History of Atheism

In his Atheists & Atheism before the Enlightenment, Prof. Michael Hunter has argued that in early modern France atheistic ideas were shared and discussed in 'informal and irreverent venues' (Hunter, 2023, p.73), such as coffee houses, private correspondence, and parties. However, this picture is compromised by 'sliding and inclusive definitions, the overlap between the real and the imaginary, the ambivalence, [and] the element of cliché': there is always a 'mirage' of atheism in history which every scholar of atheism will struggle to separate from the real. Today I will be elaborating on and attempting to clarify some elements of the thesis that Hunter and a growing number of other scholars of historical atheism have tentatively deployed: that atheism is not a constructed philosophical worldview, as it is often imagined to be, but is centred around an unbelief which is mostly either uncaused or has emotional causes. This rethought psychology of atheism will provide a framework for locating atheism in space, as well as evidence, in ancient Greece. This will substantially expand on the theory behind my book and demonstrate that any 'mirage' is a constructed one: historical atheism is real, discoverable, and abundantly present in the ancient material when we are invested in finding it rather than excluding it and we understand what it is we are looking for and therefore where to look for it.

A tension is apparent from the earliest descriptions of the gods in Homer, between supremely powerful, abstracted cosmic entities and individually motivated, morally ambiguous, embodied, human-like figures. The gods of the Epic tradition seem to have provoked cutting criticisms in Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Protagoras, and others. There were many attempts to reconcile this tension, including allegorical interpretations of the gods, perhaps beginning with Theagenes of Rhegium in around 525 BC. But many of the core criticisms had enduring and wide influence across Greek culture, particularly on the bodily form and immanence of the gods, and depictions and cult worship of them. Naturally, this tension was also baked into the traditions of Greek atheism, partly in irreverence towards statues of the gods: from the accusations of impious embezzlement and adorning of the statue of Athena by Pheidias, through the mutilation of the herms in 415BC, to the supposed chopping up of a statue of Herakles to use as fire-wood by Diagoras. There is a good case to be made not only for sampling more material culture – statues, dedications, pottery, and so on – but also, in seeking discussions of the atheism of concrete godly bodiliness in ancient Greece, moving attention away from philosophical discourses. Deeply unserious contexts are of increasing research interest to the student of historical atheism: those that show a ‘cynical and this-worldly attitude to politics and religion’, an ‘iconoclastic manner’ of humour, wit, and scoffing (Hunter Atheists and Atheism 2023). The highly political and socially aware fun-poking of Aristophanes is a particularly interesting lens for thinking about atheism and the ambivalent function of divine embodiment in Greek society, especially in plays like the Clouds which confront atheism directly. These works were certainly impactful on the history of atheism and theism in Greece beyond Socrates’ contentions as recorded in Plato’s Apology.

