Mental Imagery

Sensory information undergoes extensive associative elaboration and attentional modulation as it becomes incorporated into the texture of cognition. This process occurs along a core synaptic hierarchy which includes the primary sensory, upstream unimodal, downstream unimodal, heteromodal, paralimbic and limbic zones of the cerebral cortex. Connections from one zone to another are reciprocal and allow higher synaptic levels to exert a feedback (top-down) influence upon earlier levels of processing. Each cortical area provides a nexus for the convergence of afferents and divergence of efferents. The resultant synaptic organization supports parallel as well as serial processing, and allows each sensory event to initiate multiple cognitive and behavioural outcomes. Upstream sectors of unimodal association areas encode basic features of sensation such as colour, motion, form and pitch. More complex contents of sensory experience such as objects, faces, word-forms, spatial locations and sound sequences become encoded within downstream sectors of unimodal areas by groups of coarsely tuned neurons. The highest synaptic levels of sensory-fugal processing are occupied by heteromodal, paralimbic and limbic cortices, collectively known as transmodal areas. The unique role of these areas is to bind multiple unimodal and other transmodal areas into distributed but integrated multimodal representations. Transmodal areas in the midtemporal cortex, Wernicke's area, the hippocampalentorhinal complex and the posterior parietal cortex provide critical gateways for transforming perception into recognition, word-forms into meaning, scenes and events into experiences, and spatial locations into targets for exploration. All cognitive processes arise from analogous associative transformations of similar sets of sensory inputs. The differences in the resultant cognitive operation are determined by the anatomical and physiological properties of the transmodal node that acts as the critical gateway for the dominant transformation. Interconnected sets of transmodal nodes provide anatomical and

The cortical anatomy of the conscious resting state (REST) was investigated using a meta-analysis of nine positron emission tomography (PET) activation protocols that dealt with different cognitive tasks but shared REST as a common control state. During REST, subjects were in darkness and silence, and were instructed to relax, refrain from moving, and avoid systematic thoughts. Each protocol contrasted REST to a different cognitive task consisting either of language, mental imagery, mental calculation, reasoning, finger movement, or spatial working memory, using either auditory, visual or no stimulus delivery, and requiring either vocal, motor or no output. A total of 63 subjects and 370 spatially normalized PET scans were entered in the meta-analysis. Conjunction analysis revealed a network of brain areas jointly activated during conscious REST as compared to the nine cognitive tasks, including the bilateral angular gyrus, the left anterior precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex, the left medial frontal and anterior cingulate cortex, the left superior and medial frontal sulcus, and the left inferior frontal cortex. These results suggest that brain activity during conscious REST is sustained by a large scale network of heteromodal associative parietal and frontal cortical areas, that can be further hierarchically organized in an episodic working memory parieto-frontal network, driven in part by emotions, working under the supervision of an executive left prefrontal network.

We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to assess the maximal degree of shared neural processing in visual mental imagery and visual perception. Participants either visualized or saw faint drawings of simple objects, and then judged specific aspects of the drawings (which could only be evaluated properly if they used the correct stimulus). The results document that visual imagery and visual perception draw on most of the same neural machinery. However, although the vast majority of activated voxels were activated during both conditions, the spatial overlap was neither complete nor uniform; the overlap was much more pronounced in frontal and parietal regions than in temporal and occipital regions. This finding may indicate that cognitive control processes function comparably in both imagery and perception, whereas at least some sensory processes may be engaged differently by visual imagery and perception.

