No Miracles Argument

1-This paper shows that the NMA eluding the knowing subject would be nothing more than a profession of faith. 2-Then it re-introduces the subject with the help of Ontology of Knowledge. 3-Using the example of the theory of Relativity it shows the difficulties resulting from the elision of the subject and propose a solution to include the subject into the NMA

Entropy is not part of the human condition.  Wonder, empathy, desire to know – these characterize human life.  Human beings are curious, innovative, and creative:  We transform the world around us.  We share life moments with those around us; we share food with those in need; we share ideas with others asking questions.  Human beings build lives, communities, gardens, libraries, machines.  When we define “reality” and talk about what exists, we must include human life.  Our world view depends more upon our transformative effects on the world than any theories which are distant from our experiences. A naturalistic view of the universe is too narrow to explain what is real.

A guiding thread in Mario Alai's longstanding research is the exploration of the nature and limits of our knowledge of reality. For at least 20 years now, he has focused specifically on scientific knowledge and the issue of scientific realism versus antirealism, making some rather significant contributions to the advancement of the debate. In particular, with his distinctive rigour and attention to the structure of the argument, Alai has played a key role in defining what is no doubt one of the most convincing, if not THE most convincing, formulations of scientific realism nowadays. Namely, a sort of selective 'deployment realism' urging a realist attitude only towards those elements within scientific theories that prove to be responsible for those theories' unexpected predictions. In this short note, I illustrate (what I take to be) the main components of Alai's views. Based on the proposed reconstruction, I then suggest a couple of points where Alai's arguments, and predictivist deployment realism more generally, could be objected to and might benefit from further reflection. 2. Mario Alai's scientific realism Scientific realism is the thesis that the best philosophical explanation of the success of scientific theories is that they are (approximately) true descriptions of the world. As is well-known, scientific realists have to respond to the antirealist critique based on Laudan-style (Laudan 1981) pessimistic meta-inductions. Even granting realism the status of 'default' position, the objection goes, several cases can be pointed at in the history of science in which theories that we now regard as false have nonetheless been successful. Therefore, scientific realism is untenable. Typical realist defences are based on the idea that a realist commitment is in fact still warranted, once it is restricted to those parts of theories that are responsible for their success and have been preserved across theory change. Consider, however, empirical success intended as the ability to account for what has been observed. A constructive empiricist, who is only committed to the empirical adequacy of a theory, i.e., to its ability to 'save the phenomena', can contend that nothing else is required in the case at hand: since that a theory T saves the phenomena means that T accounts for the known data, that T is empirically adequate suffices for explaining why T accounts for the known data. 'Deployment realists' such as Alai consequently embrace 'predictivism', putting a special emphasis on novel predictions. They argue that, while it is indeed reasonable to think that the accommodation of old data does not lend support to the claim that a certain hypothesis is true or approximately true, a theory's ability to apply to unexpected domains and make correct predictions about them strongly suggests that it latched onto the objective structure of reality. This leads to the problem that prediction and confirmation are logically on a par: after all, whether or not certain data are already known when a theory is formulated is a contingent fact, hence prediction cannot play any role that the confirmation by known data cannot also play. In response to this 'deductivist' objection, Alai (see, e.g., Alai 2014c) acknowledges the logical symmetry between prediction and confirmation but at the same time argues that the crucial features of novel predictions do not concern their logical relationship with the theory. Rather, what makes them instrumental to the realist case is that novel predictions are in at least some occasions genuinely surprising: as Alai explains, this happens when they are not used essentially in the construction of the relevant theories (Alai 2014c, 303-307; Alai 2018, 123-124; Alai, 2014a, 57), they are a priori improbable (Alai 2014c, 307-309), and they are heterogeneous with respect to the data that proved essential for producing the theory (Alai 2014c, 309-312). 1 Based on this conception of novel prediction, Alai also successfully deals with other challenges. For instance, Doppelt (2005, 2007) contends that deployment realism is in fact not efficacious in neutralizing the pessimistic meta-induction. Doing so, says Doppelt, requires a compelling account of a theory's ability to explain known data in a virtuous way, that is, to provide explanations that are simple, complete, plausible, consistent with background beliefs etc. This is because it is only by having recourse to these non-empirical virtues that one can make sense of the fact that some particular theories were selected among several empirically equivalent alternatives. Noticing that some of the false theories of the past were virtuous in this sense, however, Doppelt concludes that realists should restrict their claims to current theories, which are clearly successful in the most comprehensive sense, as well as non-falsified (Doppelt 2011). In response to this, Alai convincingly argues that novel predictions are normally made by virtuous theories, while being virtuous is by itself insufficient to licence realism. Indeed, says Alai, it is only the conjunction of novel predictions and theoretical virtues that counts, and requiring both sidesteps Doppelt's objection (Alai 2018, 126). According to Alai, however, Doppelt is right in saying that theories with the right features can plausibly be regarded as true only if one makes certain additional assumptions, ultimately at the metaphysical level (Doppelt 2005, 1082). How can one claim that a theory is (approximately) true 2 and virtuous, i.e., simple, unified, etc., if not by assuming that nature is itself simple, unified, etc.? Alai, however, also points out that what Doppelt specifically asks is whether it is an accident that true theories are also virtuous, and this seems to presuppose truth rather than using it as an explanans. The question 'Why are theories that make true predictions also virtuous?', adds Alai, is also potentially misleading, for it might be intended as asking of a theory why it is the case that it makes the predictions that it in fact does and has the internal structure that it in fact has, which of course are purely logical facts about the theory being itself (Alai, 2014a, 50, referring