versiteit van Amsterdam. In 1987 promoveerde zij op de uitgave van De brieven van De Schoolmeester. In De geest van de dichter (Multatuliprijs 1991) voert ze zogenaamde gesprekken met negentiende-eeuwse schrijvers. Zij is columniste van NRC Handelsblad. In 1998 ontving zij de Prins Bernhard Fondsprijs voor de Geesteswetenschappen. In 2001 verzorgde zij de uitgave in de Griffioenreeks van De gedichten van De Schoolmeester. in schoolmeesters en dominees de dienst uitmaakten. Het hele leven was bekrompen en benepen, leerde ik. De negentiende eeuw die ik kende, kreeg een masker opgezet, waardoor ik het vertrouwde niet meer herkende. Het levende gezicht werd onzichtbaar achter de onbeweeglijke en verstarde trekken van het masker. Mijn leraar Nederlands dweepte met de Tachtigers, die niet bij de negentiende eeuw gerekend werden. Ik leerde dat die pas echte literatuur geschreven hadden en dat pas daarna iets gebeurde in de Nederlandse letterkunde dat Europees niveau had. In de schoolbibliotheek vond ik werk van Jacob van Lennep, van De Schoolmeester, van Piet Paaltjens en van Nicolaas Beets. Ik vond dat niet zo heel saai als de leraar beweerde. En ook las ik Tolstoj, Alexandre Dumas, Emily , Bronte, Charles Dickens en Walter Scott. Ik vond dat heel mooi, minstens zo mooi als Jacob van Lennep. Toen ging ik studeren en weer leerde ik dat de negentiende eeuw een tijd van verval was, waarin geen letterkunde van enig niveau geschreven werd. Maar als ik de negentiende-eeuwers las, vond ik hun taalgebruik rijk en hun verhaallijnen krachtig. Ik werd eigenwijs en vond dat de Tachtigers overschat, en de vroege negentiende eeuw onderschat werd. Door een voorbestemd toeval vond ik de onuitgegeven brieven van Gerrit van de Linde, alias De Schoolmeester, in een Amsterdams ar- chief. Het was alsof ik van de achtbaan naar beneden duizelde. Die brieyen staan zo ver van elke sufheid en saaiheid af, ze zijn zo emotioneel, in zo'n ongewoon expressieve taal geschreven, zo kunstig zijn alle mogelijkheden van de taal uitgebuit, dat ik besefte dat ik die niet voor mezelf mocht houden. Ik was nog student toen ik besloot die brieven uit te geyen. Ik ging me verdiepen in de negentiende-eeuwse geschiedenis, in het alledaagse leven, de omgangsvormen, de mentaliteit kortom. Toen ontdekte ik de rijkdom van de veranderingen in de negentiende eeuw. De negentiende eeuw is een omslagpunt. Alles wat we zijn, waardoor we geen middeleeuwse primitieve maatschappij meer zijn met lijf-en doodstraffen, bloedwraak, openbaar geselen en kinderarbeid, en waardoor de slavernij afgeschaft is, is te danken aan negentiende-eeuwse be- wegingen. Doordat steeds meer mensen onderwijs kregen en de publieke debatten konden volgen, werden verlichte ideeen sneller en met meer invloed verspreid. De vrouwenbeweging, de antislavernijbeweging, de arbeidersbeweging waren internationaal georganiseerd. Voor het eerst werden wereldcongressen gehouden. De vooruitgang van de medische wetenschap heeft bijgedragen aan een mentale ommekeer. De koepokinenting, hoe fel daartegen ook geageerd werd, raakte in gebruik, waardoor de pokken uitgebannen werden. De cholera verdween uit de steden zodra er waterleiding aangelegd was. De kindersterfte nam in de loop van de eeuw gigantisch of door de verbetering van de hygiene. De uitvinding van het gipsverband maakte dat been-en armbreuken niet meer automatisch invaliditeit tot gevolg hadden. Alles wat vastgestaan had, leek te kunnen veranderen. Door de mechanisering en de stoomkracht konden er opeens dingen die nooit gekund hadden. Een schip kon varen ook als God geen wind in de zeilen blies, een machine kon meer kracht produceren dan honderd man bij elkaar. Afstanden werden bijna letterlijk verkleind door de stoomtrein. Alsof de tijd zelf snel geworden was, zo dichtte A. Beeloo het: De tijd gaat snel, de tijd der stoomkracht, die de vleugelen der winden aanschiet, neen, der stormen, niet te teugelen. Het is niet alleen het nageslacht dat die tijd een masker opgezet heeft. Om te kunnen leven tussen realiteiten en wensdromen moesten de tijdgenoten zelf met maskers lopen. Het was onmogelijk te voldoen aan alle voorschriften en idealen. Men kon een ideale huisvader willen zijn, maar de dienstmeisjes waren zo mooi. Men kon matigheid preken, maar na afloop van de vergadering van de matigheidsbeweging stond de cognac op de societeit in voile flessen te wachten. Als moeder de huisvrouw langdurig ziek in een kraambed lag, waren de hoeren aantrekkelijk. Je kon een cent geven aan een bedelaarskind, en een bedelaarsgesticht mee helpen oprichten, maar dat wilde nog niet zeggen dat je zo'n kind in huis zou nemen. De befaamde dubbele moraal van de negentiende eeuw komt voort uit het conflict tussen willen en kunnen. Ili raakte zowel geboeid door het masker dat de negentiende eeuw zichzelf opzette als door dat van het nageslacht. De verheviging van een bepaalde expressie of eigenschap is gewoonlijk het doel van een masker. Een masker concentreert de aandacht op een eigenschap. De burgerlijkheid van de negentiende eeuw is samengebald in dat masker dat haar opgedrukt is. En zeker, die eeuw was burgerlijk. Alleen vat ik burgerlijk op als een geuzennaam. De negentiende eeuw is een door en door burgerlijke eeuw, in die zin dat de burger zijn meest intensieve bewustwor-12 ding toen beleefde. Hij nam geen genoegen meer met de oude verdeling van macht en invloed. Hij wilde niet meer dat grote groepen armen, krankzinnigen, zieken, misdadigers buitengesloten werden en dus verkommerden. Hij nam krachtige initiatieven om een betere samenleving op paten te zetten. Om dit te bereiken moest hij wel een soort verheven masker opzetten. Kwam het door de Franse Revolutie dat iedereen opeens aan de slag leek te gaan om een maatschappij te creeren die beter in elkaar zat dan voorheen? In heel Europa wordt de wildheid beteugeld en wordt gebouwd aan idealen. Uitwassen zijn ongewenst. Er moet een verstandige, tedere maatschappij komen, die plaats biedt aan iedereen. Deze maatschappij moet gevormd worden zoals een gezin. Model voor de ideale samenleving is de piramidale drie-eenheid van vader, moeder, kind. Het kind is een samenvattend begrip voor nageslacht. De vader staat aan de top en is in alle opzichten het verstand, de rationaliteit, de planner. Hij staat in een liefdevolle verhouding met de moeder, die voor het evenwicht zorgt, scherpe kanten van de vader neutraliseert en de microkosmos van het gezin bestiert. Het kind is het product van de harmonie tussen de vader en de moeder. Vrouw en kind staan op dezelfde lijn, want voor beiden is de vader verantwoordelijk. De bekende dominee Otto Gerhard Heldring hield zijn kinderen in de gaten. 'De kinderkamer was mijn studeerkamer. Een afzonderlijk studeervertrek hield ik er niet op na, wel een boekenkamer, waar mijn lessenaar stond, maar ik kon het nooit over mij krijgen om daar, afgezonderd van de huisgenoten, te gaan zitten. Ik was te midden van mijn kinderen van hun eerste levensjaar af, omdat ik het als vaderplicht beschouwde in de huiskamer te zijn, waar zij speelden. Daar zag ik ze altijd onder mijn ogen, daar alleen was het mogelijk klein en groot gade te slaan en overeenkomstig hun karakter te leren behandelen. Ik had te dikwijls gezien, hoe het studeervertrek van de predikant hem al te zeer uit het midden van zijn familie trekt. Hij is dan, ofschoon vader, beter in zijn bibliotheek thuis dan in zijn kinderwereld. De kinderen hebben in huis aan hem niets, en is hij daarbuiten, dan leeft hij geheel voor de gemeente. Arme moeder!' De ideale vader uit de negentiende eeuw is aanwezig voor zijn kinderen, en betrokken bij hun ontwikkeling. Het gezinsmodel geldt ook voor de andere maatschappelijke instellingen. Om dit te begrijpen moet men wat goochelen met metaforen die in de negentiende eeuw gemakkelijk van vrouwelijk naar mannelijk en van figuurlijk naar letterlijk wisselen. Het piramidemodel is overdraag-13 De piramide van het harmonieuze gezin baar op de staat. De koning heeft hier de rol van vader, die wijs en verstandig met zijn onderdanen, de kinderen moet omgaan. Het vrouwelijk element is hier de natie, die zich heeft laten bevruchten door de koning om de onderdanen te verwekken. Onderdanen ontstaan immers alleen als zij zich deel van een natie voelen. De natie waarborgt dat tussen onderdanen en koning een evenwichtige relatie bestaat. Het beeld van de koning die als een vader voor zijn kinderen zorgt, is geliefd bij de dichters van de negentiende eeuw. '0 Koning! herder! vorst en vader, geliefd door uw vereend gezin!' zo zong Hendrik Tollens Willem i toe bij zijn kroning tot vorst in '8'5. De nieuwe massa-industrie van de eeuw gebruikt zelfs de gezinssymboliek. De werkgever is de verantwoordelijke vader die voor het heil van zijn werknemers moet zorgen. Het fabrieksproduct is hier de liefdesbaby van de rechtvaardige vader en zijn toegewijde arbeiders. Daartegenover staat de zwarte zijde van de negentiende eeuw, die verborgen moest blijven. Er heerst grote verwarring gedurende de hele eeuw. De mens is niet redelijk. Uitspattingen komen veelvuldig voor. De mens werkt aan zijn eigen ondergang door te streven naar een geoliede maatschappij. Verbeteringen brengen verslechteringen voort. Wie staatsregelingen voor prostitutie wil, erkent het kwaad van de prostitutie. Humanisering van de massale gevangenissen leidt tot trieste isolering. Meer loon betekent meer drank, meer macht leidt tot meer misbruik. Seksualiteit valt niet te beteugelen. Dit geldt ook voor de natuur, waar kindersterfte en epidemieen ondanks alle vooruitgang in de wetenschap mensenlevens opslurpen. Daar kwam bij dat de oude moraal niet meer voldeed. Welke veranderingen kwamen van de duivel, welke van God? Het Kwaad kwam in een identiteitscrisis. De oude moraal had geen antwoord op de dilemma's waar de nieuwe mens voor kwam te staan. Bovendien gebruikte het kwaad zelf een masker om zich in de maatschappij te nestelen, zoals Johannes Kneppelhout zo prachtig...