Cerebral blood flow was measured using positron emission tomography (PET) in three experiments while subjects performed mental imagery or analogous perceptual tasks. In Experiment 1, the subjects either visualized letters in grids and decided whether an X mark would have fallen on each letter if it were actually in the grid, or they saw letters in grids and decided whether an X mark fell on each letter. A region identified as part of area 17 by the Talairach and Tournoux (1988) atlas, in addition to other areas involved in vision, was activated more in the mental imagery task than in the perception task. In Experiment 2, the identical stimuli were presented in imagery and baseline conditions, but subjects were asked to form images only in the imagery condition; the portion of area 17 that was more active in the imagery condition of Experiment 1 was also more activated in imagery than in the baseline condition, as was part of area 18. Subjects also were tested with degraded perceptual stimuli, which caused visual cortex to be activated to the same degree in imagery and perception. In

Twelve right-handed men participated in two mental rotation tasks as their regional cerebral blood flow~rCBF! was monitored using positron emission tomography. In one task, participants mentally rotated and compared figures composed of angular branching forms; in the other task, participants mentally rotated and compared drawings of human hands. In both cases, rCBF was compared with a baseline condition that used identical stimuli and required the same comparison, but in which rotation was not required. Mental rotation of branching objects engendered activation in the parietal lobe and Area 19. In contrast, mental rotation of hands engendered activation in the precentral gyrus~M1!, superior and inferior parietal lobes, primary visual cortex, insula, and frontal Areas 6 and 9. The results suggest that at least two different mechanisms can be used in mental rotation, one mechanism that recruits processes that prepare motor movements and another mechanism that does not. Descriptors: Mental rotation, Mental imagery, Positron emission tomography, Cognitive neuroscience Address reprint requests to: S. M. Kosslyn,

Mental imagery has been considered relevant to psychopathology due to its supposed special relationship with emotion, although evidence for this assumption has been conspicuously lacking. The present review is divided into four main sections: (1) First, we review evidence that imagery can evoke emotion in at least three ways: a direct influence on emotional systems in the brain that are responsive to sensory signals; overlap between processes involved in mental imagery and perception which can lead to responding “as if” to real emotion-arousing events; and the capacity of images to make contact with memories for emotional episodes in the past. (2) Second, we describe new evidence confirming that imagery does indeed evoke greater emotional responses than verbal representation, although the extent of emotional response depends on the image perspective adopted. (3) Third, a heuristic model is presented that contrasts the generation of language-based representations with imagery and offers an account of their differing effects on emotion, beliefs and behavior. (4) Finally, based on the foregoing review, we discuss the role of imagery in maintaining emotional disorders, and its uses in psychological treatment.

This work explores the cerebral structures involved in the operations. We found activations preferentially in the left hemisphere for familiarity, pitch tasks and rhythm, and in appreciation of music. We studied six young healthy subjects (right handed, French, without musical talent), using a high the right hemisphere for the timbre task. The familiarity task activated the left inferior frontal gyrus, Brodmann area (BA) resolution PET device (CTI 953B) and 15 O-labelled water. In three tasks, we studied the effects of selective attention to 47, and superior temporal gyrus (in its anterior part, BA 22). These activations presumably represent lexico-semantic pitch, timbre and rhythm; a final task studied semantic familiarity with tunes (considered as divided attention for access to melodic representations. In the pitch task, activations were observed in the left cuneus/precuneus (BA pitch and rhythm). These four tasks were performed on the same material (a tape consisting of 30 randomly arranged 18/19). These results were unexpected and we interpret them as reflecting a visual mental imagery strategy employed to sequences of notes). We selected a paradigm, without a reference task, to compare the activations produced by carry out this task. The rhythm task activated left inferior Broca's area (BA 44/6), with extention into the neighbouring attention to different parameters of the same stimulus. We expected that the activations recorded during each task insula, suggesting a role for this cerebral region in the processing of sequential sounds. would differ according to the differences in cognitive Abbreviations: ANCOVA ϭ analysis of covariance; BA ϭ Brodmann area; rCBF ϭ regional cerebral blood

The b-adrenergic blocker propranolol given within hours of a psychologically traumatic event reduces physiologic responses during subsequent mental imagery of the event. Here we tested the effect of propranolol given after the retrieval of memories of past traumatic events. Subjects with chronic post-traumatic stress disorder described their traumatic event during a script preparation session and then received a one-day dose of propranolol (n = 9) or placebo (n = 10), randomized and double-blind. A week later, they engaged in scriptdriven mental imagery of their traumatic event while heart rate, skin conductance, and left corrugator electromyogram were measured. Physiologic responses were significantly smaller in the subjects who had received post-reactivation propranolol a week earlier. Propranolol given after reactivation of the memory of a past traumatic event reduces physiologic responding during subsequent mental imagery of the event in a similar manner to propranolol given shortly after the occurrence of a traumatic event.