I develop an account of predictive similarity that allows even Antirealists who accept a correspondence conception of truth to answer the Realist demand (recently given sophisticated reformulations by Musgrave and Leplin) to explain the success of particular scientific theories by appeal to some intrinsic feature of those theories (notwithstanding the failure of past efforts by van Fraassen, Fine, and Laudan). I conclude by arguing that we have no reason to find truth a better (i.e., more plausible) explanation of a theory's success than predictive similarity, even of its success in making novel predictions. 1. Introduction. The strongest plank in the support for Scientific Realism is an argument classically articulated by Popper (1963), Smart (1968), Putnam (1975, 1978), and Boyd (1984) and which has received a powerful new formulation in the hands of such authors as Alan Musgrave (1988) and Jarrett Leplin (1997). The argument is that the only satisfactory explanation for the success of our scientific theories is that they are true (or approximately true, or true in those respects which are actually responsible for their success) in something very like the classical correspondence senses of these terms. This is sometimes called the Ultimate Argument for Scientific Realism (first by van Fraassen (1980)), or the Miracle argument

Esta pesquisa analisa alguns tópicos sobre a metodologia de acordo com a filosofia da ciência de Larry Laudan, além de examinar, na área da educação, esta proposta de interpretação filosófica. Trouxemos como elementos algumas considerações e definições sobre a metodologia em Laudan, isto é, da metodologia como um instrumento para a realização da axiologia (que são as metas e os valores cognitivos), porém, apresentando também interessantes relações para com as teorias específicas, como o de justificar as teorias específicas e de ser restringida por elas. A metodologia é também, dentro do modelo reticulado de Laudan, justificada pela axiologia. Para além desta análise, há também uma defesa da metodologia enquanto o estudo dela própria, o que permite encontrarmos conexões interessantes em teorias da educação, como no caso da investigação-ação, onde vemos que estamos diante de uma tradição de pesquisa nos moldes defendidos pela filosofia da ciência de Laudan, por reconhecermos que temos um modelo reticular composto por teorias específicas, metodologias e axiologia também na área da educação. Veremos também que a metodologia em Laudan possui um caráter dinâmico, tensionando e sendo tensionada pelos componentes da tradição de pesquisa, caracterizando o modelo reticulado de racionalidade proposto pelo filósofo. Este debate em Laudan, juntamente com a tradição de pesquisa da investigação-ação da área da educação serão investigados neste artigo. Como base para a construção deste texto, utilizamos as seguintes obras de Laudan: The Progress and its problems: towards a theory of scientific growth (1977), Science and Values (1984a), Explaining the success of science: beyond epistemic realism and relativism (1984b), Methodology’s prospects (1986), Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism (1987a), Aim-less Epistemology? (1990a) e Normative Naturalism (1990b).

The paper addresses the so-called miracle argument in favor of scientific realism and examines the viability of scientific reahsm as an explanation for the success of science. Scientific realism is committed to the claims that the theoretical terms in the mature sciences typically refer to real objects and that the theoretical laws in such sciences are typically approximately true. Instrumentalism or non-realism draws an the principles that factual claims need to be confirmed empirically and that experience fails to single out true assumptions. The miracle argument says that if a theory referred to fictitious objects, it would he miraculous that it is able to correctly predict observable effects. This argument transforms scientific realism into a hypothesis that is testable by the history of science. 1 perform such tests and conclude that the only type of realism that appears to be in agreement with the historical record is "reahsm of natural Kinds." Theories that enjoy distinguished explanatory success truthfully establish equivalence relations among phenomena.

The aim here is to develop some of Alai’s ideas and strategies in order to defend a realist approach to scientific understanding. Although the notion of scientific understanding is not central to his work, I think his defence of scientific realism is helpful in disambiguating and defining the role of scientific understanding in arguing for or against scientific realism.  In particular, I argue that, in order to clarify their positions, philosophers of understanding should define them with respect to the realism-antirealism debate before digging into the subtleties of understanding (also scientific).
So, the focus here will be on the scientific realism issues, rather than on the Quinean themes which determined my first encounter with Alai. In §2 I sketch the main ideas taken from the debate about scientific understanding. In §3, I present Alai’s contribution to the scientific realism debate, namely his definition of deployment realism (DR), as an upgrading to resist anti-realist criticisms (Lyons 2002, 2016; Laudan, 1981). In §4, I present the defence of realism provided by Pincock (2023) on the basis of an analysis of scientific understanding. In §5, I sketch a possible line of connection between the debate about scientific realism and scientific understanding, and describe the role of essentiality in scientific understanding.

