Metaphysical grounding

According to Spinoza, God expresses himself in infinite ways and, in recent years, scholars have started to debate whether this expression involves one type of relation or multiple. Both sides of the debate, however, understand expression in terms of relations with distinct relata, which is problematic because these distinctions cause a vicious infinite regress of relations, known as Bradley's Regress. This paper suggests that we interpret God's expression as metaphysical grounding instead and shows how weak grounding among modes does not involve Bradley's Regress, while the strict grounding between the mediate infinite mode, the immediate infinite mode, and God does.

Realism is the view that some class of properties is ontologically legitimate. One commonly found argument for realism invokes inference to the best explanation (IBE), the thesis that if a property is needed in the best explanation of some aspect of the world, we should include that property in our ontology. IBE is often employed in the defence of moral properties: moral realists claim that moral properties should be included in our ontology because they are needed in the best explanations of certain phenomena. Many of these moral philosophers take the important explanatory relation to be causal. However in a recent paper, David Liggins employs the metaphysical notion of grounding -- a non-causal explanatory dependence relation -- in proposing 'a recipe for creating candidate [non-moral] explanations'. In this essay I raise some potential problems for this proposal, all of which in some way concern the relata of grounding.

This Element tackles the question of how – in what way, and in virtue of what – facts about the legal properties and relations of particulars (such as their rights, duties, powers, etc.) are metaphysically explained. This question is divided into two separate issues. First, the Element focuses on the nature of the explanatory relation connecting legal facts to their metaphysical determinants. Second, it looks into the kinds of entities that figure in the explanation of legal facts. In doing so, special attention is paid to the role that laws, or legal norms, play in such explanations. As it turns out, there are different ways in which legal facts might be explained, all of which have something to be said in their favor, and none of which is immune from problems.

I will consider two views about the structure of reality: metaphysical foundationalism (all grounded entities are fully grounded in ungrounded entities) and metaphysical infinitism (there are infinite chains of grounding that lack a foundation). Foundationalists motivate their view by appealing to an intuition that there must be a fundamental level that is the source of reality (Schaffer) or causal capacity (Trogdon) of grounded entities because a grounded entity inherits its reality or causal capacity from its ground and there would be a vicious infinite regress otherwise. I will argue that this argument is not successful as the source of reality or causal capacity of an infinite chain can be its cause. For example, this source can be the direct physical cause, the first physical cause or a Prime Mover. A vicious infinite regress is avoided this way too because there is no transference of the same status ad infinitum.

Случайността на света "Реалността на всекидневния живот се проявява като вече обективирана, т.е. конституирана чрез ред на обекти, които са били обозначени като обекти преди появяването ми на сцената... Аз живея в географски обозначено поле; аз използвам инструменти-от най-простите съдове до спортните коли-вече обозначени в техническия речник на моето общество; аз живея в мрежа от човешки отношения... които също са речниково обозначени. По този начин езикът набелязва координатите на моя живот в обществото и изпълва този живот със значими обекти". 1

This paper presents a novel modal argument for the existence of a necessary being that addresses traditional objections to cosmological proofs through a systematic distinction between hierarchical grounding relations. We employ S5 modal logic to establish that contingent beings require ultimate grounding in a necessary foundation that transcends temporal causal chains. The argument introduces a formal distinction between intra-temporal grounding (dependencies within the temporal order) and ultimate grounding (atemporal existential foundation), demonstrating that while temporal causal chains may extend indefinitely, they require timeless grounding to avoid explanatory circularity. Through graph-theoretic analysis and applications of Zorn's lemma, we prove that any well-founded grounding hierarchy terminates in a unique necessary being possessing traditional divine attributes. This approach resolves key objections from quantum indeterminacy, eternal cosmologies, and self-sustaining systems while maintaining the rigor of contemporary modal metaphysics.

How the semantic significance of numerical discourse gets determined is a metasemantic issue par excellence. At the sub-sentential level, the issue is riddled with difficulties on account of the contested metaphysical status of the subject matter of numerical discourse, i.e., numbers and numerical properties and relations. Setting those difficulties aside, I focus instead on the sentential level, specifically, on obvious affinities between whole numerical and non-numerical sentences and how their significance is determined. From such a perspective, Frege's 1884 construction of number, while famously mathematically untenable, fares better metasemantically than extant alternatives in the philosophy of mathematics.