Comprehending high-imagery sentences like The number eight when rotated 90 degrees looks like a pair of eyeglasses involves the participation and integration of several cortical regions. The linguistic content must be processed to determine what is to be mentally imaged, and then the mental image must be evaluated and related to the sentence. A theory of cortical underconnectivity in autism predicts that the interregional collaboration required between linguistic and imaginal processing in this task would be underserved in autism. This functional MRI study examined brain activation in 12 participants with autism and 13 age-and IQ-matched control participants while they processed sentences with either high-or low-imagery content. The analysis of functional connectivity among cortical regions showed that the language and spatial centres in the participants with autism were not as well synchronized as in controls. In addition to the functional connectivity differences, there was also a group difference in activation. In the processing of low-imagery sentences (e.g. Addition, subtraction and multiplication are all math skills), the use of imagery is not essential to comprehension. Nevertheless, the autism group activated parietal and occipital brain regions associated with imagery for comprehending both the low and high-imagery sentences, suggesting that they were using mental imagery in both conditions. In contrast, the control group showed imagery-related activation primarily in the highimagery condition. The findings provide further evidence of underintegration of language and imagery in autism (and hence expand the understanding of underconnectivity) but also show that people with autism are more reliant on visualization to support language comprehension.

A special association between imagery and emotion is often assumed, despite little supporting evidence. In Experiment 1, participants imagined unpleasant events or listened to the same descriptions while thinking about their verbal meaning. Those in the imagery condition reported more anxiety and rated new descriptions as more emotional than did those in the verbal condition. In Experiment 2, 4 groups listened to either benign or unpleasant descriptions, again with imagery or verbal processing instructions. Anxiety again increased more after unpleasant (but not benign) imagery; however, emotionality ratings did not differ after a 10-min filler task. Results support the hypothesis of a special link between imagery and anxiety but leave open the question of whether this also applies to other emotions.

Although many neuroimaging studies of visual mental imagery have revealed activation in early visual cortex (Areas 17 or 18), many others have not. The authors review this literature and compare how well 3 models explain the disparate results. Each study was coded 1 or 0, indicating whether activation in early visual cortex was observed, and sets of variables associated with each model were fit to the observed results using logistic regression analysis. Three variables predicted all of the systematic differences in the probability of activation across studies. Two of these variables were identified with a perceptual anticipation theory, and the other was identified with a methodological factors theory. Thus, the variability in the literature is not random.

POSITRON emission tomography was used to investigate the functional anatomy of mental simulation of routes (MSR) in five normal volunteers. Normalized regional cerebral blood flow was measured while subjects mentally navigated between landmarks of a route which had been previously learned by actual navigation. This task was contrasted with both static visual imagery of landmarks (VIL) and silent Rest. MSR appears to be subserved by two distinct networks: a non-specific memory network including the posterior and middle parts of the hippocampal regions, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the posterior cingulum, and a specific mental navigation network, comprising the left precuneus, insula and medial part of the hippocampal regions.

The visual system processes object properties (such as shape and color) and spatial properties (such as location and spatial relations) in distinct systems, and neuropsychological evidence reveals that mental imagery respects this distinction. The findings reported in this article demonstrate that verbalizers typically perform at anintermediate level on imagery tasks, whereas visualizers can be divided into two groups. Specifically, scores on spatial and object imagery tasks, along with a visualizer-verbalizer cognitive style questionnaire, identified a group of visualizers who scored poorly on spatial imagery tasks but excelled on object imagery tasks. In contrast, a second group of visualizers scored high on spatial imagery tasks but poorly on object imagery tasks. The results also indicate that object visualizers encode and process images holistically, as a single perceptual unit, whereas spatial visualizers generate and process images analytically, part by part. In addition, we found that scientists and engineers excel in spatial imagery and prefer spatial strategies, whereas visual artists excel in object imagery and prefer object-based strategies.