A água ocupara um papel destacado nas cosmogonias de civilizações antigas, moldando a compreensão humana acerca da origem do
Cosmos. Com o tempo, transcende a função de elemento que sustenta
da vida, tornando-se num poderoso símbolo da criação, purificação e
regeneração. A diversidade geográfica, social e religiosa destas comunidades originou múltiplas narrativas cosmogónicas com paralelos notáveis entre o Antigo Próximo-Oriente e o Antigo Egipto. Este artigo propõe uma análise comparativa entre as primeiras 10 linhas da tabuinha
nº1 do Enūma Eliš (K.5419.c) e as três principais cosmogonias egípcias
— heliopolitana, hermopolitana e menfita —, com especial atenção no
papel criador da água. No Antigo Egipto, destaca-se o Nun, uma massa
aquosa primordial e caótica, um estado preexistente de onde tudo
emerge. Em contraste, o mito babilónico descreve a união de Apsû
(águas doces) com T’iamat (águas salgadas) como o ponto de partida
para a Criação. Em ambas as tradições, a interação destas águas primordiais, por vezes mediada por um demiurgo (no caso egípcio), catalisa o surgimento da vida humana e divina, e do Cosmos. O poder e a força  das águas primordiais refletem a sua importância para sociedades que viviam habituadas à aridez da região mesopotâmica e egípcia, e que encontraram a chave da sobrevivência nas águas do Nilo, do Tigris e do
Eufrates.

Dice e] au to r de la presente obra, en el últim o capítulo de la prim era parte, que la palabra se deja aprender y traducir, pero nunca aprehender y trasponer del todo. Por ello el trad u cto r de sea precisar algunos puntos dificultosos de su tarea: 1. De algunas soluciones, especialm ente críticas, se ha dado justificación en nota a pie de página. 2. Cuando el térm ino de la traducción no conseguía abarcar la extensión y com prensión del original, se ha recurrido a diver sas soluciones: a) d ar a continuación del vocablo español, y en tre paréntesis, el térm ino original; b) recu rrir a varios térm inos com plem entarios entre sí, y o bien yuxtaponerlos o bien utilizar ora uno, ora otro, atendiendo al contexto -el lector adivinará fácilmente en cada caso que se tra ta de trasponer un mismo térm ino original, porque los vocablos em pleados en la traduc ción, al aparecer p or p rim era vez, se dan yuxtapuestos. 3. Palabras que han precisado soluciones diversas: «achever», «acquis» (adj. sustantivo), «dépasser», «s'écouler», «ego» («je», «moi»), «investir», «langage». Además: «entourage» que hemos vuelto en «circunstancia»; «esprit» ora en «espíritu», ora en «men te»; «nonsens», siguiendo a M. Sacristán, en «sinsentido»; «po ser», algunas veces, forzando, en «plantear», mas, en general, en «pro-poner»; «refouler» en «contencionar» (como «revolución» da «revolucionar», pese a «revolver»), ya que «contener» hubiera dado lugar a lecturas erróneas (cf. pp. 100, 112, 337). 4. Términos h arto complejos, esenciales en la obra, nos han sugerido las siguientes soluciones: -apparence: «apariencia», pese a ser un tanto forzado y ligera m ente equívoco, ha resultado ser el vocablo m ás adecuado; -apercevoir/aperception; percevoir/perception: se ha procurado salvar las relaciones entre estos vocablos del original, pero ha resultado imposible para «apercevoir», que hem os vertido por «descubrir», «advertir», «percatarse», según los casos; -avoir cf. «être»; -en-soi cf. «soi»; -être (y avoir): el por qué de al gimas soluciones se da en nota; en algunos casos hemos recurrido a fórm ulas corno «soy, es toy, ahí...», «...está situado...», o echando mano, sin más, de «ser», aun cuando resulte duro. Asimismo, formas como «être 5 à..,» se han traducido por «ser de..., pertenecer a...»; «être au-mode» se justifica en nota. -VOn: «lo Im personal»; alguna vez, «el Se»; -parole-mot: hem os preferido el p ar «palabra-vocablo», even tualm ente «discurso-término», a la inm anipulable solución «habla-palabra». Especialm ente en cap. VI de la p rim era parte; -pour-soi cf. «soi»; -prise (juega con reprise), luego de infinitas vueltas, y fiándonos del Casares (artículo «presa») se ha recurrido a «presa»: «ha cer, tener, presa en, sobre». (E n cuanto a «reprise», según con texto»); -réaliser: se explica solución en nota; algunas veces, no obstan te, h a sido preciso re cu rrir a otras voces p ara evitar situa ciones intolerables, por ejem plo: «percatarse, advertir»; -soi: pese a equivocidad de Sí, no había o tra solución; en soi y pour soi: «en sí» y «para sí», con tilde intercalado cuando se usan sustantivam ente; de otro modo, no; -viser, visée: no ha parecido posible guardar el alcance del tér m ino original en un solo vocablo español; por lo general se ha recurrido a «apuntar», incluso en casos algo sorprendentes, pero no se ha querido ir demasiado lejos, y, cuando ha sido necesario, no se ha vacilado en tran sfo rm ar totalm ente la frase cuidando sólo de ofrecer el significado conceptual del texto francés. J. Cabanes 1. Méditations Cartésiennes, pp. 120 ss. hom bre interior, el hom bre está en el m undo, es en el m undo que se conoce. Cuando vuelvo hacia mí a p a rtir del dogm atism o del sentido com ún o del dogm atism o de la ciencia, lo que en cuentro no es un foco de verdad intrínseca, sino un sujeto brin dado al m undo. * * Vemos, así, el verdadero sentido de la célebre reducción fenomenológica. No cabe duda de que no existe ningún problem a en el cual H usserl haya invertido m ás tiem po p ara com prenderse a sí mismo; ningún problem a, asim ismo, sobre el que haya vuelto más a m enudo, ya que la «problem ática de la reducción» ocupa en los trabajos inéditos un lugar im portante. D urante largo tiem po, incluso en textos recientes, se h a presentado la reducción como el retorno a una consciencia transcendental ante la cual el m undo se desplegaría en una transparencia absoluta, movido de cabo a cabo p or una serie de apercepciones que el filósofo tendría p o r m isión reconstituir a p a rtir del resultado de las m ism as. Así, mi sensación de lo rojo se advierte como m anifes tación de un rojo sentido, éste como m anifestación de una su perficie roja, ésta como m anifestación de un cartón rojo y éste, por fin, como m anifestación o perfil de algo rojo, de este libro. Sería, pues, la aprehensión de cierta hylé como significando un fenómeno de grado superior, la Sinn-gebung, la operación activa de significación que definiría a la consciencia, y el m undo no sería m ás que la «significación mundo», la reducción fenomcnológica sería idealista, en el sentido de un idealism o transcen dental que tra ta al m undo como una unidad de valor indivisa entre Pablo y Pedro, en la que sus perspectivas se recortan, y que hace com unicar la «consciencia de Pedro» y la «consciencia de Pablo», porque la percepción del m undo «por p arte de Pedro» no es o b ra de Pedro, ni la percepción del m undo «por p arte de Pablo», obra de Pablo, sino, en cada uno de ellos, obra de cons ciencias prepersonales cuya comunicación no constituye proble m a al venir exigida p o r la definición m ism a de la consciencia, del sentido o de la verdad. En cuanto que soy consciencia, eso es, en cuanto que algo tiene sentido p ara mí, no estoy ni aquí, ni allá; no soy ni Pedro, ni Pablo; en nada me distingo de «otra» consciencia, puesto que todos somos presencias inm ediatas en el m undo y que este m undo es, por definición, único, siendo como es el sistem a de las verdades. Un idealism o transcendental con secuente despoja al m undo de su opacidad y su transcendencia. El m undo es aquello m ism o que nos representam os, no en cuan to hom bres o en cuanto sujetos em píricos, sino en cuanto so mos, todos, una sola luz y participam os del Uno sin dividirlo. El análisis reflexivo ignora el problem a del otro, así como el problem a del mundo, porque hace aparecer en mí, con los p ri