The ordered structure and intelligibility of H₂O (water) exemplify the metaphysical principle that contingent regularities require grounding beyond themselves. This paper argues that the real, intersubjectively verifiable order in H₂O cannot be explained by an infinite regress of contingent causes. Using quantified modal logic and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, it is demonstrated that the intelligibility of H₂O points toward the existence of a necessary being whose essence is existence itself.

The recognition of coherence, regularity, and intelligibility in natural phenomena raises the question of whether such order is intrinsic to the world or merely a projection of the human mind. Ever since the critique of Hume, Kant's epistemic turn, and W. V. O. Quine-"On What There Is" (1948) foundational essay challenged traditional ontological categories and the analytic/synthetic distinction, directly questioning the meaningfulness of much metaphysical discourse, metaphysics became logically rigorous in its persuit to demonstrate ontological or metaphysical necessity. David Lewis-On the Plurality of Worlds (1986) in his influential book developed a comprehensive metaphysical system based on modal realism, defending the existence of possible worlds as concrete realities. It became a centerpiece in current analytic metaphysics.The followung goes further and argues that the intelligibility observed in H₂O is not an instance of apophenia but a reflection of its ontologically grounded form and essence. Using a quantified modal framework, we demonstrate that the regularity in H₂O is intersubjectively verifiable, predictively robust, and causally explicable, thereby necessitating its grounding in the essence of the substance rather than in mental constructs. This conclusion aligns with classical metaphysics, where intelligibility is a real property of being, accessible to human intellect.

Ha sido uno de los alegatos centrales de la teoría así llamada “cognitiva” de las proposiciones que su carácter representacional —y, con ello, sus condiciones de verdad— es derivativo del carácter representacional primitivo de los actos cognitivos concretos por los que un agente predica una propiedad de un objeto. Las proposiciones heredan su carácter representacional porque son ‘tipos’ de actos cognitivos particulares que poseen el ‘mismo’ contenido representacional. Se argumenta en este trabajo que esta suposición está en conflicto con el hecho de que actos cognitivos concretos son instancias de ciertos tipos. Bajo la mayoría de las concepciones acerca de lo que funda el hecho de que una pluralidad de objetos comparte la ‘misma’ naturaleza —i. e., acerca de cómo son algo ‘uno’ en lo múltiple— el carácter cualitativo de un objeto está fundado en universales o en alguna otra construcción aceptable para el nominalista.

In both everyday language and philosophical discourse, the terms existence and reality are often used interchangeably. This conflation is especially evident in debates on the ontology of time. For example, an orthodox presentist will say that only present things truly exist, treating all non-present entities (past or future) as unreal in an absolute sense – “all such objects are unreal, according to Presentism,” as one defender neatly put it. This paper serves as a focused extension and clarification of the metaphysical framework introduced in Existential Realism – A Distinct Ontological Framework Beyond Presentism. It addresses specific questions raised by readers and critics: Is it coherent to distinguish existence from reality? What philosophical work does that distinction do? How does it help with longstanding problems like truthmaking, the status of unobservable entities, and future ethics? In short, while the original paper laid out the core ontological structure, this follow-up revisits its foundations to deepen the theoretical implications, refine key definitions, and explore practical consequences. Our central thesis remains: existence and reality are not identical. But here, we argue more sharply that separating them yields a more nuanced, empirically grounded, and philosophically productive ontology of time. We defend this view against objections, offer clarified examples, and explore its implications for epistemology, phenomenology, and ethics. We proceed as follows. Section 2 defines existence narrowly, in terms of presentness and empirical accessibility, drawing on the spirit of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism . Section 3 then defines reality more broadly, to include causal and structural aspects of the world inferable beyond the present—illustrated through examples such as dinosaurs, future climate events, and cognitive anticipations. Section 4 explores how this distinction addresses several philosophical issues: the truthmaker problem for past truths, the ontological status of unobservable scientific entities, the phenomenology of temporal experience (in the sense of Husserl and Metzinger ), and considerations of metaphysical parsimony. Section 5 argues why this two-tier ontology is not merely a restatement of presentism or eternalism, but a distinct metaphysical framework. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our contributions and highlights new directions this view opens—particularly in ethics (e.g., our duties to future persons), AI models of time, and decision theory under uncertainty. Throughout, we maintain an academic tone and use end-of-paragraph references in line with the original paper’s style. Our aim is for this article to stand on its own as a focused argument on the existence–reality distinction, while continuing and enriching the foundation laid by Existential Realism.