Some authors proposed that exact mental calculation is based on linguistic representations and relies on the perisylvian language cortices, while the understanding of proximity relations between numerical quantities implicates the parietal cortex. However, other authors opposed developmental arguments to suggest that number sense emerges from nonspecific visuospatial processing areas in the parietal cortex. Within this debate, the present study aimed at revealing the functional anatomy of the two basic resolution strategies involved in mental calculation, namely arithmetical fact retrieval and actual computation, questioning in particular the respective role of language and/or visuospatial cerebral areas. Regional cerebral blood flow was measured with positron emission tomography while subjects were at rest (Rest), read digits (Read), retrieved simple arithmetic facts from memory (i.e., 2 ؋ 4, Retrieve), and performed mental complex calculation (i.e., 32 ؋ 24, Compute). Compared to Read, Retrieve engaged a left parietopremotor circuit representing a developmental trace of a finger-counting representation that mediates, by extension, the numerical knowledge in adult. Beside this basic network, Retrieve involved a naming network, including the left anterior insula and the right cerebellar cortex, while it did not engage the perisylvian language areas, which were deactivated as compared to Rest. In addition to this retrieval network, Compute specifically involved two functional networks: a left parieto-frontal network in charge of the holding of the multidigit numbers in visuospatial working memory and a bilateral inferior temporal gyri related to the visual mental imagery resolution strategy. Overall, these results provide strong evidence of the involvement of visuospatial representations in different levels of mental calculation.

One approach in pursuit of general intelligent agents has been to concentrate on the underlying cognitive architecture, of which Soar is a prime example. In the past, Soar has relied on a minimal number of architectural modules together with purely symbolic representations of knowledge. This paper presents the cognitive architecture approach to general intelligence and the traditional, symbolic Soar architecture. This is followed by major additions to Soar: nonsymbolic representations, new learning mechanisms, and long-term memories.

Event-related potentials (ERP) were recorded in two experiments to examine the effects of concreteness and emotionality on visual word processing. Concrete and abstract words of negative, neutral or positive valence, as well as pseudowords were presented in a hemifield lexical decision task. Experiment 1 yielded early (P2) and late (N400, late positive component/LPC) emotional word effects. Concreteness affected the N400 and the LPC. In line with the extended dual coding model and with previous studies, the N400 effect represents greater semantic activation, whereas the LPC effect may result from mental imagery being activated by concrete words. Experiment 2 engaged participants in a go/no-go task pressing a button for pseudowords. Here, emotionality and concreteness modulated the N400 independently, but interacted in the LPC time window. Only concrete emotional words differed in the LPC response suggesting that concrete negative words such as "wound" or "bomb" differ from neutral and positive words as a function of mental imagery.

The cortical, cerebellar and brainstem BOLD-signal changes have been identified with fMRI in humans during mental imagery of walking. In this study the whole brain activation and deactivation pattern during real locomotion was investigated by [ 18 F]-FDG-PET and compared to BOLD-signal changes during imagined locomotion in the same subjects using fMRI. Sixteen healthy subjects were scanned at locomotion and rest with [ 18 F]-FDG-PET. In the locomotion paradigm subjects walked at constant velocity for 10 min. Then [ 18 F]-FDG was injected intravenously while subjects continued walking for another 10 min. For comparison fMRI was performed in the same subjects during imagined walking. During real and imagined locomotion a basic locomotion network including activations in the frontal cortex, cerebellum, pontomesencephalic tegmentum, parahippocampal, fusiform and occipital gyri, and deactivations in the multisensory vestibular cortices (esp. superior temporal gyrus, inferior parietal lobule) was shown. As a difference, the primary motor and somatosensory cortices were activated during real locomotion as distinct to the supplementary motor cortex and basal ganglia during imagined locomotion. Activations of the brainstem locomotor centers were more prominent in imagined locomotion. In conclusion, basic activation and deactivation patterns of real locomotion correspond to that of imagined locomotion. The differences may be due to distinct patterns of locomotion tested. Contrary to constant velocity real locomotion (10 min) in [ 18 F]-FDG-PET, mental imagery of locomotion over repeated 20-s periods includes gait initiation and velocity changes. Real steady-state locomotion seems to use a direct pathway via the primary motor cortex, whereas imagined modulatory locomotion an indirect pathway via a supplementary motor cortex and basal ganglia loop.

