Multiverse Theory

The multiverse hypothesis is growing in popularity among theistic philosophers because some view it as the preferable way to solve certain difficulties presented by theistic belief. In this paper, I am concerned specifically with its application to Rowe’s problem of no best world, which suggests God’s existence is impossible given the fact that the world God actualizes must be unsurpassable, yet for any given possible world, there is one greater. I will argue that, as a solution to the problem of no best world, the multiverse hypothesis fails. To defend my thesis I will first define the multiverse hypothesis, articulate the problem of no best world and how the multiverse hypothesis is thought to solve it. I will then show that the solution fails by articulating two problems that have been mentioned, but not developed, in the literature—what I call the problem of no highest standard and the problem of multiverse cardinality. In each case, after articulating the problem, I will offer possible responses to the problem, and show why those responses are inadequate.

The Hyperuniverse Programme, introduced in Arrigoni-Friedman (2013), fosters the search for new set-theoretic axioms. In this paper, we present the procedure envisaged by the programme to find new axioms and the conceptual framework behind it. The procedure comes in several steps. Intrinsically motivated axioms are those statements which are suggested by the standard concept of set, that is the `maximal iterative concept', and the programme identifies higher-order statements motivated by the maximal iterative concept. The satisfaction of these statements in countable transitive models, the collection of which constitutes the `hyperuniverse', has remarkable consequences, which should be viewed as new intrinsically motivated set-theoretic axioms (H-axioms).

The slower and more economical contraction of smooth muscle as compared to that of skeletal muscle may relate to the arrangement of its contractile apparatus. Because the arrangement of the contractile apparatus determines the manner in which a single smooth muscle cell shortens, shortening of a contracting cell was examined by tracking of marker bead movements on the cell surface by means of digital video microscopy. Smooth muscle cells were observed to freely shorten in a unique corkscrew-like fashion with a pitch of 1.4 cell lengths (that is, the length change required for one complete rotation of cell) at a rate of 27 degrees per second. Corkscrew-like shortening was interpreted in terms of a structural model in which the contractile apparatus or cytoskeleton (or both) are helically oriented within the cell. Such an arrangement of these cytoarchitectural elements may help to explain in part the contractile capabilities of smooth muscle.

In recent years, one of the main thrusts of set-theoretic research has been the investigation of maximality principles for V, the universe of sets. The Hyperuniverse Programme (HP) has formulated several maximality principles, which express the maximality of V both in height and width. The paper provides an overview of the principles which have been investigated so far in the programme, as well as of the logical and model-theoretic tools which are needed to formulate them mathematically, and also briefly shows how optimal principles, among those available, may be selected in a justifiable way.

In this paper, a simple model for a closed multiverse as a finite probability space is analyzed. For each moment of time on a discrete time-scale, only a finite number of states are possible and hence each possible universe can be viewed as a path in a huge but finite graph. By considering very general statistical assumptions, essentially originating from Boltzmann, we make the set of all such paths (the multiverse) into a probability space, and argue that under certain assumptions, the probability for a monotonic behavior of the entropy is enormously much larger then for a behavior with low entropy at both ends. The methods used are just very simple combinatorial ones, but the conclusion suggests that we may live in a multiverse which from a global point of view is completely time-symmetric in the sense that universes with Time’s Arrow directed forwards and backwards are equally probable. However, for an observer confined to just one universe, time will still be asymmetric.

The journeys of the protagonist of Philip K. Dick’s novel Valis across different personalities, points in time, and realities become a penetrating exploration of the very fabric of the real through his heteromorphic cosmogony that can serve as a paradigm to understanding Dick’s literary-philosophical matrix. Whether a diagnosis or a profound insight into other realities, both insanity and schizophrenia in Valis develop into a means to diagnose the nature of reality by projecting the microcosm of an individual to the macrocosm of the entire universe and vice versa. Dick’s earlier major works of fiction are reflected in Valis as is Valis reflected in them in a way that shows the line between insanity and reason, and reality and hallucinations, is not only thin but often non-existent. Unlike many who consider themselves normal, Dick never recoiled from an opportunity to embark on an exploration of other realities, both in life and in his fiction, as is evident from the close and intimate connections among them.

This article explores new forms of serial structure found in transmedia story worlds, with particular attention to the innovations of amateur transmedia works.  Although the term transmedia has most often been associated only with corporate media at the center, taking amateur works as the paradigmatic example produces new insights into the affordances of digital technology, beyond the industry’s limitations, namely how transmedia creativity can function in the absence of the need to remain marketable, to maintain a coherent brand, and to work within a corporate family of conglomerated media companies.  This study thereby focuses on fan fiction, art, and “vids”, a form of remix video collage, to demonstrate how contemporary amateur production interacts with professional content, but also produces its own type of complex narration through unique forms, aesthetics, and story structures, likewise encouraging alternate reception practices as a result.  This article identifies at least three types of transmedial seriality elucidated by studying amateur fan media.  First, fan works emphasize the increasingly complex nature of seriality in all transmedia and the way in which serial effects do not vanish, but increasingly depend upon the viewer’s choices. Secondly, fan works create their own kind of flexible and multiple serial effects wherein meaning does not depend on consuming a specific sequence of narratives, but instead upon reading any collection of narratives within larger cycles or tropes to assemble a sense of flowing norms, genres, and preferences. Finally, fan works also uniquely analyze and reconfigure the serial effects of tropes found not only across the transmedia components of individual stories, but also across the breadth of popular culture. By remixing and reimagining repeated structures of representation, fan works often call attention to latent forms of seriality within popular culture as a collective whole.