Die Antwort ist stark davon abhängig, wie weit sich jemand mit diesem Thema auseinandergesetzt hat und welche weltanschauliche Position er selbst vertritt.
Es werden weniger die Kulthandlungen als die Inhalte der Religionen in die Untersuchung einbezogen. Da die These vertreten wird, dass auch moderne Ideologien als eine Religion betrachtet werden können, steht auch die Frage, ob alle Religionen einen Gott verehren?

1. Téngase en cuenta por ejemplo este fragmento: «Otro efecto malo del comercio es que rebaja el valor de la humanidad y tiende a extinguir el espíritu marcial... Estos son los inconvenientes del espíritu comercial. Las mentes de los hombres se contraen y se hacen incapaces de elevarse. La educaci6n es despreciada o al menos descuidada, y el espíritu her6ico desaparece casi por completo. Poner un remedio a estos defectos sería un tema digno de gran atenci6n». Lectures on Justice, Po/ice, Revenue and Arms,

Atheism is, according to the Cambridge Dictionary, "the belief that God does not exist" (https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/atheism). In fact, atheism exists in many varieties: it was (and still is) conceptualized by thinkers with different backgrounds (including authors who elaborated a criticism of polytheism), and it is expressed through multiple theories that, usually, do not only incorporate a rejection of (a) religion but also a constructive proposal on how to find meaning, purpose, and morality in a godless/religionless life. In this course we will explore, in chronological order as well as in comparative and critical fashion, the forms of atheism advanced by some of the most important authors of the Western philosophical tradition.

Introducción: A partir del estatuto privilegiado del que gozan los denominados delirios extraños en el DSM-IV, el autor expone que este término incluye en su interior experiencias incluidas como síntomas schneiderianos de primer rango. Mediante una descomposición del síntoma muestra que no se trata de una expresión preconcebida sino probablemente el resultado de un recorrido. Del análisis de los organizadores de los trastornos del yo, junto con las experiencias de influencia y alienación, propone el autor como hipótesis si el alivio de la experiencia delirante tuviera que ver con la posibilidad de recuperar o desplazar aspectos de la propia mente no expresables de otro modo y, también, la función de facilitación protésica que desempeñaría el delirio.

В статье рассматривается история написания и редакционной подготовки научно-популярной книги Е. Г. Кагарова «Религии древнего мира», принятой в 1929 г. к печати в издательстве «Безбожник», но не вышедшей в свет. Автор выявляет причины, по которым завершенная рукопись, осталась в редакционном портфеле и не была опубликована. Второй съезд Союза воинствующих безбожников, состоявшийся в начале лета 1929 г., осудил «оппортунистический отход» от классовой пролетарской линии в отношении религии, выражающийся в «культурничестве» и «просветительстве», оторванном от задач классовой борьбы, поэтому издательство «Безбожник» отказалось от публикации книги Е. Г. Кагарова. Его попытки применения экономико-социологического анализа к истории религий и определения «производственного значения» религиозных явлений были признаны недостаточно четко выраженными и не имеющими необходимого критического основания. The article examines the history of writing and editorial preparation of the popular science book by E. G. Kagarov “Religions of the Ancient World”, accepted for publication in 1929 by the publishing house “Bezbozhnik”, but never published. The author identifies the reasons why the completed manuscript remained in the editorial portfolio and was not published. The Second Congress of the Union of Militant Atheists, held in the early summer of 1929, condemned the “opportunistic departure” from the class proletarian line in relation to religion, expressed in “culturalism” and “enlightenment” divorced from the tasks of the class struggle, so the publishing house “Bezbozhnik” refused to publish the book by E. G. Kagarov. His attempts to apply economic and sociological analysis to the history of religions and to determine the “production significance” of religious phenomena were recognized as insufficiently clearly expressed and lacking the necessary critical basis.

