, yet terrorist crimes still lack a universally agreed-upon definition. The necessity of reaching a consensus to provide a comprehensive definition and address the complexities of this phenomenon within the international community remains mandatory and undeniable. Thus, the most significant deficiency and gap in the international criminal law system is the absence of a comprehensive convention on terrorism that categorizes terrorist crimes as criminal acts in general. Nevertheless, the prevalence of this grave phenomenon has led to extensive legal developments, resulting in the approval of regulatory measures at both national and international levels. Governments, confronted with such threats, have sought to establish national regulations and, through comprehensive cooperation, have initiated the compilation and establishment of various documents in this field.
The lack of legal and international recognition of these crimes, due to the absence of consensus among governments and international organizations—despite the existence of international conventions against terrorist crimes in global, regional, and even extra-regional territories—facilitates their increasing occurrence, thereby jeopardizing international peace and security. This situation not only aids in preventing threats to international peace and security but also underscores the justification for criminalization.
Therefore, there is an imperative need to formulate a coherent, technical, legal, and comprehensive definition that remains free from the politicization of international organizations and governments. The adoption of principled mechanisms and the utilization of maximum cooperation among governments and organizations at regional and international levels in combating terrorist acts is indispensable.

This report summarizes the findings of a nation-wide survey of public perceptions of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War environment. Participants included 1,301 members of the general public, 1,155 randomly selected members of the Union of Concerned Scientists, and 1,226 employees randomly selected from the technical staffs of four DOE national laboratories. A majority of respondents from all three samples perceived the post-Cold War security environment to pose increased likelihood of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation; and nuclear terrorism. Public perceptions of nuclear weapons threats, risks, utilities, and benefits were found to systematically affect nuclear weapons policy preferences in predictable ways. Highly significant relationships were also found between public trust and nuclear weapons policy preferences. As public trust in official government information about nuclear weapons increased, perceptions of nuclear weapons management risks decreased and perceptions of nuclear weapons utilities and benefits increased. A majority of respondents favored decreasing funding for: (1) developing and testing new nuclear weapons (2) maintaining existing nuclear weapons; and (3) maintaining the ability to develop and improve nuclear weapons. Substantial support was found among all three groups for increasing funding for: (1) enhancing nuclear weapons safety; (2) training nuclear weapons personnel; (3) preventing nuclear proliferation; and (4) preventing nuclear terrorism. Most respondents considered nuclear weapons to be a persistent feature of the post-Cold War security environment.

Introduction Donald J. Trump was officially inaugurated as the 47th President of the United States on January 20, 2025, taking the oath of office in accordance with constitutional provisions. Shortly thereafter, his administration implemented sweeping policy shifts, including an executive order that resulted in the immediate suspension of nearly all foreign assistance worldwide. According to CNN, the U.S. State Department enforced a comprehensive Stop Work Order (SWO), placing a 90-day hold on all U.S. aid programs. This abrupt policy directive had significant implications for global development efforts, disrupting funding channels and halting critical humanitarian and economic assistance programs as it is often narrated. However, what is not seen in this disruption is why the Aid Sector was unprepared for this event?

By studying Iran's criminal policy and its developments, we realize the fact that the criminal legislator has used two strategies at any time: the first strategy is related to Sharia standards and the second strategy is related to governmental or customary standards. Despite being aware of the differences, the legislator has always considered these two strategies as integral principles of criminal policy. This research with descriptive-analytical method has achieved the important fact that these two strategies were present in all legislative periods from General Penal Act 1304 to Islamic Act Code 1392 and only the share of each has changed. Apparently, these two strategies are competing with each other, but in fact, despite the differences, the common point that can be seen in the legislative process is the preservation of both strategies, which is a legislative phenomenon, and the legislator can achieve greater compromise and homogenization by resolving the conflicts and harmonizing the above two strategies.

This research paper explores the multifaceted nature of nuclear weapons, addressing their characteristics, history, and the contentious debate surrounding their use and abolishment. It examines the devastating humanitarian, environmental, and financial impacts of nuclear weapons, alongside their potential to disrupt global peace and stability. Drawing on historical events such as the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and highlighting international treaties like the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the study underscores the urgent need for nuclear disarmament. Advocating for a world free from nuclear threats, this paper argues that the long-term risks and catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons far outweigh any perceived benefits, emphasizing the necessity of prioritizing humanity over military dominance.

