pura y destacaremos los elementos que se sostienen a lo largo de sus investigaciones. Nuestra hip... more pura y destacaremos los elementos que se sostienen a lo largo de sus investigaciones. Nuestra hipótesis es que la lectura de Caimi tiene como idea rectora el problema del método. Sostenemos que la naturaleza sintética del método proporciona la clave principal de su interpretación. En segundo lugar, mostraremos que Caimi lee estas secciones de la Crítica como una explicación sobre cómo el pensamiento se vincula con lo real. El problema del método es la guía para dar respuesta al problema de la relación entre ser y pensar. Pondremos en evidencia que en función de este modo de aproximación se comprenden otros dos aspectos que atraviesan su lectura. En primer lugar, el rechazo a una interpretación psicologista de la obra de Kant. En segundo lugar, el esfuerzo por exhibir la relevancia del momento hilético en las diferentes secciones de la Crítica.
La noción de cosa en sí es uno de los ejes del idealismo trascendental de
Immanuel Kant y foco de... more La noción de cosa en sí es uno de los ejes del idealismo trascendental de Immanuel Kant y foco de numerosas críticas. En este artículo, pretendemos dar cuenta de su complejidad a través de un análisis de cuatro interpretaciones de ella. Tales interpretaciones son: 1. el fisiologismo; 2. el realismo; 3. el ficcionalismo; 4. la posición lógico- epistémica
In his book After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux presents some objections against Kant's transcend... more In his book After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux presents some objections against Kant's transcendental idealism that have been especially developed in the field of so-called "speculative realism". This article examines one of these objections. It is the objection according to which an access to things themselves is possible. For Meillassoux, the case of the "arche-fossils" is the proof that some sciences produce knowledge about things. The aim of this paper is to show that what the arche-fossil refers to corresponds, strictly speaking, to the realm of the objects of experience possible for us. In this way, according to our interpretation, the objection does not succeed in attacking the difference between the objects of knowledge and things themselves, which is the core of Kant's transcendental idealism.
Resumen: En este artículo, se señala una limitación de las objeciones del realismo especulativo d... more Resumen: En este artículo, se señala una limitación de las objeciones del realismo especulativo de Meillassoux contra el idealismo trascendental de Kant. Más específicamente, se explica por qué no es factible un acceso a las cosas mismas a través del conocimiento matemático. Para ello, a través de un examen de la noción de cantidad, se especifica la determinación sensible e intelectual de todo conocimiento matemático, que hace que él no pueda sino referirse a los objetos de una experiencia posible para nosotros.
This investigation aims to show that there is a tension between the definition of concept in the ... more This investigation aims to show that there is a tension between the definition of concept in the Aesthetics and the Dialectic and the notion of concept as function, according to its presentation in the Transcendental Logic. Our hypothesis is that the Kantian definition of concept considered in the Aesthetics and in the Dialectic responds to the way empirical concepts are formed, whereas the definition of concept as a function introduced in the Transcendental Logic reflects a sui generis notion of concept that comes into tension with the definition of concept as a representation by common marks. We will argue that this tension arises because, while the definition of concept as function is a novelty of the Kantian system, the definition of concept as universal representation is borrowed from tradition.
The aim of this paper is to exhibit the core of Paul Natorp's criticisms of psychologism. We expo... more The aim of this paper is to exhibit the core of Paul Natorp's criticisms of psychologism. We expose the arguments that lead Natorp to conclude that knowledge cannot have a subjective foundation but must have an objective grounding. We argue that, according to Natorp, the problem of psychologism is fundamentally methodological. Psychologism confuses the study of the laws of knowledge with the study of the legality of psychical life. Thus, the problem of the genesis is confused with the problem of validity.
This work studies the systematic role of the deduction of categories in Paul Natorp's Logical Fou... more This work studies the systematic role of the deduction of categories in Paul Natorp's Logical Foundations of the Exact Sciences. Through an analysis of the deduction of the categories of quantity and quality, we contend that this deduction is not merely a historiographical exercise, but it is the core of Natorp's system. It is argued that Natorp follows a synthetic method, rather than an analytic, similar to that employed by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. We argue that the core of Natorp's deduction is rooted in the principle of correlation. Unlike Kant, who derives categories from the table of judgments, Natorp constructs his deduction by examining the structure of thought itself. We demonstrate that this approach allows for a systematic deduction of the properties of number and the fundamental series. The study shows how this deduction of categories is the ground for the construction of the fundamental series and how it is aligned with Natorp's methodological prescriptions.
The aim of our research is to exhibit the characterization of the material conditions of experien... more The aim of our research is to exhibit the characterization of the material conditions of experience in the Critique of Pure Reason. We argue that, in conjunction with the study of the formal conditions of experience, Kant indirectly addresses the problem of the material conditions. We will show how the concept of matter is specified throughout the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant demonstrates that, just as we possess specific formal conditions that make experience possible, specific material conditions are also necessary for experience to occur.
Kant distinguishes between two methods in philosophy: the analytical method and the synthetic met... more Kant distinguishes between two methods in philosophy: the analytical method and the synthetic method. According to the analytical method, philosophy starts from a given fact to find its conditions of possibility. On the contrary, the synthetic method starts from an obscure and confused representation to provide clarity and distinction to each concept in order to show its necessary relation with other concepts. Marburg Neo-Kantianism holds that philosophy must begin with the fact of science. These claims have led numerous commentators to identify the Neo-Kantian method as a regressive method. I will show that, according to Paul Natorp's approach, the progressive method is the fundamental method of philosophy while the analytical method is a second step in the investigation.
ideas y valores • vol. lxv • n. o 161 • agosto 2016 • issn 0120-0062 (impreso) 2011-3668 (en líne... more ideas y valores • vol. lxv • n. o 161 • agosto 2016 • issn 0120-0062 (impreso) 2011-3668 (en línea) • bogotá, colombia • pp. 43-59
Uploads
Papers by Laura Pelegrin
Immanuel Kant y foco de numerosas críticas. En este artículo, pretendemos dar cuenta de su complejidad a través de un análisis de cuatro interpretaciones de ella. Tales interpretaciones son: 1. el fisiologismo; 2. el realismo; 3. el ficcionalismo; 4. la posición lógico- epistémica