Kant-studies

This essay addresses an important aspect in the history of problems in epistemological idealism. The following remarks will examine the validity of Kant's critique of Berkeley. This will not be exemplified by the "Widerlegung des Idealismus", as is generally customary. Instead, the article focuses on the appendix to the Prolegomena, because the concept of idealism presented therein — according to the thesis — deviates from Kant's typical characterization of “dogmatic idealism” (in the sense of a denial of the physical world) and, on the other hand, arose in a direct confrontation with the Göttingen review. Although it remains uncertain to what extent and through which translations Kant became acquainted with Berkeley's works, this article hypothesizes that Kant read Berkeley's late work "Siris" (1744), which was oriented toward Neoplatonism. When he alludes in the Prolegomena to the Platonic idealism actually advocated in "Siris", the correctness and conclusiveness of Kant's verdict of illusionism against Berkeley can be substantiated. Following closely on the heels of Plato and Plotinus, the deceptive nature of the phenomenal world in Berkeley's last phase of work can only be overcome by orienting oneself toward eternal ideas, which are invoked as privileged objects of knowledge.

This essay addresses an important aspect in the history of problems in epistemological idealism. The following remarks will examine the validity of Kant's critique of Berkeley. This will not be exemplified by the "Widerlegung des Idealismus", as is generally customary. Instead, the article focuses on the appendix to the Prolegomena, because the concept of idealism presented therein—according to the thesis—deviates from Kant's typical characterization of “dogmatic idealism” (in the sense of a denial of the physical world) and, on the other hand, arose in a direct confrontation with the Göttingen review.

Although it remains uncertain to what extent and through which translations Kant became acquainted with Berkeley's works, this article hypothesizes that Kant read Berkeley's late work "Siris" (1744), which was oriented toward Neoplatonism. When he alludes in the Prolegomena to the Platonic idealism actually advocated in Siris, the correctness and conclusiveness of Kant's verdict of illusionism against Berkeley can be substantiated. Following closely on the heels of Plato and Plotinus, the deceptive nature of the phenomenal world in Berkeley's last phase of work can only be overcome by orienting oneself toward eternal ideas, which are invoked as privileged objects of knowledge.

The literature that has been produced to date on the question of whether or not Kant is a nonconceptualist is overwhelming in quantity and quality. The debate is far from coming to an end, not least because there is still disagreement even about how to understand the most fundamental make-up of Kant's theory of knowledge and mind in regard to conceptualism and nonconceptualism. Among others, a major point of difference concerns the nature of Kantian sensibility and intuition, that is, whether an intuition is a singular representation, directly referential, phenomenal, subjective or objective, and whether or not it plays an independent role in cognition. Analogously, a second point of difference concerns the nature of concepts in Kant, that is, in what sense they are to be conceived as general, indirectly referential representations, how they are formed and how