Simposios 1. "Creencia, justificación y normatividad: aportes desde la perspectiva pragmatista" 2 · El concepto de impulso o pulsión en la psicología del pragmatismo clásico de John Dewey y George H. Mead. / Pedro Martínez Romagosa 11 · El Derecho a las convicciones. Aportes jamesianos a la epistemología del desacuerdo / Federico Penelas 19 · Triangulación de gestos: abordaje al problema del surgimiento del pensamiento desde las perspectivas de

This speculative essay suggests the possibility of a different perspective on the question whether Pan’gye Yu Hyŏngwŏn (1622-1673) was in any sense a modern thinker, the question that has preoccupied both Korean scholars and James Palais (and prompted them to provide quite different answers). What was Pan’gye’s thought like if seen from a seventeenth-century or eighteenth-century European perspective rather than a nineteenth- or twenty–century perspective, which has too frequently been applied to it? And might this perhaps change our perception of the usefulness of the concept of modernity? The focus will be on a number of intellectuals who were active in north-western Europe and particularly in The Netherlands, France and Germany.

This essay compares Jean-Paul Sartre’s claim that “existence precedes essence” with Richard Rorty’s rejection of human nature in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Sartre grounds radical freedom in the absence of God and fixed values, emphasizing responsibility and an ethics of invention. Rorty, by contrast, stresses contingency, describing the self as a historically conditioned network of beliefs and desires, and proposing an ethics of solidarity rather than essentialism. Both philosophers converge in their rejection of universals and their emphasis on value creation, yet differ in their views of consciousness, contingency, and the scope of human freedom. The essay evaluates their respective systems of ethics, arguing that while each stretches their core claims too far, both offer valuable insights into freedom, responsibility, and the construction of values in a world without absolutes.

Like all ancient texts, the Hebrew Bible was written for its contemporaries, who understood their history through cultural memory. We, moderns, know our history as taught by historians, who often protect religion by not revealing information that may harm it.

This chapter traces the central dynamics of Christian theological perspectives on evil in the early twentieth century. Using a later framework from Paul Ricoeur, the chapter distinguishes four “myths” of evil - the Christian theological “Adamic” and three alternatives: “chaos”, “tragedy” and “embodiment”. The chapter argues that the classical Augustinian perspective on evil that the twentieth century inherits contains three basic points of tension, regarding sin, privation and theodicy. It further argues that resurgences of the alternative myths of evil put further pressures on the classical Christian account of evil, leading to the development of significant new theological perspectives that seek to integrate the insights of the alternative myths of evil into the Adamic account. The chapter briefly considers in this framework the proposals of three theological giants of the period, Karl Rahner, Paul Tillich and Karl Barth

Zusammenfassung:
Diese religionssoziologische Hausarbeit untersucht die berühmte Aussage von Karl Marx: „Die Religion ist das Opium des Volkes“ im theoretischen, historischen und gesellschaftskritischen Kontext. Der Fokus liegt auf Marx’ Verständnis von Religion als Überbau einer durch soziale Ungleichheit geprägten Gesellschaft sowie als ideologisches Mittel zur Rechtfertigung und Verschleierung sozialer Missstände.

Die Arbeit analysiert zunächst den Religionsbegriff in der Soziologie und grenzt marxistische Religionskritik von theologischen und philosophischen Perspektiven ab. Marx betrachtet Religion nicht primär als Feindbild, sondern als Ausdruck des menschlichen Elends – sowohl als Trostspender wie auch als Hindernis für soziale Emanzipation.

In einem innovativen Ansatz wird Marx’ Religionskritik mit der ethischen Botschaft des Qur’ân verglichen. Dabei werden zentrale Begriffe wie Vernunft, Verantwortung und Selbstveränderung herangezogen, um aufzuzeigen, dass die qur’anische Botschaft selbst gegen religiösen Missbrauch und blinde Gefolgschaft warnt. Besonders betont wird der freie Wille und die Verpflichtung zur aktiven Veränderung ungerechter Zustände – ein Punkt, der sich mit Marx’ gesellschaftskritischem Denken überschneidet.


Abstract:
This sociological essay examines Karl Marx's famous statement, ‘Religion is the opium of the people,’ in a theoretical, historical, and socio-critical context. The focus is on Marx's understanding of religion as the superstructure of a society characterised by social inequality and as an ideological means of justifying and concealing social injustices.

The paper first analyses the concept of religion in sociology and distinguishes Marxist criticism of religion from theological and philosophical perspectives. Marx does not primarily regard religion as an enemy, but as an expression of human misery – both as a source of comfort and as an obstacle to social emancipation.

In an innovative approach, Marx's criticism of religion is compared with the ethical message of the Qur'an. Central concepts such as reason, responsibility and self-change are used to show that the Qur'anic message itself warns against religious abuse and blind allegiance. Particular emphasis is placed on free will and the obligation to actively change unjust conditions – a point that overlaps with Marx's socially critical thinking.

In this article we report a conversation with AI regarding the question of the different depiction of ancient humas as long and slender in 40kY cave paintings and as Sumerian Gods, in contrast to the Sumerian people and Indian Gods dipicted as short and stocky. This seemed to point to an older civilization that has probably gone under the water of the present day Persian/Arabian Gulf to go along with the Sumerian out of water origin of knowledge and wisdom. Question 1: People depicted in cave arts 4kY ago show thin and tall humans, but all the remains of Neanderthal, Denisovans and others show stubby and short figures. Is there an explanation ?