This thesis provides a comprehensive follow-up to previous work dismantling grounding theory by addressing the most sophisticated defenses that have emerged in contemporary analytic metaphysics. Through formal mathematical analysis, systematic responses to pluralist strategies, empirical case studies, and methodological innovations, this work demonstrates that grounding theory cannot be salvaged through any of its current defensive strategies. The thesis advances a positive post-foundationalist framework based on Dynamic Process Networks that provides superior explanatory power while accommodating the fundamental instability revealed by contemporary science and social reality. Key contributions include: (1) formal mathematical proofs that Ontological Instability violates all essential properties of grounding relations, (2) systematic refutation of primitivist, circular, pluralist, and deflationary defenses, (3) empirical validation through AI ethics, quantum mechanics, and social identity case studies, (4) development of transformation networks as a viable alternative to grounding hierarchies, and (5) methodological innovations for post-foundationalist metaphysical practice. The work establishes that the foundationalist project in metaphysics has reached its theoretical limits and must be replaced by approaches that can work productively with rather than against fundamental instability.

Suppose you write down all of the whole numbers from 1 to 99,999. How many times would you write down the digit 7? The answer turns out to be 50,000 times. That is a striking result since (as you have probably noticed) 50,000 is half of 100,000, which is just one more than 99,999. philosophers ' imprint -2 -vol. 19, no. 33 (august 2019)

THE METAPHYSICS OF SYSTEMICITY IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF A. UYOMOV’S HYLOMORPHISM
This article presents an attempt to reconstruct a neo-Aristotelian hylomorphic model within the framework of A. I. Uyomov’s systems metaphysics. By correlating the classical Aristotelian four causes with Uyomov’s systems descriptors (concept, structure, and substrate), the paper develops a symmetrical analysis of both classical and systemic hylomorphism. This approach allows for the clarification of several problematic aspects of the traditional model, particularly concerning the logical and ontological order of causes, the minimal required set of causes, and the problem of reducibility of certain causes to others. The second part of the paper focuses on the formalization of metaphysical dependence between system components using first-order modal logic of type FOLS5. This enables an interpretation of Uyomov’s hylomorphism as a specific hierarchy of ontological dependencies, wherein a system is conceived as an ordered whole grounded in a functional conceptual core. The proposed approach reveals the compatibility of Uyomov’s model with key themes in contemporary analytic metaphysics, particularly in the context of ontological dependence, grounding, structural realism, and modal metaphysics. Furthermore, the formal analysis of metaphysical relations between system descriptors opens the way for a purely logical investigation of the philosophical foundations of the systems approach.
Keywords: Uyomov, hylomorphism, systems metaphysics, Aristotelian causes, systems descriptors, ontological dependence, metaphysical grounding, FOLS5

An extended critical investigation of Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism (EAAN). I wrote this a couple of years ago as a way of thinking through the argument, but now lack the ambition to revise it into a paper. (It's too long to be a paper, too short and too narrowly focused on one person's argument to be a book.) Rather than let it age in private, I'm sharing it publicly for anyone interested in Plantinga's argument

Advanced cognitive temporal models — such as RES = RAG [1] — offer sophisticated
and imaginative frameworks for understanding time as a symbolic or interpretive process. While these
models are intellectually stimulating and valuable within cognitive science, they remain structurally
incompatible with presentist metaphysics and the physics of instantaneous causality.
This divergence highlights the need for deeper integration between symbolic temporal modelling
and the constraints imposed by physical and biological reality. Although I do not propose a formal replacement model for cognitive science, this article aims to clarify why any such model must ultimately remain accountable to the ontological primacy of the present.
Drawing on classical physics, systems engineering, and biological processes, I argue that causality occurs exclusively in the present moment 𝑡0 , without reliance on memory, anticipation, or symbolic mediation. Real-time systems, from oscilloscopes to meiosis, confirm that transformation and emergence are not interpreted but enacted.
Ultimately, the inescapability of the present suggests a metaphysical origin beyond the systems it conditions. The Now is not constructed — it is imposed. It is the operative axis of causality and, as such, may be understood as a sacred law of reality — a Divine act through which presence becomes.