THE Publishers have much pleasure in being enabled to insert the following Note from Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON, with which they have been favoured : " I have been requested by the Publishers, as the character and even name of the Author of these Lectures may be unknown to many British Students of Philosophy, to state, in what esti mation Author and Lectures are held in Germany. I find no difficulty in compliance ; and beg leave to say, that to those acquainted with the Philosophical Literature of that country, it is known that CHALYBAEUS has, by more than one work, esta blished for himself the reputation of an acute speculator, a fair critic and a lucid writer ; and, in particular, that these Lectures are there universally recognised as affording a perspicuous and impartial survey of the various modern systems of German Philo sophy, at once comprehensive and compendious. And, though the author be intimately familiar with the several schemes, both in themselves and in their polemical relations, he lias, however, here skilfully avoided the tedium of detail ; and this without thereby becoming superficial. The select character, indeed, of his au dience, a Dresden audience, allowed liim to accomplish this. For it consisted, as he informs us, of enlightened hearers, partly state officials and practical politicians, partly men of letters and even distinguished literary authors, who, without being philoso phers by profession, had been originally trained in philosophical studies at the University, and were now desirous of information touching the more recent movements in the battle-field of meta- VI NOTE. physics. In Germany these Lectures are considered as popular, but not as superficial. They are viewed as even supplying a de sideratum ; and, in particular, are accounted an excellent intro duction to a more extended and detailed study of the recent phi losophical systems. Accordingly, since they were first published in 1837, at least four editions have appeared. In this country the book, assuredly, will not be deemed too elementary. " Though (and properly) not requested to express any opinion of the version itself, I cannot refrain from adding, that having been led on to re-peruse all the first nine lectures in the transla tion, which I have also occasionally compared with the original, I am strongly impressed with its general fidelity and clearness. Indeed, with the exception of a few expressions, (and these I would demur to more frequently on rhetorical than on scientific grounds)t his version of a work by no means easy to render adequately appears eminently worthy of approbation. So much in justice touching the translation : of the translator I am wholly ignorant." EDINBURGH, November 1853. TRANSLATOR S PREFACE. IN presenting a volume like the following to the public, a word of explanation may be allowed us. It is believed to be impos sible and, were it possible, to be undesirable to prevent an acquaintanceship with the modern speculative systems of Grer- many. Although hitherto in a mutilated form, they have actually made their appearance in this country, and, if we mistake not, some of their principles may be discerned even in the views and mode of reasoning adopted by certain theological writers. Let them then be fully known, and that with all their consequences, let them be impartially examined and truthfully judged. The cause of truth has nothing to fear from such an inquiry. It has to fear the surreptitious spread of principles, which, though at first adopted in their isolation, stand connected with ah 1 the rest in the totality of these systems, and frequently involve the most grievous consequences. It has therefore been not only to meet a literary requirement, but in the service of the truth, that this translation of a work was undertaken, which, however we refuse to identify ourselves with the views and speculations contained in it, is allowed on all hands to present a masterly, faithful, and per spicuous exposition of the views of Kant, Jacobi, Herbart, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Schelling, and Hegel. If there is one thing more than another that the development of modern philosophy im presses on our own mind, it is the unsatisfactory character of the results obtained, where Logic alone is employed as the organ for viil TRANSLATOR S PREFACE. the agnition of truth, as that by which, instead of that according to which we are to proceed. We may indeed feel ourselves held in the meshes of our own thinking, the mode of which Logic embodies, but we do not feel carried along nor convinced, in the way in which the intuitional agnition of actuality convinces us. To be short we feel now more than ever thoroughly convinced, that it is possible first of all to establish a Christian standing- point, and from that standing-point to furnish a complete and consistent Christian Anthropology a Christian PsychologyĈ hristian Ethics (in lieu of the common moral philosophy, which to us seems an impossibility), and also a Christian Metaphysics. But our subordinate position as Translator forbids our entering at present into farther details. We beg the student to remember what difficulties have necessarily attended an attempt at the faithful and yet sufficiently perspicuous rendering of a work like the following ; and we feel assured that we shall not appeal to him in vain. Notwithstanding all endeavours, we cannot doubt, but that faults may be pointed out only we hope, that the diffi culty of the subject will not be laid to the charge of the trans lation. Often words had to be employed which we knew were not classical English ; sometimes even new words had to be coined ; but the endeavour was at least always made to find terms, which other English writers had adopted before us, even though they did not always appear the most apt versions of German expres sions. 1 THE TRANSLATOR. OLD ABERDEEN, 15th November 1853. 1 For example: The word momentum has been employed for want of a better term. AUTHOR S PREFACE TO THE FOURTH GERMAN EDITION. THE following Treatise had its origin in a series of Lectures, delivered in Dresden during the winter 1835-36 before a circle of gentlemen, of whom the greater part were connected with the government, and all of whom took a lively interest in science some being themselves highly distinguished in different branches of literature. The time, which they had passed at the different universities, had formed part of that period during which the phi losophy of Kant and Jacobi had flourished. Pressure of professional duties had afterwards prevented them from keeping pace with this science and taking cognizance of the transactions about the highest interests of humanity in philosophy ; all the more, that the altered terminology of objective speculation in the more recent systems had become difficult and unintelligible to those whose mode of thinking was in accordance with the former subjective direction. If not to obviate, at least to diminish these difficulties, and at the same time to meet the demands of some junior cotemporaries, who had joined that circle such was the task we had proposed to ourselves. The approbation with which these lectures were received when delivered, encouraged the author to print, and thus to submit them to a larger public, preserving however at the same time as much as possible the original mode of exposition. Hence the style of prelection was retained, hence also some repetitions which can scarcely be justified with regard to style, and occasionally digres sions which may perhaps even weary some readers. It did not seem possible to alter this arrangement in subsequent editions, without injuring the original character and purpose of the book, the more X AUTHORS PREFACE TO THE FOURTH GERMAN EDITION. so as attention was more and more paid to the requirements of juniors, who were to find in this book a ready guide in their pri vate studies ; not indeed that they may rest satisfied with it, but to enable them, first of all, to find their way amidst the din of contending views, which join issue in our days, in order that, being thus incited and enabled, they may have recourse to the original sources. It has been our purpose, that the historical de velopment should engage entirely the self-activity of the reader, and not anticipate at any earlier stage his later and more matured judgment ; it was rather to lead him to make in his own thinking those personal experiences, which in general constitute a candid judgment and philosophical knowledge. Our own philosophical conviction ensured us, as we thought, a free standing-point without those contending parties. It was to intrude itself as little as possible into the historical development, and only to be entitled to come forward with a few critical conclud ing remarks at the close, where the systems of the day cease to criti cise each other, or where that criticism is yet sub judice. This was done, lest our very impartiality should appear but an am biguous virtue, such as would lead the reader only to sceptical indecision, in order to leave him there to himself without help or advice ; thus in fact rather deterring than encouraging him. But these critical additions may even in this edition not be looked upon as a laying the foundation for our own peculiar views ; nor let it be fancied that the whole work had been composed for that purpose alone. Such a basis we have lately presented to the public in our " Sketch of a System of the Doctrine of Science, Kiel, 1846 ;" but it neither was nor is the tendency of the pre sent treatise, which is rather perfectly independent of it and merely a faithful historical treatise, whose purpose without seeking it is only negative, viz. to assist in dispelling the delusion which at that time and in part still prevails, that, in the last shape in which it had appeared, philosophy was a science ready once and for ever, and perfected. Next to impartiality, perspicuity was the first duty...