In this paper I argue that understanding is an indispensable epistemic procedure when historians use texts as evidence. On my account understanding installs a norm that determines what kind of event or object a texts is evidence of. Historians can debate which norms should govern a body of texts, and if they reach consensus, they can use that body of texts as an empirical constraint over their historical claims. I argue that texts cannot perform this constraining function without understanding -it is thus indispensable. In order to argue for this position I first discuss two existing accounts of textual evidence in analytic philosophy of science by Kosso and Hurst. Both defend a coherentist position. I show that their coherentist position is flawed by applying it to the famous case of Lucien Febvre's argument that François Rabelais was not an atheist. I show that a coherence between texts leaves the debate concerning Rabelais' religious beliefs underdetermined, even though this should not be necessary. I argue that my account of understanding better captures Febvre's actual reasoning with texts. In the final section of the paper I show that the two most famous accounts of understanding in analytic philosophy by Hempel and Taylor ignore either the epistemic indispensability of understanding, or the actual success of evidentiary reasoning in the historical sciences that was enabled by understanding.

This article considers the Sravaisnava theologian Vedanta understanding of sabdapramana and deference to sabdapramana that is evident in one of his most important expositions the Tattvamuktakalapa and its commentary the Sarvarthasiddhi. For Desika, deference to sabdapramana is motivated by belief in a particular view of reality. This would be the acceptance of Visnu as the Brahman of the upanisads, his connection to authoritative scripture, and its propagation. Furthermore, to defer to sabdapramana requires membership in a community and the requisite pedagogical training that confers the authority needed to speak for the tradition.

What does it feel like to be an atheist? Some would say the question makes no sense. Isn't atheism the ultimate expression of muscular rationalism--whether rightly guided or hopelessly led astray--totally detached from feeling? This article suggests the opposite--that atheism is and always has been infused by a rich inner life.

What does it feel like to be an atheist? Some would say the question makes no sense. Isn't atheism the ultimate expression of muscular rationalism--whether rightly guided or hopelessly led astray--totally detached from feeling? This article suggests the opposite--that atheism is and always has been infused by a rich inner life.

Atheology Interfaith Pedagogy presents a nonviolent secular state rule of law (RoL) intercultural interconvictional interfaith lay educational proposal in full compliance with the scientific methodology for irreligious stakeholders justice equity diversity inclusion (JEDI). It was developed through years of collaboration with several international atheistic, agnostic, and quasi-theistic networks at the same time that developing open policymaking with the most respected science and religion diplomacy institutions. It was compiled due to requests in the Ethical Union 'Citizenship Encampment All Societies Platform'.

Procesi razvoja odnosa lokalnih komunističkih vlasti u Hrvatskoj i vjerskih zajednica bili su ponajprije motivirani odlukama Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i na saveznoj i na republičkoj razini. Vjerske zajednice, prije svega Katolička Crkva u Hrvatskoj, ostale su jedini istinski organizirani oblik antikomunističkoga otpora u Jugoslaviji, pa je, dakako, i pozornost vladajuće ideologije bila usmjerena ponajprije na njih. Partijski nadzor na području općine Virovitica nad djelatnošću Katoličke Crkve doći će poglavito do izražaja sredinom 80-ih godina 20. stoljeća pri organiziranju Nacionalnoga euharistijskoga kongresa u Mariji Bistrici 1984. godine, a nad Srpskom pravoslavnom Crkvom krajem 80-ih godina prošloga stoljeća pri održavanju vjerskoga skupa u Virovitici kao stvaranju nužnih preduvjeta za pokretanje srpske agresije na šire virovitičko područje iznimno značajne geostrateške vrijednosti.

The Oxford handbook of early Christian archaeology. Edited by David K. Pettegrew, William R. Caraher and Thomas W. Davis. Pp. xvi +  incl.  figs and  tables. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, . £.      JEH () ; doi:./S The field of (early) Christian archaeology has a long tradition, stretching back all the way to Giovanni Battista de Rossi and his foundational work on the catacombs of Rome. The organisation of the field appears from the international conferences held at irregular intervals since , the last one at Utrecht/Nijmegen, The Netherlands, in . And yet, this discipline has undergone significant changes in the last couple of decades, with the rise of New Archaeology, and several further developments in its wake such as landscape archaeology, and the paradigm shift in late antique studies, resulting in the new subdiscipline of late antique archaeology, shaking up traditionally held concepts, approaches and methods, not least the text-based approach that was so characteristic of earlier scholarship. This Oxford handbook takes the opportunity to provide an updated state of the field. The book opens with an introductory chapter by two of the editors (Caraher and Pettegrew) giving a (very brief) overview of the discipline, which is here taken to cover the first eight centuries of our era, and some of the recent trends in the field, discussed in a slightly artificial way in five time frames (-, -, -, - and - CE; note that Peter Brown is emphatically associated with the last time range, which does not do justice to the much wider scope of this scholar's work which covers the whole of late antiquity). It is followed by thirty-three chapters, divided into four parts, 'The Archaeology of Ancient Christianity', 'Sacred Space and Mortuary Contexts', 'Art and Artifacts in Context' and 'Christian Archaeology in Regional Perspective'. The first part consists of only two chapters. They deal with a traditional branch of Christian (and Biblical) archaeology, New Testament archaeology. Chapter ii (J. F. Strange) focuses on the world of the Gospels and chapter iii (T. W. Davis) on the one beyond the Gospels, especially Greece and Asia Minor. With the second part starts a series of useful overviews of Christian structures and buildings, chapter iv (V. Fiocchi Nicolai) on the catacombs, which besides the famous ones in Rome also covers those in other places such as Naples and Syracuse, chapter v (D. L. Eastman) on martyria, chapter vi (S. C. Fox and P. Tritsaroli) on Christian burial, presenting data from Greece, Cyprus,

Second paper for an undergraduate class on existentialism. PHIL 336: Twentieth-Century Continental Thought: Existentialism. Spring 2012. Professor Martin J. De Nys.

Course info: https://philosophy.gmu.edu/courses/phil336/course_sections/6694

Abstract:

The question of freedom is certainly not without controversy in the realm of philosophy. Seemingly innocuous conversations on the topic quickly develop into heated arguments regarding free will, determinism, theodicy, theology, God, and the like. And, of course, this should come as no surprise, as the epistemological and ontological implications of this philosophical paradigm comprise vast regions both within and outside of academia, extending into the very foundations of human existence itself. In fact, it is precisely the question of the meaning and nature of human existence that gave rise to the movement commonly referred to as Existentialism. Accordingly, when considering the crucial significance of freedom within existential thought, one might very well conclude that an investigation of the subject through the eyes of its greatest existential proponents may provide a fruitful stepping stone for our endeavors. We turn, then, to the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, whose insight into this matter will be of immense importance. Consequently, the purpose of this paper will be to provide a brief exposition of Sartre’s views on freedom, and to explore exactly what he means when he says “man is condemned to be free.”