Total and sudden transformations of language seldom happen; conquests and migrations are now very rare: but there are other causes of change, which, though slow in their operation, and invisible in their progress, are perhaps as much superior to human resistance, as the revolutions of the sky, or intumescence of the tide.

This article aims at discussing an interesting variant of scientific realism recently proposed and defended by Sandra Mitchell (forthcoming), namely an affordances-based and pragmatist variant of scientific realism. We firstly place Mitchell’s proposal in the context of the current state of the debate over scientific realism. Secondly, we summarize the salient features of Mitchell’s proposal. Thirdly, we point out some aspects of that proposal that might require some further refinement and clarification in order to make it less prone to criticisms by both realists and antirealists. More precisely, in this paper we address the following issues: 1) whether Mitchell’s proposal can be classified as a genuine form of scientific realism; 2) whether the fact that in Mitchell’s proposal figure some variants of the no miracle argument is in tension with some other of its features.

The contemporary scientific realism debate centers around the realist’s claim that successful scientific theories are at least approximately true. Realists, such as Hilary Putnam justify this claim by arguing that it would be a miracle were our successful scientific theories not at least approximately true. Denying the possibility of miracles, the scientific realist must defend a theory’s approximate truth as the only possible explanation for its success. Anti-realist Bas van Fraassen responds to the realist’s argument by offering a Darwinian explanation for the success of scientific theories, an explanation that involves neither truth nor miracles: we have successful theories because we reject those that do not succeed. Realists object that – although van Fraassen’s alternative may explain why we have successful theories – it fails to explain why any particular theory is successful. Striking at realism from another direction, Larry Laudan offers a list of historically successful sc...

IN SPITE OF appearances to the contrary, I will not present an exercise in applied theology but rather in applied philosophy of science. That is, I will draw some systematic conclusions from some historical case studies. More specifically, my aim is to show that the so-called "Miracle Argument" that is frequently advanced in favor of scientific realism doesn't hold water. Before I can address the problematic aspects of that argument, I must first straighten out the argument itself as well as the position it is intended to support.

Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold Sommerfeld’s ([1916]) derivation of the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. Not only were his predictions good, he derived exactly the same formula that would later drop out of Dirac’s 1928 treatment (something not possible using 1925 Schrödinger–Heisenberg quantum mechanics). And yet the most central elements of Sommerfeld’s theory were not even approximately true: his derivation leans heavily on a classical approach to elliptical orbits, including the necessary adjustments to these orbits demanded by relativity. Even physicists call Sommerfeld’s success a ‘miracle’, which rather makes a joke of the so-called ‘no miracles argument’. However, this can all be turned around. Here I argue that the realist has a story to tell vis-à-vis the discontinuities between the old and the new theory, leading to a realist defence based on sufficient continuity of relevant structure. 1Introduction2No Realist...

V diplomski nalogi preizprašujem tehtnost ideje, ki vzpostavlja razlagalno povezavo med empiričnim uspehom teorije in njeno resničnostjo. Ker deluje ideja intuitivno zelo prepričljivo, se mi zdi toliko bolj zanimivo proučiti načine, kako vse bi jo lahko preizkušali. Tako je temeljno vprašanje naloge, kako razložiti empirični uspeh v znanosti. Ta izhodiščna točka je povezana z vrsto podvprašanj: kaj so ugovori realistični razlagi, ki jo tukaj jemljem za zdravorazumsko izhodišče diskusije, in kakšne so alternativekakšnega pomena je to vprašanje in kakšno vlogo igra v širšem epistemološkem vprašanju o spoznavnem statusu znanostizakaj je to vprašanje pomembno? V nalogi skušam doseči celostni pregled nad diskusijo okoli t. i. argumenta brez čudežev.This paper examines the plausibility of an explanatory link connecting the empirical success of a scientific theory with its truth. Because this idea is intuitively convincing, it might be worth considering all the potential problems of it. Th...

IN SPITE OF appearances to the contrary, I will not present an exercise in applied theology but rather in applied philosophy of science. That is, I will draw some systematic conclusions from some historical case studies. More specifically, my aim is to show that the so-called "Miracle Argument" that is frequently advanced in favor of scientific realism doesn't hold water. Before I can address the problematic aspects of that argument, I must first straighten out the argument itself as well as the position it is intended to support.

Recent studies examine the determinants of entrepreneurial efforts among immigrants (Borjas, 1986; Fairlie and Meyer, 1996; Lofstrom 2002). In general, studies point out that migrant status and ethnicity affect the individual propensity to start a new business (Levie, 2006) and that ...