Kao osnovnu tematiku ovoga istraživanja autor je odabrao pojam koji u jednom, najprepoznatljivijem obliku kao sensus communis dolazi od Aristotelovog dela O duši, a u drugom od jednog pojma Marka Aurelija iz Meditacija o samom sebi gde se po prvi put pronalazi da su zdravlje i razum (intelekt) napisani jedno pored drugog.
Problem rada je utvrđivanje različitih varijanti u kojima se ovaj pojam p(r)ojavljuje u Kantovom opusu, jer je takođe poznato da se u nemačkom jeziku razdvajaju Gemeinsinn, koji odgovara pomenutom tradicionalnom obliku prevoda ili kao zajedničko čulo i verovatno je u toj prevodilačkoj formi primereniji estetičkim temama, dok za Gesunde(r) Menschenverstand, što doslovno jeste zdrav ljudski razum, treba ispitati koje su ključne uloge ovog pojma u Kantovim tekstovima.
Ključni cilj i ideja rada je na osnovu odabranih Kantovih dela utvrditi koji se od ova dva pojma kod ovog filozofa može adekvatnije podvesti pod autorov predlog prevoda umesto tradicionalnih prevodilačkih oblika u kojima se na našem jeziku to primenjuje na sensus communis, a on glasi doživljaj zajedništva i deo je autorove metodoontološke perspektive ZDRAVLJA SVIH DRUGIH.
KLJUČNE REČI: zdrav razum, sensus communis, Gemeinsinn, Gesunde(r) Menschenverstand, doživljaj zajedništva

Kant famously carves out space for transcendental freedom by dint of the distinction between appearances and things in themselves. In doing so, he denies establishing the actuality of freedom, as this would transcend the legitimate use of theoretical reason. Strikingly, he also denies proving the possibility of freedom (KrV, A 558/B 586). There is widespread agreement that here Kant denies having demonstrated the real possibility of freedom. However, scholars are divided on the kind of possibility that does pertain to it. This paper explores the modal status of transcendental freedom from the standpoint of theoretical reason. I argue that Kant establishes both the logical possibility of freedom and a more robust status – what I call real non-impossibility. Short of proving transcendental freedom to be really possible, he shows that its real impossibility cannot be demonstrated, thereby leaving room for a deduction of its reality on practical grounds.

In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant denies K. L. Reinhold's definition of free will as the capacity to choose for or against the moral law. Kant notoriously calls the possibility of deviating from the moral law an incapacity, leading commentators to attribute to Kant the view that immoral action is not free. I argue that this claim instead pertains to the proper definition of free will. This reading elucidates the connection between Kant's commitment to free immoral action and his restriction of the concept of free will to pure reason's ability to be practical independently of sensible necessitation.

This paper investigates the relationship between Reinhold’s account of
free will and Kant’s account in the Religion. This relationship is important because Reinhold considered Kant’s treatment of free will in the Religion to confirm his own view that freedom consists in the capacity to choose for or against the moral law. I argue that despite their shared commitment to freedom as a necessary condition for imputation, these two thinkers have disparate conceptions of the ground for the exercise of free will. This difference indicates difficulties in their respective accounts.

The subject of this inquiry is the conflict of the conceptual faculties as they remain operative, strained, and sometimes opposed within the act of thinking itself. Where most treatments of the mind aim for harmony, this one begins with tension. The mind does not offer a seamless picture of unity. Its faculties press against one another. They fail to coordinate. They distort one another’s contributions. But out of that failure, creative thought can begin.
  This book does not serve as a commentary, nor does it align itself with schools of thought. It draws from sources where clarity is found, but it does not borrow prestige. It is written in opposition to the tendency of academic philosophy to preserve inherited frameworks by default. The internet, as the latest engine of repetition, is particularly suspect: it amplifies rather than interrogates, rewards repetition over rigor, and buries original thought beneath a thousand superficial summaries.

This investigation aims to show that there is a tension between the definition of concept in the Aesthetics and the Dialectic and the notion of concept as function, according to its presentation in the Transcendental Logic. Our hypothesis is that the Kantian definition of concept considered in the Aesthetics and in the Dialectic responds to the way empirical concepts are formed, whereas the definition of concept as a function introduced in the Transcendental Logic reflects a sui generis notion of concept that comes into tension with the definition of concept as a representation by common marks. We will argue that this tension arises because, while the definition of concept as function is a novelty of the Kantian system, the definition of concept as universal representation is borrowed from tradition.