Roger White (God and design, Routledge, London, 2003) claims that while the fine-tuning of our universe, alpha , may count as evidence for a designer, it cannot count as evidence for a multiverse. First, I will argue that his considerations are only correct, if at all, for a limited set of multiverses that have particular features. As a result, I will argue that his claim cannot be generalised as a statement about all multiverses. This failure to generalise, I will argue, is also a feature of design hypotheses. That is, design hypotheses can likewise be made insensitive or sensitive to the evidence of fine-tuning as we please. Second, I will argue that White is mistaken about the role that this evidence plays in fine-tuning discussions. That is, even if the evidence of fine-tuning appears to support one particular hypothesis more strongly than another, this does not always help us in deciding which hypothesis to prefer.

Darwinism and the idea of multiverse versus religious explanation for the rationality and intelligibility of nature


I show that at present times there is a conflict between natural science and religion (Christian theism) in the domain that, until recently, was considered to be beyond scientific interest. What I mean here, is the question of general order, rationality or intelligibility of nature that was supposed to belong to the domain of philosophy or
theology, rather than science itself. I show that Darwin’s theory of natural selection allowed to remove from science not only explanations referring to God’s supernatural interventions in nature, but also any reference to God’s guidance of development of life on Earth. The success of Darwin’s theory contributes to domination of naturalism in science. In turn the concept of multiverse that is found in the contemporary cosmology and quantum physics, is an idea that in naturalistic waywhich makes it acceptable in science- makes it possible to rationally deny even the deistic concept of God’s only
role in nature as a source of general order, rationality and intelligibility of the world.

Keywords: multiverse, Darwinism, theism, atheism, nature, naturalism, theistic naturalism, anthropic principle

The contemporary physics has revealed growing evidences that the emergence can be applied to
not only biology and condensed matter systems but also gravity and spacetime. We observe that noncommutative
spacetime necessarily implies emergent spacetime if spacetime at microscopic scales
should be viewed as noncommutative. Since the emergent spacetime is a new fundamental paradigm
for quantum gravity, it is necessary to reexamine all the rationales to introduce the multiverse hypothesis
from the standpoint of emergent spacetime. We argue that the emergent spacetime certainly
opens a new perspective that may cripple all the rationales to introduce the multiverse picture. Moreover
the emergent spacetime may rescue us from the doomsday of metastable multiverse as quantum
mechanics did from the catastrophic collapse of classical atoms.

Privileged-perspective realism (PPR) is a version of metaphysical realism that takes certain irreducibly perspectival facts to be partly constitutive of reality. PPR asserts that there is a single metaphysically privileged standpoint from which these perspectival facts obtain. This chapter discusses several views that fall under the category of privileged-perspective realism. These include presentism, which is PPR about tensed facts, and non-multiverse interpretations of quantum mechanics, which the chapter argues, constitute PPR about world-indexed facts. Using the framework of the bird perspective and the frog perspective, it argues that PPR views methodologically treat the frog perspective as metaphysically primary. This chapter considers case studies of metaphysical interpretations of special relativity and quantum mechanics in order to demonstrate that such motivations for PPR are non-naturalistic. Further, it considers psychological factors that motivate the appeal of PPR views and offers naturalistic explanations of why we should not expect them to produce an adequate metaphysics of science.

This work is a critical introduction to Alfred Schutz’s sociology of the multiple reality and an enterprise that seeks to reassess and reconstruct the Schutzian project. In the first part of the study, I inquire into Schutz’s biographical con- text that surrounds the germination of this conception and I analyse the main texts of Schutz where he has dealt directly with ‘finite provinces of meaning.’ On the basis of this analysis, I suggest and discuss, in Part II, several solutions to the shortcomings of the theoretical system that Schutz drew upon the sociological problem of multiple reality. Specifically, I discuss problems related to the struc- ture, the dynamics, and the interrelationing of finite provinces of meaning as well as the way they relate to the questions of narrativity, experience, space, time, and identity.

In order to determine the concept of space interpretation in several multiverse hypotheses, this
article analyzes a number of them, which arises from some theories of modern physics. The
interpretation of space in the history of philosophy and science and their interrelation with
modern physical notions are presented. The research is based on the cognitive interpretation
method of the contents of formalistic mathematics and physics theories, the method of
comparative analysis (analysis of philosophical texts), the hermeneutical method, and the
phenomenological method (analysis of representations). The author shows how the context of
modern physics multiverse hypotheses contributes to new connotations in the perception of
space. The research draws some conclusions about the present status of the philosophical
perception of space.

I do not want to upset anyone, but Einstein's theory of relativity (STR) strictly forbids the existence of multiverse. This follows from the simple fact that since there are different multiverse, they all exist in a certain non-material substance called "nothing"...

