VENUS'S TEMPLE: PLEASURE AND POLITICS IN MONTESQUIEU

1981

Hobbes: The knowledge of the citizen and the knowledge of the ruler 165 4. Conclusion: The dilemma of the absolutist theory of political knowledge 170 IV. THE POLITICAL EXPRESSION OF SELF: CITIZENSHIP IN THE LETTRES PERSANES 173 The conjunction of politics and history 3. Law, tradition and ideology. .

Studies in the Age of Chaucer NO. 36 , 2014

Th e conscious attention to the rhetoric of seduction in Troilus and Criseyde puts it in a tradition of erotodidactic literature going back at least as far as Ovid's amatory poetry. 1 Medieval texts such as the Facetus, Andreas Capellanus's De amore, and parts of the Roman de la rose teach an Ovidian rhetoric of seduction described as praeludia to physical acts of love. 2 Troilus and Criseyde can itself be described as an ars amandi, and was treated as such well into the sixteenth century. 3 Unlike its predecessors, Troilus and Criseyde sets this erotodidactic tradition in a more serious fictional world by personifying that tradition in the voluble Pan-

Throughout the Federalist Papers, Publius limits his use of direct references to the works of Montesquieu. When he does provide direct references (e.g., with quotes or stating his name) it is usually done so only to reply in kind to the Anti-Federalists. Publius also restricts these references to more technical issues. As Kesler explains, “Montesquieu is introduced [by Publius] only in response to the circumstances…he is not presented as an independent authority for the Constitution on his own terms” (Kesler 1987, 21). Publius’ purpose in writing the Federalist Papers is multifaceted; all at once he seeks to defend the Constitution against the Anti-Federalists’ charges, to convince the public of the urgency of ratifying the Constitution without further adjustments, to persuade his readers of the Constitution’s merits, and to cultivate a general reverence for Constitution. To accomplish this, the Constitution must be seen to stand on its own good design; its defense cannot rely too heavily on past examples or foreign standards. Publius discusses Montesquieu in a topical manner, but refers to him only as ancillary support and on isolated occasions. To be embraced as the foundation of America, the Constitution has to be viewed as entirely American. Publius, too, leading the charge of the Constitution’s defense, must present himself as quintessentially American and devotedly republican. At the helm of a uniquely public debate, Publius has to create an image of himself as both trusted citizen and erudite political pundit. He has to be seen as impervious to dangerous foreign influences, but at the same time enlightened about worldly affairs. In the Federalist Papers, he makes his knowledge of foreign nations, ancient history, and distant philosophers undeniable, but he does not allow his arguments to depend on these things alone. Even though Montesquieu is highly respected among the Anti-Federalists, Publius is cautious about openly invoking a French baron with an unapologetic monarchical bent. The war fought against the British monarchy is still fresh in Americans’ minds, and so appearing too Montesquieuian could tarnish the image of Publius as the citizen upon a hill. The minimal number of direct references, often technical in nature, may distract the reader from immediately recognizing the deeper philosophical links between the two authors. In Federalist 9, for example, Publius counters the Anti-Federalists’ frequent appeals to Montesquieu’s statement about the small size of republics by employing a different Montesquieu quote concerning the insecurity of small republics. This counter-quote, however, is merely an initial refutation of the small republic challenge; it does not comprise Publius’ full response in this debate, nor does it characterize Publius’ full understanding of Montesquieu on this point. Montesquieu’s influence on this subject is, in actuality, stronger where Publius does not cite him directly. On closer inspection, Publius’ use of direct Montesquieu references appears strategic. Even in Federalist 47, where Publius specifically references Montesquieu regarding separation of powers, Publius begins by examining the British Constitution in order to “ascertain his meaning on this point” and only subsequently addresses Montesquieu’s own words (Hamilton et al. 1999, 298). Publius then proceeds to examine the distribution of powers within the state constitutions, and comments on how these correspond to Montesquieu’s doctrine. This method of using the legal document to interpret the theory is an odd reversal of what would normally be expected, but such a strategy delicately leads the reader to consider the US Constitution first instead of Montesquieu’s own propositions. The Constitution, not an abstract theoretical doctrine, is placed as the standard, as the “mirror of political liberty,” and as the source of political principles (ibid.). In a circuitous manner, however, this strategy follows Montesquieu. If the principles of a constitution are good, he says, “liberty will appear there as in a mirror” (Montesquieu 2009, 156). “Not much trouble needs be taken to discover political liberty in the constitutions,” he adds, for “[i]f it can be seen where it is, if it has been found, why seek it?” (ibid.). Furthermore, Montesquieu does not intend his works to be interpreted as templates for constitutional designs; far from it, he seeks rather to direct the legislator’s attention to societal particulars, while always keeping a knowledge of universals. Though Publius may prudently conceal much of the footsteps in which he follows, the shared path is not as necessary to hide. Publius’ insight does not require the backing of eminent persons because his arguments reveal wisdom and prudence on their own. This allows Publius to take Montesquieu’s, and others’, teaching and form it anew in an American light. Publius, as the enlightened legislator, is a student of Montesquieu; but as the citizen lodestar, Publius offers a genius all his own. A legacy is thus established, whereby “Americans will look to the explanation of Publius, who will become our authority, even as Montesquieu was his” (Kirstol 1987, 105). Much of Publius’ success, however, must be attributed to his artful appeal and skillful persuasion, part of which rests on his literary autonomy. Obviously well-read in Montesquieu’s works, Publius could have opted to debate the Anti-Federalists on their theoretical interpretation of the philosophe (and probably could have won), yet he chooses not to refute them in this way. Instead, he entices his opponents—the misguided but “enlightened friends of liberty”—over to his side by illuminating the American Constitution as the best available means for achieving their common cause (Hamilton et al. 1999, 67).

Mnemosyne , 2019

This article examines three sections of the proem to Lucretius' De rerum natura: the so-called hymn to Venus (Lucr. 1.1-43), the praise of Epicurus (1.62-79), and the Iphigenia passage (1.80-101). The article's goal is to show that distinct, interconnected political echoes are perceptible in these three sections of Lucretius' proem, and that Lucretius intertwines his philosophical teaching with Roman political culture in such a way as to make his Epicurean message more acceptable to Roman audiences. The article demonstrates Lucretius' interaction with the use of myth in political language in Rome in the 60s and 50s bce. It analyzes the relevance of the Mithridatic wars to Roman discussions of imperialism and Lucretius' exploitation of this conflict's iconic status. This article suggests that Memmius' political action in the 60s may have made him a particularly suitable addressee for Lucretius' poem. It also explores the implications of this new reading of the proem for the date of Lucretius' De rerum natura.

This article dwells on what ways Montesquieu's transformative thought can be understood as an adaptation of Machiavelli's philosophy of aggrandizement. It turns especially on the question of ordinary acquisitiveness, which Montesquieu is glad to find flourishing in a world cured of Machiavellianism. But he is no simple Anti-Machiavel. Joining Machiavelli in excusing worldly acquisitiveness and facing its obstacles, Montesquieu departs from his predecessor on behalf of the ordinary individual whose wish to improve his lot in life the philosophe favors and whose security is among his first concerns. Beginning from Machiavelli's beginnings, Montesquieu moves from the grand acquirer to the ordinary and here takes Machiavellianism to a liberal conclusion. This is Montesquieu's (anti-)Machiavellianism.