Recent studies examine the determinants of entrepreneurial efforts among immigrants (Borjas, 1986; Fairlie and Meyer, 1996; Lofstrom 2002). In general, studies point out that migrant status and ethnicity affect the individual propensity to start a new business (Levie, 2006) and that ...

Lyons (2016, 2017, 2018) formulates Laudan's (1981) historical objection to scientific realism as a modus tollens. I present a better formulation of Laudan's objection, and then argue that Lyons's formulation is supererogatory. Lyons rejects scientific realism (Putnam, 1975) on the grounds that some successful past theories were (completely) false. I reply that scientific realism is not the categorical hypothesis that all successful scientific theories are (approximately) true, but rather the statistical hypothesis that most successful scientific theories are (approximately) true. Lyons rejects selectivism (Kitcher, 1993; Psillos, 1999) on the grounds that some working assumptions were (completely) false in the history of science. I reply that selectivists would say not that all working assumptions are (approximately) true, but rather that most working assumptions are (approximately) true.

Many formulations of scientific realism (SR) include some commitment to metaphysical realism (MR). On the other hand, authors like Schlick, Carnap and Putnam held forms of scientific realism coupled with metaphysical antirealism (and this has analogies in Kant). So we might ask: do scientific realists really need MR? or is MR already implied by SR, so that SR is actually incompatible with metaphysical antirealism? And if MR must really be added to SR, why is that so? And which additional arguments scientific realists need to support it? After reviewing and classifying a number of different kinds of realisms, metaphysical and not, I answer that SR and MR are logically independent of each other, so that there is no logical inconsistency in holding SR while rejecting MR. However, I argue that the “no miracle” argument (NMA) not only is the “ultimate” argument for SR, but by the same token it also supports MR. Therefore one cannot effectively defend SR without also subscribing to MR, bu...

Gerald Doppelt claims that Deployment Realism cannot withstand the antirealist objections based on the “pessimistic meta-induction” and Laudan’s historical counterexamples. Moreover it is incomplete, as it purports to explain the predictive success of theories, but overlooks the necessity to explain also their explanatory success. Accordingly, he proposes a new version of realism, presented as the best explanation of both predictive and explanatory success, and committed only to the truth of best current theories, not of the discarded ones (Doppelt (2007, 2011, 2013, 2014). Elsewhere I criticized his new brand of realism. Here instead I argue that (a) Doppelt has not shown that Deployment Realism cannot solve the problems raised by the history of science, (b) explaining explanatory success does not add much to explaining novel predictive success, and (c) Doppelt is right that truth is not a sufficient explanans, but for different reasons, and this does not refute Deployment Realism,...

The empirical underdetermination of theories is a philosophical problem which until the last century has not seriously troubled actual science. The reason is that confirmation does not depend only on empirical consequences, and we can choose among empirically equivalent theories on the basis of theoretical virtues. True, in current quantum mechanics not even theoretical virtues allow to choose among many competing theories and interpretations, but this is because none of them possess those virtues to a sufficient degree. However, first, we can hope for some advancement in the state of the art: in past history we never witnessed unsolvable scientific problems. Second, even if no further progress came forth, all the most credited competitors agree on a substantial core of theoretical assumptions. Therefore underdetermination does not show that we cannot be realist on unobservable entities in general, but at most that in particular fields our inquiry may encounter some de facto limits. Realism is not a claim of omniscience: since the reality we know is subjectindependent, gaps or mistakes are always possible in principle.

Predictivists use the no miracle argument to argue that ''novel'' predictions are decisive evidence for theories, while mere accommodation of ''old'' data cannot confirm to a significant degree. But deductivists claim that since confirmation is a logical theory-data relationship, predicted data cannot confirm more than merely deduced data, and cite historical cases in which known data confirmed theories quite strongly. On the other hand, the advantage of prediction over accommodation is needed by scientific realists to resist Laudan's criticisms of the no miracle argument. So, if the deductivists are right, the most powerful argument for realism collapses. There seems to be an inescapable contradiction between these prima facie plausible arguments of predictivists and deductivists; but this puzzle can be solved by understanding what exactly counts as novelty, if novel predictions must support the no miracle argument, i.e., if they must be explainable only by the truth of theories. Taking my cues from the use-novelty tradition, I argue that (1) the predicted data must not be used essentially in building the theory or choosing the auxiliary assumptions. This is possible if the theory and its auxiliary assumptions are plausible independently of the predicted data, and I analyze the consequences of this requirement in terms of best explanation of diverse bodies of data. Moreover, the predicted data must be (2) a priori improbable, and (3) heterogeneous to the essentially used data. My proposed notion of novelty, therefore, is not historical, but functional. Hence, deductivists are right that confirmation is independent of time and of historical contingencies such as if the theorist knew a datum, used it, or intended to accommodate it. Predictivists, however, are right that not all consequences confirm equally, and confirmation is not purely a logical theory-data relation, as it crucially involves background epistemic conditions and the notion of best explanation. Conditions (1)-(3) make the difference between prediction and

Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold Sommerfeld’s ([1916]) derivation of the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. Not only were his predictions good, he derived exactly the same formula that would later drop out of Dirac’s 1928 treatment (something not possible using 1925 Schrödinger–Heisenberg quantum mechanics). And yet the most central elements of Sommerfeld’s theory were not even approximately true: his derivation leans heavily on a classical approach to elliptical orbits, including the necessary adjustments to these orbits demanded by relativity. Even physicists call Sommerfeld’s success a ‘miracle’, which rather makes a joke of the so-called ‘no miracles argument’. However, this can all be turned around. Here I argue that the realist has a story to tell vis-à-vis the discontinuities between the old and the new theory, leading to a realist defence based on sufficient continuity of relevant structure. 1Introduction2No Realist...

The basic idea of realism is that the kinds of thing which exist, and what they are like, are independent of us and the way in which we find out about them; antirealism denies this. Most people find it natural to be realists with respect to physical facts: how many planets there are in the solar system does not depend on how many we think there are, or would like there to be, or how we investigate them; likewise, whether electrons exist or not depends on the facts, not on which theory we favour. However, it seems natural to be antirealist about humour: something’s being funny is very much a matter of whether we find it funny, and the idea that something might really be funny even though nobody ever felt any inclination to laugh at it seems barely comprehensible. The saying that ‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder’ is a popular expression of antirealism in aesthetics. An obviously controversial example is that of moral values; some maintain that they are real (or ‘objective’), othe...

In this article, I explore the compatibility of inference to the best explanation (IBE) with several influential models and accounts of scientific explanation. First, I explore the different conceptions of IBE and limit my discussion to two: the heuristic conception and the objective Bayesian conception. Next, I discuss five models of scientific explanation with regard to each model's compatibility with IBE. I argue that Philip Kitcher's unificationist account supports IBE; Peter Railton's deductivenomological-probabilistic model, Wesley Salmon's statistical-relevance Model, and Bas van Fraassen's erotetic account are incompatible with IBE; and Wesley Salmon's causal-mechanical model is merely consistent with IBE. In short, many influential models of scientific explanation do not support IBE. I end by outlining three possible conclusions to draw: (1) either philosophers of science or defenders of IBE have seriously misconstrued the concept of explanation, (2) philosophers of science and defenders of IBE do not use the term 'explanation' univocally, and (3) the ampliative conception of IBE, which is compatible with any model of scientific explanation, deserves a closer look.

The paper addresses the so-called miracle argument in favor of scientific realism and examines the viability of scientific reahsm as an explanation for the success of science. Scientific realism is committed to the claims that the theoretical terms in the mature sciences typically refer to real objects and that the theoretical laws in such sciences are typically approximately true. Instrumentalism or non-realism draws an the principles that factual claims need to be confirmed empirically and that experience fails to single out true assumptions. The miracle argument says that if a theory referred to fictitious objects, it would he miraculous that it is able to correctly predict observable effects. This argument transforms scientific realism into a hypothesis that is testable by the history of science. 1 perform such tests and conclude that the only type of realism that appears to be in agreement with the historical record is "reahsm of natural Kinds." Theories that enjoy distinguished explanatory success truthfully establish equivalence relations among phenomena.

IN SPITE OF appearances to the contrary, I will not present an exercise in applied theology but rather in applied philosophy of science. That is, I will draw some systematic conclusions from some historical case studies. More specifically, my aim is to show that the so-called "Miracle Argument" that is frequently advanced in favor of scientific realism doesn't hold water. Before I can address the problematic aspects of that argument, I must first straighten out the argument itself as well as the position it is intended to support.

Van Fraassen's (1989) infamous best of a bad lot objection is widely taken to be the most serious problem that afflicts theories of inference to the best explanation (IBE), for it alleges to show that we should not accept the conclusion of any case of such reasoning as it actually proceeds. Moreover, this is supposed to be the case irrespective of the details of the particular criteria used to select best explanations. The best of a bad lot objection is predicated on, and really only requires, the idea that in any real case of IBE where one hypothesis is favored as best over those with which it competes, it is always the case that it is more likely that the true explanation is to be found in the set of unformulated and unconsidered logical alternatives to the set of actually considered hypotheses. On this basis, Van Fraassen believes that accepting the conclusion of IBEs so understood is irrational and this is simply because such inferences are supposedly not probative. In this paper the best of a bad lot objection will be addressed and it will be shown that Van Fraassen's notorious criticism of IBE depends on a problematic conflation of two notions of rationality and thus that his criticism of IBE involves a damning equivocation. In essence, he conflates ideal standards of rationality with epistemic standards of rationality and, in so doing, makes it appear to be the case that we should not accept the conclusions of IBEs. But, when we disambiguate the concepts of rationality at work in the argument Van Fraassen's conclusion simply does not follow.

