Military Doctrine

In early 1981, an Ecuadorian incursion in the eastern part of the Cordillera del Cóndor triggered an armed confrontation with Peru, in a context of border disputes that dated back to the first years of the existence of both republics. This article carries out a detailed analysis of this episode, examining its historical, strategic and geopolitical background based on documentary, specialized academic and journalistic sources. The study begins with the geographical characterization of the disputed area and the immediate antecedents that led to the Ecuadorian incursion and the occupation of border posts within Peruvian territory. Subsequently, the Peruvian military response is reconstructed, detailing the offensive operations undertaken to recover the territory and evaluating the effectiveness of the adopted strategy. The impact of the conflict on Peruvian public opinion is also analyzed, as well as the position of both countries in the international arena and the role of the OAS and the mediating countries in the resolution of the confrontation. Finally, the subsequent negotiations and agreements are examined, as well as the impact of the conflict on bilateral relations between Peru and Ecuador. The article contributes to the understanding of this confrontation within a broader framework of territorial and geopolitical defense in South America.

Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 1 - Fundamentals of Land Warfare was the Australian Army's capstone doctrine publication between 2006 and the early 2010s.  The publication was produced under contract by Noetic Solutions Pty Ltd, and I was the lead author on the writing team.

Israel’s founding military doctrine, expressed in its 1948 Plan Dalet, directs attacks on Indigenous civilian Palestinian homes and human settlements that forcibly displace inhabitants into columns and clusters of shelter seekers. Israeli forces often have bombed the displaced persons in flight and/or their places of refuge, including refuges that Israeli military commanders deem ‘safe’ or ‘humanitarian’ zones.

This article traces the pattern of Israeli forces applying their military doctrine in opportunistic phases, most dramatically manifest in the Nakba and two decades of serial wars against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. It presents serial examples that demonstrate how this military doctrine has evolved through various tactics and techniques, geographical scope, scale, intensity, rationale and technologies. While these attributes differ slightly over time, they remain consistent with military doctrine set in Israel’s conquest phase (1946–53), institutionalized under a state ideology that aligns Israel’s raison d’état with the serious crimes of apartheid, population transfer and, now, genocide, as currently charged before the International Court.

On the afternoon of 11 July 1944, a Canadian Corps HQ once again became operational on the soil of France. Lieutenant-General Guy Granville Simonds assumed responsibility for 8,000 yards of front in the Caen sector. There was little time or inclination to mark this event or link it with the memory of the vaunted Canadian Corps of World War 1 fame—there was too much to be done. Elements of the newly-arrived 2nd Canadian Infantry Division would take over part of the line and acquire some badly needed experience. Plans for the Corps’ role in Operation “Goodwood” had to be elaborated while Simonds met with his Divisional and Brigade commanders. The following documents are reproduced from the War Diaries of the 2nd Field Historical Section, July 1944 (National Archives of Canada RG24 Volume 17506). Major A.T, Sesia, who commanded the unit, tried to record Simonds’ words in the first extract, but settled on a summary of the General’s views in subsequent reports.

Israel's founding military doctrine, expressed in its 1948 Plan Dalet, directs attacks on Indigenous civilian Palestinian homes and human settlements that forcibly displace inhabitants into columns and clusters of shelter seekers. Israeli forces often have bombed the displaced persons in flight and/or their places of refuge, including refuges that Israeli military commanders deem 'safe' or 'humanitarian' zones. This article traces the pattern of Israeli forces applying their military doctrine in opportunistic phases, most dramatically manifest in the Nakba and two decades of serial wars against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. It presents serial examples that demonstrate how this military doctrine has evolved through various tactics and techniques, geographical scope, scale, intensity, rationale and technologies. While these attributes differ slightly over time, they remain consistent with military doctrine set in Israel's conquest phase (1946-53), institutionalized under a state ideology that aligns Israel's raison d'état with the serious crimes of apartheid, population transfer and, now, genocide, as currently charged before the International Court.