This paper aims to outline some features of Pierre Gassendi's epistemology and its reception in John Locke. To do so, I will also analyze a few potential intermediaries between Gassendi and Locke, that is, the so-called Port-Royal Logic and Gilles de Launay's Essais logiques. Then, I will address Locke's manuscript drafts of his well-known Essay, showing the extent to which he endorses Gassendi's objections to Descartes. According to the present interpretation, Gassendi's epistemology is mainly a polemical weapon for Locke. Accordingly, the present tentative inquiry aims to place Locke's 'New Way of Ideas' in a wider context of anti-Cartesian claims. Ironically, the framework in which both Gassendi and Locke articulated these anti-Cartesian claims is entirely Cartesian, resulting from his epistemological shift towards ideas.

Leibniz never addressed systematically the sceptical issue in its various historical and conceptual dimensions. Nevertheless he progressively met different challenges and arguments throughout his innumerable readings, correspondences and writings displaying different faces of scepticism: the Academic negative meta-dogmatism of Francisco Sanches; Simon Foucher’s middle way; the three related figures of the libertine misosopher, of the fideist after Bayle’s manner, and of a fictitious ‘Sceptician’; and eventually, at the end of his life, Sextus Empiricus’ neo-pyrrhonism. Yet the meaning of his opposition to scepticism is not the same in all those cases: on the one hand, he claims that metaphysical and epistemological sceptical challenges can be refuted by rational arguments; on the other hand, he acknowledges the practical difficulties to overthrow the more dangerous moral and religious scepticism.

This article focuses on a fundamental conceptual error often made in atheistic and agnostic criticism of God: The tendency to think of God as a human-like being. This approach is fueled by psychological expectations that God is a being who feels, gets angry, punishes, or forgives. However, these criticisms are not aimed directly at God Himself, but at the limited conceptions that people have formed in their minds. The article emphasizes the difference between the ontological reality of God and the epistemological models formed in human minds and argues that ignoring this difference makes philosophical discussions shallow and reductionist. At the same time, pantheistic approaches that attempt to reduce God to the nature of the universe are discussed as different forms of this humanistic modeling. The article shows that criticisms of the theistic model of God are often based on superficial contextual errors, disconnected from other elements of the system, such as free will, testing and the afterlife. Finally, it is emphasized that the attitude of asking God "how should you have created" is epistemologically contradictory and far from a rational basis.

In the modern era of the West, various atheistic approaches have emerged, each reflecting the philosophical perspectives of its time. This article aims to outline the evolution of these diverse approaches and demonstrate the challenges each has posed to theism. Typically, these challenges have allowed theism to refine its perspectives and rebuild its beliefs more logically. The article will then illustrate how theism has developed along this path. I identify this process as a nine-stage journey, each of which will be explained in this article. Ultimately, it will be shown how each of these challenges has become a chapter in the philosophy of religion, and the areas in which philosophical discussions about religion have been shaped will be explored. As a result, the article will present the 13 key themes of the philosophy of religion that have emerged following these challenges.

The monograph explores Christian Francken's encounter with atheism as philosophical position in his works written around 1590 in Transylvania. The volume presents the edition of the manuscripts attesting to Francken's radical criticism on then-contemporary philosophical theology. The interpretation of the sources concentrates on the theoretical reconstruction of Francken's criticism within the context of radical protestant thinking in Early Modern Eastern Europe.

Humanity has created dark images related to afterlife referring to evil and punishment. In different parts of the World different civilizations and cultures have imagined several possible "places" which can be considered as hell or hell-related compositions. What has affected people in these imaginations? Sociology of religion, social anthropology and physical geography are functional for us in order to understand the dimensions of these imagined places. Do they exist in real? What is analyzed and discussed in this article is that there are certain geographical structures possibly inspired these narrations of purgatory or hell environments. When people's surrounding geography changes inevitably their expectations or fears change too. This research will provide you some original discussions in several disciplines of social sciences.

In most of the twentieth century, the Enlightenment was seen as a time when religious belief was incompatible with Enlightenment values of reason, toleration, and science. David Sorkin maintains that many religious Protestants, Catholics, and Jews emphasized toleration and reason while participating in the secular public sphere. Sorkin asserts that these people were part of the religious Enlightenment. This article focuses on a group of ten English deists who identified themselves as deists, claimed to be Christian, and devoted their writings to explaining their concept of true Christianity. This article argues that these ten deists, whom I label "Jesus-centered deists", were much more religious than other deists. Like the Protestants, Catholics, and Jews that Sorkin considers part of the religious Enlightenment, these deists emphasized toleration and used reason to defend their conception of God and genuine Christianity. Furthermore, these deists participated in discussions in the public sphere about secular Enlightenment concerns. Unlike stereotypical Enlightenment deists, these Jesus-centered deists did not believe in an inactive and impersonal God. Instead, they believed in a loving and kind God who performed miracles and made revelations. They also emphasized developing a closer relationship with God through prayer. These deists should be included in the religious Enlightenment.

Many Medieval historians and archaeologists of today agree that the 5 th Century AD marks the end of a civilization and the beginning of another in the West. Few prefer instead to see a continuity and regard the Dark Ages as a period of transition. The ferocious wars fought by Rome against Attila and by Byzantium against the Goths , followed by the great Germanic invasions of the Roman West, caused such disruption of civilization, of culture, art and architecture, with widespread death and disease, that the world that emerged ad regenerated after that, between the 6 th and the 9 th Centuries, bore no relationship with the previous. Italy was repopulated by Germanic tribes and Levantine refugees from Turkey, Syria, Armenia, Egypt; Greece was invaded by Goths and then by Slavs who laid waste the whole country to the last island. The coasts of Turkey were turned into a desert of ruins while the interior was invaded by Central Asian nomads. France was invaded by various Germanic tribes in the north and by refugees from North Africa in the South; Spain was invaded by Visigoths, and other Germanic tribes along with Iranian-speaking Alans, Berbers and by tribes from Central Asia who arrived along the North African coast. Layers of sediments cover the rammed rubble of all Roman cities in the West. Splendid marble buildings in Turkey, in Greece, in Rome, in Gaul and in Britain and North Africa were largely reduced to heaps of rubble and often rammed into the ground, and in their place, wooden thatched huts were erected by mounted wandering nations whose homeland had been for centuries the grasslands of Eurasia, their house the wagon. How did the world change from the 5 th Century AD onwards? And what were the causes and nature of such change? It appears to me that Chauvinism and nationalism have blinkered the eyes of generations of historians till the end of the 20th Century and beyond. At the onset of the Third Millennium, in a much troubled world, it seems about time that we should look at some facts, and rethink history. Alexander's empire, putting into direct contact India with the Mediterranean, strengthens a cultural bridge between cities thousands of miles apart, such as Kashgar,