The universalist position in set theory maintains that there is only a single, maximal universe of sets and, as a result, all sentences about these objects are ideally verifiable. Often, those who subscribe to this view are committed to offering a sensible account to alternative universes familiar to many mathematicians. In this article, we will analyze the reduction strategies offered by universalists. Recently, Enayat in [1] proved that no two models of ZF are bi-interpretable, while Hamkins and I in [2] proved that no two well-founded models of ZF are mutually interpretable. In view of these results, we will argue that the range of the construction for alternative universes in a single universe is limited. Thus, the adherents of an alternative universe have sufficient grounds to reject the alleged copy offered by the universalist as a faithful copy. Finally, we will argue that the reasons for adding new elements to the multiverse should be specific instead of being the result of an emulation in a previously known universe.

A proposed univon particle or cosmic quantum, composed of a circulating superluminal primordial information quantum (sprinq), created our universe and many others as a multiverse of equally "fine-tuned" universes. Their fundamental particle masses, forces, and other fundamental parameters are "just right" to evolve stable galaxies, stars, advanced life-forms and developed minds. Based on previous electron and photon models, sprinqs also compose the fundamental particles in our universe and other universes by moving superluminally in different ways to express different particle attributes. The univon is the quantum particle of a proposed univon quantum field. If other universes are detected having "un-tuned" values of their constants and thus without stable stars and higher life forms, this would suggest that all universes emerge by following purely physical laws. Our fine-tuned inhabitable universe would then just be an extremely improbable universe. However, observational evidence for a fine-tuned multiverse would support the hypothesis of a cosmic intelligence creating and maintaining our multiverse in a natural way.

Currently there is no consensus among cosmologists about what happened at the beginning of our universe before the rapid inflationary period that led to the big bang-the hot, dense state that became our universe. In the present proposal, identical univon quantum particles, produced from a univon quantum field, created our universe and many other universes in a multiverse. A univon, also called a cosmic quantum, is composed of a helically-circulating superluminal primordial information quantum (sprinq). Univons produce universes with identical fundamental constants such as c, h and G. Our universe is known to be "fine-tuned" to produce stable galaxies and stars, and also living beings and minds. Each univon will create such a universe. Each universe in the multiverse of all the universes will be unique because of random quantum probabilities for events within each universe. The univon hypothesis can be tested by comparing fundamental physical constants in other universes with those in our own, to see if they are the same or different.

The multiverse hypothesis has drawn tremendous attention recently from philosophers and theologians. Some of their arguments about it rest on sociological claims regarding the beliefs and motivations of cosmologists, others on metaphysical claims regarding the nature of universes. There is no survey evidence supporting these claims. To fill this evidential gap, a survey was conducted of a large, representative sample of cosmologists. Thematically, three questions about the multiverse hypothesis were explored: whether cosmologists regard it as fully scientific, what motivates cosmologists to explore it, and what the nature of a universe is. The results are presented and discussed.

In this paper I consider an objection to Bayesianism: it seems that, on Bayesianism, literally anything in the world would be overwhelmingly strong evidence for a multiverse. But this conflicts with our intuitive judgments about evidence for the multiverse. I explain that this can be avoided by an independently motivated understanding of Bayesianism, where the evidence is only that which we know with most certainty. I then explain some implications of this for reasoning about multiverses and fine-tuning arguments for theism.

This is an excerpt from the Pictorial Compendium of The Secret Doctrine
Volume IV, The Nature of Everything.

From Newton's mechanical calculations to Einstein's general and special relativity to the baffling indeterminacy of quantum mechanics, the discipline of physics has become increasingly arcane and complex, and less and less governed by orderly laws. This presents a problem for the layperson, who struggles to understand how Newtonian physics, with its predictable observations of physical forces, relates to the parallax and paradox of later discoveries. " If you don't already know physics, " says physicist Dominic Walliman, it's difficult sometimes to see how all of these different subjects are related to each other. " So Walliman has provided a helpful visual aid: an animated video map showing the connections between classical physics, quantum physics, and relativity.

We then delve into the Physics of NOE at a high-level.

This article aims to elucidate the theory of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari by using their latest explanations on philosophy and the creation of concepts (in Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?), lecture notes of Deleuze and other unpublished materials in french through a musical analogy: “the concept sythesiser”.

Review of the book by mathematician and science writer Amir Aczel, *Why Science does not Disprove God,* recently reissued in paperback, with a focus on the chapters on mathematics and God, and criticisms from the standpoint of the epistemology of the science and religion dialogue.

It has always started from the premise that the pattern of scientific knowledge is incompatible with the religious one; it was assumed that the models of modern scientific Cosmologyincluding theories of Big Bang and, especially, M-theorycannot be explained into a theistic version. Moreover, it has been argued that these patterns of scientist thinking (under acronym ST inside the paper) may not include even presumptively the concept of God-the Creator. Though, modern science, in her unyieldingness quest to achieve an unifying theory encompassing all human knowledge itself earned till present, can no longer ignore the answer provided by religion in the great problems of mankind, i.e.