Generating credible deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is premised upon the ability of the US and its allies/partners to act collectively and operate together effectively.  Whilst this is important across all natures of operations, this particularly significant for operations in the information environment (OIE).  A key means to achieve this outcome is by doctrinal alignment:  using compatible terms and concepts in doctrine to minimise friction and to build a shared vision of intended  ways, means, and ends.  This entails more than merely understanding the ontology (the ‘what’) of partner doctrine, but also its aetiology (the ‘why’).  The purpose of this paper is to contribute to such a shared understanding to enhance US-Australian interoperability in the OIE.

In this paper I provide an account of the evolution of information-based operating concepts (IBOC), as instantiated in Australian joint operations doctrine.  In the first part of the paper, I address fundamental conceptual matters:  key definitions; the relationship between operating concepts and doctrine; the place of doctrine in generating military capability; and the role of doctrine in generating multi-national interoperability.  In the second part of the paper, I provide an account of the origins and evolution of IBOC in Australian joint operations doctrine – from an ontological and aetiological perspective – from the mid-1970s to the present.  In the third part of the paper, I propose how understanding the ontology and aetiology IBOC in Australian joint operations doctrine can enhance US-Australian interoperability for OIE.  The paper concludes with some closing words on the increasing significance of OIE in the context of the evolving security environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Operations 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) Colonel David Hudak 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER Colonel James C. Markley Center for Strategic Leadership 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

This research titled: Analysis of the Doctrine of Compact under the Nigerian Military Law is concerned about the legal status of a soldier upon joining the military profession on the one hand, and his contract of service to the state on the other hand. The soldiers compact spelt-out his right privileges, liabilities and limitations. He is expected to perform his constitutional roles to the state in accordance to rule of law and International acceptable standard. The importance of the military profession in the development of a state cannot be over emphasized because no nation in the world today can develop without peace and stability. The primary role of the military is to ensure peace and stability through performance of their constitutional roles. It is in line with the important constitutional roles of the military that the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria established the Armed Forces of Nigeria namely; Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy and Nigerian Air force with their specific roles to the country. These constitutional roles of the soldier to the state is subjugated to military, civil and international law. However, it has been observed that there are problems in the application of military law to the soldier which range from the abused of human rights to inconsistencies of the military law with the constitution. The aim of the research work is to analyzed the legal status of the soldier under military law, civil law, and international law. In achieving this the objective is evaluating the extend of the application of military law, civil law and international law of the soldier in terms of his rights, duties, privileges and limitations. This research work adopts the doctrinal research methodology. The sources of information relied upon include relevant Textbooks, Statutes, Articles in Journals, Case Law, Internet Materials, Newspapers and Conference Papers. The research work finds that the Military Law and Military Justice System are not inconformity with democratic rules and the spirit of the constitution which has largely been the challenges of the Military Justice System in the Administration of Military Justice. The research concludes by recommending that the Military Justice System should be reformed to be inconformity with democratic rules and the constitution so as to correct the inconsistencies that infringes on human rights of service personnel. It also recommended for the reformed of the Armed Forced (Disciplinary Proceedings) (Special Provisions) Act which is discriminatory to service personnel and as well legalized double jeopardy in its provisions. Finally, it is recommended the need for soldiers to be educated at the point of joining the military service on their legal status, so as to help in upholding the law and preserving human rights by service personnel.

Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan and Secretary, Department of Military Affairs, formally released declassified versions of the Joint Doctrines for Cyberspace Operations during the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting in New Delhi. The Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations outlines a unified approach to defend national cyberspace interests, integrating offensive and defensive cyber capabilities and enabling synchronised operations across the three Services. It emphasises threat-informed planning, resilience building, real-time intelligence integration and development of joint cyber capabilities.

Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Anil Chauhan and Secretary, Department of Military Affairs, formally released declassified versions of the Joint Doctrines for Cyberspace Operations during the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting in New Delhi. The Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations outlines a unified approach to defend national cyberspace interests, integrating offensive and defensive cyber capabilities and enabling synchronised operations across the three Services. It emphasises threat-informed planning, resilience building, real-time intelligence integration and development of joint cyber capabilities.