Criminal law plays a unique role in protecting environmental rights. Ecocide as an environmental problem is a global problem that has transcended national borders and turned into environmental pollution and regional and global ecosystem problems. The use of criminal law and determining the guarantee of execution, both in the domestic and international dimensions, to protect environmental rights, will have an effective impact on the protection of the global environment. Internationally, environmental rights are defined as the right to have a good environment. However, this concept is developing and a precise definition of the crime of ecocide of material and spiritual elements and what place ecocide has in the definition of the crime has not yet been provided. Governments, groups, and companies with power and wealth, as the main cause of environmental destruction, what restrictions do they create in establishing and passing laws related to ecocide? This article analytically and descriptively shows that criminal behavior in the field of environmental crimes is a very serious issue. These behaviors include illegal activities related to water and air pollution, destruction of natural resources, illegal hunting and wildlife trade, migration developments, smuggling of biological products, and other activities that harm the environment as destruction. In other words, the purpose of this research is to map where ecocide is located under the criminal law offense and provide directions for future research.

Each country has a determined response system for committing a crime. And in the Islamic Penal Code, the punishment for committing a crime is explicitly stated in Article 122. Indeed, this action helps to the coherence of the rulings. However, despite this positive approach, this system has faced gaps in crimes with multiple punishments and has presented problems to judges; For example, in a crime such as combat, which has diverse and facultative penalties, It is not clear based on which paragraph of Article 122 of the Islamic Penal Code the judge should determine the punishment at the beginning of this crime. Penalties prescribed for combat do not fit into any of the mentioned articles, such as negation. There are different perspectives to address this issue. These notions can be divided into three main approaches, encompassing the judge's discretion that is the criterion for imposing the most severe or mild legal punishment. Examination of the existing opinions shows that the application of each will have advantages and disadvantages. In this article, we have studied and analyzed these approaches through the interpretative analytical method. Thus, in crimes that the trial took the legislature of any crimes, this discretion is also true at the beginning. However, in order for judges to be less likely to issue dissenting verdicts, they should pay attention to the type of crime committed and the policy that is enacted from the set of criminal rules governing those crimes.

The paper addresses some entrenched myths concerning illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials as well as, connected with them, threats of proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as nuclear and radiological terrorism in terms of insufficient reliability and accuracy of data and information on illicit trafficking incidents contained in relevant databases. Arguments are presented that, at least partly, the problem is derived from the dubious definitions given to the term 'illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials' in IAEA documents, and domination of a regulatory approach to this term definition as well as data reporting and processing procedures. Some measures to improve analytical efforts to minimise deficiencies in this field are proposed.

How would our lives be affected, if terrorists managed to detonate a nuclear bomb in a capital city anywhere in the world? To what extent, and in which way, such act would change our present and our future, that of our country and of others?
This document, developed by a high-level multidisciplinary Expert Group convened by the NPSGlobal Foundation for its project, the Latin American and Caribbean Leadership Network (LALN), aims at demonstrating through systematic analysis that if such an attack were to take place, multiple negative impacts would spread promptly around the globe.
Intuitive thinking shows that such act would undoubtedly draw a line in the history of humankind. In fact, it would trigger deep changes in all the meaningful dimensions of human activity, and in the way that countries and individuals relate to one another. Such global disruption would affect not only the balance of global and regional power, and the levels of confidence between states, but also the legal framework that regulates international relations. Implications would reach military affairs, the global economy and finance, the international trade, and consequence of panic and chaos, the behavior of individuals and societies. It is evident that one single act can unleash terror as never seen before.