The aim of our research is to exhibit the characterization of the material conditions of experience in the Critique of Pure Reason. We argue that, in conjunction with the study of the formal conditions of experience, Kant indirectly addresses the problem of the material conditions. We will show how the concept of matter is specified throughout the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant demonstrates that, just as we possess specific formal conditions that make experience possible, specific material conditions are also necessary for experience to occur.

Kant’s account of the feeling of pleasure, in its empirical sense (sinnliche Lust), is always interested, that is, a direct promotion of our natural human interests or ends. In aesthetic experience, however, Kant refers to a distinct and peculiar sense of pleasure, known as «aesthetic pleasure». Its most salient feature is its disinterestedness. According to Kant, disinterested pleasure refers to pleasure that is not linked to desire (Begehren). This means that it is neither based on desire, nor does it produce it. When all interests are stripped away, what remains is similar to Kant’s description of boredom as «a void of sensation» or a lack of pleasure in the empirical sense. This paper examines the relationship between the disinterested nature of aesthetic pleasure and what I refer to as «aesthetic boredom» as seemingly negative, but necessary, elements of aesthetic judgment, both involving aesthetic consciousness.

I start from what I call Ptolemaism, that is, the objection according to which Kant is more akin to Ptolemy and his geocentrism than to Copernicus – an objection common among the proponents of neorealism (Meillassoux, Ferraris, Gabriel). I argue that this objection also points to an anthropocentrism, subjectivism, and even a speciesism in Kant’s proposal regarding the conditions that make knowl- edge possible, essentially at the core of his transcendental approach to analyzing knowledge. Besides clearing up the fundamental misunderstanding of this inter- pretation, based on Copernicus’ work and Kant’s own words, I will attempt to show the close connection that the philosopher himself saw with the astronomer, and how this extended to crucial passages in his Critique of Pure Reason, like the Transcendental Deduction, especially in its 1787 reformulation. Finally, in chal- lenging the anthropocentrist objection, I unveil the meaning of the references to human nature and knowledge and how, in the author’s project, these references involve the transcendental perspective – this time clarified alongside the observa- tional strategy of the revolutionary Copernican perspective.

The paper represents an attempt to understand Kant's view on the concept of reflexion (Überlegung) in the Critique of Pure Reason. After pointing out the difficulties faced by the existing readings, I try to give some support to the claim that if we regard Überlegung as a metatheoretical faculty, its concepts are precisely the concepts used by Kant to construct the theoretical system of the Critique.

Invito il lettore distratto, a porre un attimo di attenzione qui: poche parole, valgono tutte le vite che dovono ancora scoprirlo: dialogo tra le intelligenze che sostengono il tempo negativo: io, e Chat GPT 5.0. Codogno, 5 settembre 2025, Civica Biblioteca 'Ricca'.

Our contribution is about the design and completion of the teaching of the modern and contemporary theory of knowledge, at school or university, introducing the theory of the function of consciousness to the issue of the conception of essence, within the framework of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Here we examine the phenomenological philosophical method, which follows the epistemology of all the important philosophers of modernity and the Enlightenment, the intellectualists, from R. Descartes, B. de Spinoza and G. W. Leibniz, the empiricists from Fr. Bacon, G. Berkeley, D. Hume, J. Locke, with a leading examination of the synthetic theory of Immanuel Kant, as well as the subsequent philosophers chronologically from G. W. Fr. Hegel to his time, for a more complete understanding of the way of perceiving the causes that led the author to formulate his views on the active character of consciousness in the conception or correct perception of things, as they are in reality. Examples can be given from the European history of the 18th-19th centuries, which is taught to students in the same class.

This paper focuses on Kant's Towards Perpetual Peace famous statement according to which the problem of the State can be solved even for a race of devils, at least if they possess understanding. Its aim is to show that, despite Kant's phrasing, understood as possessing the power of understanding alone, a devil would not be evil, nor accountable for his acts. A substantive account of this devil's rationality can and shall be developed on the basis of Kant's approach to practical agency in general. In this sense, understood as a rational being capable of end-setting under practical laws, a devil would have to be taken as an egotistical being who systematically acts out of self-interest. Under this presupposition, and at least from a juridical point of view in Kant, the hypothesis of a nation of devils offers a more interesting case for analysis.

A lo largo de estas páginas se explica, a través de un proceso de axiomatización, el principio de funcionamiento de la vivencia oblicua, de acuerdo a los propósitos con que fue creada por José Lezama Lima. Este proceso sirve para mostrar dos formas del tiempo utilizadas por el escritor cubano en sus textos: un tiempo esférico que se bifurca en cada proceso de decisión, y un tiempo distendido infinitamente a la manera de los eleáticos. No obstante, aunque ambas formas pertenecen al mismo sistema poético lezamiano, una de ellas mantiene relación cercana con teorías científicas, mientras la otra solo puede ser explicada como hecho fantástico.