En el artículo "Fenomenología, filosofía, metafísica", Gustavo Bontadini sostiene que la metafísica es una mediación racional de la experiencia inmediata, iluminada por la idea de lo absoluto. Distingue dos tipos de fenomenología: una previa a la metafísica, que corresponde a la experiencia cierta e inmediata, y otra posterior, que es la fenomenología de lo humano, o historia. Bontadini defiende que la metafísica es incontrovertible en cuanto que responde a la necesidad racional del ser humano, aunque no siempre resulte persuasiva. Reconoce que, si bien la metafísica ha sido declarada imposible por algunos, esas objeciones ayudan a depurar su significado y función. En última instancia, argumenta que la metafísica, como ciencia del ser, está ligada esencialmente al destino del hombre y a su libertad, y que su persistencia es inevitable frente al fluir del tiempo y la muerte, simbolizada en el experimentum crucis.

Despite the affinity of monism and monotheism–and despite monism’s
recent philosophical renaissance–few have defended the conjunction of the two claims, of what we might call ‘theistic monism’. I argue, first, that
monism and monotheism are consistent, and second, that each one provides good reasons to accept the other one. Monotheists, qua monotheists, have good reason to be monists; and monists, qua monists, have good reason to be monotheists. There should be much greater overlap between the monist camp and the monotheist camp than there is at present.

The established view about regress problems has it that they, roughly speaking, come in only one variety. This view is mistaken. Two types of problems are typically subsumed under the label of regress problems-stopping problems and starting problems. Both problem types share the same surface structure in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but their deeper founding structure reveals some key differences. Stopping problems rely on a regress clause, raise the question whether infinite chains are possible, and present terminatism, infinitism, and nihilism as potential solutions. In contrast, standard starting problems, which many regress problems are, rely on a founding clause and not on a regress clause, do not raise questions about the possibility of infinite chains, and offer only two potential solutions, terminatism and nihilism. Non-standard starting problems also allow for infinitism as a viable solution, but nevertheless they differ structurally in various aspects from stopping problems.

Since Kripke's Naming and Necessity, it has been widely accepted that the essences of particular substances may be knowable only a posteriori. E. J. Lowe, however, argues against a posteriori essentialism, claiming that if a posteriori essentialism is accepted, a substance should depend for its identity upon another substance, but the identity dependence of a substance upon another has problematic consequences. In this paper, I defend a posteriori essentialism against Lowe's argument. How a substance depends for its identity upon another substance is more complex than Lowe thinks. Once the complexity is unraveled, I argue, the identity dependence of a substance upon another does not have the implausible consequences Lowe thinks it has.

The project of grounding necessity in essence often goes together with the model of essence that assimilates the constitutive essence of an object to the definition of it. The paper argues that if the grounding project is to succeed, the definitional model must be questioned. Like any object whatever, a concrete individual is necessarily identical to that individual. It is argued that this necessity can have an essential ground only if the primitive identity property of it or its thisness is essential to it, and the thisness is in its constitutive essence while not in the definition of it. A concrete individual is in essence partly definable but not fully explainable, for the definition of it forms a crucial part of its constitutive essence, but the constitutive essence includes something fundamental beyond definition or explanation. The definitional model must give way to a model of essence that accommodates this.

In standard first order predicate logic with identity it is usually taken that $a=a$ is a theorem for any term $a$. It is easily shown that this enables the apparent proof of a theorem stating the existence of any entity whatsoever. This embarrassing result is a motivation for the construction of free logics, but in most orthodox treatments of first order logic with identity it is generally dealt with by being ignored. We investigate the possibility that this problem can be obviated by dropping the rule that $a=a$ is a theorem and requiring instead that it be treated as a global but in principle defeasible assumption about the objects in the domain of discourse. We propose that any logic in which this is done be called "open." We review some motivations in physics, philosophy, and literature for questioning the classical notion of self-identity, and we show that Carnap's "null object" has a natural role to play in any system of predicate logic where self-iden...