No Brasil, apesar de a Força Conjunta de Operações Especiais (FCjOpEsp) estar consolidada como uma das forças componentes nos distintos comandos operacionais ativados, existe uma defasagem em termos doutrinários. Isso ocorre porque, atualmente, a doutrina de Operações Especiais Conjuntas é tratada somente no MD30-M-01 e de forma superficial, constituindo apenas um capítulo do 1º volume deste manual de Doutrina de Operações Conjuntas. Nesse contexto, até pouco tempo atrás, não havia um consenso sobre o processo de planejamento a ser utilizado pela FCjOpEsp. Dessa forma, no ano de 2022, por ocasião do Adestramento Conjunto de Planejamento de Operações Especiais, realizado no Comando de Operações Especiais (COpEsp), em Goiânia-GO, oficiais de Estado-Maior das três Forças Singulares (FS) elaboraram uma proposta de Processo de Planejamento Conjunto de Operações Especiais (PPC Op Esp). Esta proposta seguiu para a apreciação das Escolas de Estado-Maior das três FS,
através da Comissão Interescolar de Doutrina de Operações Conjuntas (CIDOC), dirigida pela Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG). Como resultado, no ano de 2023, a CIDOC publicou a Nota Escolar nº 13 O Planejamento Conjunto de Operações Especiais. Considerando este contexto, o presente artigo teve por objetivo realizar uma comparação entre o PPC Op Esp realizado no Brasil e o Special Operations Component Command (SOCC) Planning Process, mais consolidado e utilizado pela OTAN. Ao término desta
comparação, foi realizada uma síntese sobre as principais ideias envolvendo ambos os processos, com o intuito de verificar possíveis possibilidades de ajuste no PPC Op Esp utilizado no Brasil.

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

For over a decade, operations associated with irregular warfare have placed large demands on U.S. ground forces and have led to development of new Army and Joint doctrine. This report helps analysts identify and assess twelve key factors that create and perpetuate environments susceptible to insurgency, terrorism, and other extremist violence and instability to inform military decisions on allocation of analytic and security assistance resources.

Over the past several decades, advances in technology have transformed communications and the ability to acquire, disseminate, and utilize information in a range of environments. Modern societies and their respective militaries have taken advantage of a robust information space through network-centric systems. Because military and commercial operations have increasingly converged, communication and information infrastructures are now high-priority military objectives in times of war. This article examines the theoretical underpinning of current cyber warfare research, what we have learned so far about its application, and some of the emerging themes to be considered; it also postulates the development of a (national) cyber warfare doctrine (CWD). An endeavor of this scale requires lots of considerations and preparation for its development if it is to be cooperatively embraced. This article considers why information technology systems and their supporting infrastructures should be considered legitimate military targets in conflicts, and offers several events that support this supposition. In addition, it identifies the various forms of doctrine that will become the basis for developing a CWD, discusses a CWD's possible components, and proposes a national collaborative and discussion framework for obtaining a nation's stakeholder buy-in for such an endeavor.

The paper analyses the concerns arising from a moral perspective in the context of a renewed arms race in South Asia. It challenges the idea that possession of nuclear power could in any way contribute to any sort of balance. The emulation of so-called great powers and expecting that balance would arrive as it did in the case of the US and the erstwhile-USSR during cold war is detrimental to the temporal and spatial uniqueness of South Asia. Deterrence, based on rational choice theory, does not apply to the South Asian context due to ambiguity owing to mutual mistrust especially in the case of India and Pakistan. Also, it no longer only sates that are sole actors in the international arena. One cannot expect the non-state actors to behave in a rational manner. Furthermore, the idea of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ itself is questionable as it is a flexible posture adjusted to relative prowess and ambiguity in policy further aggravates the situation. The paper argues from a consequen...