Cómo se vería afectada nuestra vida cotidiana si terroristas detonaran una bomba nuclear en alguna gran capital del mundo? Hasta qué punto y de qué manera tal acto cambiaría nuestro presente y nuestro futuro, el de nuestro país y el de otros?
Este documento, elaborado por un Grupo de Expertos multidisciplinario de alto nivel convocado por la Fundación NPSGlobal para su proyecto, Red de Líderes de América Latina y el Caribe (LALN), pretende demostrar mediante un análisis sistemático que de producirse tal ataque, los impactos negativos alcanzarían dimensión global en forma inmediata.
La intuición nos indica que dicho acto determinaría un antes y un después en la historia de la humanidad. De hecho, provocaría cambios profundos en todas las dimensiones significativas de la actividad humana y en la forma en que los países y los individuos se relacionan entre sí. Una disrupción generalizada afectaría, no sólo
el balance de poder global y regional y los niveles de confianza entre los estados, sino también el marco jurídico que regula las relaciones internacionales. Las implicaciones llegarían también a los asuntos militares y a la economía y las finanzas globales, al comercio internacional y, del mismo modo, el pánico y caos generados afectarían el comportamiento de los individuos y de las sociedades. Sin dudas un acto semejante
desataría el terror global en una escala sin precedentes.

The only good thing about "Complex 2030," the publicly announced United States plan to modernize its nuclear weapons complex and replace its entire nuclear arsenal with new "Reliable Replacement Warheads" by the year 2030, is that it's visible. Other than that, the proposed project, which could cost more than $150 billion over 25 years, is tantamount to a U.S. declaration of "nukes forever," and a repudiation of its obligation under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to end the arms race "at an early date" and to negotiate "in good faith" the elimination of its nuclear arsenal. As described in the current Department of Energy (DOE) Strategic plan, the DOE "has a rich and diverse history with its lineage tracing back to the Manhattan Project and the race to develop an atomic bomb during World War II." 1 Today, the DOE's Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) in Californiathe direct descendants of the Manhattan Project -are engaged in a new arms race. The Livermore Lab was founded in 1952 to compete with Los Alamos -the original home of the Manhattan Project -to develop a hydrogen bomb, orders of magnitude more powerful than the U.S. atomic bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Now the Labs are working on competing designs for a replacement for the 100-kiloton W76 warhead (some 1,600 of which are currently deployed on Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles). 2 The DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) 3 is expected to select the winning design before the end of 2006, sending the program into its next phase. A recently uncovered Department of Defense (DoD) chart outlining the future of the nuclear stockpile, forecasts that the U.S. will "develop warheads for next-generation delivery systems" between 2010 and 2020. Titled "Stockpile Transformation," the chart also has a "long term vision" that includes "possible new DoD platforms and delivery systems." In addition, the "long-term vision" includes "2-4 types of RRW's" (reliable replacement warheads), while most media coverage to date has suggested that there will be only be two RRW designs, one to be developed by Livermore and one by Los Alamos. 4

The agenda of decolonization is animosity. Using Kenneth Waltz’s three images of war (individual, state level, and systemic), this article thoroughly examines the three major conflicts that have broken out between India and Pakistan. Since both countries gained independence from the British, ties between India and Pakistan, have been tense. South Asian instability directly results from repeated conflicts between the two countries. The dread of a nuclear conflict that could wipe out all human civilization is a new factor in the India-Pakistan conflict, exacerbated by the spread of nuclear weapons in the region. Foreign strategists and actors from both nations have tried to understand what drives tensions between these longtime adversaries. However, only some have looked at the Indo-Pak conflict from three images of war. This research uses Waltz’s three images of war as a prism to analyse the wars that have broken out between India and Pakistan and offer suggestions for how the two war-weary neighbors can avert another catastrophic conflict. The article is grounded in qualitative research. It investigates the past to find relationships and causes that have modern-day relevance. Structural Realism (Neorealism), primarily articulated by Kenneth Waltz, serves as the theoretical foundation for this investigation. Additionally, this article speculates the likelihood of future confrontations between India and Pakistan based on Waltz’s three conceptions of war.