In logic programming, Horn clauses play a basic role, and in many logical constructs their consideration is important. In this paper we study the multiple revision of a belief base where the underlying logic is composed by Horn clauses. The main difficulties as to restricting to the Horn fragment for revision operators by a single sentence are analyzed, and general results are presented about multiple revision operators on belief bases. We define prioritized multiple revision operators under a more restricted logic than classical propositional logic, i.e. Horn logic. We propose a set of postulates and representation theorems for each operation. This work is relevant for multiple revision in areas that employ Horn clauses, such as logic programming and deductive databases applications.

Recent metaphysics has turned its focus to two notions that are—as well as having a common Aristotelian pedigree—widely thought to be intimately related: grounding and essence. Yet how, exactly, the two are related remains opaque. We develop a unified and uniform account of grounding and essence, one which understands them both in terms of a generalized notion of identity examined in recent work by Fabrice Correia, Cian Dorr, Agustín Rayo, and others. We argue that the account comports with antecedently plausible principles governing grounding, essence, and identity taken individually, and illuminates how the three interact. We also argue that the account compares favorably to an alternative unification of grounding and essence recently proposed by Kit Fine.

Brian Epstein has advanced a powerful and influential argument for the introduction of a novel relation of metaphysical determination called 'anchoring' and, correlatively, against identifying anchoring with metaphysical grounding (Epstein, B. 2015. The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford University Press). The argument aims to establish this by showing that they have different modal properties: anchoring is a 'universal tool', in that it allows for an anchored kind to be instantiated at worlds where its anchors are absent, whereas grounding does not, as it is 'world-bound'. In this paper, I provide a novel diagnosis of where the argument goes wrong. Contrary to extant responses in the literature, I argue that anchoring can be a form of grounding even if we grant all of Epstein's key (if controversial) insights. Moreover, I show that Epstein's reasoning has stronger dialectical force against the related but distinct view that social facts are grounded in rules. Even in this respect, however, I argue that there are good reasons to resist this negative conclusion.

In recent philosophy of perception, an important debate has been raised as regards whether one can experientially perceive absences. Three main positions have been discussed: radical perceptualism, cognitivism, and metacognitivism. In this paper, first of all, I want to claim that perceptualism can be maintained in a moderate form, once one explains the proper role that the relevant expectations play, as weakly cognitively penetrating one's perception of absence in its phenomenal difference from a previous perceptual experience. Moreover, I want to claim that a similar result can be applied to pictorial perceptual experiences of absences, once one takes pictorial experience as a genuine yet sui generis perceptual seeing-in experience.

Philosophers have long pondered the Problem of Universals. One response is Metaphysical Realism, such as Plato's Doctrine of the Forms and Aristotle's Hylomorphism. We postulate that Measurement in Quantum Mechanics forms the basis of Metaphysical Realism. It is the process that gives

We postulate that Measurement in Quantum Mechanics forms the basis of a Causally Active Metaphysical Realism. It is Quantum Measurements that give rise to the instantiation of Universals as Properties, processes we refer to as Hylomorphic Functions. The process of measurement is the creation of a quantum of information-a Fact. How this happens is explained differently in different interpretations of Quantum Mechanics, but the creation of a fact is the same in all of them. This combines substance metaphysics and process metaphysics by identifying the hylomorphic functions as causally active processes complementary to physical substances, forming a dualism of both substance and information which mutually interact. We look at this hypothesis in relation to various different interpretations of Quantum Mechanics starting with the Copenhagen Interpretation. Measurements of fundamental properties of matter are the Atomic Universals of metaphysics, which combine to form the whole taxonomy of Universals, including causally inactive Inferences made of separate Atomic Facts. Since the Hylomorphic Functions are causally active, it is possible to suggest experimental tests that can verify this viewpoint.

A Philosophical Dialogue on Naturalism and the Necessity of a First Principle. It summarize various papers that have been published explaining in simple terms the ground of natural law and a coherent and intelligible structure in the universe.

The attention metaphysical monism has received over the past decades from philosophers across the analytic-continental spectrum has become common knowledge. The paper explores this topic from a metametaphysical standpoint by asking what difference it makes whether one endorses monism or pluralism. To show how the answer depends on the theoretical framework within which monism is formulated, I will focus on two versions of monism: Jonathan Schaffer’s priority monism and Hegel’s monism of spirit in his 1830 Encyclopedia. I argue that following Schaffer’s framework, it does not make much of a difference whether we endorse monism or pluralism. Following Hegel’s framework, however, endorsing monism matters because the alternative (i.e. pluralism) proves incoherent.