ONE OF THE MANY REASONS for the humbling of the mighty Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during the 2006 Lebanon War was an Israeli combat doctrine named Systemic Operational Design, better known by its perhaps aptly abbreviated acronym SOD. The brainchild of a group of military intellectuals clustered around the IDF's Operational Theory Research Institute (OTRI), SOD was first mooted in 1995. It was an operational doctrine that drew on U.S. studies and postmodern French philosophical and textual analysis to develop an integrative critical and creative approach to the battlefield and generate new means of addressing old problems. The basic paper outlining SOD was signed by then incoming Chief of Staff Dan Halutz and formally adopted as the IDF's operational doctrine in April 2006. 1 Put to almost immediate test in southern Lebanon, the IDF's experience with SOD in July 2006 was disastrous. Not only did its intellectual content challenge senior officers' understanding, but its somewhat rarified Foucauldian precepts sowed confusion rather than clarity on the battlefield, with the consequence that orders were misunderstood, misinterpreted, or altogether ignored. Rather than help to "integrate" operations, SOD played a significant part in the tactical disorder that marked the IDF's performance over the thirty-three days of the war. The results were predictable. SOD was rapidly dropped, as the Israeli high command grappled with its shortcomings and failures as revealed by the war, and Halutz's successive replacements (Gabriel "Gabi" Ashkenazi and Benjamin "Benny" Gantz) launched a long process of organizational and doctrinal reevaluation that passed through the 2007 Meridor Commission, the 2008 Winograd Commission, and finally culminated in the 2015 IDF Strategy of Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot (hereafter ED, short for Eisenkot Document), made available in English for the first time here, by the Journal of Palestine Studies (JPS). Published in August 2015, the ED consists of thirty-three pages (in the original Hebrew) and is a shorter and unclassified version of a more comprehensive attempt to produce a five-year IDF plan known as "Gideon." 3 Unlike SOD, which was never made public and dealt with operational issues and combat techniques, the ED is intended as a strategic document that encompasses a broad spectrum of grand strategy analysis, prediction, and recommendation, as measured against a

Much of the Middle East's recent turmoil stems from internecine Middle Eastern rivalries spilling onto third country battlefields and Saudi and United Arab Emirates-led efforts to roll back the achievements of the 2011 popular Arab revolts and pre-empt further uprisings. This week's successful toppling of ailing Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and months of anti-government demonstrations that have put Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir on the defensive suggest that the Saudi-UAE effort may be faltering. So does the record of the past eight years. The counterrevolution's one success, Egypt, has produced some of the harshest repression in the country's history. Saudi and UAE intervention in Yemen has sparked one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, tarnished the image of the two Gulf states, and provided an opportunity to Iran to 1/4 brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

Much of the Middle East's recent turmoil stems from internecine Middle Eastern rivalries spilling onto third country battlefields and Saudi and United Arab Emirates-led efforts to roll back the achievements of the 2011 popular Arab revolts and pre-empt further uprisings. This week's successful toppling of ailing Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and months of anti-government demonstrations that have put Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir on the defensive suggest that the Saudi-UAE effort may be faltering. So does the record of the past eight years. The counterrevolution's one success, Egypt, has produced some of the harshest repression in the country's history. Saudi and UAE intervention in Yemen has sparked one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, tarnished the image of the two Gulf states, and provided an opportunity to Iran to 1/4 brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

Pakistan and India are the two countries facing nuclear deterrence from each other as they have had a conflict since 1947. This creates a threat to South Asian regions Pakistan is using nuclear deterrence in order to discourage Indian conventional dominance. On the other hand, as India does not have the ability to change the quality of being at a competitive advantage of it is conventional to finish the Kashmir war with Pakistan, India established the doctrine called-Cold Start Doctrine-in 2004, which is an assaultive doctrine. According to this doctrine, India can militarize in a quick way and use small retaliatory attacks on Pakistan without trespassing into their nuclear part. Cold Start gives an advantage to India for being more capable of a conventional mobilization when acting together with their Air Force.