Although imagery rescripting has long been part of cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT), recent years have seen a growing interest in the use of imagery rescripting interventions in CBT, especially with patients who struggle with distressing, intrusive imagery. This growth in the clinical applications of imagery has led to the creation of the current special issue of collected papers on imagery rescripting, which is designed to: (a) present research and clinical applications of imagery rescripting techniques to problematic mental imagery, (b) consider problematic imagery across a wide range of psychological disorders that might be a target for imagery rescripting (including novel areas such as mental contamination, bulimia and suicidality), (c) explore a variety of imagery rescripting techniques in the treatment of PTSD, as well as depression, social phobia, and snake phobia, and (d) stimulate interest for future treatment innovation in the use of imagery rescripting techniques to address other clinical disorders. The aim of this editorial is to summarise the collected papers presented and the links between them. A working definition of two types of imagery rescripting is provided, along with a heuristic framework for conceptualising the range of imagery techniques in cognitive therapy.

Therapists often assume a special association between mental imagery and emotion, though empirical evidence has been lacking. Using an interpretation training paradigm, we previously found that imagery had a greater impact on anxiety than did verbal processing of the same material (Holmes & Mathews, 2005). Although the finding of a differential impact of imagery versus verbal processing of negative material was replicated, findings did not extend to benign material. Results therefore left open the question of whether there may be a special association between imagery and positive emotion. The current experiment examined positive interpretation training. Numerous scenarios were presented with initial ambiguity as to positive outcome or not, with final information then yielding consistently positive resolutions. Participants were asked to either imagine these positive events or to listen to the same descriptions while thinking about their verbal meaning. Those participants in the imagery condition reported greater increases in positive affect and rated new descriptions as being more positive than did those in the verbal condition. Results suggest that positive training can be enhanced through imagery as opposed to verbal processing. This study also provides the first test of a standardized intervention using an “interpretive bias training” paradigm to improve positive mood.

A theory of the structure and cognitive function of the human imagination that attempts to do justice to traditional intuitions about its psychological centrality is developed, largely through a detailed critique of the theory propounded by Colin McGinn. Like McGinn, I eschew the highly deflationary views of imagination, common amongst analytical philosophers, that treat it either as a conceptually incoherent notion, or as psychologically trivial. However, McGinn fails to develop his alternative account satisfactorily because (following Reid, Wittgenstein and Sartre) he draws an excessively sharp, qualitative distinction between imagination and perception, and because of his flawed, empirically ungrounded conception of hallucination. His arguments in defense of these views are rebutted in detail, and the traditional, passive, Cartesian view of visual perception, upon which several of them implicitly rely, is criticized in the light of findings from recent cognitive science and neuroscience. It is also argued that the apparent intuitiveness of the passive view of visual perception is a result of mere historical contingency. An understanding of perception (informed by modern visual science) as an inherently active process enables us to unify our accounts of perception, mental imagery, dreaming, hallucination, creativity, and other aspects of imagination within a single coherent theoretical framework.