Throughout history scientists and philosophers have discussed whether the theoretical descriptions of unobservable entities and facts were credible or not. The problem, I claim, is not due to an epistemic boundary demarcating the observable from the unobservable, but to methodological problems concerning theories, both local (as incompatibility with background theories, or lack of independent evidence) and global (as empirical underdetermination and basic human fallibility). This is seen by reviewing Celsus’ account of controversies in Hellenistic medicine, selected contemporary sources on ancient, medieval and modern cosmology, some outlines of developments in atomistic theory, wave theories, classical and relativistic mechanics, and the most recent debates on scientific revolutions.

The currently most plausible version of scientific realism is probably “deployment” (or “partial”, or “conservative”) realism, based on various contributions in the recent literature, and worked out as a unitary account in Psillos (1999). According to it we can believe in the at least partial truth of theories, because that is the best (or the only non-miraculous) explanation of their predictive success (especially novel predictive success), and discarded theories which had novel predictive success had nonetheless some true parts, those necessary to derive their novel predictions. According to Doppelt (2005, 2007) this account cannot withstand the antirealist objections based on the “pessimistic meta-induction” and Laudan’s historical counterexamples. Moreover it is incomplete, as it purports to explain the predictive success of theories, but overlooks the necessity to explain also their explanatory success. Accordingly, he proposes a new version of realism, presented as the best ex...

This paper presents an argument for metaphysical realism, understood as the claim that the world has structure that would exist even if our cognitive activities never did. The argument is based on the existence of a structured world at a time when it was still possible that we would never evolve. But the interpretation of its premises introduces subtleties: whether, for example, these premises are to be understood as assertions about the world or about our evidence, internally or externally, via assertibility conditions or truth conditions-and what sorts of beings are included in the 'we' upon whose cognitions the antirealist supposes the structure of the world to depend. I argue that antirealism can provide no defensible, fully articulated interpretation of the premises that either shows them not to be true or defeats the reasoning.

A "Porta dos Desesperados" é um jogo com três portas: atrás de uma delas há um prêmio, e atrás das outras, um monstro. O participante escolhe uma porta e ganha o que estiver atrás dela. Então o apresentador, sabendo em qual porta está o prêmio, abre uma das portas não escolhidas revelando um monstro. E faz a derradeira pergunta: "Quer trocar?". Afinal, é ou não vantajoso trocar de porta? Este pequeno problema é mais difícil do que parece, e a resposta é contra-intuitiva: é sim vantajoso trocarna verdade, a probabilidade de ganhar o prêmio dobra ao se trocar de porta.

O argumento do milagre afirma que o realismo científico é a melhor explicação para o sucesso da ciência: teorias científicas são bem-sucedidas porque são verdadeiras, e cientistas são bem-sucedidos em encontrar teorias verdadeiras porque se baseiam em normas metodológicas confiáveis. A tese da incomensurabilidade metodológica afirma que teorias científicas não são escolhidas através de um algoritmo neutro de normas epistêmicas. Isso revela uma lacuna na explicação realista: normas epistêmicas confiáveis não são suficientes para conduzir a escolhas de teorias verdadeiras, pois tais escolhas também são determinadas por outros fatores além de normas epistêmicas. A introdução de fatores adicionais como subdeterminando a escolha de teorias engendrou argumentos relativistas e antirrealistas contra o realismo. A explicação realista pode ser reabilitada se postular que os cientistas possuem autoridade epistêmica para aprimorar as normas metodológicas da ciência, sendo aptos a tomar decisões autônomas em vez de regidas por regras.

In this article, I explore the compatibility of inference to the best explanation (IBE) with several influential models and accounts of scientific explanation. First, I explore the different conceptions of IBE and limit my discussion to two: the heuristic conception and the objective Bayesian conception. Next, I discuss five models of scientific explanation with regard to each model's compatibility with IBE. I argue that Philip Kitcher's unificationist account supports IBE; Peter Railton's deductivenomological-probabilistic model, Wesley Salmon's statistical-relevance Model, and Bas van Fraassen's erotetic account are incompatible with IBE; and Wesley Salmon's causal-mechanical model is merely consistent with IBE. In short, many influential models of scientific explanation do not support IBE. I end by outlining three possible conclusions to draw: (1) either philosophers of science or defenders of IBE have seriously misconstrued the concept of explanation, (2) philosophers of science and defenders of IBE do not use the term 'explanation' univocally, and (3) the ampliative conception of IBE, which is compatible with any model of scientific explanation, deserves a closer look.

This paper takes a stance in the debate on scientific understanding. It claims that the case for a specific type of understanding, understanding without explanation (UWE), is still open, despite some tendencies in the current literature that might suggest otherwise. The paper begins by situating the distinction between explanatory and non-explanatory understanding in the debate on understanding introducing Lipton's account of UwE. It discusses next the significance of Lipton's proposals for the debate and argues that Kelp's interpretation does not exhaust the challenge they pose to any theory of understanding. The paper deals further with the best articulated critique of Lipton's account provided by Khalifa and reject it as inadequate. It ends by sketching a list of positive reasons that supports a further working agenda on UwE.