It has long been recognized that military success relies on knowledge of the enemy. In the context of standard warfare, adequate knowledge of the enemy may be gained by analyzing observable, measurable data. In the context of modem counterinsurgency operations and the global war on terror, the task of predicting the behavior of the enemy is vastly more complex and difficult. Without an understanding of , the ways individuals in the host nation interpret and react to events, no amount of objective information can provide the insight required to accurately predict behavior. US military doctrine has begun to recognize the importance of the many ways that local culture can affect operation success. Increasingly military decision makers use cultural information in the service of operation planning, and troops are provided with pre-deployment cultural training. However, no amount of training can cover the breadth and depth of potentially useful cultural information, and no amount of careful planning can avoid the need to adapt as situations develop. Therefore, a critical challenge is to provide useful tools to US personnel in their efforts to collect, analyze, and utilize cultural information. Essential functions for cultural support tools include the following: 1) to narrow down a broad range of available data and focus the user's attention on contextrelevant information, 2) to present cultural information in an easily understood form, 3) to prompt the user to seek relevant information in the environment, 4) to synthesize information, and 5) to predict outcomes based on possible courses of operation. In this paper, we begin by reviewing the ways in which military operations can benefit from cultural intelligence. We then discuss frameworks for analyzing cultural information in the context of a military operation. We conclude with a demonstration of our current efforts to develop a tool that meets the aforementioned functional challenges.

A full-scale India-Pakistan war can also undermine global non-proliferation efforts and embolden other regional flashpoints. The strategic and normative credibility of arms control will be weakened. From Taiwan to Ukraine, other rivalries may follow suit if great powers and global institutions fail to prevent catastrophe in South Asia.

Turkistan is located in the center of the Asian continent, the largest land mass on earth, and is a land bridge between various regions of Asia and between Asia and Europe. Turkistan contains steep mountains and mountain passes that are vital for both trade and military operations. In this study the Dzungarian Gate, Torugart Pass, Irkeshtam Pass, the Pamir Highway, which contains many natural passes, and the Fergana Valley are examined in terms of military supply chains. In this context, firstly, the military supply-geography relationship is discussed through the military geography literature. Then, in order to provide a bird's eye view of the location of these passages and the points between which they provide passage, the international transportation corridors connected to Turkistan are grouped according to the countries that took the initiative in their construction. When the natural passages in Turkistan and the logistics lines they are connected to are examined, it is seen that they can be dual-use infrastructures that can be built in peacetime and used for military purposes when necessary, as in the historical examples of Germany and Russia. It was concluded that the passages in Turkistan examined within the scope of the study are of great importance for Russia, China, the European Union and Türkiye, which are investing in transportation infrastructure in the region. Existing international transportation corridors connected to Turkistan must pass through these passages. It has been determined that some of the Turkistan's passes examined in this article have no alternatives due to mountainous conditions and therefore have strategic importance in terms of east-west and north-south military supply chains.

Foucault discusses military doctrine and drills in several of his works,
each with different research aims, utilizing fragmentary and heterogeneous examples from various spheres of social life to address a broader theoretical question: how power manifests in society, how it is shaped within discourse and linked to knowledge, and in what ways it acts upon individuals. The paper challenges Foucault’s analysis of military doctrine and the development of military drills in the 17th and 18th
centuries as partial, overly linear, and excessively focused on structures rather than on people. By situating the research within Foucault’s concepts of the genealogy of power, episteme, and resistance, the paper argues that Foucault’s approach has effectively precluded the possibility of addressing and exploring the space of human freedom.

When the Russian President Vladimir Putin made world shocking visit to International Criminal Court member state for the first time since his arrest warrant in 2023. One of his visit purposes was to commemorate 85th anniversary of Khalkhiin gol War. After a fall of Soviet Union, Soviet-satellite country faced their own destiny to run sovereign foreign policy without directive from Kremlin. Mongolia has unique geographic setting, located between two authoritarian nuclear power competing with the west. Mongolian diplomats effectively used their favorable period as two neighbors not paying strong attention to their buffer state to find long lasting solution for security assurance. The country chosen neutral, multi pillared, open and peaceful foreign policy principles through politicaldiplomatic means. After 85 years, international atmosphere becoming more dismal and even risky for small and medium states. Current situation highlights importance of studying the geopolitical settings and consequences of Khalkhiin Gol War. Following paper discusses prewar geopolitical settings and causes using bargaining theory.