According to the Divide & Conquer (DC) strategy (Fogal & Risberg 2020) moral supervenience can be partly explained by appeal to pure moral principles. Bhogal (2022) has recently argued that DC fails. A pure moral principle like Act Utilitarianism (AU) cannot explain moral supervenience because AU is not a difference-maker for moral supervenience. That is, there is nothing special about AU which explains why moral properties supervene on natural properties. On the other hand, if the proponent of DC appeals to some general feature of pure moral principles (like the fact that they have a ‘bridge-law’ structure) then there is a question of what explains that feature. In this paper I do two things. First, I propose an extended DC-strategy against Bhogal’s challenge: specifically, it could be argued that the underlying metaphysics of moral principles are as such that they provide a plausible explanation of moral supervenience. To illustrate this, I consider what I take to be the most prominent accounts about the metaphysics of moral principles and I show that, prima facie, they all converge on the view that moral principles are as such that they explain moral supervenience. Secondly, I argue that the extended DC-strategy faces an interesting dilemma: it either explains the metaphysical necessity of moral principles by adopting parochial (and potentially problematic) metaphysical assumptions, or DC leads towards moral contingentism. Finally, I note that the resulting form of moral contingentism is moderate and potentially philosophically desirable. So, in this sense, one could take DC to motivate moral contingentism.

You can listen to me share the backstory and recite Jellyfish 29 minutes into this video: https://www.academia.edu/video/1qbx3l (2011 at the Tree Reading Series in Ottawa; published in Alphabestiary and recited at the International Festival of Authors in Toronto that year).
As the poem mentions transparency and an umbrella, it was calligraphically inscribed on a transparent umbrella and first presented in Pune, India, in 2011: https://www.academia.edu/49834997/_Guftgu_review_by_Forum_for_Exchange_and_Excellence_in_Design
and in Goa in 2012 :https://www.academia.edu/46030642/In_Transit_Photograph_Poem_Calligraphy_Video_Building.
Both the calligraphy and the poem have now appeared in the Tiny Seed Literary Journal.

“Medina Highway” disengages itself from the contemporary gestures and mannerisms of writing about the sacred and is a resonant paean in praise of divine omnipotence in the language of imAages of a highway. The highway becomes the universe in microcosm, with its eternity of distances and heights, its unstoppable onrush of time, its teeming multitudinous life controlled by a powerful law. The poem is a resounding celebration of this realm of infinity, system and speed and a rapturous invocation addressed to the presiding force..."

"Medina Highway" poem reviewed by Kavya Bharati https://www.academia.edu/127919910/_Medina_Highway_poem_reviewed_by_Kavya_Bharati

I shall present a new theory of the distinction between facts and events that is based on taking events as occurrent modes. Roughly, I shall argue that facts are the modes that are involved in events and that they are not further occurrent modes. First, I shall introduce some data concerning the distinction between facts and events. Later on, I shall recall the view of events as occurrent modes and some tools that may be exploited for the task of drawing the distinction between facts and events. Finally, within this perspective, I shall account for data and motivate every relevant departure from them.

After decades of attempts to conceptually reduce metaphysics and an increasingly optimistic attitude towards it, causal realism has begun to attract the interest of the philosophical community. Causal realism consists of the metaphysical thesis that causal relations are legitimate and real entities in our world, one of the metaphysical building blocks that undergird our reality, such that this relation cannot be reduced to other non-causal relations. Although literature is not clear on which theses constitute the basic core of causal realism, the following characteristics are generally associated with it: productivity (or efficacy) and necessity. Productivity conveys the idea that causality is a genuine relation of our reality where causes bring about their effects into existence, and this productive relation from cause to effect must be explained. To this end, the causal realist appeals to properties endowed with this productive power capable of driving causality. Necessity, in turn, is what ensures that a certain arrangement of causes necessarily produces its effects, and it is precisely around this concept that necessitarians and anti-necessitarians diverge. On one side, the causal necessitarianist maintains that one of the distinctive characteristics of causality as a metaphysical relation is the necessity it There's no difference between causation or causality. However, some authors such as Peirce employ distinct uses for each of these words (see Hulswit 2002: xiv).