RESUMEN El presente trabajo se propone abordar el problema de las percepciones y repre-sentaciones, así como los matices con que ambas se recrean en el mundo interior. Por el método de una rigurosa hermenéutica se contrastan con las alucinaciones ...

This paper delves into the ethical complexities of autonomy and self-creation, focusing on the intersection of individual freedom and moral responsibility. By exploring existentialist perspectives on autonomy, particularly the works of Jean-Paul Sartre and Friedrich Nietzsche, the paper examines the challenges of living authentically in a modern world shaped by societal pressures and constraints. It addresses the ethical implications of self-creation, considering how autonomy can be reconciled with social responsibility and interdependence. Through this analysis, the paper contends that self-creation is not an individualistic pursuit, but a shared ethical responsibility that requires a balance between personal agency and collective justice. The discussion extends to the social conditions necessary for the realization of true autonomy, highlighting the importance of social justice in the ethical process of self-definition.

I received this message, and it inspired this blog post:

“Hello Damien, I’m a Spanish follower of yours. I discovered your artistic work online some time ago, and recently, I found you on “X.” First of all, I want to thank you for your amazing work and art; they have helped me a lot in understanding humanity’s past. I would like to ask you a question I’ve had for a while, and I believe you are the right person to help me solve it. Here’s the thing: I don’t understand the origin of the WHG and its relationship with Cro-Magnon. Is the WHG the evolution of Cro-Magnon? What Y-haplogroup did Cro-Magnon have? If they are not related, what is the origin of the WHG? Thank you very much in advance. Keep up the great work; you’re doing an excellent job! Greetings from the other side of the Atlantic!” – Commemtor

My response, Well, I don’t use the term “Cromagdon.” It is an outdated language from when people were not sure all humanity came from Africa or had bigoted ideas that Europeans came from Europe, not Africa. Cro-Magnons, now stated as “European early modern humans,” were the first early modern humans (Homo sapiens) to settle in Europe. I mainly use the “cultures,” such as the “Aurignacian culture,” an archaeological industry of the Upper Paleolithic associated with early European modern humans lasting from around 45,000 to 25,000 years ago. Or the “Gravettian culture,” an archaeological industry of the Upper Paleolithic associated with early European modern humans lasting from around 35,000 to 20,000 years ago.

They were an early movement of mainly Haplogroup C male DNA. Aurignacian samples are the paternal male haplogroups C1a, C1b, and K2a and female mt-DNA haplogroup M, N, R, and U. It is much more involved, and I will get to it all. The Aurignacian people with male Haplogroup C came from the Middle East through Turkey and the Balkans into France and Germany from 50,000 to 40,000 years ago. Then, a different branch and different culture, now called Gravettian culture, came from the Middle East into Siberia, then turned into East Europe and then Germany 30,000 to 25,000 years ago, male Haplogroup C but different from the Aurignacian culture branch. This was all before Western Hunter-Gatherers, who had yet a different culture and somewhat different DNA.

Western hunter-gatherers (also known as West European hunter-gatherers) date to around 15,000~5,000 years ago and are a distinct ancestral component of modern Europeans. Before them was yet another culture of Europe, Magdalenian refers to a prehistoric European cultural period and toolmaking industry that lasted from around 17,000 to 12,000 years ago. The three samples of Y-DNA included two samples of haplogroup I and one sample of HIJK. All samples of mtDNA belonged to U, including five samples of U8b and one sample of U5b. Western hunter-gatherers came in a different wave of migrations.

WHG-associated remains belonged primarily to the human Y-chromosome haplogroups I-M170 with a lower frequency of C-F3393 (specifically the clade C-V20/C1a2), which has been found commonly among earlier Paleolithic European remains such as Kostenki-14 and Sungir. Kostenki is in Russia, somewhat near the Caucasus Mountains. Sungir is in Russia, somewhat near Moscow. So, migrations from Eastern Europe have DNA similar to that of Aurignacian culture.

"One has to remember the fact that yoga occurs between jiivátmá (unit consciousness) and Paramátmá (Supreme Consciousness)", says Shrii Shrii Anandamurti. "That means, yoga is meant for theists and not for atheists. Yoga is not for people who perform worldly actions under the influence of atheism. Whatever deeds, small or big, good or bad, personal or social or national, are done by an atheist, their philosophy of life is based on atheism. That person cannot pursue the path of yoga. According to the aphorism Saḿyogo yoga ityukto jiivátmá Paramátmanah, one has to accept the reality of jiivátmá and Paramátmá. So the fact is that yoga sádhaná [yoga practice] is possible only for theists."

Liberty is Montesquieu's decisive political good, and so contemporary scholarship often debates which political path he thought best to secure it. But as for why liberty is good, most scholars leave that question unexamined. In this article I argue that Montesquieu justifies liberty and politics by a romantic hedonism, and we understand this hedonism if we compare him to the ancient hedonist he most admired, Lucretius. Uniting Montesquieu's best-known works and restoring his neglected Temple of Gnidus, this article explores the reasoning behind Montesquieu's political thought, the paradoxes that result, and a twist in Lucretius's early-modern reception.

In 1966, Richard L. Rubenstein initiated a debate about theological consequences of the Holocaust (Krawcowicz, 2015, p. 27), and particularly he raised an important question, which was “how can Jews believe in an omnipotent, beneficent God after Auschwitz?” (Rubenstein, 1981, p. 153). Subsequently, scholars explore the impact of the Holocaust on the beliefs of the survivors. The research question of this paper is what degree and why did the survivors change their faith. And the goal of this study is to provide a new insight into this topic.