Keywords: imagination; mental imagery; mental image; perception; eye movements; active vision; enactive perception; seeing as; dreams; hallucination

There is a long-standing debate as to whether visual mental imagery relies entirely on symbolic (language-like) representations or also relies on depictive (picture-like) representations. We sought to discover whether visual mental imagery could evoke cortical activity with precise visual field topography (retinotopy). Participants received three conditions: the perception condition consisted of a standard retinotopic mapping procedure, where two flickering checkerboard wedges rotated around a central fixation point. The imagery and attention conditions consisted of the same stimulus, but only the outer arcs of the wedges were visible. During imagery, participants mentally reproduced the stimulus wedges, using the stimulus arcs as a guide. The attention condition required either distributed attention or focused attention to where the stimulus wedges would have been. Event-related analysis revealed that the imagery (greater than either form of attention) retinotopic maps were similar to the perception maps. Moreover, blocked analysis revealed similar perception and imagery effects in human motion processing region MT1. These results support the depictive view of visual mental imagery.

Highly affect-laden memory intrusions are a feature of several psychological disorders with intrusive images of trauma especially associated with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The trauma film paradigm provides a prospective experimental tool for investigating analogue peri-traumatic cognitive mechanisms underlying intrusion development. We review several historical papers and some more recent key studies that have used the trauma film paradigm. A heuristic diagram is presented, designed to simplify predictions about analogue peri-traumatic processing and intrusion development, which can also be related to the processing elements of recent cognitive models of PTSD. Results show intrusions can be induced in the laboratory and their frequency amplified/attenuated in line with predictions. Successful manipulations include competing task type (visuospatial vs. verbal) and use of a cognitive coping strategy. Studies show that spontaneous peri-traumatic dissociation also affects intrusion frequency although attempts to manipulate dissociation have failed. It is hoped that further use of this paradigm may lead to prophylactic training for at risk groups and an improved understanding of intrusions across psychopathologies.

Mental imagery is an under-explored field in clinical psychology research but presents a topic of potential interest and relevance across many clinical disorders, including social phobia, schizophrenia, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder. There is currently a lack of a guiding framework from which clinicians may select the domains or associated measures most likely to be of appropriate use in mental imagery research. We adopt an interdisciplinary approach and present a review of studies across experimental psychology and clinical psychology in order to highlight the key domains and measures most likely to be of relevance. This includes a consideration of methods for experimentally assessing the generation, maintenance, inspection and transformation of mental images; as well as subjective measures of characteristics such as image vividness and clarity. We present a guiding framework in which we propose that cognitive, subjective and clinical aspects of imagery should be explored in future research. The guiding framework aims to assist researchers in the selection of measures for assessing those aspects of mental imagery that are of most relevance to clinical psychology. We propose that a greater understanding of the role of mental imagery in clinical disorders will help drive forward advances in both theory and treatment.

Positron emission tomography (PET) was used to monitor regional cerebral blood flow variations while subjects were constructing mental images of objects made of three-dimensional cube assemblies from auditorily presented instructions. This spatial mental imagery task was contrasted with both passive listening (LIST) of phonetically matched nonspatial word lists and a silent rest (REST) condition. All three tasks were performed in total darkness. Mental construction (CONS) specifically activated a bilateral occipitoparietal-frontal network, including the superior occipital cortex, the inferior parietal cortex, and the premotor cortex. The right inferior temporal cortex also was activated specifically during this condition, and no activa-tion of the primary visual areas was observed. Bilateral superior and middle temporal cortex activations were common to CONS and LIST tasks when both were compared with the REST condition. These results provide evidence that the so-called dorsal route known to process visuospatial features can be recruited by auditory verbal stimuli. They also confirm previous reports indicating that some mental imagery tasks may not involve any significant participation of early visual areas.

In the past decade there has been renewed interest in the study of mental imagery. Emboldened by new findings from neuroscience, many people have revived the idea that mental imagery involves a special format of thought, one that is pictorial in nature. But the evidence and the arguments that exposed deep conceptual and empirical problems in the picture theory over the past 300 years have not gone away. I argue that the new evidence from neural imaging and clinical neuropsychology does little to justify this recidivism because it does not address the format of mental images. I also discuss some reasons why the picture theory is so resistant to counterarguments and suggest ways in which non-pictorial theories might account for the apparent spatial nature of images.