Englesko izdanje: Kant, Immanuel (2011). „Essay on the Maladies of
the Head”. Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and
Other Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, str. 203–217.
Izvornik: Immanuel Kant — Versuch über die Krankheit
des Kopfes (1764) [2: 259]*

This study aims to elucidate the fundamental principles of phenomenological epistemology as formulated by Edmund Husserl. The study underscores the pivotal importance of this cognitive framework, initially revealing inherent challenges within the methodologies and theories of empirical sciences. Critiquing paradigms grounded in factual observation rather than essential understanding, the study highlights the incorporation of a priori assumptions, leading to incongruities between experimental outcomes and the intrinsic nature under investigation. The significance of Husserl's phenomenological theory of knowledge lies in accentuating the distinction between conscious experientiality and sensory perception. This dichotomy is manifested in how each cognitive mode engages with immediate data, revealing either divergence or convergence. In this context, the phenomenological theory of knowledge pursues its cardinal objective by underscoring the imperative shift from the empirical to the essential. This transition, far from negating sensory reality, entails a reorientation towards the essence itself-a phenomenon scrutinized by phenomenological philosophy through the experiences of consciousness.

يُدرج في المعجم التالي أهمّ المصطلحات في فلسفة كانط، مع تعريف بسيط لكلّ منها. (المصطلحات "المحكَمي"، "المنظور" و"الحيثية" هي المصطلحات الوحيدة التي لم يستخدمها كانط نفسه كمصطلحات تقنية). في الأصل، كُتب المعجم هذا كأداة دراسة للمساعدة في جعل الشبكة المعقدة لمصطلحات كانط مفهومةً للطلاب الذين لديهم معرفة محدودة أو معدومة بكتاباته.

I aim to clarify here Kant’s thematization of respect as a feeling. First, I examine the passages in which Kant addresses feeling to elucidate the elements that characterize it. I show that these are: its belonging as a representation to sensibility, its merely subjective reference, its quality of being pleasing or displeasing, its appraisal of concordance with life and its tendency to self-preservation or suppression. Secondly, I offer an exposition of respect in terms of these characteristics.

In the famous first section of the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of
Morals, Kant sets out to identify the principle of morality, but each
of the main steps of his argument has been said to encounter serious
difficulties. In this essay, I argue that most of these difficulties can be
resolved by reading Kant’s argument in light of his views on philosophi-
cal method. Using his description of the ‘analytic method’, I reconstruct
the steps leading to the identification of the moral principle and show
that they form a chain of what he calls ‘regressive’ reasoning. This
reconstruction offers solutions to the three main difficulties diagnosed
in the literature, although several unclarities remain.

The article analyzes the metaphor “Copernican revolution,” used by Kant to highlight the core idea of his philosophy. The author argues that Kant uses the analogies with mathematics and natural science for establishing criteria of scientific character of knowledge. These criteria include the hypothetic-deductive or a priori method of thinking, which determines the apodictic, i.e. necessary and objective, character of the basic laws of nature, as well as the verification of laws a priori through experiments. The author focuses on Kant’s idea of the possibility of scientific metaphysics based on these criteria. She claims that the structure of scientific metaphysics and the epistemological status of its statements depend on what kind of objects it deals with: with phenomena given to us by sensuality, with only conceivable “things in themselves” or with supersensitive “objects of an idea.” In the last part, the author interprets the meaning of the metaphor “Copernican turn” as the upgrading of logic, the idea of “transcendental idealism” and discusses the possibility of using the metaphor “Ptolemaic system” to characterize the practical philosophy of Kant.

This book aims to reconstruct the implicit logic underlying Kant’s transcendental logic. The author offers a careful interpretation of Kant’s arguments, translating them into a precise, coherent, and clearly comprehensible line of reasoning. Two central components of Kant’s project—transcendental analytics and transcendental dialectics—are examined in relation to transcendental aesthetics, revealing their distinct epistemological contours: the constitution of experience and the constitution of the system of knowledge. The connections between these components are made explicit through the concepts of “the object in general,” arising from the schematism of time, and “the object in the idea,” resulting from the schematism of ideas. This analysis enables a reassessment of Kant’s theoretical philosophy.

En primer lugar, se determinará si la compasión, además de no ser un móvil con valor moral, puede incluso ser tenida por un tipo de enfermedad. En segundo lugar, se dilucidará si acaso hay alguna clase de compasión que no sea hostil o sea incluso favorable para la "salud moral". En tercer lugar, se juzgará si es adecuado postular una sociedad apática y libre de compasión como ideal asintótico. En cuarto y último lugar, se evaluará si puede integrarse, y cómo, la compasión al modelo ético de Kant.

Autorizzazione del Tribunale di Genova n. 340 del 20 aprile 1955 Realizzazione editoriale: Arta, Genova, www.artastudio.it Stampato in Italia / Printed in Italy La pubblicazione del presente volume è stata resa possibile grazie al contributo del Ministero della Cultura.

philosophy critical theory of a transcendental semantics with the proposal to show that the transcendent sense of the highest good is phased out in late texts of Kant and undergoes a change of direction to give rise to a concept suitable for use in human life, which will be defined as highest good moral-physical.