The article includes a systemic analysis of Poland's potential and response capabilities to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. As a result of the conducted research, the dominant threats, technological resources, legal framework and socio-political reactions related to CBRN incidents in Poland were shown. In addition, Poland's technological capabilities in the detection of chemical agents, gamma and nucleoids were presented. The important role of protective clothing in responding to CBRN threats was emphasized. An analysis of the legal framework underpinning detection and response to CBRN threats has been carried out. In addition, a comprehensive analysis of international cooperation and the role of Poland in supporting joint initiatives focused on counteracting CBRN threats was presented. A detailed analysis of the Polish preparedness strategy in the event of potential chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear incidents was helpful in drawing conclusions. The article highlights the multifaceted nature of the Polish approach, which includes understanding CBRN threats, investing in advanced detection technologies, ensuring the security of response through protective equipment, implementing robust civil protection measures, and adhering to a comprehensive legal framework. The discussion additionally sheds light on the key role of international cooperation in the Polish CBRN strategy. Basically, the article presents Polish preparations as a comprehensive approach combining technological knowledge, legal infrastructure, public security measures and international cooperation, with the overriding goal of effectively counteracting CBRN threats. In addition, it sheds light on the possibilities of Poland's response to CBRN threats, including showing the directions of future research projects.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

About CSIS For four decades, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has been dedicated to providing world leaders with strategic insights on—and policy solutions to—current and emerging global issues. CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, formerly deputy secretary of ...

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

This paper asks the question "Is mankind about to face extinction?" It discusses the missile arms race with reference to China, Russia and North Korea. It concludes mankind's propensity for warfare could lead to WWIII. A childhood habit beyond simple 'cowboys and Indians' transmogrified to sophisticated war games using drones (viz, slaughterbots) and lethal nuclear missiles.
Other factors demonstrating mankind's vulnerability include climate change, , overpopulation, food and water shortages, natural disasters, mass migration, epidemics/pandemics, famine and depletion of adequate mineral resources in the future. Should kinetic warfare not breakout this decade or later, then these other factors are more likely to come into play.

Background and Aim: Economic crimes are one of the important issues of today's Iranian society, which have many destructive economic and social effects. In this article, an attempt has been made to investigate the legal jurisprudence of Corrupt on Earth and its examples in economic crimes.
Materials and Methods: This paper is descriptive and analytical and library method is used.
Ethical Considerations: In this paper, the originality of the texts, honesty and trustworthiness are observed.
Results: The findings showed that Corrupt on Earth is a crime independent of mahariyyah from a jurisprudential and legal point of view, which can have different examples. The most important characteristic of Corrupt on Earth  is the creation of widespread corruption and severe disruption of public order, which is simply not possible to determine examples in the field of economic crimes. The most important law of the country regarding economic crimes, that is, the law on punishing those who disrupt the economic system, lacks the necessary transparency.
Conclusion: The presence of vague concepts such as major and macro disturbance without the criteria and extent being clear causes different interpretations and possibly issuing conflicting opinions. It is necessary to clearly define what the legislator means by major and large-scale disturbance and to determine how much is considered major and large-scale in the law of combating economic disruptors, so that it can be considered as corruption in economic crimes.

While the term ''weapons of mass destruction'' (WMD) is a relatively new one, the effort to stop the spread of arms and weapons systems that can inflict mass harm is by no means new. Indeed, efforts to stop the production and possible use of these most fatal weapons have been successful by many accounts. From agreements following World War I to ban mustard gas to the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the nearly universal acceptance of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to the inauguration of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997, the international community has made great strides in limiting states' ability to pursue, and interest in pursuing, WMD. Libya's recent decision to dismantle and allow international inspections of its own WMD program serves as evidence of the effectiveness of today's nonproliferation regime. The agreements and institutions at the core of this nonproliferation regime, however, are designed to affect the decisions and policies of only one type of actor in the international community, that is, states. As such, current arrangements do not do enough to halt the spread of WMD to nonstate actors in the international system. And, yet, it is widely believed that WMD proliferation among nonstate actorsFsuch as terrorist groups, ethnic secessionist groups, and religious sectsFwill be the critical nonproliferation challenge of the next twenty years. With this challenge in mind, the Center for International Development and Conflict Management of the University of Maryland convened a conference on nonstate actors, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction on October 15, 2004. The conference was made possible by a grant from the International Peace and Security Program of the Carnegie Corporation of New York. 1 The goal of the conference was to gather a small group of leading social science experts on nonstate actors, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction in a setting conducive to the 1 The conference organizers would like to thank Amy Benavides, Bidisha Biswas, Derrick Franke, and especially Jane Schmitt for their help in organizing and working at the conference.