The concept of mental toughness is widely used, but empirical evidence is required to fully understand this construct and its related variables. The purpose of this paper was to explore the relationship between: (a) mental toughness and coping, (b) mental toughness and optimism, and (c) coping and optimism. Participants were 677 athletes (male 454; female 223) aged between 15 and 58 years (M age = 22.66 years, SD = 7.20). Mental toughness correlated significantly with 8 of the 10 coping subscales and optimism. In particular, higher levels of mental toughness were associated with more problem or approach coping strategies (mental imagery, effort expenditure, thought control, and logical analysis) but less use of avoidance coping strategies (distancing, mental distraction, and resignation). Eight coping subscales were significantly correlated with optimism and pessimism. In conclusion, the relationships observed in this study emphasize the need for the inclusion of coping and optimism training in mental toughness interventions.

Although much recent research has emphasized the equivalence between imagery and perception, there are critical differences between these activities: Perception, initiated by an external stimulus, is to a large extent concerned with the interpretation of that stimulus. Images, in contrast, are created as symbols of something and hence need no interpretive process. Without a construal process, images do not allow reconstrual. In support of this argument, we ask whether subjects can reverse an ambiguous figure in mental imagery. In three experiments, no subject was ever able to reverse a mental image. In contrast, all of the subjects were able, immediately after this failure, to draw a picture from their mental image and then reconstrue the figure in their own drawing. This failure to reverse images occurs despite hints to the subject, some coaching, and a moderate amount of training in figural reversal. This study emerged from discussions in a seminar on mental imagery that was made possible by a grant from the Exxon Foundation for the support of jointly taught graduate courses. We want to thank the participants in that seminar, especially

This article is part of an entertainment-education research (EE) from the
perspective of narrative persuasion. It presents the results of experimental research aimed at contributing to the improvement of the design of EE strategies to promote HIV testing in men who have sex with men (MSM). Specifically, we assessed the effect of the entertainment-education message (written vs. audiovisual) and the moderating role of the ability to generate mental imagery in the persuasive impact of EE pieces. In this experimental research, 109 MSM were randomly distributed into two experimental conditions (audiovisual versus written message). The results showed that the ability to generate mental imagery moderated the effects of the EE message modality on narrative transportation and the identification with characters. Besides, it was verified that narrative transportation and identification with characters are relevant mediating mechanisms, but these indirect effects were conditioned by the ability to generate mental imagery. These results suggest an advance in the knowledge process of narrative persuasion, the role of individual differences, and the provision of relevant information for the design of EE interventions.

The consumption of a food typically leads to a decrease in its subsequent intake through habituation—a decrease in one’s responsiveness to the food and motivation to obtain it.
We demonstrated that habituation to a food item can occur even when its consumption is merely imagined. Five experiments showed that people who repeatedly imagined eating a food (such as cheese) many times subsequently consumed less of the imagined food than did people
who repeatedly imagined eating that food fewer times, imagined eating a different food (such as candy), or did not imagine eating a food. They did so because they desired to eat it less, not because they considered it less palatable. These results suggest that mental representation alone can engender habituation to a stimulus.

The generality of findings implicating secondary auditory areas in auditory imagery was tested by using a timbre imagery task with fMRI. Another aim was to test whether activity in supplementary motor area (SMA) seen in prior studies might have been related to subvocalization. Participants with moderate musical background were scanned while making similarity judgments about the timbre of heard or imagined musical instrument sounds. The critical control condition was a visual imagery task. The pattern of judgments in perceived and imagined conditions was similar, suggesting that perception and imagery access similar cognitive representations of timbre. As expected, judgments of heard timbres, relative to the visual imagery control, activated primary and secondary auditory areas with some right-sided asymmetry. Timbre imagery also activated secondary auditory areas relative to the visual imagery control, although less strongly, in accord with previous data. Significant overlap was observed in these regions between perceptual and imagery conditions. Because the visual control task resulted in deactivation of auditory areas relative to a silent baseline, we interpret the timbre imagery effect as a reversal of that deactivation. Despite the lack of an obvious subvocalization component to timbre imagery, some activity in SMA was observed, suggesting that SMA may have a more general role in imagery beyond any motor component.