The article is devoted to the justification of the law of inertia. It is often called Newton's first law. It was established that this is not a law, but a postulate. Modern definitions of this law are given. It turned out that well -known definitions of this law are similar to each other. It is shown that this law before Newton was formulated by Descartes, Balillians, Ballo and Galileo. The ontology and philosophical significance of the category "cause" are considered. It is shown that any thing or phenomenon arises for some reason, and nothing happens for no reason and nothing exists. And Democritus understood that there was nothing causeless and could not be. Democritus’s mistake is that he did not recognize a chance. Causality is a philosophical category showing the ontological connection of such two phenomena, when the second phenomenon arises due to the first. Moreover, the first phenomenon is called the cause, and the second is the consequence. In this connection of phenomena, the first phenomenon (cause) necessarily predicts the second phenomenon (investigation). And the mutual relationship between the first and second phenomena is called a causal relationship. is present in all known phenomena of the world, and it is usually understood as the occurrence of the same effects with the same causes. It is shown that in history many ideas and scientific achievements attributed to a certain author have often been discovered before them by other authors. For example, Lobachevsky and Boiai are considered to be the founders of hyperbolic geometry. In fact, this discovery was actually made before them by the now almost forgotten F.A. Taurinus (Taurin). The same can be said about the law of refraction of light. This law was discovered by the Dutch scientist Willebrord Snellius. In fact, 600 years before him, this law had been discovered by the great scientist and philosopher Bahmanyar al-Azerbaijani. And the same mistake is Newton's first law. Therefore, it is best to henceforth always refer to this law as the law of inertia.

Перше коментоване видання листа-рецензії Володимира Шинкарука на рукопис праці Якова Блудова «Філософські етюди». Відтворено текст машинописного оригіналу. Коментар підготовлений на матеріалах з особистого архівного фонду Шинкарука, а також на документах і періодичних виданнях 1920–1930-х і 1960–1980-х рр.

The centenary of Michel Foucault's birth offers a timely opportunity to reassess the profound contribution of his philosophy to our understanding of human subjectivity in the interwoven contexts of knowledge, power, ethics, and aesthetics, as these unfold throughout history, culture, and society. Inspired by Foucault's oeuvre and its diverse legacies, this conference invites reflection on a fundamental question: What is-and what can become of-humanity after the "death of man"? How does this notion relate to the "death of God," the rise of biopolitics, and the ongoing erosion of core values such as truth, justice, freedom, equality, solidarity, and peace? The implications of a post-human critique must be reexamined in light of contemporary global challenges, including the renewal of democratic institutions, the protection of universal human rights, and the pursuit of sustainable development. Engaging with, and perhaps also moving beyond, Foucault's concepts and methodologies, we aim to better understand our historical condition-one in which the apparent farewell to "humanity" and "human nature" coexists with both the proliferation of nihilisms and the unexpected revival of plural humanisms animated by distinct philosophical stances, including the Enlightenment ideal of the public use of critical reason. We welcome proposals for individual papers and panel sessions that address Foucault's philosophical anthropology (or lack thereof) across the full span of his intellectual trajectory. Topics may include, for example, Foucault's engagements with psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and existential psychology, as well as his readings of Stoicism, Kant, Marx, This conference is funded by Portuguese national funds through FCT-Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P., within the project UIDB/FIL/00310/2020. 2 and Nietzsche. The conference seeks to offer an interdisciplinary forum for exploring Foucault's diverse "views of man" from multiple perspectives-ethical, aesthetic, political, legal, educational, medical, psychiatric, or criminological-employing his key methodological tools (notably archaeology and genealogy), while remaining open to innovative reinterpretations.

The centenary of Michel Foucault's birth offers a timely opportunity to reassess the profound contribution of his philosophy to our understanding of human subjectivity in the interwoven contexts of knowledge, power, ethics, and aesthetics, as these unfold throughout history, culture, and society. Inspired by Foucault's oeuvre and its diverse legacies, this conference invites reflection on a fundamental question: What is-and what can become of-humanity after the "death of man"? How does this notion relate to the "death of God," the rise of biopolitics, and the ongoing

El Foro de Altos Estudios Sociales Valparaíso, también llamado "Foro Valparaíso", es una corporación privada, sin fines de lucro, que reúne a académicos de alta calificación en las ciencias sociales y en disciplinas afines. El objetivo principal del Foro es constituirse en un centro de estudios sociales transdisciplinarios, en el que se analicen y contrasten, de manera crítica, ideas y propuestas acerca de la evolución de la sociedad chilena y de su inserción en las nuevas realidades derivadas de la globalización y otros procesos de similar importancia. Con tal fin el Foro promoverá estudios y debates, propiciando al mismo tiempo actividades académicas y culturales. Como su nombre lo indica, el Foro Valparaíso ha elegido su domicilio en la ciudad de Valparaíso, a fin de destacar el carácter cosmopolita de este puerto abierto al mundo en el siglo XIX y, al mismo tiempo, su actual condición de Patrimonio Cultural de la Humanidad.