In this paper, the methodological character of the internal point of view (IPoV) will be examined. That the IPoV is a method of legal philosophy is not disputed. What is disputed is which point of view a theorist needs to occupy in order to successfully theorise about law. However, the choice between different points of view is based on the participant the theory chooses to study. This means that the participant's viewpoint is not a method of our theory but an epistemic point through which the object of our study becomes available. If this is the case, different theories simply aim to study different participants. Hence, the criticisms raised on methodological grounds against theories not taking the IPoV or not taking the correct IPoV lose their force. Here, to demonstrate this point, the paper will offer a definition of method from a theory-construction perspective and examine the uses of the IPoV in Hart's theory since it is the one that introduced the notion in legal philosophy. I will argue that the IPoV cannot play a methodological role for reaching main epistemic aims, but it can be a method for identifying the object of study.

A truthmaker for a proposition P is exact if it contains nothing irrelevant to P. What are the exact truthmakers for necessitated propositions? This paper makes progress on this issue by showing how to extend Fine's truthmaker semantics for intuitionistic logic to an exact truthmaker semantics for intuitionistic modal logic. The project is of interest also to the classical logician: while all distinctively classical theorems may be true, they differ from the intuitionistic ones in how they are made true. This sheds new light on the status of the T and B axioms.

Resumen Este artículo describe el punto de vista de Derek Parfit y su importancia en el debate público contemporáneo. La tesis central de Derek Parfit es que tres de los más importantes puntos de vista en filosofía moral-kantismo, consecuencialismo y contractualismo-convergen en un consecuencialismo de reglas bajo inspiración kantiana. Al defender esa tesis, Parfit suscribe el realismo moral y una concepción externalista de las razones. Todo ello le permite oponerse a los supuestos de la economía neoclásica.

Instrumentalism is just a form of voluntarily persisting in any already moribund epistemic status quo, i.e. DOGMATISM rebranded. On different background premising there is no problem of measurment at all, just an open door to new meta-epistemic structures hiding in all the plain "seeings" of vital beings.

This is an explanation and critique of Simo Knuuttila's narrative according to which synchronic modalities were discovered in the Middle Ages -- in their outlines by Gilbert of Poitiers in the twelfth century, fully by Scotus at the end of the thirteenth. Here a different account is suggested, especially by reference to Boethius, Gilbert of Poitiers (with reinterpretations of the passages on which accounts of his views on modality are based) and Scotus.

In this paper I consider the merits and motivations for eliminativist error theories of absence causation, such as those offered by Beebee, Varzi, and Mumford. According to such views, there is no causation by absence. Here I argue that, despite offering an alternative picture of the practice of citing absences as causes, these views are inadequately motivated. I consider and reject a range of arguments for error-theoretic approaches, including appeals to ontological economy, physicalism and the causal closure of the physical, as well as Mumford's recent appeal to soft Parmenideanism. I also argue that the arguments in the literature which aim to show that causation by absence is conceptually problematic are less forceful than they might initially appear. The result is that there is no compelling reason yet why we should reject absence causation.

Any scientific theory (here we consider physical theories only) has an underlying logic, even if it is not totally made explicit. The role of the underlying logic of a theory T is mainly to guide the proofs and the accepted consequences of the theory's principles, mainly when described by its axioms. In this sense, the theorems of the underlying logic are also theorems of the theory. In most cases, if pressed, the scientist will say that the underlying logic of most physical theories is classical logic or some fragment of a set theory suitable for accommodating the theory's mathematical and logical concepts. We argue that no physical theory and no philosophical discussion based on the theory should dismiss its underlying logic, so the arguments advanced by some philosophers of physics in that certain entities (the considered case deals with quantum entities) can be only weakly discerned or be just 'relational' and that they cannot be absolutely identified by a monadic property, are fallacious once one remains within a 'standard' logico-mathematical framework, grounded on classical logic. We also discuss the (to us) unjustifiable claim that some properties (such as those that came from logic) would be 'illegitimate' for discerning these entities. Thus, this paper may interest logicians, physicists, and philosophers.