2’nci Dünya Savaşı’nın sona ermesiyle Soğuk Savaş Dönemi başlamış ve dünya iki kutuplu bir hâl almıştır. ABD, SSCB tehditlerine karşılık 1947 yılında adı “Truman Doktrini” olarak anılacak bir planla Türkiye ve Yunanistan’a askerî ve ekonomik yardım yapmayı tüm dünyaya açıklamıştır. Truman Doktrini ile Türkiye’ye askerî yardım olarak sağlanan 100 milyon dolardan 48,5 milyon doları, Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı modernizasyonu için ayrılmıştır. Amerika, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin modernizasyonunu yapmak ve Türkiye’nin savunma kabiliyetini arttırmak amacıyla “Türkiye’ye Yardım İçin Amerikan Misyonu”nu kurmuştur. Bu kapsamda modern silah, araç ve teçhizat ikmali yapılmış, birliklerin teşkilatları yeniden düzenlenmiştir. Amerikan talimnameleri de Türkçeye çevrilerek birliklerde uygulanmaya başlamıştır. Modern silah, araç ve teçhizatları kullanma ve teknik eğitimleri Amerikalı subaylar tarafından sınıf okullarında verilmesi üzerine piyade sınıfının eğitimlerine de Çankırı Piyade Okulunda başlanmıştır. Bu kapsamda sınıf subayları, piyade sınıfının teşkilat, teçhizat ve doktrin modernizasyonunu Piyade Dergilerinde yazdıkları makalelerle tüm sınıf personeline tanıtmayı amaçlamıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, 1948-1953 yılları arasında yayınlanan Piyade Dergilerinde, piyade sınıfının teşkilat, teçhizat, doktrin yeniliklerini konu alan makalelerin analiz edilmesi, subayların o dönemdeki Amerikan doktrinine ve modernizasyona bakış açılarını, iki ülkenin piyade sınıf doktrinini nasıl kıyasladıklarının ortaya çıkarılmasıdır. Çalışma da tespit edilen bulgular dikkat çekicidir. Bazı makale yazarı subaylar, Amerikan talimnamelerinin 2’nci Dünya Savaşı tecrübelerini yansıtmadığını, sadece 2’nci Dünya Savaşı’nın Pasifik bölümündeki harekâtları incelediğini, bu doktrinin Türkiye’nin arazi şartlarında olduğu gibi uygulanamayacağı sonucuna vararak Amerikan piyade doktrinine eleştirel bir bakış açısı sunmuştur. Talimnamelerdeki terim karışıklıkları, üslup ve anlatım tarzı da eleştirilen diğer hususlardan olmuştur. Birçok konudaki eğitimlerin örnekleriyle anlatılması, silahların pratik ve kolay atış teknikleri olumlu olarak görülmüştür. Ayrıca envantere yeni giren araçlar ile energa tanksavar tüfek bombası, bazoka, havanlar, telsizler gibi modern silah ve teçhizatların piyadenin muharebe gücünü artırdığı belirtilerek övgüyle bahsedilmiştir.

Partindo  de  uma  abordagem  qualitativa  e  utilizando  a  revisão  de  literatura  e  a  análise  documental  para  coleta  de  dados  e  de  fontes,  este  artigo  analisa  a  segunda  edição  do  manual  Operações Interagências,  MD33-M-12,  editado  pelo  Ministério  da  Defesa  brasileiro, em 2017, logo após os grandes eventos esportivos realizados no país, quando havia a possibilidade de que a publicação incorporasse os  principais  ensinamentos  do  trabalho  interagências  desenvolvido  naquele  período.  Esta  pesquisa  identificou  que  essa  possibilidade não se confirmou, pois a versão de 2017 é bastante similar ao manual editado  em  2012,  incluindo  pequenas  alterações  formais,  sem  apresentar  evolução  perceptível  em  termos  doutrinários,  com  uma  metodologia de planejamento semelhante àquela adotada pelas Forças Armadas. Além disso, identificamos a falta de uma metodologia de planejamento própria das operações interagências, o que impõe limites à  participação  das  agências  no  processo,  um  protagonismo  centrado  na  atuação  das  Forças  Armadas  em  detrimento  da  participação  das  demais agências e uma cultura militar que dificulta a inserção de todos os  órgãos  nas  fases  do  planejamento.  Argumentamos,  portanto,  que  é possível a utilização de metodologia mais flexível e adaptativa no emprego, em larga escala, desse tipo de operação realizada pelas demais agências do Estado.