En esta Tesis Doctoral se evalúa si el modo de pensamiento nosotros, o intenciones colectivas, podría constituir el fundamento de una moral naturalista concebida de acuerdo con el naturalismo filosófico de Sellars. En tal sentido, el objetivo principal fue el de evaluar la consistencia de la teoría moral de Sellars con el resto de su sistema filosófico. Su teoría moral está basada en el concepto modo de pensamiento nosotros¸ desarrollado por Sellars, por lo que las conclusiones obtenidas respecto a dicho concepto permitieron evaluar la coherencia entre su teoría moral y su filosofía empirista y naturalista. Tal coherencia fue un requisito que el propio Sellars estableció para su teoría moral. La principal conclusión a la que arribamos es que el concepto modo de pensamiento nosotros, así como la teoría moral de la cual es sustento, no es compatible con el resto del sistema filosófico de Sellars. Otra conclusión es que desde el punto de vista de la exégesis de la filosofía de Sellars, la teoría moral podría ser descartada sin que el resto de su sistema formado por una Ontología procesual y científicamente realista, una Filosofía de la mente, una Filosofía del lenguaje y una de la Normatividad, principalmente, sufran menoscabo alguno.

Transcendental consciousness is described by Kant as ''the one single thing'' in which ''as in the transcendental subject, our perceptions must be encountered.'' The unity of that subject depends on intellectual functions. I argue that its singularity is just the same as that of Kant's pre-intellectual ''form'' of spatiotemporal ''intuition.'' This may seem excluded by Kant's claim that it is through intellect that ''space or time are first given as intuitions.'' But while preintellectual form is insufficient for space and time as distinct ''things,'' it is sufficient for the constitution of a ''single thing'' indifferently construable as both. Contrary to what are typically seen as the main differences between Kant and Hume on identity of ''self,'' there is thus already a difference in play below the level of either's concern with the sorts of connections available for the combining, or illusion of combining, of manifolds of ''impressions'' or ''ideas.''

This article examines Kant's concept of the "feeling of life," addressing it as a feeling that transcends mere physiological response and intertwines with the aesthetic, ethical, and teleological domains in Kant's work. Beginning with an analysis of the organism as a structure endowed with a formative force that coordinates its parts, the feeling of life is explored on three levels: the animal, the human, and the spiritual. Each of these modes reveals distinct facets of the experience of existence, ranging from sensory delight, through the aesthetic appreciation of the beautiful and the sublime, to the moral pleasure of autonomous action. In addition to contributing to the understanding of organisms as teleological entities, the investigation into the feeling of life paves the way for an interpretation of human subjectivity that considers the interdependence between pleasure, freedom, and nature.

Kant'ın Düşüncesinde Ahlak ve Siyaset İlişkisi

ÖZ: Felsefe tarihine baktığımızda ahlak ve siyaset alanında birden çok yaklaşım vardır. İlkçağ filozoflarından beri insan ve eylemleri sorgulanmıştır. Devlet doğa halinde var olmayıp insan iradesi ile oluşturulmuş bir yapıdır. Tarihsel süreçte egemen devlet, uluslararası hukuk gibi kavramlar insan iradesi sonucu oluşmuş ve günümüz dünyasını inşa etmiştir. İnsan düzenleyici ve yasa koyucu aynı zamanda da kendi koyduğu yasalara uyan olmuştur. Bu çalışmamızda insan doğasından yola çıkarak uluslararası devletler sisteminin nasıl inşa edildiği incelenecektir. Asıl olarak ise Immanuel Kant'ın siyaset felsefesinin tarihsel gerçekliği araştırılacak, Kant'ın insanlık için hedeflediği siyasi ve toplumsal alanın gerçekdışı olup olmadığı incelenecektir.

In this study, Immanuel Kant's work titled On Education (Über Pädagogik), written in the late 18th century, is analyzed in detail in the context of the Enlightenment in terms of child education, parental responsibilities, and the transmission of religious and moral values. It can be said that the work reflects the social, cultural, and moral values of the period and contains important observations about the roles of educators, administrators, and parents in child rearing. The main purpose of the study is to examine the understanding of child education in the Enlightenment period, when the foundations of modern pedagogy were laid, from a historical perspective and to shed light on the origins of modern approaches. In his work, Kant describes the responsibilities of educational institutions and parents towards children and emphasizes the importance of physical, moral, and religious education. When the work is examined, it is seen that despite the changing family structure, socioeconomic conditions, educational policies, and many other current issues, some of the fundamental values regarding child education and parental responsibilities remain constant. The work, which serves as a bridge between past and present pedagogical approaches, is thought to contribute to understanding the historical development and fundamental dynamics of modern child-rearing concepts. Additionally, Kant's educational philosophy aligns with many aspects of modern educational theories and highlights the importance of education for humanity's shared future; in this context, the work can be considered a valuable resource for researchers, educators, and academics working in the field of child upbringing and education.