Es wird der Frage nachgegangen, ob das No-Miracle Argument als ein Schluss auf die beste Erklärung ein gutes Argument ist. Diese Frage ist auch deshalb interessant, weil, wenn sie bejaht werden kann, es rational ist, anzunehmen, dass reife wissenschaftliche Theorien uns einen epistemischen Zugang zu einer Welt jenseits des direkt Beobachtbaren erschließen.

Scientific realism plays a central role in the philosophico-methodological discussions on research. There are two are the main directions in the contributions made to scientific realism: the “internal” line and the “external” path. Following the first line, there are new visions of realism focused on central aspects of science: semantic, logic, epistemological, methodological, ontological, axiological, and ethical components. When the route follows the second path, realism in science is seen as interrelated with realism in technology and as connected to a philosophical approach to society. Altogether there is now a plethora of characterizations of scientific realism, and this paper presents the main contemporary versions of scientific realism. The analysis of the central tenets of the recent views on scientific realism contributes to present this book, which offers novelty to the ongoing debate on scientific realism.

The explanatory defense of scientific realism is motivated by science’s success. By contrast, local realists claim that scientific realism must be justified contextually, by considering individually the scientific evidence relevant to assess each theory. I propose that both approaches can be harmonized by appealing to a particularist epistemology. The characterization of local realism as a form of particularism allows us to re-evaluate its relation to the explanatory defense. Local realists reject the explanatory defense as incompatible with the localist stance, but according to particularism, our attribution of knowledge to particular cases is made prima facie, in a way open to the refinement of our epistemic norms. The function of epistemic criteria is not to demonstrate that we have knowledge, but rather to reveal its epistemic nature. One can formulate epistemological criteria by inspecting particular instances of knowledge. And one can evaluate the adequacy of his criteria by adjusting them to his cognitive life in a process of reflective equilibrium. And this is precisely what the explanatory defense of realism does. In this thesis, I develop a particularist defense of scientific realism, showing how a realist stance can be reasonably sustained in the face of the main anti-realist arguments: the pessimistic meta-induction; the problem of unconceived alternatives; and the argument from underdetermination of theory by data.

V diplomski nalogi preizprašujem tehtnost ideje, ki vzpostavlja razlagalno povezavo med empiričnim uspehom teorije in njeno resničnostjo. Ker deluje ideja intuitivno zelo prepričljivo, se mi zdi toliko bolj zanimivo proučiti načine, kako vse bi jo lahko preizkušali. Tako je temeljno vprašanje naloge, kako razložiti empirični uspeh v znanosti. Ta izhodiščna točka je povezana z vrsto podvprašanj: kaj so ugovori realistični razlagi, ki jo tukaj jemljem za zdravorazumsko izhodišče diskusije, in kakšne so alternative; kakšnega pomena je to vprašanje in kakšno vlogo igra v širšem epistemološkem vprašanju o spoznavnem statusu znanosti; zakaj je to vprašanje pomembno? V nalogi skušam doseči celostni pregled nad diskusijo okoli t. i. argumenta brez čudežev.

Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold Sommerfeld's 1916 derivation of the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. Not only were his predictions good, he derived exactly the same formula that would later drop out of Dirac's 1928 treatment (something not possible using 1925 Schrödinger-Heisenberg quantum mechanics). And yet the most central elements of Sommerfeld's theory were not even approximately true: his derivation leans heavily on a classical approach to elliptical orbits, including the necessary adjustments to these orbits demanded by relativity. Even physicists call Sommerfeld's success a 'miracle', which rather makes a joke of the so-called 'no miracles argument'. However, this can all be turned around. Here I argue that the realist has a story to tell vis-à-vis the discontinuities between the old and the new theory, leading to a realist defence based on sufficient continuity of relevant structure.

realism (MR). On the other hand, authors like Schlick, Carnap and Putnam held forms of
scientific realism coupled with metaphysical antirealism (and this has analogies in Kant).
So we might ask: do scientific realists really need MR? or is MR already implied by SR,
so that SR is actually incompatible with metaphysical antirealism? And if MR must really
be added to SR, why is that so? And which additional arguments scientific realists need to
support it? After reviewing and classifying a number of different kinds of realisms, metaphysical
and not, I answer that SR and MR are logically independent of each other, so that
there is no logical inconsistency in holding SR while rejecting MR. However, I argue that
the “no miracle” argument (NMA) not only is the “ultimate” argument for SR, but by the
same token it also supports MR. Therefore one cannot effectively defend SR without also
subscribing to MR, but this can be done at no additional argumentative cost. I show this by
discussing not only the standard version of the NMA, but also three more versions which
are not usually considered as such in the literature.