We review recent methodological advances in electromagnetic source imaging and present EEG data from our laboratory obtained by application of these methods. There are two principal steps in our analysis of multichannel electromagnetic recordings: (i) the determination of functionally relevant time periods in the ongoing electric activity and (ii) the localization of the sources in the brain that generate these activities recorded on the scalp. We propose a temporal segmentation of the time-varying activity, which is based on determination of changes in the topography of the electric fields, as an approach to the first step, and a distributed linear inverse solution based on realistic head models as an approach to the second step. Data from studies of visual motion perception, visuo-motor transfer, mental imagery, semantic decision, and cognitive interference illustrate that this analysis allows us to define the patterns of electric activity that are present at given time periods after stimulus presentation, as well as those time periods where significantly different patterns appear between different stimuli and tasks. The presented data show rapid and parallel activation of different areas within complex neuronal networks, including early activity of brain regions remote from the primary sensory areas. In addition, the data indicate information exchange between homologous areas of the two hemispheres in cases where unilateral stimulus presentation requires interhemispheric transfer.

Several recent neuroimaging studies have examined the neuroanatomical correlates of normal emotional states, such as happiness, sadness, fear, anger, anxiety, and disgust; however, no previous study has examined the emotional state of guilt. Methods: In the current study, we used positron emission tomography and the script-driven imagery paradigm to study regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) during the transient emotional experience of guilt in eight healthy male participants. In the Guilt condition, participants recalled and imagined participating in a personal event involving the most guilt they had ever experienced. In the Neutral condition, participants recalled and imagined participating in an emotionally neutral personal event.

tivation of the left and right posterior parietal cortex, suggesting that these regions perform distinct functions in this imagery task. This is confirmed by a trialby-trial analysis of correlations between reaction time and onset, width, and amplitude of the hemodynamic response. These findings pose neurophysiological constraints on cognitive models of mental imagery.

Over the past few years, the neural bases of mental imagery have been both a topic of intense debate and a domain of extensive investigations using either PET or fMRI that have provided new insights into the cortical anatomy of this cognitive function. Several studies have in fact demonstrated that there exist types of mental imagery that do not rely on primary/early visual areas, whereas a consensus now exists on the validity of the dorsal/ventral-route model in the imagery domain. More importantly, these studies have provided evidence that, in addition to higher order visual areas, mental imagery shares common brain areas with other major cognitive functions, such as language, memory, and movement, depending on the nature of the imagery task. This body of recent results indicates that there is no unique mental imagery cortical network; rather, it reflects the high degree of interaction between mental imagery and other cognitive functions. 1998 Academic Press

There are two major sources of information to build a topographic representation of an environment, namely actual navigation within the environment (route perspective) and map learning (survey perspective). The aim of the present work was to use positron emission tomography (PET) to compare the neural substrate of the topographic representation built from these two modes. One group of subjects performed a mental exploration task in an environment learned from actual navigation (mental navigation task). Another group of subjects performed exploration in the same environment learned from a map (mental map task). A right hippocampal activation common to both mental navigation and mental map tasks was evidenced and may correspond the neural substrate of a "dual-perspective" representation. The parahippocampal gyrus was additionally activated bilaterally during mental navigation only. These results suggest that the right hippocampus involvement would be sufficient when the representation incorporates essentially survey information while the bilateral parahippocampal gyrus would be involved when the environment incorporates route information and includes "object" landmarks. The activation of a parietofrontal network composed of the intraparietal sulcus, the superior frontal sulcus, the middle frontal gyrus, and the pre-SMA was observed in common for both mental navigation and mental map and is likely to reflect the spatial mental imagery components of the tasks.