Truxal, Luke W. The Failed Bombing Offensive: A Reexamination of the Combined Bomber Offensive in 1943. Master of Arts (History), December 2011, 106 pp., 1 illustration, references, 77 titles. For decades nations have debated how to successfully employ air power. In 1943 the United States and Great Britain launched a massive strategic bombing campaign against Germany. The two sides agreed to a flawed plan due to the fundamental differences on bombing doctrine. As a result, the campaign was fraught with issues that remained largely unresolved in 1943. Without a clearly defined plan, the Allies were unable to determine which commands or targets received priority throughout the offensive. This ultimately led to a confused and unfocused campaign. High losses and inconclusive results derailed the American bombing effort. By November, the two sides agreed that the entire bombing offensive was either behind schedule or had failed entirely.

The U.S. Marine Corps’ Force Design roadmap has inspired great debate about the purpose, role, and strength of the Marine Corps in an increasingly contentious and complex world. On the surface, Force Design appears to be an attempt to make the Marine Corps relevant in a rapidly changing operational environment that has seen the rise of powerful nation-states opposed to a United States-led world order. Rather than debating whether Force Design is best for the Marine Corps, this article delves into actionable recommendations for how to improve the Force Design roadmap given the Marine Corps’ responsibilities in both competition and warfare, which include the use of the new stand-in forces concept to foil further annexations of territory by major powers as well as the more traditional responsibilities of maintaining forward presence and conducting amphibious operations in war.

Although formal planning procedures are key parts of military doctrine, they may not be well suited to highly dynamic, time-pressured environments. The authors describe an intuitive planning process developed as an alternative to the procedure used by the Canadian Forces (CF). The Intuitive Operational Planning Process (IOPP) treats planning as a highly iterative process of incremental refinement in which a single course of action is elaborated and continually evaluated for its suitability. To examine the effectiveness of the IOPP, 12 members of a reserve CF Civil Military Cooperation unit of Land Force Central Area acted as planning staffs and created plans for two simulated planning exercises. Participants employed the IOPP for one scenario and the existing CF Operational Planning Process (OPP) for another. The teams were able to successfully employ the IOPP to develop acceptable plans; however, it was not possible to determine statistically that the quality of these plans surpass...

Over the past several decades, advances in technology have transformed communications and the ability to acquire, disseminate, and utilize information in a range of environments. Modern societies and their respective militaries have taken advantage of a robust information space through network-centric systems. Because military and commercial operations have increasingly converged, communication and information infrastructures are now high-priority military objectives in times of war. This article examines the theoretical underpinning of current cyber warfare research, what we have learned so far about its application, and some of the emerging themes to be considered; it also postulates the development of a (national) cyber warfare doctrine (CWD). An endeavor of this scale requires lots of considerations and preparation for its development if it is to be cooperatively embraced. This article considers why information technology systems and their supporting infrastructures should be considered legitimate military targets in conflicts, and offers several events that support this supposition. In addition, it identifies the various forms of doctrine that will become the basis for developing a CWD, discusses a CWD's possible components, and proposes a national collaborative and discussion framework for obtaining a nation's stakeholder buy-in for such an endeavor.

Logistical support was essential to maintain the German offensive's momentum during the Blitzkrieg on Poland in 1939. The Blitzkrieg launched by Germany against Poland was supported by combat logistics ranging from planning the logistical needs of operations to logistics distribution. For this reason, intelligence capabilities that can provide accurate information about the condition of logistics are needed, mainly logistical estimates in addition to information on other military aspects. The purpose of this paper is to analyse Germany's preparations for the Blitzkrieg against Poland in 1939 from the perspective of logistical intelligence. The method used in this writing is descriptive with a literature study approach. In analysing the substance focus, both information and data are obtained from open sources, including mass media, electronic media, literature, and other open sources. Based on German intelligence information about the enemy's current and ongoing activities, led Hitler to carry out an arms program to keep up with the development of the political situation by developing the weaponry of his armed forces. Logistics depots are prepared according to the disposition of the frontline troops to re-equip and adjust with information about the area of operation analysis.