Surrealism holds that observables behave as if T were true, whereas scientific realism holds that T is true. Surrealism and scientific realism give different explanations of why T is empirically adequate. According to surrealism, T is empirically adequate because observables behave as if it were true. According to scientific realism, T is empirically adequate because it is true. I argue that the surrealist explanation merely clarifies the concept of empirical adequacy, whereas the realist explanation makes an inductive inference about T. Therefore, the surrealist explanation is a conceptual one, whereas the realist explanation is an empirical one, and the former is not an alternative to the latter.

A WORTHWHILE REVIEW  648 PAGES TO BE ENJOYED ON A QUIET NIGHT OR TWO
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science is an outstanding guide to the major
themes, movements, debates and topics in philosophy of science. Fifty-five entries by
a team of renowned international contributors are organized into four parts:
• Historical and Philosophical Context
• Debates
• Concepts
• Individual Sciences
The Companion begins with a critical examination of how philosophy of science has
been involved in a mutually fruitful interaction with philosophical theories in areas
such as metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language, and reassesses the
major schools of philosophy of science in the twentieth century.
The second part explores the development of current debates among philosophers and
scientists on issues such as confirmation, explanation, realism, scientific method, and
the ethics of science. Part three discusses controversial concepts such as causation,
prediction, unification, observation, and probability that lie at the heart of many
disputes about science and scientific theories. The final part addresses some of the
main philosophical problems that arise within eight branches of science: biology,
chemistry, cognitive science, economics, mathematics, physics, psychology, and the
social sciences.
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science is essential reading for anyone
interested in philosophy of science and the connections between philosophy and the
natural and social sciences.
Stathis Psillos is an Associate Professor of Philosophy of Science at the University
of Athens, Greece. He is the author of Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth
(Routledge), Causation and Explanation and Philosophy of Science A–Z.
Martin Curd is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University, USA. He
is co-editor (with Jan Cover) of Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues.

PART I
Historical and philosophical context 1
1 The epistemology of science after Quine 3
PAUL A. ROTH
2 The history of philosophy and the philosophy of science 15
JOANNE WAUGH AND ROGER ARIEW
3 Metaphysics 26
Stephen Mumford
4 Philosophy of language 36
Rod Bertolet
5 The role of logic in philosophy of science 47
Diderik Batens
6 Critical rationalism 58
Gürol Irzik
7 The historical turn in the philosophy of science 67
ALEXANDER BIRD
8 Logical empiricism 78
Thomas Uebel
9 Pragmatism and science 91
Robert Almeder
Part II
Debates 101
10 Bayesianism 103
Colin Howson
11 Confirmation 115
ALAN HÁJEK AND JAMES M. JOYCE
12 Empiricism 129
Elliott Sober
vi

13 Essentialism and natural kinds 139
BRIAN ELLIS
14 Ethics of science 149
David B. Resnik
15 Experiment 159
Theodore Arabatzis
16 Explanation 171
JAMES Woodward
17 The feminist approach to the philosophy of science 182
CASSANDRA L. PINNICK
18 Inference to the best explanation 193
Peter Lipton
19 Laws of nature 203
Marc Lange
20 Naturalism 213
RONALD N. GIERE
21 Realism/anti-realism 224
Michael Devitt
22 Relativism about science 236
Maria Baghramian
23 Scientific method 248
Howard Sankey
24 Social studies of science 259
ROBERT NOLA
25 The structure of theories 269
Steven French
26 Theory-change in science 281
John Worrall
27 Underdetermination 292
Igor Douven
28 Values in science 302
GERALD DOPPELT

vii
Part III
Concepts 315
29 Causation 317
Christopher Hitchcock
30 Determinism 327
Barry Loewer
31 Evidence 337
Peter Achinstein
32 Function 349
D. M. WALSH
33 Idealization 358
James Ladyman
34 Measurement 367
HASOK CHANG AND NANCY CARTWRIGHT
35 Mechanisms 376
Stuart Glennan
36 Models 385
DEMETRIS PORTIDES
37 Observation 396
ANDRé KUKLA
38 Prediction 405
MALCOLM FORSTER
39 Probability 414
Maria Carla Galavotti
40 Reduction 425
Sahotra Sarkar
41 Representation in science 435
PAUL TELLER
42 Scientific discovery 442
Thomas Nickles
43 Space and time 452
OLIVER POOLEY
44 Symmetry 468
Margaret Morrison
viii

45 Truthlikeness 478
Graham Oddie
46 Unification 489
TODD JONES
47 The virtues of a good theory 498
Ernan McMullin
Part IV
Individual sciences 509
48 Biology 511
Alexander Rosenberg
49 Chemistry 520
Robin FINDLAY Hendry
50 Cognitive science 531
Paul Thagard
51 Economics 543
USKALI MÄKI
52 Mathematics 555
PETER CLARK
53 Physics 567
SIMON SAUNDERS
54 Psychology 581
RICHARD SAMUELS
55 Social sciences 594
HAROLD KINCAID
Index 605
THEN AS A COMPLEMENTARY READING
https://www.academia.edu/2807083/In_defence_of_scientism