Recent advances in the technologies of virtual and augmented reality give a rise to discussions of legal problems both in serious and seemingly unserious contexts. As for the serious, one may recall a case of 2019 where a British soldier...
moreRecent advances in the technologies of virtual and augmented reality give a rise to discussions of legal problems both in serious and seemingly unserious contexts. As for the serious, one may recall a case of 2019 where a British soldier was charged after “going rogue” in virtual combat simulation. As for the seemingly unserious, a good example is hype about Pokémon Go back in 2016 and discussions around possibility of legal qualification of placing virtual pokémons into representations of real spaces. A sophisticated reader can also trace the core of this discussion back to the issues of virtual property and virtual law in 2000-s, which are also absolutely relevant. However, now it becomes apparent that the problem underlying particular legal collisions is extremely broader. In terms of J. Baudrillard, we live in a new [postmodern] world full of simulacra. At the same time, the classic legal institutions are not ready to give up, and this results, metaphorically speaking, in two parallel worlds – the one of “old-fashioned” tangible reality where what we perceive as law exists and operates, often implying threat of coercion, and the one of “deceptive” media reality where we can easily be misled by simulacra. Hence, from the standpoint of legal theory and philosophy, the problem of finding a line between “real” and “virtual” worlds actually can be interpreted as a problem of certain new limits of law. Such limits can conventionally be called as the “semantic” ones because here we speak about different realities, re-created in our minds by concepts, and we navigate between these “worlds” by means of switching between the conceptual fields and connections of signs and meanings, as opposed to the case where we switch between various legal systems by means of travelling through different territories. If we follow this approach, many other cases may supplement the practical examples of legal collisions that relate to virtual worlds and virtual property, as long as they involve some kind of simulacra. In this sense, to summarize, the core idea of this paper is that most of the legal collisions that are conventionally related to “virtual reality”, in fact, imply a broader problem that can be re-conceptualized as the problem of legal significance of the artifacts of media reality, or the “attitude” of law to various simulacra. Hence, the problem of the “magic circle” pertaining e.g. to the online multiplayer games context in general and to virtual property in particular actually is just a tip of the iceberg. A good example of the broader field would be the problems of applying Internet content restriction rules which exist in modern Russia to imaginary, humorous and other “unserious” contexts (or, better to say, this is the question of how to define when the context is “serious enough” for the purposes of law and when it is not). If we look into this problem from the standpoint of legal interpretation or application of law, it appears that it can be explained by means of H.L.A. Hart’s idea of “core” and “penumbra” (also, this problem also naturally is the problem of absurdity and common sense in law). Artifacts of media reality are somewhere in the penumbra. It is required then both for theoretical and practical purposes to find a way to connect those artifacts which are not simulacra, to the core meaning of certain concept-word used in the respective legal text, or to explain why this is not the case. In the end, what is suggested in this paper, is to employ a two-tier test comprising of the “criterion of reality” and the “criterion of seriousness”, based on the notion of generalized symbolic media from the field of sociology (in the latest interpretation by S. Abrutyn). An object of social relationship can have legal significance in case it has “socio-currency value”, i.e. it serves as an external referent of value of certain generalized symbolic medium and as such has this kind of intersubjective value. The “criterion of reality” is satisfied when an artifact of media reality has functional correspondence to the core meaning of a concept-word used in the respective legal text (so that it formally falls within the scope of a legal concept-word), this is a formal criterion. The “criterion of seriousness” is satisfied when an artifact of media reality by itself is an external referent of value and has “socio-currency value" (so that it would not be absurd by default to apply law to it), this is a substantial criterion. If both criteria are satisfied, then it is a kind of “easy case” where there is no absurdity at all. If just one of the criteria is satisfied, it is a case requiring “balancing” or “weighing” of values. If both criteria are not satisfied (just as when, in most cases, you engage in “interaction” with non-player characters of videogames, but not in all cases, to be fair), it would be absurd to consider the object of the corresponding relationship to be of legal significance in this particular aspect. Ultimately, this reasoning could be correlated with and translated into the formal language of legal argumentation.