The article reveals the specifics of the involvement of the US National Guard and the US AF performing the tasks of the US southern border security during the presidency of Donald Trump. The author analyzes the reasons for the involvement of military units, the scope of their tasks, and describes the specific tasks performed by military personnel in cooperation with the US Customs and Border Protection. Changes in the nature of the use of army units during the operations «Guardian Support» and «Faithfull Patriot» in 2018 and after the declaration of a state of emergency on the border with Mexico in 2019 are revealed. The main problems encountered by the U.S. Department of Defense in its operations at the border, in the context of fierce domestic political opposition to Donald Trump’s immigration policy, were separately examined. It is argued that the involvement of the US AF in solving migration problems on the U.S. southern border had both potential benefits and risks. On the one h...

Current Army and Air Force doctrine and emerging Joint doctrine indicate disagreement on the nature, definition, and purpose of attacking the enemy in the area bounded by the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) and the outer limit of the Land Component Commander's (LCC) Area of Operations (AO). This paper will examine the doctrinal background of the Services' disagreement, the contribution of joint doctrine, and finally the impact of the issue on the Joint Force Commander (JFC). The first task is to define the terms used and look at Service and joint doctrine on the subject. Definitions are important since doctrinally the terms depth, deep battle, deep attack, interdiction, and air interdiction are used interchangeably to the confusion of all involved. Second, I will examine the dilemma the JFC has in determining who is responsible for deep battle and interdiction. Finally, I will draw some conclusions and offer recommendations for modifying existing and emerging joint doctrine 16.Distribution /

The AirLand Battle doctrine is often seen as an epoch-making new concept that changed how the United States approached war and warfare. The doctrine is also referred to as the adaptation of the principles of Auftragstaktik into the American military theory. The Auftragstaktik is the product of the great military theorists of the German school of military science in the 19 th Century-Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, and Moltke. This idea created the highest level of decentralized mission command. But the Auftragstaktik is more than a tactical theory, it is an institutional culture. In contrast, the AirLand Battle doctrine uses a more conservative concept of command and control. Although it gives officers more freedom than before, it seeks to standardize the execution of missions and tasks.

This study hypothesizes that armed escort is required to protect special operations lift helicopters inserting, extracting, or resupplying SOF ground teams deep in the enemy rear. It compares the escort doctrine and tactics utilized by conventional air assets with current special operations tactics in light of the proliferation of highly capable air defenses among lesser developed nations. Beginning with the historical perspective of armed escort, then examining the current and projected threat, this study concludes that armed escort is indeed required to counter the increasingly capable and proliferating air defense threat. Based upon Phase One of the Concept Based Requirements System, Concept Formulation, this thesis proposes an Operational Concept for armed escort. The doctrine and tactics for armed escort during deep assault and attack missions already exist in Army and Air Force manuals. In order to conduct long-range clandestine penetrations, conventional doctrine needs modification. Part of the adjustment has to be in mindset-forcible entry is the least preferred option in most Direct Action or Special Reconnaissance scenarios. 14. SUBJECT TERMS ,.Special Operations, Concept Based IS. NUMBER OF PAGES Requirement System, Air Defense, Armed Escort, 151 Special Air Operations, Aviationk, (1. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

The U.S. Navy’s current trajectory may remind the reader of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) prior to the outbreak of World War II in the Pacific in late 1941. This article argues that many of the same problems the IJN faced against its larger U.S. opponent in World War II exist today in the U.S. Navy’s planning and preparation for possible conflict with the People’s Republic of China. Problems that both navies share include brittle readiness, planning for a short war with a resulting doctrine to match, and a fleet that is too small to sustain any form of attritional war at sea. The article further argues that in many senses the U.S. Navy is less prepared today than was the IJN in 1941. The author provides several recommendations for how to begin to correct these difficulties.