El presente artículo tiene como objeto de estudio la pobreza económica a partir del pensamiento moral de Immanuel Kant. Para tal propósito, se analizan elementos de su moral pura a priori y su moral impura a priori o ética material, con el objetivo de matizar el supuesto formalismo kantiano y demostrar que la necesidad de los más necesitados no es ajena a la propuesta moral kantiana. Este abordaje aporta nuevos elementos, que obligan a repensar la tesis según la cual la moral kantiana consiste únicamente en una moral del deber por el deber, una moral desencarnada que, por tanto, se muestra del todo ajena a nuestras particularidades. En esta configuración, conceptos como los de dignidad, deber de beneficencia, deber de simpatía, creatividad moral y ética material, hacen cada vez más visible la necesidad de indagar sobre una moral kantiana que oriente frente a problemas que aquejan gravemente a la humanidad.

Daniel Erlewein's and my edition of the Logic-Volckmann will appear in October 2025. Volckmann's transcript shares the same source as the Vienna-Logic (Ak. vol. 24)  and Hechsel-Logic (Pinder 1998). There is also another text added by the Leipzig Kantian philosopher Born that appeared to a excerpt from another logic-transcript which shares the same source with Hechsel.

The paper describes the most important research trends on
German classical philosophy (DkPh ) by Belarusian , Russian
and Ukrainian scholars in the period from the 1970s to the
2020s . Two periods can be clearly distinguished here : the late
Soviet phase ( 1970s to 1980s ) and the post -Soviet phase ( since
1991 ). It can be seen that DkPh studies in the USSR played both
a supportive and a subversive role in relation to Soviet Marxism . Its supportive role was to underpin the Soviet Marxist
dogma regarding the sources of Marx's theory , and its subversive role was to provide philosophers with a field for academic
practice where they could avoid direct involvement in ideological work . Since 1991 , the DkPh has lost its direct ideological
influence , although for a long time it supported both the rise of
normativism (in the spirit of Kant ) and the decline of historicism (in connection with Hegelian thought ) . Translations of
German classical texts into Belarusian , Russian and Ukrainian
have become more numerous and have gained in quality .
Over the past fifty years , DkPh has been one of the most attractive areas of research in the historical and philosophical
sciences . Since the 2010s , one can speak of a growing influence
of Hegelianism and a declining influence of Kantian thought .

Properly speaking, the sublime “cannot be contained in any sen- sible form, but concerns only ideas of reason”. Moreover, for the sublime to take place—Kant affirms—we must abandon sensibility. To some ex- tent, the sublime is a negation of the sensible world. Therefore, in contrast to Kant’s approach, I will focus instead on the non-sublime aspect of the sublime, i.e., that sensible element that plays a critical role in the experi- ence but is not considered worthy of the label “sublime”. After all, it is the Analytic of the Sublime that highlights what it tries to overshadow: the in- tractable excess of the sensible realm and imagination’s non-subservience to the mandates of reason. Unlike the properly sublime, art is not intended to serve a shielding function (the sublime comfort us by reassuring us of the purposiveness of our moral vocation); rather, like the non-sublime, it promotes the disruption of what is well formed.

The aim of this article is to trace the meaning that Immanuel Kant assigns to the concept of transcendental apperception and to present its role in the second edition of the Transcendental Deduction in his Critique of Pure Reason. It will be shown that the doctrine of transcendental apperception resolves some problematic features of the theories of consciousness in the traditions of Rationalism and Empiricism. In this regard, Kant's transcendental apperception will be examined in contrast with the concepts of inner sense (John Locke and David Hume), Cogito (René Descartes), and intellectual intuition (Gottfried Leibniz). This comparative approach will allow us to gain a clearer understanding of the meaning of transcendental apperception. Finally, its role in the justification of the pure concepts of understanding will be considered.

The doctrine of the highest good has given rise to numerous controversies. Indeed, several divergent interpretations have emerged in the more recent literature. Among these interpretations, one school of thought-which I will call the transcendent interpretationholds that the highest good should be understood from an individual, transcendent, and religious perspective that emphasizes the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. A competing interpretation-which I will call the immanent interpretation-maintains that the doctrine of the highest good should be interpreted from a collective and immanent perspective, attributing a central role to the historical and political dimension. According to this line of interpretation, the emphasis placed on the concept of the "highest good in the world" in Kant's writings of the 1790s marks a shift in perspective, in which the transcendent position of the previous decade would have been abandoned by Kant in favor of an immanent outlook. My aim is to present, in general terms, the state of the debate. I argue that, in the 1790s, Kant adopts an immanent perspective on the highest good, but does not abandon its transcendent dimension. I maintain that, from a systematic point of view, the immanent perspective is problematic and, therefore, the transcendent perspective must continue to be considered the foundation of the doctrine of the highest good.